CN114679281B - RSA-based joint signature generation method and apparatus - Google Patents

RSA-based joint signature generation method and apparatus Download PDF

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Publication number
CN114679281B
CN114679281B CN202210255511.2A CN202210255511A CN114679281B CN 114679281 B CN114679281 B CN 114679281B CN 202210255511 A CN202210255511 A CN 202210255511A CN 114679281 B CN114679281 B CN 114679281B
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modulus
signature
target
key
joint
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CN114679281A (en
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王亚伟
王磊
夏德胜
孙博文
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Beijing Hongsi Electronic Technology Co ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3249—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The embodiment of the application discloses a joint signature generation method and a device based on RSA, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the first device generates a key element, wherein the key element comprises a first modulus, a first modulus inverse element and an integer agreed by the first device and the second device; the first equipment receives a second modulus sent by the second equipment, and calculates and obtains a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule; the first device encapsulates the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulus to generate a first private key; the first device signs the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using a first private key to obtain a first signature; the first equipment receives a second signature sent by the second equipment and judges whether the length of the second signature is smaller than a target modulus; if the value is smaller than the first modulus inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and the second operation rule are calculated to obtain the combined signature. The method ensures the security and reliability of the combined signature.

Description

RSA-based joint signature generation method and apparatus
Technical Field
The application relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a RSA-based joint signature generation method and device.
Background
In the field of information security, more usage scenarios exist, and both devices need to perform joint signature to push a service to be performed. The existing joint signature method always has the transmission of sensitive information such as a private key and the like, and further causes a security problem, so that a scheme for realizing joint signature on the premise of not revealing any sensitive information is needed to be provided, so that the security and the reliability of the joint signature are ensured.
Disclosure of Invention
The embodiment of the application provides a joint signature generation method and device based on RSA. The technical scheme is as follows:
in a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a RSA-based joint signature generation method, where the method includes:
the key generation process comprises the following steps:
generating a key element by first equipment, wherein the key element comprises a first modulus, a first modulo reverse element and an integer agreed by the first equipment and second equipment;
the first device receives a second modulus sent by the second device, and calculates and obtains a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule;
the first device encapsulates the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulus to generate a first private key;
a joint signature generation process comprising the steps of:
the first device signs the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using the first private key to obtain a first signature;
the first device receives a second signature sent by the second device and judges whether the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, wherein the second signature is obtained by signing a hash value of plaintext information to be signed by the second device by using a second private key generated by the second device, and the second private key is obtained by packaging a second modulo inverse element generated by the second device and the target modulus;
and if the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, calculating according to the first modulus inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and a second operation rule to obtain a joint signature.
In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an RSA-based joint signature generation apparatus, where the apparatus includes a key generation module and a joint signature generation module, where:
the key generation module comprises the following units:
a key element generating unit, configured to generate a key element, where the key element includes a first modulus, a first modulo inverse element, and an integer agreed by the first device and the second device;
the target modulus calculation unit is used for receiving the second modulus sent by the second equipment and calculating to obtain a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule;
a private key generation unit, configured to encapsulate the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulus, and generate a first private key;
the joint signature generation module comprises the following units:
a first signature obtaining unit, configured to sign a hash value of plaintext information to be signed by using the first private key, to obtain a first signature;
the signature length judging unit is used for receiving a second signature sent by the second device and judging whether the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, wherein the second signature is obtained by the second device by signing the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using a second private key generated by the second device, and the second private key is obtained by packaging a second modulo inverse element generated by the second device and the target modulus;
and the joint signature calculation unit is used for calculating and obtaining the joint signature according to the first modulo-inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and a second operation rule if the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus.
In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which when executed by a processor performs the steps of the method of the first aspect described above.
In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, where the processor executes the program to implement the steps of the method described in the first aspect.
The technical scheme provided by the embodiments of the application has the beneficial effects that at least:
the application provides a scheme that two parties of equipment can finish a complete RSA signature together without transmitting any sensitive information, which is realized by the following steps: the first device obtains a new modulus based on the modulus generated by the first device and the modulus generated by the second device, generates a new key based on the new modulus, and realizes the joint signature through the new key. The method ensures the security and reliability of the combined signature.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are required in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described, it being obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the application, and that other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a joint signature generation method based on RSA according to an embodiment of the present application;
FIGS. 2-4 are schematic flow diagrams of a RSA-based joint signature generation method according to an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a joint signature generating device based on RSA according to an embodiment of the present application.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application will be given with reference to the accompanying drawings.
When the following description refers to the accompanying drawings, the same numbers in different drawings refer to the same or similar elements, unless otherwise indicated. The implementations described in the following exemplary examples do not represent all implementations consistent with the application. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatus and methods consistent with certain aspects of the application as detailed in the accompanying claims.
In the description of the present application, it should be understood that the terms "first," "second," and the like are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance. The specific meaning of the above terms in the present application will be understood in specific cases by those of ordinary skill in the art. Furthermore, in the description of the present application, unless otherwise indicated, "a plurality" means two or more. "and/or", describes an association relationship of an association object, and indicates that there may be three relationships, for example, a and/or B, and may indicate: a exists alone, A and B exist together, and B exists alone. The character "/" generally indicates that the context-dependent object is an "or" relationship.
The following describes in detail the RSA-based joint signature generation method according to the embodiment of the present application with reference to fig. 1 to fig. 4.
Referring to fig. 1, a flowchart of an RSA-based joint signature generation method according to an embodiment of the present application is shown.
As shown in fig. 1, the method according to the embodiment of the present application may include two processes:
the first process is a key generation process, comprising the steps of:
step S1: the first device generates a key element comprising a first modulus, a first modulo inverse element, and an integer agreed by the first device with the second device.
In the present application, the first device and the second device may be any devices that need to generate a joint signature.
For example, the first device may be a certificate authority device and the second device may be a user terminal; alternatively, the first device and the second device are both user terminals.
It is noted that the first device generates a first modulus that is different from the second device generates a second modulus, and the first device generates a first modulo-inverse element that is different from the second device generates a second modulo-inverse element.
Step S2: the first device receives a second modulus sent by the second device, and calculates and obtains a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and the first operation rule.
Specifically, the target modulus=the first modulus×the second modulus.
In a possible embodiment, the first device may obtain the second modulus by sending a second modulus obtaining instruction to the second device, or may actively send the second modulus to the first device when the second device determines that the environment where the second device is currently located is safe, where, of course, the two devices may also receive/send the second modulus based on a certain convention.
Step S3: the first device encapsulates the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulo to generate a first private key.
The second process is a joint signature generation process, comprising the steps of:
step S4: the first device signs the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using the first private key, and obtains a first signature.
The hash value of the plaintext information to be signed is obtained by indicating that the plaintext information is filled according to a specified format after hash operation.
In the application, the two devices for carrying out the joint signature can simultaneously possess the plaintext information to be signed, or only one device can possess the plaintext information to be signed, wherein the device possessing the plaintext information to be signed can generate the plaintext information to be signed by itself, or can receive the plaintext information to be signed sent by a server or other terminals.
In the latter case, when the device of one party possessing the plaintext information to be signed determines that the current environment is safe, the plaintext information or the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed can be actively sent to the device of the other party; or, the device having the plaintext information to be signed may send the plaintext information or the hash value of the plaintext information to the other device after receiving the plaintext information acquisition instruction or the hash value acquisition instruction of the plaintext information to be signed sent by the other device.
Step S5: the first device receives a second signature sent by the second device and determines whether the length of the second signature is less than a target modulus.
The second signature is generated as follows:
the second device generates a second modulus and a second modulus inverse element, acquires a first modulus from the first device, multiplies the acquired first modulus with a second modulus generated by the second device to obtain a target modulus, and encapsulates the second modulus inverse element and the target modulus to generate a second private key.
The second device performs hash operation on the plaintext information to be signed and fills the plaintext information according to a specified format to obtain a hash value of the plaintext information to be signed, and signs the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using a second private key to obtain a second signature.
In the same way as in step S4, the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed used by the second device may be generated by itself through an operation, or may be obtained from a server or other terminals.
When the second device determines that the environment is safe, the generated second signature can be actively sent to the first device, or after receiving a second signature acquisition instruction sent by the first device, the second signature can be sent out. In practical applications, it may be the case that how the second signature is transmitted/received, and this is not described here.
Step S6: if the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, the combined signature is obtained through calculation according to the first modulus inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and the second operation rule.
In the application, the joint signature generated by the first equipment and the second equipment together is a complete RSA signature, and the legitimacy of the signature can be verified by a complete public key generated by integer and target modulus encapsulation. The commonly generated joint signature is a complete signature obtained by a certain operation process after a part of signatures are generated by the two parties respectively.
When any one of the first device and the second device signs by using the private key generated by the first device and the second device, the generated signature is not a complete signature, so that the validity of the incomplete signature cannot be verified by the complete public key.
The application provides a scheme that two parties of equipment can finish a complete RSA signature together without transmitting any sensitive information, which is realized by the following steps: the first device obtains a new modulus based on the modulus generated by the first device and the modulus generated by the second device, generates a new key based on the new modulus, and realizes the joint signature through the new key. The method ensures the security and reliability of the combined signature.
Fig. 2 to fig. 4 are schematic flow diagrams of a RSA-based joint signature generation method according to an embodiment of the present application.
As shown in fig. 2-4, the method of the application embodiment may include three processes:
the first process is a key generation process, comprising the steps of:
step S11: the first device generates a key element comprising a first modulus, a first modulo inverse element, and an integer agreed by the first device with the second device.
The first device randomly selects two prime numbers p 1 、q 1 And calculates a first modulus N based on the selected prime numbers 1 ，N 1 Examples are:
BB7D4A0D57BF0B6C07419D7937FF429E51CBC54EE45A8B6142917091980DDF64621112AB77A6C29C2C2BBF4B760FA774813751C2287E65A9401BED3B713DBBF7154938BF1614E159BDDA6C36BFC856DB12F89EBE626229440D6EC6579D5A35B62E235BFD48AD2703601440390CDAFAF0551FB28784E787D4092D9A9211E53361。
the integer e agreed by the first device and the second device is, for example: 10001.
based on the agreed integer e and two randomly selected primes p 1 、q 1 Calculate the first modulo inverse d 1 ，d 1 ＝e -1 mod(p-1)(q-1)。
d 1 Examples are:
7D42CA9BB978F8DF96C57EB902F17687A1AC5B4947053B43A29EDAAF5B0041B4A65433BDFD359BA58D5938F7E88BB2DC028C7C0214DDC57BDB4A0D27FE93392548ED962DC396144E47A05F9AC450D9F63B8E5A5BB42AD4BDA74734053FFF94C3D3F06D1F5F0E16DB74B514EB109FE09F87345F73FDDD34D435D0F2379E68F4C1。
step S12: the first device receives a second modulus sent by the second device, and calculates and obtains a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and the first operation rule.
More specifically, the steps may include:
step S121: the first device receives a second modulus transmitted by the second device.
The second device randomly selects two prime numbers p according to itself 2 、q 2 Calculate the second modulus N 2 ，N 2 Examples are:
B6DB16359348C1A87C70C221D4E247E751C47A791344D7BE5197324874308AECF72098F41EBBA4EDB8D465EE5B4F5246249E3976D49EE8CA29FEACE9EFE6FBE61FA1A77C934BFAB351C87070434D13352C4146A8A0AA191B77BB59212594213E2D6604426682940CFB87071FDECE0EC8A03AAEEAD6091355E7858A6813E6BE7D。
step S122: the first device calculates a greatest common divisor of the first modulus and the second modulus, and judges whether the greatest common divisor is 1.
Step S123: and if the greatest common divisor is 1, calculating according to the first modulus, the second modulus and the first operation rule to obtain the target modulus.
Based on the above N 1 、N 2 Is obtained by GCD (N) 1 ，N 2 )＝1。
Calculating a target modulus N, n=n 1 *N 2 。
N is, for example:
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。
step S124: if the greatest common divisor is not 1, an error message is returned and ended.
Because the modulus and the modulo-inverse element in the key element are generated by the two devices respectively and independently, the embodiment adds the pair N 1 、N 2 The judgment of the greatest common divisor can avoid the two devices from generating the same key pair.
Step S13: the first device encapsulates the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulo to generate a first private key.
Based on the first modulo-inverse element d given above 1 And the data instance of the target modulus N is used for obtaining a first private key:
7D42CA9BB978F8DF96C57EB902F17687A1AC5B4947053B43A29EDAAF5B0041B4A65433BDFD359BA58D5938F7E88BB2DC028C7C0214DDC57BDB4A0D27FE93392548ED962DC396144E47A05F9AC450D9F63B8E5A5BB42AD4BDA74734053FFF94C3D3F06D1F5F0E16DB74B514EB109FE09F87345F73FDDD34D435D0F2379E68F4C1，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。
the second process is a joint signature generation process, comprising the steps of:
step S14: the first device signs the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using the first private key, and obtains a first signature.
The first device obtains a first signature by performing modular exponentiation on a hash value of a first private key and plaintext information to be signed.
The value of Wen Haxi is expressed in m and c 1 Representing the first signature, then there is c 1 ＝m d1 modN。
The plaintext hash value m is, for example:
2F13A9F34E621464267ABE605D0714EE5F29822A40BC030E72B1448C413F7AE67D9BD7AF828E40CD14D4228906580B7755F4AC1C1B5C15C4D282C4B18BAA28A74EFA8EEBB1E27927459F978374E8CCEE5C612AFF9CCF84B7EAFF03CD5B60886F674D7090BE8BAC3CB9ECCBCC49C3458A238A0BAC3F7F29AF34A95468AF4E7982。
a first signature c obtained by modular exponentiation 1 Examples are:
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。
further, after obtaining the first signature, the first device further includes:
the first signature is sent to the second device.
The first device may actively send the first signature to the second device when the first device determines that both are in a secure environment with the second device.
Or, the first device may send the first signature to the second device after receiving the acquisition instruction sent by the second device.
How the first signature is sent to the second device in particular is not a limitation of the present application.
Step S15: the first device receives a second signature sent by the second device and determines whether the length of the second signature is less than a target modulus.
A second module N generated by a second device 2 Examples are:
B6DB16359348C1A87C70C221D4E247E751C47A791344D7BE5197324874308AECF72098F41EBBA4EDB8D465EE5B4F5246249E3976D49EE8CA29FEACE9EFE6FBE61FA1A77C934BFAB351C87070434D13352C4146A8A0AA191B77BB59212594213E2D6604426682940CFB87071FDECE0EC8A03AAEEAD6091355E7858A6813E6BE7D。
second device-generated secondModulo inverse element d 2 Examples are:
AEEF467E16DBE239B8637FB6321E1140221FE03378D5C1B8D801D81F2CD94BEF8C35695F130FDDA777CDEB7E6F68A1836D80D9E4EF60DFC0991086887FF4F14305B43929D7B7B1334394B0CC4948AE35B630CA4FB791F8B9637A912CDA965D75CC11FF117FBAD0486C7D9C3A1BE3E109BC4D01AE2E2D01CE4EA317139BF332C1。
based on the second modulo-inverse element d 2 And a second modulus N 2 A second signature c can be obtained 2 ：
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。
Further, to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, the second device may split the second signature into multiple parts and develop it to the first device. In this regard, step S15 may specifically include:
step S151: the first device receives the first partial signature and the second partial signature sent by the second device in sequence.
The first local signature received by the first device is, for example:
296A226EC0B6F2C0BFD732D455A3CF74B471859D20FE430C77CB28FBA33933EE7E8B38622A71D8E17C84DB8AE6D0F32E22B1C7F1CF57DEDD35D4685644E3FAD65F17AB16C425932E856A0D802462785CD81753E145F3AD7DC313AE7CD506ECF9A0F39C18E33844D2239F91B1EC07CCA2B69E3304213F9F83892B24196741F622。
the second partial signature received by the first device is, for example:
49DD1DE94820A1689A501828B8D1C3C1FCF55FA5E779D3BEC8723A5A37FE56E236CFC0A31F8EF9FDDD4F8B427BCA815629152A59ECCFA965E5BF93798C2E8CAF3AB1A3B79ABF7E633D1D016D63F67070EE07DA6FDB0B431AC15DEDDF1C18CE456CD162DCCC77D047802E5739971A7A9FF70982902753F55FE5B15483C76D8B14。
step S152: the first device combines the first partial signature with the second partial signature to obtain a second signature.
Step S153: the first device determines whether the length of the second signature is less than a target modulus.
Step S16: if the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, the combined signature is obtained through calculation according to the first modulus inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and the second operation rule.
Specifically, the first device first generates a first modulo-inverse element d 1 Integer e and second signature c 2 Calculating a first operation result c 1 ’，Reuse of the first signature c 1 Second signature c 2 First operation result c 1 ' calculate the joint signature c, ">
Based on the data example given in the above steps, the joint signature c obtained by calculation through the second operation rule is, for example:
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。
further, the process of the second device generating the joint signature is as follows:
the second device first generates a second modulo-inverse element d 2 Integer e and first signature c 1 Calculating a second operation result c 2 ’，Reuse of the first signature c 1 Second signature c 2 And a second operation result c 2 ' a joint signature c is calculated,
in an alternative embodiment, the following steps are also included:
step S16': and if the length of the second signature is greater than or equal to the target modulus, returning error information and ending.
In an alternative embodiment, step S13 further includes:
the first device encapsulates the integer and the target modulus to generate a public key;
the first device sends the public key to the signature verification device.
In an alternative embodiment, the method may further include a joint signature verification process, where the signature verification device may have one or more devices, which may be other than the first device and the second device, and may also be the first device or the second device.
The signature verification process includes the steps of:
the third process is a joint signature verification process, comprising the steps of:
step S17: the signature verification device receives the joint signature to be verified, which is sent by the first device.
Similar to the reception of the second signature in step S15, this step does not detail the reception scenario of the joint signature to be verified.
Step S18: the signature verification device verifies the joint signature to be verified by using the public key.
The signature verification device decrypts the joint signature to be verified by utilizing the owned public key to obtain a hash value, then carries out hash operation on plaintext information (sent together with the joint signature to be verified) to obtain another hash value, compares the two hash values, if the two hash values are the same, the joint signature verification is successful, otherwise, the joint signature verification fails.
The application provides a scheme that two parties of equipment can finish a complete RSA signature together without transmitting any sensitive information, which is realized by the following steps: the first device obtains a new modulus based on the modulus generated by the first device and the modulus generated by the second device, generates a new key based on the new modulus, and realizes the joint signature through the new key. The method ensures the security and reliability of the combined signature.
The following are examples of the apparatus of the present application that may be used to perform the method embodiments of the present application. For details not disclosed in the embodiments of the apparatus of the present application, please refer to the embodiments of the method of the present application.
Referring to fig. 5, a schematic structural diagram of an RSA-based joint signature generating apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present application is shown.
The RSA-based joint signature generation apparatus may be implemented as all or part of an electronic device by software, hardware, or a combination of both. The device comprises a key generation module and a joint signature generation module, wherein:
the key generation module comprises the following units:
a key element generating unit, configured to generate a key element, where the key element includes a first modulus, a first modulo inverse element, and an integer agreed by the first device and the second device;
the target modulus calculation unit is used for receiving the second modulus sent by the second equipment and calculating to obtain a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule;
the private key generation unit is used for packaging the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulus to generate a first private key;
the joint signature generation module comprises the following units:
a first signature obtaining unit, configured to sign a hash value of plaintext information to be signed by using the first private key, to obtain a first signature;
the signature length judging unit is used for receiving a second signature sent by the second device and judging whether the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, wherein the second signature is obtained by signing the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by the second device by using a second private key generated by the second device, and the second private key is obtained by encapsulating the target modulus and a second modulus counter element generated by the second device;
and the joint signature calculation unit is used for calculating and obtaining the joint signature according to the first modulo-inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and a second operation rule if the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus.
In an alternative embodiment, the target modulus calculation unit includes:
the common divisor judging subunit is used for calculating the greatest common divisor of the first modulus and the second modulus and judging whether the greatest common divisor is 1;
and the target modulus calculation subunit is used for calculating and obtaining the target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and the first operation rule if the greatest common divisor is 1.
In an alternative embodiment, the target modulus calculation subunit is specifically configured to:
and if the greatest common divisor is 1, performing product operation on the first modulus and the second modulus to obtain a target modulus.
In an alternative embodiment, the target modulus calculation unit further includes:
and the information feedback subunit is used for returning error information and ending if the greatest common divisor is not 1.
In an alternative embodiment, the signature length determining unit is specifically configured to:
sequentially receiving a first local signature and a second local signature sent by the second equipment;
combining the first partial signature and the second partial signature to obtain a second signature;
and judging whether the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, wherein the second signature is obtained by signing the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by the second equipment by utilizing a second private key generated by the second equipment, and the second private key is obtained by packaging the target modulus and a second modulo inverse element generated by the second equipment.
In an alternative embodiment, the information feedback subunit is specifically further configured to:
and if the length of the second signature is greater than or equal to the target modulus, returning error information and ending.
In an alternative embodiment, the key generation module further includes a public key generation unit, configured to:
and sending a public key generated by the integer and the target modulus package to a signature verification device.
In an alternative embodiment, the apparatus further comprises a signature verification module comprising:
the signature receiving unit is used for receiving the joint signature to be verified, which is sent by the first equipment;
and the signature verification unit is used for verifying the joint signature to be verified by utilizing the public key.
It should be noted that, when the RSA-based joint signature generation apparatus provided in the foregoing embodiment performs the RSA-based joint signature generation method, only the division of the foregoing functional modules is used as an example, and in practical application, the foregoing functional allocation may be performed by different functional modules according to needs, that is, the internal structure of the device is divided into different functional modules, so as to complete all or part of the functions described above. In addition, the RSA-based combined signature generating apparatus provided in the foregoing embodiment and the RSA-based combined signature generating method embodiment belong to the same concept, which embody the detailed implementation process in the method embodiment, and are not described herein again.
The foregoing embodiment numbers of the present application are merely for the purpose of description, and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.
The application provides a scheme that two parties of equipment can finish a complete RSA signature together without transmitting any sensitive information, which is realized by the following steps: the first device obtains a new modulus based on the modulus generated by the first device and the modulus generated by the second device, generates a new key based on the new modulus, and realizes the joint signature through the new key. The method ensures the security and reliability of the combined signature.
The present application also provides a computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which when executed by a processor performs the steps of the method of any of the previous embodiments. The computer readable storage medium may include, among other things, any type of disk including floppy disks, optical disks, DVDs, CD-ROMs, micro-drives, and magneto-optical disks, ROM, RAM, EPROM, EEPROM, DRAM, VRAM, flash memory devices, magnetic or optical cards, nanosystems (including molecular memory ICs), or any type of media or device suitable for storing instructions and/or data.
The embodiment of the application also provides an electronic device, which comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and capable of running on the processor, wherein the processor realizes the steps of the method of any embodiment when executing the program.
In the embodiment of the application, the processor is a control center of the computer system, and can be a processor of a physical machine or a processor of a virtual machine. The processor may include one or more processing cores, such as a 4-core processor, an 8-core processor, and the like. The processor may be implemented in at least one hardware form of DSP (Digital Signal Processing ), FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array, field programmable gate array), PLA (Programmable Logic Array ). The processor may also include a main processor, which is a processor for processing data in an awake state, also called a CPU (Central Processing Unit ), and a coprocessor; a coprocessor is a low-power processor for processing data in a standby state.
The memory may include one or more computer-readable storage media, which may be non-transitory. The memory may also include high-speed random access memory, as well as non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic disk storage devices, flash memory storage devices. In some embodiments of the application, a non-transitory computer readable storage medium in memory is used to store at least one instruction for execution by a processor to implement the method in embodiments of the application.
In some embodiments, the electronic device further includes: a peripheral interface and at least one peripheral. The processor, memory, and peripheral interfaces may be connected by buses or signal lines. The individual peripheral devices may be connected to the peripheral device interface via buses, signal lines or circuit boards. Specifically, the peripheral device includes: at least one of a display screen, a camera and an audio circuit.
The peripheral interface may be used to connect at least one Input/Output (I/O) related peripheral to the processor and the memory. In some embodiments of the application, the processor, memory, and peripheral interfaces are integrated on the same chip or circuit board; in some other embodiments of the application, either or both of the processor, memory, and peripheral interfaces may be implemented on separate chips or circuit boards. The embodiment of the present application is not particularly limited thereto.
The display screen is used to display a UI (User Interface). The UI may include graphics, text, icons, video, and any combination thereof. When the display is a touch display, the display also has the ability to collect touch signals at or above the surface of the display. The touch signal may be input to the processor for processing as a control signal. At this time, the display screen may also be used to provide virtual buttons and/or virtual keyboards, also referred to as soft buttons and/or soft keyboards. In some embodiments of the present application, the display screen may be one, and a front panel of the electronic device is provided; in other embodiments of the present application, the display may be at least two, and each display may be disposed on a different surface of the electronic device or in a folded design; in still other embodiments of the present application, the display may be a flexible display disposed on a curved surface or a folded surface of the electronic device. Even more, the display screen may be arranged in a non-rectangular irregular pattern, i.e. a shaped screen. The display screen may be made of LCD (Liquid Crystal Display ), OLED (Organic Light-Emitting Diode) or other materials.
The camera is used for collecting images or videos. Optionally, the camera comprises a front camera and a rear camera. In general, a front camera is disposed on a front panel of an electronic device, and a rear camera is disposed on a rear surface of the electronic device. In some embodiments, the at least two rear cameras are any one of a main camera, a depth camera, a wide-angle camera and a tele camera, so as to realize that the main camera and the depth camera are fused to realize a background blurring function, and the main camera and the wide-angle camera are fused to realize a panoramic shooting and Virtual Reality (VR) shooting function or other fusion shooting functions. In some embodiments of the application, the camera may further comprise a flash. The flash lamp can be a single-color temperature flash lamp or a double-color temperature flash lamp. The dual-color temperature flash lamp refers to a combination of a warm light flash lamp and a cold light flash lamp, and can be used for light compensation under different color temperatures.
The audio circuit may include a microphone and a speaker. The microphone is used for collecting sound waves of users and the environment, converting the sound waves into electric signals and inputting the electric signals to the processor for processing. For the purpose of stereo acquisition or noise reduction, a plurality of microphones may be respectively disposed at different positions of the electronic device. The microphone may also be an array microphone or an omni-directional pickup microphone.
The power supply is used to power the various components in the electronic device. The power source may be alternating current, direct current, disposable or rechargeable. When the power source comprises a rechargeable battery, the rechargeable battery may be a wired rechargeable battery or a wireless rechargeable battery. The wired rechargeable battery is a battery charged through a wired line, and the wireless rechargeable battery is a battery charged through a wireless coil. The rechargeable battery may also be used to support fast charge technology.
The block diagrams of the electronic device shown in the embodiments of the present application are not limited to the electronic device, and the electronic device may include more or less components than shown, or may combine some components, or may employ different arrangements of components.
In the present disclosure, the terms "first," "second," and the like are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying a relative importance or order; the term "plurality" means two or more, unless expressly defined otherwise. The terms "mounted," "connected," "secured," and the like are to be construed broadly, and may be, for example, fixedly connected, detachably connected, or integrally connected; "coupled" may be directly coupled or indirectly coupled through intermediaries. The specific meaning of the above terms in the present application can be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art according to the specific circumstances.
In the description of the present application, it should be understood that the directions or positional relationships indicated by the terms "upper", "lower", etc. are based on the directions or positional relationships shown in the drawings, are merely for convenience of description and simplification of the description, and do not indicate or imply that the apparatus or unit referred to must have a specific direction, be constructed and operated in a specific direction, and therefore, should not be construed as limiting the present application.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the present application, and the present application is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art will readily recognize that variations or substitutions are within the scope of the present application. Accordingly, equivalent variations from the claims of the present application are intended to be covered by the present application.

Claims (9)

1. A RSA-based joint signature generation method, the method comprising:
the key generation process comprises the following steps:
generating a key element by first equipment, wherein the key element comprises a first modulus, a first modulo reverse element and an integer agreed by the first equipment and second equipment;
the first device receives a second modulus sent by the second device, and calculates and obtains a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule;
the first device encapsulates the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulus to generate a first private key;
a joint signature generation process comprising the steps of:
the first device signs the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using the first private key to obtain a first signature;
the first device receives a second signature sent by the second device and judges whether the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, wherein the second signature is obtained by signing a hash value of plaintext information to be signed by the second device by using a second private key generated by the second device, and the second private key is obtained by packaging a second modulo inverse element generated by the second device and the target modulus;
if the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, calculating according to the first modulus inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and a second operation rule to obtain a joint signature;
the calculating according to the first modulus, the second modulus and the first operation rule to obtain a target modulus includes:
calculating the greatest common divisor of the first modulus and the second modulus, and judging whether the greatest common divisor is 1;
if the greatest common divisor is 1, calculating according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule to obtain a target modulus;
and if the greatest common divisor is not 1, returning an error message and ending.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the calculating the target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus, and the first operation rule comprises:
and performing product operation on the first modulus and the second modulus to obtain a target modulus.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein after said determining whether said greatest common divisor is 1, further comprising:
and if the greatest common divisor is not 1, returning an error message and ending.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the first device receiving the second signature transmitted by the second device comprises:
the first device sequentially receives a first local signature and a second local signature sent by the second device;
the first device combines the first partial signature with the second partial signature to obtain a second signature.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein said determining if the length of the second signature is less than the target modulus further comprises:
and if the length of the second signature is greater than or equal to the target modulus, returning error information and ending.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein in the key generation process, after generating the first private key, further comprises: the first device sends a public key generated by the integer and the target modulus package to a signature verification device;
the method further includes a joint signature verification process comprising the steps of:
the signature verification device receives a joint signature to be verified, which is sent by the first device;
and the signature verification device verifies the joint signature to be verified by using the public key.
7. An RSA-based joint signature generation apparatus, the apparatus comprising a key generation module and a joint signature generation module, wherein:
the key generation module comprises the following units:
a key element generating unit, configured to generate a key element, where the key element includes a first modulus, a first modulo-inverse element, and an integer agreed by a first device and a second device;
the target modulus calculation unit is used for receiving the second modulus sent by the second equipment and calculating to obtain a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule;
a private key generation unit, configured to encapsulate the first modulo-inverse element and the target modulus, and generate a first private key;
the joint signature generation module comprises the following units:
a first signature obtaining unit, configured to sign a hash value of plaintext information to be signed by using the first private key, to obtain a first signature;
the signature length judging unit is used for receiving a second signature sent by the second device and judging whether the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus, wherein the second signature is obtained by the second device by signing the hash value of the plaintext information to be signed by using a second private key generated by the second device, and the second private key is obtained by packaging a second modulo inverse element generated by the second device and the target modulus;
the joint signature calculation unit is used for calculating to obtain a joint signature according to the first modulo-inverse element, the integer, the first signature, the second signature and a second operation rule if the length of the second signature is smaller than the target modulus;
the target modulus calculation unit is specifically configured to receive a second modulus sent by the second device, calculate a greatest common divisor of the first modulus and the second modulus, determine whether the greatest common divisor is 1, and calculate to obtain a target modulus according to the first modulus, the second modulus and a first operation rule if the greatest common divisor is 1, and if the greatest common divisor is not 1, return an error message and end.
8. A computer readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, characterized in that the program, when being executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method according to any of the claims 1-6.
9. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that the processor implements the steps of the method of any of claims 1-6 when the program is executed.
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