CN114697082A - Production and application method of encryption and decryption device in server-free environment - Google Patents
Production and application method of encryption and decryption device in server-free environment Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
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Abstract
The invention provides a method for producing an encryption and decryption device in a server-free environment, which comprises the steps of placing a security chip of the encryption and decryption device in a secure intranet environment; firstly, burning a safety chip firmware, writing a program into a COS memory, and skipping the life cycle of the safety chip; step two, producing a protection key and a transmission key to take effect; step three, deriving a non-derivable confusion parameter; step four, the production tool detects whether the security chip is in a hardware initialization state, assembles a product batch mark ciphertext message by using an initialization key, assembles a final production message, issues the security chip, and writes a product batch mark; and step five, finishing the production of the safety chip. The invention has the beneficial effects that: the server is not needed to realize the services of terminal ciphertext communication, local data protection and the like, the possible influence of the server on the user service and the secret key is avoided, the level of application encryption is improved, and the safety of the user service and the data is ensured.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a production and application method of an encryption and decryption device in a server-free environment.
Background
With the continuous development of information science and intelligent terminal technology, intelligent terminals gradually become necessities of people's life and work, various application software is installed on people's intelligent terminals, various methods for acquiring user's personal data and information emerge endlessly, various hackers and terminal viruses are more and more, and people pay more and more attention to data encryption services. With the gradual maturity of encryption technology, a large number of software encryption systems and hardware encryption devices appear, and data encryption services are applied more generally, so that application data and personal data of a terminal are protected, data leakage is effectively prevented, and data security is improved.
In the prior art, when an Android mobile phone system and hardware password equipment are used, a business server and a KMS key management server are required to participate in scenes and production stages of related local encryption service, network transmission encryption service, identity authentication service and the like to complete personal business service, the server can affect the safety of business or keys, the safety of application data cannot be completely guaranteed, and potential safety hazards still exist.
Disclosure of Invention
According to the defects of the prior art, the invention designs a new scene of pure end-to-end or local encryption service use without server participation, no server participation exists in the whole encryption process, no server participation exists when hardware password equipment is produced, authorized and returned to a factory, and KEYs in different batches can not be intercommunicated, thereby ensuring the application safety, avoiding the influence of the server on the safety of services and KEYs, improving the application safety level, and meeting the requirements of the safety level of individuals and user terminals when the server is not trusted and the third-party server is in the environment, and ensuring the safety of user services. The technical scheme is as follows.
A production method of an encryption and decryption device in a server-free environment places a security chip of the encryption and decryption device in a secure intranet environment, and comprises the following steps:
firstly, burning a safety chip firmware, writing a program into a COS memory, and skipping the life cycle of the safety chip;
step two, the production protection key takes effect, the transmission key takes effect, and the two groups of keys are used for protecting the safe chip of the cryptograph safe production of the local production tool in the intranet environment;
step three, the security chip randomly generates a group of 16-byte random numbers to derive a non-derivable confusion parameter;
step four, the production tool acquires the chip life cycle ciphertext mark, detects the safety chip life cycle ciphertext mark, whether the safety chip life cycle ciphertext mark is in a hardware initialization state, uses an initialization key to assemble a product batch mark ciphertext message after detecting and confirming that the safety chip life cycle ciphertext mark is correct, uses a transmission key to calculate a ciphertext message MAC value, assembles a final production message, issues the safety chip, and writes the product batch mark;
and fifthly, the safety chip detects the ciphertext MAC, decrypts the production message, extracts the product batch message, writes the production information, performs self-check on the production algorithm and integrity, changes the life cycle to the personal information initialization state, and completes the production of the safety chip.
An application method of an encryption and decryption device in a server-free environment, comprising a first terminal and a second terminal, wherein the first terminal comprises a first security chip and a first unique identifier, the second terminal comprises a second security chip and a second unique identifier, and the application method comprises the following steps:
the first terminal assembles the first unique identifier to form a communication connection authentication message, sends the communication connection authentication message to the first security chip, the first security chip splices the first unique identifier and the second unique identifier of the second terminal to form a third unique identifier according to the first unique identifier and the second unique identifier of the second terminal, splices the product batch mark to serve as a session key root key generation source, and uses the odd-digit and even-digit exclusive or value of the SM3 value of the source as a session key root key;
the first security chip encrypts by using the session key root key, assembles and connects the authentication message derivation factor ciphertext and the residual message content, encrypts by using the derived current session key for the message key item, calculates a corresponding message by using the derived current session key, and sends the corresponding message to the first terminal;
the first terminal sends a call invitation to the second terminal and sends a connection authentication message, the second terminal receives the connection authentication message, the second security chip verifies the communication connection message and returns a connection authentication result to the second terminal, and the second terminal establishes ciphertext communication with the first terminal.
Further, the application method comprises the following steps of encrypting the local file:
when a terminal has a local data file to be encrypted, the security chip analyzes the file format, splices the SN of the local chip, the batch information of the product and the local encryption confusion parameter according to the file information of the file header, and uses the data source as the data source of the local data encryption root key, and generates the encryption key of the current file by using the odd-digit and even-digit exclusive or values of the SM3 value of the data source as the local encryption root key and using the encrypted file header as a derivation factor, and then encrypts the main content of the data file and returns the ciphertext data file to the terminal for storage.
Further, the application method also comprises the step of decrypting the encrypted file, and the steps are as follows:
when a terminal needs to decrypt a local ciphertext file, the security chip analyzes the file format after acquiring the file to be decrypted, splices encryption confusion parameters according to file information of a file header to serve as a data source of a local data encryption root key, generates an encryption key of a current file according to the encryption file header serving as a derivation factor, performs MAC (media access control) verification on the main content of the data file to obtain a plaintext data file, and returns the plaintext data file to the terminal for storage.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the problem that the server affects the safety of user services and secret keys is solved, the method is adaptive to more scenes, under the environment of a server-free scene, an untrusted server and a third-party server, the smooth completion of services such as terminal ciphertext communication, local data protection and the like is guaranteed, the possible influence of the server on the user services and the secret keys is avoided, the safety level of application encryption is improved, and the safety of the user services and data is guaranteed.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a timing diagram for secure chip production according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a timing diagram of the secure communication without server according to the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a timing diagram of data encryption storage according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a timing diagram for viewing data decryption in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The embodiments of the invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings, but the invention can be implemented in many different ways as defined and covered by the claims.
Fig. 1 shows a timing chart of the secure chip production according to an embodiment of the present invention. The production of the security chip is carried out in a secure intranet environment and comprises the following production steps.
Firstly, burning the firmware of the safety chip, writing the program into the COS memory, and skipping the life cycle of the safety chip.
And secondly, the production protection key takes effect, the transmission key takes effect, the production protection key is a 16-byte SM4 key and is used for decrypting the ciphertext production message of the production tool, the transmission key is a 16-byte SM4 key and is used for generating a MAC value of the ciphertext production message, and the two groups of keys are used for protecting the ciphertext safety production safety chip of the local production tool in the intranet environment.
And step three, each chip randomly generates a group of 16-byte random numbers and derives confusion parameters, and the confusion parameters of each piece of hardware are different and cannot be known outside or derived.
And step four, the production tool acquires the chip life cycle ciphertext mark, detects the safety chip life cycle ciphertext mark, judges whether the chip life cycle ciphertext mark is in a hardware initialization state (firmware is downloaded, COS is written in, and a product batch mark is not written in), uses an initialization KEY to assemble a product batch mark ciphertext message after detecting and confirming that the chip life cycle ciphertext mark is correct, uses a transmission KEY to calculate a ciphertext message MAC value, assembles a final production message, issues the safety chip, writes the product batch mark, has the same product batch KEY, can verify that the domain isolation effect can be achieved through end-to-end communication service, and the KEY of different batches cannot be communicated with each other.
And fifthly, the safety chip detects the ciphertext MAC, decrypts the production message, extracts the product batch message, writes the production information, then performs production algorithm and integrity self-check, changes the life cycle to the personal information initialization state, and completes the production of the safety chip.
In the above step, the hardware of the encryption and decryption apparatus includes:
an upper computer: the upper computer can be attached with a chip without limitation (a mobile phone, a card reader and the like).
And the PC is a computer provided with firmware burning software.
PC system: and is not limited.
Network environment: a secure intranet.
Fig. 2 shows a timing diagram of the server-less secure communication according to the present invention, which includes two terminals and a secure chip.
Firstly, a first terminal assembles unique identifiers such as a receiver mobile phone number, an IM call account ID and the like to form a communication connection authentication message, sends the communication connection authentication message to a first security chip, the first security chip splices the unique identifiers of a self mobile phone number and an IM call account number according to the unique identifiers such as the receiver mobile phone number and the IM call record account and splices a product batch mark to serve as a session key root key generation source, and the SM3 value odd-digit, even-digit exclusive or value of the source serves as a session root key.
Then, generating a session key derivation factor 16 byte random number, generating a session key of a current session according to the derivation factor by using a session key root key generation source, encrypting the derivation factor 16 byte random number by using the session key root key, assembling a connection authentication message derivation factor ciphertext, then assembling residual message content comprising contents such as an initiator mobile phone number, a receiver mobile phone number or an IM account ID, a service ID, a timestamp and the like, encrypting a message key item by using the derived current session key, then calculating a corresponding message MAC value by using the derived current session key, assembling a connection and IM communication connection authentication message, and sending the message to a first terminal, wherein the first terminal dials and opens a second terminal or establishes an IM communication window, and sends a connection and IM communication connection authentication message to the second terminal.
The second terminal receives the message, the second security chip verifies the communication connection message, the security chip B performs MAC verification firstly, decrypts IDs of an initiator and a receiver and compares the IDs with a local machine to detect the correctness of the communication connection message, then decrypts the service ID, executes a relevant service process, splices a mobile phone number of the second terminal and the unique identifier of an IM call account according to the unique identifier of the receiver, such as the mobile phone number, the IM call account number and the like, splices a product batch mark as a session key root key generation source, uses the odd number and the even number of the SM3 value of the source as a session root key, then uses the session key root key to decrypt a session key derivation factor 16-byte random number, generates a session key of a current session according to the derivation factor, and the second chip stores the current session key. And returning the connection authentication result to the second terminal.
The data to be sent by the first terminal is encrypted by the first security chip by using the session key of the current session, and the encrypted data is returned to the first terminal. Similarly, the second terminal also successfully completes the ciphertext communication with the first terminal.
The cipher text communication between the first terminal and the second terminal is realized, one session is encrypted, the encryption and the transfer of the server are not needed, the session root key is generated during the session establishment, only the two parties of the session can calculate, only the hardware in the domain can communicate, and the communication safety of the terminals is ensured.
When two terminals communicate ciphertext, if a third-party server transfers or is in an untrusted server environment, because the negotiation key information and the current session root key can be generated only by a unique mark of both parties of the session and a security chip in a computer in hardware, the sending data is also ciphertext data, and data such as account number plaintext, derivation factor plaintext and the like are not generated in the authentication process. Under the untrusted environment, the security of the secret key can be ensured, the data is generated as a ciphertext, and the secret key is discarded and cannot be recovered after the current session is ended.
In the embodiment of the present invention, the message of negotiating the key includes a request message and a response message, which specifically includes the following steps:
bidirectional authentication request message:
{"dataEncrypt":"FA9E2F1025B3755F231C85B1B4E4B2AF0CEC87881D8600B0AC9752069AE9E272B44B26B48C6BDEA40B6471CABE09809FE207B2F3E3FED13405EE0EFE42B04EE25CA6CFE8682A6639EC77B57196749F201E9DA469240DBB42C753BEDBF45BC86EF34065C6C11832DB5429523E23D2A3EE3BC3058C21A8566B675D688602C3CD293BC3058C21A8566B675D688602C3CD293BC3058C21A8566B675D688602C3CD293BC3058C21A8566B675D688602C3CD293BC3058C21A8566B675D688602C3CD293BC3058C21A8566B675D688602C3CD29","keyEncrypt":"04B33F18FFF6566586DFF1E8CEEE5F2500F33DB10DA6B98E6F3BFF94C44BD9C043B5D8A56180A03836553668CE3295E4B5030D9CE419BBC90CCFFDCD5550743BC71FF3058D61373624B0673E269AFA42B0726AD311B0BCA333ABE4BE62155DAC550CE00EB19FA1E6DC64071B7139C9508AED17774BC7871914B843F90867550E40","timeStamp":"1638930316250","authCode":"3045022039FD115483F40C002B6C94B658B087671ECBFEB665761752ADD9BB7D5E4881EE022100B4DACAF1038F8E2480BC175C568834511FAC8BD2FBD15B9FAE93CE4FE1253DBA"}
responding to the message:
{"dataEncrypt":"041693FC8FE08E1D9BAD38E85E898CF49EE9AFC886C8E92B1B8A29296DF886DE2464BC4C602E7A8902DA05A11C2A9FFA57CB8FED1CDB53CA9D47B2BE24E317A5FE96089CC6C064A3B9D7E185C238AB144BA37C56823F8AD471BF9572378DD2384D1040315272E0EC9ED5518CE631AE32D53BED2B551D5D44FD94A30FB4BF5CA4D53BED2B551D5D44FD94A30FB4BF5CA4D53BED2B551D5D44FD94A30FB4BF5CA4D53BED2B551D5D44FD94A30FB4BF5CA4D53BED2B551D5D44FD94A30FB4BF5CA4D53BED2B551D5D44FD94A30FB4BF5CA4","keyEncrypt":"042C1F049124F68846040423EDB737E52EAFC89B2E1D5FECBDAD00D09BE88E50C335C3B7418DC2754D0E76DD5C5412E2932028086D64826841745DEE24C96290A5EF4C4BB6E8055DF5C2E71C5DF1FD88A71E4FF84B25DCC6DA91BE3FF847AEC441753248BCB55E8C9931219EEB3EEC22F34B8B1B42CAF1FE256F52443324B3E4D8","timeStamp":"1638930316442","authCode":"3044022052D89F62769442A14B48226AB31715E5F479DB219AF901ED61C0D14B756E6E8402205B88894B7D7C5620EF2DED315B12AFD005D270024DBF7FF4A34FE349429E20A0"}
the message sent by the data includes a request message and a response message, and the specific steps are as follows:
sending a request message:
{"dataEncrypt":"268FEE93CAE508CC0B4D3A357412D2893EE764B46B8441429F5469BAEEAEC44CD24A682C58046AD4C1075B046CD285E205B080E01F07D7465133F859A5C7FE1C39186F3CBC23996F18605168B62C3D928062CA639AD820CF99F41603128346E935E108C60818B9FB246736E0EAA43B8197C06519D1A6E021CFC1E2719DCB5AC497C06519D1A6E021CFC1E2719DCB5AC497C06519D1A6E021CFC1E2719DCB5AC497C06519D1A6E021CFC1E2719DCB5AC497C06519D1A6E021CFC1E2719DCB5AC497C06519D1A6E021CFC1E2719DCB5AC4","keyEncrypt":"041734B0BEAE23DB685E007ECFC7C4FE88862FC1C8DD221C7084B32F3184D665E39CCF426CCDF8DF380736AF444FDBDDFAECC87A30A6E48949B75AB63BE09ED3F2DEAE6CEE5FB18796E527B5C15CE8C86B76C4B563968D948A66F05703E2AF8DFDA73390FBD50B0FF3B8B2C18C0265D07A61781D68DE626370F8B82DECE69FF334","timeStamp":"1638929258371","authCode":"304402203DF1225542E99857608100B6E7961DD53AE1D7C3FAA77F30193CFBEC8AC8B07A022030557F574C169079543CA177351005F9DAE312942E3387B15EA707B6A796E25D"}
responding to the message:
{ msg ═ success, code ═ 0,
data={"dataEncrypt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keyEncrypt":"049E2BB98A22E78C79241B29E36C350F496D4CB1A5A874A4A418A67CE59C1CD81A78460BA8CEEA546FC8D633BFE24472D437431796E4145E8F6730CC1326854A55D457D3B8AD9D1DB881E7F284BC28FB4E99D49EFAD8248A7026D3E5619EEB5CCCC73931E361A4BF4AB6FB1A271BC6CCC68FB8569E3FD1BBE02B997C6764BDCE83","timeStamp":1638929258603,"authCode":"3046022100CC0148AF09F2395BF658E6F5E4482D1EA2F67C539121EB953FC34935DE06BF52022100FC0523300341EC70B568C2A748B459C29D119C5}}
fig. 3 shows a timing chart of the data encryption storage according to the present invention, which is a kind of protection for local data without service.
When a local data file to be encrypted at a terminal is to be encrypted, the security chip analyzes the file format, according to file information of a file header, the local chip SN, product batch information and local encryption confusion parameters are spliced to serve as a data source of a local data encryption root key, an odd-digit, even-digit or value of a data source SM3 value is used as the local encryption root key, an encryption key of a current file is generated according to the encryption file header as a derivation factor, then the main content of the data file is encrypted, the file header is kept unchanged, the file format is ensured not to be changed, but content ciphertext is displayed, an MAC value is calculated by adding the current file encryption key to verify data, the local ciphertext data file is returned to the terminal, and the terminal ciphertext stores the local data file.
Different files have different data types, and different file headers ensure that 'one data and one key store one confusion parameter by hardware', the confusion parameter cannot be exported and is unique, the hardware cannot be recovered after being lost, the encrypted data of the local computer cannot be recovered after being separated from the hardware, no server participates, the key parameter cannot be backed up and exported, the safety of the data is ensured, and the safety level of the data is improved.
Fig. 4 shows a timing chart of data decryption viewing according to the present invention.
When a terminal needs to decrypt a local ciphertext file, after the security chip acquires the file to be decrypted, the file format is analyzed, according to file information of a file header, the SN (local chip), the batch information of a product and the local encryption confusion parameter are spliced to serve as a data source of a local data encryption root key, the value of the SM3 of the data source is used as the local encryption root key, an encryption key of a current file is generated by taking the encryption file header as a derivative factor, then MAC (media access control) verification is carried out on the main content of the data file, the file header is kept unchanged, the file format is ensured not to be changed, a content ciphertext is decrypted to obtain a plaintext data file, then the local data file is returned to the terminal, and the terminal stores the local plaintext data file.
The technical scheme is an innovation on the prior art, the prior art needs the participation of a server in the encryption service process of application, the invention designs a new pure end-to-end or local encryption service use scene without any server participation, the whole encryption service process has no server participation, the influence of the server on the service and the key safety is avoided, the application encryption safety is improved, the user service safety is ensured, and the requirements of individual and user terminal safety grade are met when the server and a third party server are in an untrusted environment, and the terminal information safety is ensured.
The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and changes will occur to those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A production method of an encryption and decryption device in a server-free environment is characterized in that a security chip of the encryption and decryption device is placed in a secure intranet environment, and the production method comprises the following steps:
firstly, burning a safety chip firmware, writing a program into a COS memory, and skipping the life cycle of the safety chip;
step two, the production protection key takes effect, the transmission key takes effect, and the two groups of keys are used for producing the safety chip by the local production tool under the safety intranet environment;
step three, the security chip randomly generates a group of 16-byte random numbers to derive a non-derivable confusion parameter;
step four, the production tool acquires the chip life cycle ciphertext mark, detects the safety chip life cycle ciphertext mark, whether the safety chip life cycle ciphertext mark is in a hardware initialization state, uses an initialization key to assemble a product batch mark ciphertext message after detecting and confirming that the safety chip life cycle ciphertext mark is correct, uses a transmission key to calculate a ciphertext message MAC value, assembles a final production message, issues the safety chip, and writes the product batch mark;
and fifthly, the safety chip detects the ciphertext MAC, decrypts the production message, extracts the product batch mark, writes production information, performs production algorithm and integrity self-check, changes the life cycle to the personal information initialization state, and completes the production of the safety chip.
2. The production method of claim 1, wherein the production protection key is a 16-byte SM4 key for production tool ciphertext production message decryption.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the transport key is a 16-byte SM4 key used to generate the ciphertext production message MAC value.
4. An application method of an encryption and decryption apparatus in a serverless environment, wherein a first terminal and a second terminal having a secure chip are configured, the first terminal has a first secure chip and a first unique identifier, the second terminal has a second secure chip and a second unique identifier, wherein:
the first terminal assembles the first unique identifier to form a communication connection authentication message, and sends the communication connection authentication message to the first security chip, the first security chip splices the first unique identifier and the second unique identifier of the second terminal to form a third unique identifier and a spliced product batch mark according to the first unique identifier and the second unique identifier of the second terminal, the third unique identifier and the spliced product batch mark are used as a session key root key generation source, and the SM3 value odd-digit and even-digit exclusive or values of the session key root key generation source are used as a session key root key;
the first security chip encrypts by using the session key root key, assembles and connects the authentication message derivation factor ciphertext and the residual message content, encrypts by using the derived current session key for the message key item, calculates a corresponding message by using the derived current session key, and sends the corresponding message to the first terminal;
the first terminal sends a call invitation to the second terminal and sends a connection authentication message, the second terminal receives the connection authentication message, the second security chip verifies the communication connection message and returns a connection authentication result to the second terminal, and the second terminal establishes ciphertext communication with the first terminal.
5. The application method according to claim 4, wherein the application method comprises a method for verifying that the communication connection message produces the current session key by the second security chip, and the method comprises the following steps:
the second security chip carries out MAC verification, decrypts the ID of the initiator and the ID of the receiver and compares the ID with the local machine to detect the correctness of the communication connection message, then decrypts the service ID and executes the relevant service flow;
splicing the first unique identifier and the second unique identifier to form a fourth unique identifier, and splicing the product batch mark to be used as a session key root key generation source;
and decrypting the session key by using the session key root key to serve as a derivative factor of the 16-byte random number, generating the session key of the current session according to the derivative factor, and storing the current session key by the second security chip.
6. The application method according to claim 4, wherein the application method comprises a method for encrypting a local file by the encryption and decryption device, and the method comprises the following steps:
when a local data file to be encrypted at a terminal is to be encrypted, the security chip analyzes the file format, splices the SN (local chip), the batch information of the product and the local encryption confusion parameter according to the file information of a file header, and uses the SN (local chip) as a data source of a local data encryption root key, and generates an encryption key of a current file by using the odd-digit and even-digit exclusive or values of the SM3 value of the data source as the local encryption root key and using the encrypted file header as a derivation factor, then encrypts the main content of the data file, and returns a ciphertext data file to the terminal for storage.
7. The application method according to claim 4, wherein the application method comprises a method for decrypting the encrypted file by the encryption and decryption device, and the method comprises the following steps:
when a terminal needs to decrypt a local ciphertext file, the security chip analyzes the file format after acquiring the file to be decrypted, splices encryption confusion parameters according to file information of a file header to serve as a data source of a local data encryption root key, generates an encryption key of a current file according to the encryption file header serving as a derivation factor, performs MAC (media access control) verification on the main content of the data file to obtain a plaintext data file, and returns the plaintext data file to the terminal for storage.
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