CN114664174A - Irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method and terminal - Google Patents
Irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method and terminal Download PDFInfo
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- CN114664174A CN114664174A CN202210185432.9A CN202210185432A CN114664174A CN 114664174 A CN114664174 A CN 114664174A CN 202210185432 A CN202210185432 A CN 202210185432A CN 114664174 A CN114664174 A CN 114664174A
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- 238000007789 sealing Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 43
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 29
- 230000002427 irreversible effect Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 28
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 42
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 claims description 37
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000002372 labelling Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 7
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 2
- 229910000831 Steel Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 102100025568 Voltage-dependent L-type calcium channel subunit beta-1 Human genes 0.000 description 1
- 101710176690 Voltage-dependent L-type calcium channel subunit beta-1 Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 239000010959 steel Substances 0.000 description 1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
- G09F—DISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
- G09F3/00—Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
- G09F3/02—Forms or constructions
- G09F3/03—Forms or constructions of security seals
- G09F3/0305—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
- G09F3/0329—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having electronic sealing means
Abstract
The invention discloses an irreversible electronic lead seal sealing method and a terminal, wherein a first state bit is used for marking the opening and closing of an electronic lead seal, a second state bit is used for marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal, and the initial value of the second state bit is set to be unlocked; the method comprises the steps of determining a second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to a first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and a second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, and obtaining an actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of RFID electronic lead sealing, in particular to an irreversible electronic lead sealing method and a terminal.
Background
The existing RFID electronic lead sealing seal can be repaired manually for secondary utilization after being detached, so that the function of the lead sealing is lost. The application limitation is large, the lead seal cannot be comprehensively guaranteed not to be damaged in practical application, and particularly in the field of high-standard requirements, the existing RFID electronic lead seal cannot achieve a good anti-dismantling function and a good monitoring effect.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: an irreversible electronic lead seal sealing method and a terminal are provided, which can avoid the used electronic lead seal from being recycled or maliciously tampered.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
an irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method comprises the following steps:
marking a physical state of the electronic lead seal with a first state bit, the physical state comprising open and closed;
marking an actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, wherein the actual state comprises unlocked, locked and tampered, and an initial value of the second state bit represents that the electronic lead seal is unlocked;
and determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
In order to solve the technical problem, the invention adopts another technical scheme as follows:
an irreversible electronic lead sealing terminal comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the following steps when executing the computer program:
marking a physical state of the electronic lead seal with a first state bit, the physical state comprising open and closed;
marking an actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, wherein the actual state comprises unlocked, locked and tampered, and an initial value of the second state bit represents unlocked;
and determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: marking the opening and closing of the electronic lead seal by using a first state bit, marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, and setting the initial value of the second state bit to be unlocked; the method comprises the steps of determining a second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to a first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and a second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, and obtaining an actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of a method for irreversible electronic lead sealing according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic view of an irreversible electronic lead seal terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a flowchart illustrating steps of a method for irreversible electronic lead sealing according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an online platform according to the second embodiment;
FIG. 5 is a verification diagram of the authorization verification ID of the second embodiment;
fig. 6 is a schematic diagram illustrating the locked electronic lead seal obtained by verification in the second embodiment;
fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of the second embodiment illustrating that the electronic lead seal is verified to be tampered;
FIG. 8 is a verification diagram of the authorization verification token in an offline state;
fig. 9 is a schematic diagram of the locked electronic lead seal verified in an off-line state;
fig. 10 is a schematic diagram of an electronic lead seal verified in an off-line state to be tampered;
description of reference numerals:
1. an irreversible electronic lead seal terminal; 2. a memory; 3. a processor.
Detailed Description
In order to explain technical contents, achieved objects, and effects of the present invention in detail, the following description is made with reference to the accompanying drawings in combination with the embodiments.
Referring to fig. 1 and fig. 3, an embodiment of the invention provides an irreversible electronic lead sealing method, including the steps of:
marking a physical state of the electronic lead seal with a first state bit, the physical state comprising open and closed;
marking an actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, wherein the actual state comprises unlocked, locked and tampered, and an initial value of the second state bit represents unlocked;
and determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
As can be seen from the above description, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: marking the opening and closing of the electronic lead seal by using a first state bit, marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, and setting the initial value of the second state bit to be unlocked; the method comprises the steps of determining a second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to a first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and a second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, and obtaining an actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
Further, the method comprises, before the first status bit according to the current electronic lead seal and the last stored second status bit of the current electronic lead seal:
and reading an authorized verification identifier of the electronic lead seal, and judging whether the authorized verification identifier can be inquired, wherein if yes, the electronic lead seal is true, otherwise, the electronic lead seal is fake, and the actual state of the electronic lead seal is not judged.
According to the description, the electronic lead seal is searched according to the authorization verification identification of the electronic lead seal, whether the electronic lead seal is real or not is identified, and the safety of electronic lead seal verification is improved.
Further, the marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal by using the second state bit includes:
if the second state bit is stored in the electronic lead seal, encrypting the second state bit of the electronic lead seal;
and if the second state bit is stored in the database, determining whether to encrypt the second state bit of the electronic lead seal according to the security requirement of the electronic lead seal.
As can be seen from the above description, when the second status bit is stored in the electronic lead seal, the second status bit needs to be encrypted to prevent the second status bit in the electronic lead seal from being tampered; when the second state bit is stored in the database, the second state bit determines whether encryption is needed according to the safety requirement of the electronic lead seal, so that the safety of the electronic lead seal is ensured.
Further, the determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal includes:
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents tampering;
and if the second state bit stored last time in the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered.
According to the description, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal is determined by combining the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, so that the actual state of the electronic lead seal can be quickly obtained, and the identification of the tampering state of the electronic lead seal is realized through a common chip capable of identifying the opening and closing of the electronic lead seal.
Further, still include:
carrying out online verification on the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal through an online platform;
or, performing offline verification on the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal through an authorization database;
or the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal are verified through an online cloud authorization database.
As can be seen from the above description, the authorization check identifier and the first status bit of the current electronic lead seal can be verified in an online or offline state, and the actual status of the subsequent electronic lead seal is determined, so that the electronic lead seal can be verified in any network state.
Referring to fig. 2, another embodiment of the present invention provides an irreversible electronic lead sealing terminal, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, where the processor executes the computer program to implement the following steps:
marking a physical state of the electronic lead seal with a first state bit, the physical state comprising open and closed;
marking an actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, wherein the actual state comprises unlocked, locked and tampered, and an initial value of the second state bit represents unlocked;
and determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
As can be seen from the above description, the first status bit is used to mark the opening and closing of the electronic lead seal, the second status bit is used to mark the actual status of the electronic lead seal, and the initial value of the second status bit is set to be unlocked; the method comprises the steps of determining a second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to a first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and a second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, and obtaining an actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
Further, the method comprises, before the first status bit according to the current electronic lead seal and the last stored second status bit of the current electronic lead seal:
and reading an authorized verification identifier of the electronic lead seal, and judging whether the authorized verification identifier can be inquired, wherein if yes, the electronic lead seal is true, otherwise, the electronic lead seal is fake, and the actual state of the electronic lead seal is not judged.
According to the description, the electronic lead seal is searched according to the authorization verification identification of the electronic lead seal, whether the electronic lead seal is real or not is identified, and the safety of electronic lead seal verification is improved.
Further, the marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal by using the second state bit includes:
if the second state bit is stored in the electronic lead seal, encrypting the second state bit of the electronic lead seal;
and if the second state bit is stored in the database, determining whether to encrypt the second state bit of the electronic lead seal according to the security requirement of the electronic lead seal.
As can be seen from the above description, when the second status bit is stored in the electronic lead seal, the second status bit needs to be encrypted to prevent the second status bit in the electronic lead seal from being tampered; when the second state bit is stored in the database, the second state bit determines whether encryption is needed according to the security requirement of the electronic lead seal, so that the security of the electronic lead seal is ensured.
Further, the determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal includes:
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents tampering;
and if the second state bit stored last time in the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered.
According to the description, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal is determined by combining the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, so that the actual state of the electronic lead seal can be quickly obtained, and the identification of the tampering state of the electronic lead seal is realized through a common chip which can distinguish the open state and the closed state of the electronic lead seal.
Further, still include:
carrying out online verification on the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal through an online platform;
or, performing offline verification on the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal through an authorization database;
or, the authorization verification identifier and the first status bit of the current electronic lead seal are verified through an online cloud authorization database.
As can be seen from the above description, the authorization check identifier and the first status bit of the current electronic lead seal can be verified in an online or offline state, and the actual status of the subsequent electronic lead seal is determined, so that the electronic lead seal can be verified in any network state.
The above-mentioned irreversible electronic lead sealing method and terminal of the present invention are suitable for determining the actual state of the electronic lead seal in various network states, and can avoid the used electronic lead seal from being recycled or maliciously tampered, and the following description is made by specific embodiments:
example one
Referring to fig. 1 and 3, an irreversible electronic lead sealing method includes the steps of:
and S1, marking the physical state of the electronic lead seal by using the first state bit, wherein the physical state comprises opening and closing.
Specifically, in this embodiment, the first state bit is a pointer state bit, and the adopted hardware must require that the RFID chip has a GPIO pointer state bit function with 2 states, namely open and closed.
The product can be in any form, such as different product forms of a steel wire type lead seal, a wire connection type lead seal, a socket type lead seal and the like, and is characterized in that before the product is used, the connection Loop between the Tamper and the GND of the chip is Open and disconnected, when the seal is used, the Loop connection between the Tamper and the GND is Closed, and when the seal is removed, the connection between the Tamper and the GND is Open and disconnected.
Since the pointer status bit codes of different types of RFID chips are different, the temporary column of the present embodiment describes the pointer status bit: one is a chip with model number NXP G2IL +/G2IM +, Tamper-0040 represents open, and Tamper-8040/C040/4040 represents closed; the other is a chip with model number VBL CAB0/CAB1/VBL7, wherein Tamper-B0 FF represents open, and Tamper-B000 represents closed.
Thus, electronic lead seals for other chip types can simply modify the Tamper parameters to achieve the same effect.
And S2, marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, wherein the actual state comprises unlocked, locked and tampered, and the initial value of the second state bit is represented as unlocked.
Specifically, in this embodiment, the second state bit is a tamp bit state bit, which implements state quantity extension of the Tamper state bit, where tamp bit is 0/1/2, which respectively represents that the actual state is unlocked (unlocked)/locked (locked)/tampered (tamped), and the initial value of tamp bit is 0.
And S3, determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, and obtaining the actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
Specifically, in one embodiment, the TamperBit state bit of the last RFID electronic lead seal is encrypted and recorded in a chip of the electronic lead seal; in another embodiment, the TamperBit status bit of the last RFID electronic lead seal may be encrypted or not encrypted and then recorded in the database according to the security requirements of signing the lead seal. And judging the current actual state of the electronic lead seal by combining the physical Tamper state characteristics of the chip of the current electronic lead seal so as to confirm whether the lead seal is tampered or recycled.
Example two
Referring to fig. 4 to 7, a difference between the present embodiment and the first embodiment is that an application scenario for determining the electronic lead sealing state on line is provided, specifically:
when the Platform determines the electronic lead sealing state on line, an RFID lead sealing label including a pointer function, APP software and a Platform on-line authorization management Platform are required to be used. The platform server program can be common ASP, PHP and Think-PHP, the database matched with the platform can select ACCESS/MySQL, the unique TID/UID/EPC identification of the RFID electronic lead seal is led into the platform system database for authorization verification, and the real-time monitoring management of the lead seal use state is realized by matching with a TamperBit latching flag bit (0/1/2 respectively represents unlock/latched/sampled), and the visiws ACCESS Counter Visit Counter, and the detailed design description is as follows:
first, referring to fig. 4, before using the electronic lead seal, authorization authentication needs to be performed on the platform according to the TID/UID/EPC, and the latch status bit tamverbit is initialized to 0, which represents a completely new unused electronic lead seal.
Secondly, referring to fig. 5, when reading the electronic lead seal by the APP, the TID/UID/EPC and pointer data of the lead seal need to be read, then the 2 parameters are authorized and verified through the online platform to determine whether the electronic lead seal is true REAL or FAKE, and finally the APP generates a complete website link and displays the website link in the APP or WEB browser interface, where the website format is: domain name website + parameter, in this embodiment the website is: "http:// check. rf idtag world. com/index. htmlTID. xxxxx & Tamper. xxxx".
Further, the real authorized RFID electronic lead seal, along with the locking of the lead seal, is applied to supervision and frequent inspection of lead seal state detection at different time points in links such as logistics, transfer, circulation, receipt and inspection of goods, so as to prevent the electronic lead seal from being tampered, and the specific method for determining the actual state of the electronic lead seal at present is as follows:
1) when Tamper is B0FF (off), TamperBit is 0, representing UNLOCKED;
2) when the pointer is B000 (closed) and the pointer bit is 0, it represents that the lead seal is LOCKED, and at this time, it needs to synchronously change the pointer latch flag in the platform to 1, which represents that the platform is LOCKED;
3) when the Tamper is B000 (closed), and the TamperBit is 1, it represents that the lead-sealed LOCKED is checked for multiple times;
4) when the Tamper is B0FF (disconnected), the TamperBit is 1, which represents that the lead seal LOCKED is cut off later, i.e. represents that the lead seal is TAMPERED, and in order to prevent the lead seal from being used by malicious repair and tampering after being cut off, the TamperBit latch identifier in the platform needs to be synchronously changed to 2, which represents that the lead seal has been TAMPERED;
5) when the Tamper is B000 (closed), and the TamperBit is 2, the lead seal TAMPERED is repaired for use later, and the Tamper is secondarily TAMPERED with TAMPERED-TRIES;
6) when the Tamper is B0FF (off) and the TamperBit is 2, the sealed tamped-TRIES is cut again later, or the TaMPERED-TRIES are multiple tampering attempts.
EXAMPLE III
Referring to fig. 8 to 10, the difference between the present embodiment and the first and second embodiments is that an application scenario for determining the electronic lead sealing state offline is provided, specifically:
when the electronic lead sealing state is determined off-line, an RFID lead sealing label including a pointer function, APP software and an authorization database are required to be used. By reading the unique TID/UID/EPC of the RFID electronic lead seal, then comparing and checking in an authorized database, confirming whether the electronic lead seal is FAKE with FAKE or REAL with REAL, and simultaneously matching with a tampBit latch identification bit 0/1/2 respectively representing unlocked/latched/stamped to ensure that the latch identification bit format can adopt 0000, 0001 and 0002 to replace 0/1/2 in consideration of the operation convenience of a chip register so as to realize the REAL-time monitoring and management of the use state of the lead seal, and the detailed design description is as follows:
firstly, when the RFID electronic lead seal is authorized, the chip TamperBit register needs to be initialized to 0000, and meanwhile, the TID/UID/EPC of the electronic lead seal after initialization is created and generated to be an authorization database, so that the authenticity can be checked when the APP is used, and the encryption algorithm processing can be allowed.
Next, referring to fig. 8, when the APP reads the electronic lead seal, it needs to read TID/UID/EPC data, Tamper data, and TamperBit latch data of the RFID electronic lead seal. And then comparing the authorization database to confirm whether the electronic lead seal is REAL REAL or faKE.
Further, the method for judging the actual state of the current electronic lead sealing is the same as the online electronic lead sealing scheme. Real and authorized RFID electronic lead seal is also applied to supervision and frequent inspection of lead seal state detection at different time points in the links of logistics, transfer, circulation process, cargo signing and inspection and the like along with the locking of the lead seal, so that the lead seal is prevented from being distorted.
Example four
The difference between the present embodiment and the first to third embodiments is that an application scenario for determining the electronic lead sealing state by offline online combination is provided, specifically:
when the electronic lead sealing state is determined, an RFID lead sealing label with a pointer function, APP software and a cloud online authorization database are required to be used. By reading the unique TID/UID/EPC identification of the RFID electronic lead seal, comparison and verification are carried out in an online authorization database, whether the electronic lead seal is FAKE with FAKE or REAL with REAL is confirmed, meanwhile, a TamperBit latch identification bit 0/1/2 respectively representing unlock/latched/stamped is matched, and in consideration of the operation convenience of a chip register, the latch identification bit format can suggest to adopt 0000, 0001 and 0002 to replace 0/1/2, so as to realize the REAL-time monitoring and management of the use state of the lead seal, and the detailed design description is as follows:
firstly, referring to fig. 8, when the RFID electronic lead seal is authorized, the chip TamperBit register needs to be initialized to 0000, and the TID/UID/EPC of the electronic lead seal is initialized at the same time to generate the cloud online authorization database, so as to check authenticity when the APP is used, and allow encryption algorithm processing.
Secondly, when the APP reads the electronic lead seal, the TID/UID/EPC data, the Tamper data and the TamperBit latch data of the RFID electronic lead seal need to be read. And then, comparing by calling an online authorization database at the cloud end to confirm whether the electronic lead seal is a REAL REAL or FAKE FAKE.
Further, the current method for judging the actual state of the electronic lead seal is the same as the off-line electronic lead seal scheme. Real and authorized RFID electronic lead seal is also applied to supervision and frequent inspection of lead seal state detection at different time points in the links of logistics, transfer, circulation process, cargo signing and inspection and the like along with the locking of the lead seal, so that the lead seal is prevented from being distorted. The logic process is completely the same as that of an off-line electronic lead seal.
EXAMPLE five
Referring to fig. 2, an irreversible electronic lead sealing terminal 1 includes a memory 2, a processor 3, and a computer program stored on the memory 2 and executable on the processor 3, where the processor 3 implements the steps of an irreversible electronic lead sealing method according to one to four embodiments when executing the computer program.
In summary, according to the irreversible electronic lead seal sealing method and terminal provided by the present invention, the first status bit is used to mark the opening and closing of the electronic lead seal, the second status bit is used to mark the actual status of the electronic lead seal, and the initial value of the second status bit is set to be unlocked; firstly, searching according to an authorized verification identifier of the electronic lead seal, and identifying whether the electronic lead seal is real or not, so that the safety of electronic lead seal verification is improved; and then, according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal, so that the identification of the tampering state of the electronic lead seal is realized through a common chip capable of identifying the opening and closing of the electronic lead seal, the irreversible electronic lead seal is realized, and the used electronic lead seal is prevented from being recycled or maliciously tampered. And the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal can be verified in an online or offline state, and the actual state of the subsequent electronic lead seal is determined, so that the electronic lead seal can be verified in any network state.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and all equivalent changes made by using the contents of the present specification and the drawings, or applied directly or indirectly to the related technical fields, are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. An irreversible electronic lead sealing method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
marking a physical state of the electronic lead seal with a first state bit, the physical state comprising open and closed;
marking an actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, wherein the actual state comprises unlocked, locked and tampered, and an initial value of the second state bit represents unlocked;
and determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
2. The irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the first status bit according to the current electronic lead seal and the second status bit stored last time on the current electronic lead seal are preceded by:
and reading an authorized verification identifier of the electronic lead seal, and judging whether the authorized verification identifier can be inquired, wherein if yes, the electronic lead seal is true, otherwise, the electronic lead seal is fake, and the actual state of the electronic lead seal is not judged.
3. The irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step of marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal with the second state bit comprises:
if the second state bit is stored in the electronic lead seal, encrypting the second state bit of the electronic lead seal;
and if the second state bit is stored in the database, determining whether to encrypt the second state bit of the electronic lead seal according to the security requirement of the electronic lead seal.
4. The irreversible electronic lead sealing and labeling method according to claim 1, wherein the determining the second status bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first status bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second status bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal, and the obtaining the actual status of the current electronic lead seal comprises:
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents tampering;
and if the second state bit stored last time in the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered.
5. The irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method as claimed in claim 2, further comprising:
carrying out online verification on the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal through an online platform;
or, the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal pass through an authorization database to be subjected to offline verification;
or the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal are verified through an online cloud authorization database.
6. An irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing terminal, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program:
marking a physical state of the electronic lead seal with a first state bit, wherein the physical state comprises opening and closing;
marking an actual state of the electronic lead seal by using a second state bit, wherein the actual state comprises unlocked, locked and tampered, and an initial value of the second state bit represents unlocked;
and determining the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal to obtain the actual state of the current electronic lead seal.
7. The irreversible electronic lead seal terminal of claim 6, wherein the first status bit according to the current electronic lead seal and the second status bit stored last time on the current electronic lead seal are preceded by:
and reading an authorized verification identifier of the electronic lead seal, and judging whether the authorized verification identifier can be inquired, wherein if yes, the electronic lead seal is true, otherwise, the electronic lead seal is fake, and the actual state of the electronic lead seal is not judged.
8. The irreversible electronic lead seal terminal of claim 6, wherein the marking the actual state of the electronic lead seal with the second status bit comprises:
if the second state bit is stored in the electronic lead seal, encrypting the second state bit of the electronic lead seal;
and if the second state bit is stored in the database, determining whether to encrypt the second state bit of the electronic lead seal according to the security requirement of the electronic lead seal.
9. The terminal of claim 6, wherein the determining the second status bit of the current electronic lead seal according to the first status bit of the current electronic lead seal and the second status bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal comprises:
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocking;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents unlocked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents closed and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locked, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents locked;
if the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents disconnection and the second state bit stored last time of the current electronic lead seal represents locking, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents tampering;
and if the second state bit stored last time in the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered, the second state bit of the current electronic lead seal represents that the electronic lead seal is tampered.
10. The irreversible electronic lead seal terminal of claim 7, further comprising:
carrying out online verification on the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal through an online platform;
or, performing offline verification on the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal through an authorization database;
or the authorization verification identifier and the first state bit of the current electronic lead seal are verified through an online cloud authorization database.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202210185432.9A CN114664174A (en) | 2022-02-28 | 2022-02-28 | Irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method and terminal |
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| CN202210185432.9A CN114664174A (en) | 2022-02-28 | 2022-02-28 | Irreversible electronic lead sealing and sealing method and terminal |
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Cited By (1)
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| WO2024065887A1 (en) * | 2022-09-27 | 2024-04-04 | 厦门英诺尔信息科技有限公司 | Tamper-proof electronic lead seal |
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