CN114697030A - Data verification method for multi-party secure computing participant - Google Patents

Data verification method for multi-party secure computing participant Download PDF

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CN114697030A
CN114697030A CN202210609713.2A CN202210609713A CN114697030A CN 114697030 A CN114697030 A CN 114697030A CN 202210609713 A CN202210609713 A CN 202210609713A CN 114697030 A CN114697030 A CN 114697030A
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data
participant
participants
verification
sharing
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CN114697030B (en
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刘文博
冯黎明
马煜翔
刑冰
刘洋
王玥
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Lanxiang Zhilian Hangzhou Technology Co ltd
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Lanxiang Zhilian Hangzhou Technology Co ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/46Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem

Abstract

The invention discloses a data verification method for a multi-party secure computation participant, which comprises the following steps: after each participant encrypts the private data according to a preset encryption method, sharing the encryption result to other participants except the participant; each participant determines data sharing certification information according to the encryption result and a predetermined data verification protocol; the data verification method of the multi-party secure computation participants determines the authenticity of private data used by each participant based on the data sharing certification information and verification operation, shares the private data after data splitting, requires each participant to compute the data through a common protocol to obtain a certification result, and verifies the certification result to obtain the participation computation behavior of each participant and the authenticity of the data, so that the data of each participant is effectively protected, and the computation result is prevented from being influenced by false computation of the participants.

Description

Data verification method for multi-party secure computing participant
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of data sharing, in particular to a data verification method for a multi-party secure computing participant.
Background
The multi-party secure computing technology is a computing technology which is participated by a plurality of participants, data is dispersed on the hands of the participants to carry out computation together, and the multi-party secure computing technology is characterized in that each participant does not know the data participating in the computation (except knowing own data), and intermediate results of the secure multi-party computation are all cryptographs which cannot be interpreted. The secure multi-party calculation can ensure that the local data is not interpreted by other parties but can enjoy the result of the final calculation.
If all participants are valid following the secure multiparty computation process, the entire process will be secure and valid. However, if a participant does not actually participate in the calculation, but instead generates a random number to participate in the calculation at a time, the more participants, the less noticeable such "burdening" the participant may be. And the result of the secure multi-party calculation is usually a plaintext only among the members, which keeps the security from the outside, and the more the participants are, the smaller the influence of the input of the random number on the obtained result is. When the participators are expanded enough, the counterfeiters can enjoy the calculation result in vain without paying any knowledge, data or even calculation power, and the users are worried.
If this is more and more the calculation results of the whole system will be affected and the calculation results will become meaningless. Therefore, in order to avoid the phenomenon, all the participants are guaranteed to provide effective data to participate in calculation according to the rule, and the scheme of the application is further provided.
Based on the discrete logarithm problem, which is a mathematical problem in NP, if for an integer b and an primitive root a of a prime d, a unique exponent e can be found, such that b = ae(mod d), then the exponent e is referred to as the discrete logarithm of the base a modulo d of b.
The scheme designs the proof by using the discrete logarithm problem, a plurality of zero knowledge proofs are designed based on the scheme, the most famous is a fiat-shamir zero knowledge proof scheme, the scheme uses the discrete logarithm problem as the basis of the scheme, the most important proof scheme is to proof the whole calculation process (four arithmetic operations) and not to proof and store the result. The scheme is more important to judge whether the final result is credible according to whether the calculation process conforms to the protocol. Since in the ciphertext space, we need a method to verify correctness in the ciphertext space, and most of the current technologies, such as block chaining, perform proof tracing in the plaintext space.
Disclosure of Invention
The application mainly aims to provide a data verification method for a multi-party secure computation participant, so as to solve the problem that the participant is difficult to be found because the participant provides false data for adding computation and obtains data of other participants in the related technology, and solve the problems of overlong verification time and low efficiency of a verification means in the prior art.
In order to achieve the above object, the present application provides a data verification method for multiple parties of secure computing, the method applying multiple parties, the method comprising the following steps:
after each participant encrypts the private data according to a preset encryption method, sharing the encryption result to other participants except the participant;
each participant determines data sharing certification information according to the encryption result and a predetermined data verification protocol;
and determining the authenticity of the private data used by each participant based on the data sharing certification information and the verification operation.
Further, the method for encrypting the private data by each participant according to the preset encryption method comprises the following steps:
each participant respectively obtains a plurality of different random numbers;
and splitting the private data according to a plurality of random numbers to obtain encrypted data.
Further, the method for each participant to respectively obtain a plurality of different random numbers comprises the following steps:
each participant numbers all participants including the participant;
acquiring the total number of participants, and generating a plurality of random numbers according to the total number of the participants;
the total number of random numbers is at least one item greater than the total number of participants.
Further, the method for splitting the private data according to the plurality of random numbers comprises the following steps:
the privacy data are split according to the random numbers, and the numerical values of all items except one item are ensured to be matched with the random numbers one by one;
and simultaneously, the number of the split items of the privacy data is equal to the total number of the participants, and all the encrypted data are numbered after the splitting is finished.
Further, the method for sharing the encryption result to other parties except the party comprises the following steps:
each participant acquires the serial number of the participant before sending the encrypted data;
and reserving the encrypted data with the same number as the participant, and sending the encrypted data with other numbers to the participant with the number.
Further, the method for determining the data sharing certification information by each participant according to the encryption result and a predetermined data verification protocol comprises the following steps:
after receiving the encrypted data, each participant calculates the obtained encrypted data according to the number and the private data of the participant according to a data verification protocol to obtain data sharing certification information;
during operation, the private data with the own number is not calculated.
Further, the data validation protocol includes performing one or more of an addition operation, a subtraction operation, a multiplication operation, and a division operation on the data.
Further, the method for calculating the data sharing certification information further includes the following steps:
performing modular operation on an operation result obtained by calculation of a data verification protocol and a pre-disclosed prime number, and constructing and obtaining certification data through a disclosed construction function;
and carrying out public sharing by taking the operation result and the certification data as data sharing certification information.
Further, the verifying operation includes:
carrying out modulo operation on the operation result disclosed by each participant and the prime number;
inputting a result obtained by the modular operation into the constructor to obtain verification information;
the authentication information is compared with the certification data published by each participant to determine the authenticity of the private data used by each participant.
Further, the verification comprises instant verification and delayed verification;
the instant verification is to verify the certificates sent by all the participants immediately after the operation is finished;
the deferred verification is the verification returned within a period of time after the operation is finished.
The invention has the advantages that: according to the data verification method for the multi-party secure computing participants, data are split and then shared, a common protocol is used for operation to obtain data certification results of all the participants, and the participants verify the certification results to obtain the authenticity of the data of the participants, so that the data of all the participants are effectively protected, and false data are prevented from affecting the computing results.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a data verification method of a multi-party secure computing participant according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a method for encrypting and sharing private data according to the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating a method of verification operation according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the technical means, the creation characteristics, the achievement purposes and the effects of the invention easy to understand, the invention is further described with the specific embodiments.
In the description of the present invention, it is to be understood that the terms "center", "longitudinal", "lateral", "up", "down", "front", "back", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", and the like, indicate orientations or positional relationships based on those shown in the drawings, and are used only for convenience in describing the present invention and for simplicity in description, and do not indicate or imply that the referenced devices or elements must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and thus, are not to be construed as limiting the present invention. Furthermore, the terms "first", "second", etc. are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first," "second," etc. may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature. In the description of the present invention, "a plurality" means two or more unless otherwise specified.
In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified or limited, the terms "mounted," "connected," and "connected" are to be construed broadly, e.g., as meaning either a fixed connection, a removable connection, or an integral connection; can be mechanically or electrically connected; they may be connected directly or indirectly through intervening media, or they may be interconnected between two elements. The specific meaning of the above terms in the present invention can be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art through specific situations.
Fig. 1 schematically illustrates a data verification method for a multi-party secure computing participant according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the method applies multiple participants, and as shown in fig. 1, the method includes the following steps:
s1: after encrypting the private data according to a preset encryption method, each participant shares the encryption result to other participants except the participant;
fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a method for encrypting and sharing private data according to the present invention, as shown in fig. 2, the method includes the following steps:
s101: each participant respectively obtains a plurality of different random numbers;
s102: before generating random numbers, firstly acquiring the total number of participants, and generating a plurality of random numbers according to the total number of the participants;
the total number of random numbers is at least one item greater than the total number of participants;
e.g. when the total number of participants istTime, gett-1 random number, numbered:r 2 -r t
s103: each participant numbers all participants including the participant;
following the example, all participants are included from 1 totNumbering, wherein the numbering of the user is avoided from occurring at the head and the tail as much as possible;
s104: splitting the privacy data according to a plurality of random numbers to ensure that the numerical values of all items except one item are matched with the random numbers one by one;
it is also understood that the remaining part of the sum of the private data minus the random number is taken as one item, and the numerical values of the other items are taken as the random number;
s105: meanwhile, the number of split items of the private data is equal to the total number of the participants, and all encrypted data are numbered after the splitting is finished;
in the above example, the private data w is split into t parts:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
ensure in addition tow 1Besides, othersw 2 -w t Numerical value of andr 2 -r t are equal, i.e. satisfy:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
the method for sharing the encryption result to other participants except the user comprises the following steps:
s106: each participant acquires the serial number of the participant before sending the encrypted data;
s107: the encrypted data with the same number as the participant is reserved, and the encrypted data with other numbers are sent to the participant with the number;
e.g. the participating partiesmBefore sending the encrypted data, acquiring the number of the corresponding participant asnTherefore, it is necessary to convert the datam=m 1 +...+m n-1+m n+m n+1 +...+m tTo (1)nItem datam nHold, the data (a)m 1 ,...m n-1,m n+1 ,...m t) Sent to the participantsn,So that all the participants get the information aboutmSecret sharing of
S2: each participant determines data sharing certification information according to the encryption result and a predetermined data verification protocol;
after each participant receives the encrypted data, the obtained encrypted data and the private data of the participant are operated according to the serial number and the data verification protocol to obtain data sharing certification information;
during operation, the private data with the own number is not calculated;
assume that this is numbered asjA plurality of;
the present party encrypts data asy[t]={y 1,...y j-1 ,y j,y j+1 ,...y t},
The data of other participants is obtained asx[t-1]={x 1,...x j-1,x j+1 ,...x t};
Omitting the present datay j To obtainy[t-1]={y 1,...y j-1 ,y j+1 ,...y t};
If the number of the local side is 11, the received encrypted data of the other participants does not contain the data of the 11 th item, but the private data of the local side contains the data of the 11 th item, so that when the operation is performed according to the items, after the data of the 10 th item is calculated, the data of the 12 th item is directly calculated, and the data of the 11 th item of the local side is skipped;
performing modular operation on an operation result obtained by calculation of a data verification protocol and a pre-disclosed prime number, and constructing and obtaining certification data through a disclosed construction function;
the adopted data verification protocol comprises the steps of performing addition operation, subtraction operation, multiplication operation and division operation on data, selecting one, two or three of four operations after each participant makes an appointment according to the operation requirement, and definitely, when the operation types are more, the proved result is more accurate, and when the operation is less, the required operation time and the occupied memory space are less;
the encrypted data of the present embodiment is assumed to be:y[t-1]={y 1,...y t};
the data of the other participants obtained are:x[t-1]={x 1,...x t};
disclosed as being primeqBase numbers disclosed are g;
when the data verification protocol is an addition operation: (x + y)i=x i +y i
Figure 668392DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
The operation result is ANDed withqPerforming mod operation;
for thex iy iThe following proves:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
mod q;
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
mod q;
the result obtained by the addition operation is passed
Figure 552909DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
mod q、
Figure 67067DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
mod q and
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
to construct
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
When the data validation protocol is a subtraction operation: (x-y)i=x i - y i
Figure 665539DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
For thex iy iThe following proves:
Figure 479911DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
mod q;
Figure 36795DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
mod q;
the result obtained by the subtraction is passed
Figure 38249DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
mod q、
Figure 971570DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
mod q and is
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
To construct
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
When the data validation protocol is a multiplication operation: (x y)i =
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
Figure 843711DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
The above secret calculation results in the corresponding four arithmetic operations being performed also for the plaintext. When a participant has all secret shares, e.g., (x + y) is owned by one participant1
Performing mod operation on the operation result and q;
proof of the results obtained for the multiplication:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
mod q;
since the multiplication cannot pass
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
Construction, so sharing needs to be performed separately;
for any functionfx i ) A certificate will be output:Prvfx i )=res)=P;
i.e. for arbitraryfx) All can be based on
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
Structure certification;
for example, calculate
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
Can be converted into:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
mod q;
outputting the result as a proof P after the operation is finished;
proof of sharding requires making any one of the parties involved in secure computations
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
Can construct corresponding proofs
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
mod q;
The function may be based onxDirectly find outf(x)But are known in the artyCannot reversely findxAnd the function can quickly construct a corresponding plaintext function through the ciphertext, namely, the function passes through the ciphertext
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Can constructD x(DReal number) corresponding ciphertext;
the operation result and the certification data are used as data sharing certification information to carry out public sharing;
s3: determining the authenticity of the private data used by each participant based on the data sharing certification information and verification operation;
fig. 3 is a schematic flow chart of a method for verifying operation in the present invention, as shown in fig. 3, the method includes the following steps:
s301: carrying out modulo operation on the operation result disclosed by each participant and the prime number;
s302: inputting a result obtained by the modular operation into the constructor to obtain verification information;
s303: comparing the verification information with the certification data disclosed by each participant to determine the authenticity of the private data used by each participant;
at the time of verification:
the proving party obtaining disclosure
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
And
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
(ii) a Where f (.) is a published polynomial, the participant's protocol is to jointly compute the polynomial;
then according to
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
Information of and
Figure 679817DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
construct out
Figure 168567DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
And checking whether the self-constructed and the proving party send the same;
if equal, the sender can be proved to be actually calculated according to the protocol requirement
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
The calculation result shows that the participant uses real data to participate in calculation instead of the random number;
if the result is not true, the whole system is stopped, an error is thrown out, the calculation of the last time for verifying the result of the participant is required to be traced back, all previous calculation results are stored, and the whole system is terminated;
the verification comprises instant verification and delayed verification;
the instant verification is to verify the certificates sent by all the participants immediately after the operation is finished;
the deferred verification is the verification returned within a period of time after the operation is finished.
By adopting the method, the processes of construction certification and verification are more convenient and only need to be based onf(x)Construct out
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
And then comparing. And the scheme only requires for part of calculation results to prove, so that the calculation power can be saved, and a large amount of storage space can be saved.
Based on the above, in the multi-party secure computation process, the more the participants are, the more the data errors of a single party will have little influence on the whole, so that there may be a possibility that the participants adopt a 'false participation means' for the purpose of saving their own computing resources and protecting their own data, wherein the 'false participation means' is adopted for these purposes, i.e. the result output by the computation is a random number instead of adopting their real data in order to prevent the participants from 'false participation', and a proving process is added in the privacy computation to prove that the result computed and output by themselves is obtained by the computation of the present party;
meanwhile, the calculation efficiency of the proving step is lower than that of multi-party safe calculation, in order to prevent the calculation from being turned upside down, namely, the verification time is longer than the calculation time, the efficiency problem is considered, only partial data is used, each party proved by zero knowledge is strictly only partially trusted, but the verification probability can be ignored each time in the process of calculating for many times.
As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
While preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, additional variations and modifications in those embodiments may occur to those skilled in the art once they learn of the basic inventive concepts. Therefore, it is intended that the appended claims be interpreted as including preferred embodiments and all such alterations and modifications as fall within the scope of the invention.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application, and various modifications and changes may be made by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims (8)

1. A data validation method for multiple parties involved in secure computing, the method employing multiple parties, comprising the steps of:
after encrypting the private data according to a preset encryption method, each participant shares the encryption result to other participants except the participant, wherein the encryption method comprises the following steps: each participant respectively obtains a plurality of different random numbers; splitting the private data according to a plurality of random numbers to obtain encrypted data;
each participant determines data sharing certification information according to the encryption result and a predetermined data verification protocol, wherein the method for determining the data sharing certification information comprises the following steps: after each participant receives the encrypted data; calculating the obtained encrypted data and the private data of the user according to the serial number and a data verification protocol to obtain data sharing certification information; during operation, the private data with the own number is not calculated;
and determining the authenticity of the private data used by each participant based on the data sharing certification information and the verification operation.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: the method for each participant to respectively obtain a plurality of different random numbers comprises the following steps:
each participant numbers all participants including the participant;
acquiring the total number of participants, and generating a plurality of random numbers according to the total number of the participants;
the total number of random numbers is at least one item greater than the total number of participants.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the data validation method for the multi-party secure computing participants is as follows: the method for splitting the privacy data according to a plurality of random numbers comprises the following steps:
the privacy data are split according to the random numbers, and the numerical values of all items except one item are ensured to be matched with the random numbers one by one;
and simultaneously, the number of the split items of the privacy data is equal to the total number of the participants, and all the encrypted data are numbered after the splitting is finished.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the data validation method for the multi-party secure computing participants is as follows: the method for sharing the encryption result to other participants except the user comprises the following steps:
each participant acquires the serial number of the participant before sending the encrypted data;
and reserving the encrypted data with the same number as the participant, and sending the encrypted data with other numbers to the participant with the number.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the data validation method for the multi-party secure computing participants is as follows: the data validation protocol includes performing one or more of an addition operation, a subtraction operation, a multiplication operation, and a division operation on the data.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the data validation method for the multi-party secure computing participants comprises: the calculation method of the data sharing certification information further comprises the following steps:
performing modular operation on an operation result obtained by calculation of a data verification protocol and a pre-disclosed prime number, and constructing and obtaining certification data through a disclosed construction function;
and carrying out public sharing by taking the operation result and the certification data as data sharing certification information.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the data validation method for the multi-party secure computing participants comprises: the verification operation includes:
carrying out modulo operation on the operation result disclosed by each participant and the prime number;
inputting a result obtained by the modular operation into the constructor to obtain verification information;
the authentication information is compared with the certification data published by each participant to determine the authenticity of the private data used by each participant.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the data validation method for the multi-party secure computing participants comprises: the verification comprises instant verification and delayed verification;
the instant verification is to verify the certificates sent by all the participants immediately after the operation is finished;
the deferred verification is the verification returned within a period of time after the operation is finished.
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