CN114614975B - Method and device for calculating safe key rate in quantum communication - Google Patents
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a device for calculating a safe key rate in quantum communication, wherein the safe key rate of a physical device in a first state is calculated, and the attribute characteristics of the first state representing the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes; acquiring characteristic information of the physical device meeting the second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes; respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state according to the characteristic information; and calculating to obtain the target security key rate according to the security key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state. According to the invention, under the condition that the attribute characteristics of the physical device do not meet the preset theoretical attribute, the correction factor of the physical device is calculated, and then the security key rate is calculated, so that the security key rate can be calculated under the condition that the actual characteristics of various devices are considered, and the purpose of improving the security key rate accuracy in quantum communication is realized.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of quantum communication, in particular to a method and a device for calculating a safe key rate in quantum communication.
Background
The quantum communication technology provides an unconditional safe secret communication mode, and is a secret communication method capable of resisting a quantum computer. Through years of development, quantum communication technology is gradually matured and moved to the market.
The secure key rate has been the most important core indicator in quantum communication devices. Although scientists have proposed and proved calculation formulas of the security key rate in quantum communication at present, physical characteristics of actual equipment are not perfect, and certain characteristics cannot be avoided from deviating from theoretical requirements, so that the security of an actual system is affected. Therefore, how to obtain an accurate security key rate in the case of deviations in the device characteristics is also one of the main problems faced in quantum technology.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems, the invention provides a method and a device for calculating the safe key rate in quantum communication, which realize the purpose of improving the accuracy of the safe key rate in quantum communication under the condition that the equipment characteristics deviate.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
a method of computing a secure key rate in quantum communications, the method comprising:
calculating the security key rate of the physical device in a first state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the first state representing the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes;
acquiring characteristic information of a physical device meeting a second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes;
respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state according to the characteristic information;
and calculating to obtain a target safe key rate according to the safe key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state.
Optionally, the calculating the secure key rate of the physical device in the first state includes:
and calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the first state by using a decoy-state security key rate formula of the weak coherent light pulse.
Optionally, the method further comprises:
and creating a safe key rate calculation formula list according to the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state, wherein the safe key rate calculation formula list comprises a plurality of safe key rate calculation formulas, and each safe key rate calculation formula is matched with the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state.
Optionally, the calculating the correction factor of the physical device in the second state according to the feature information includes:
inquiring a target safe key rate calculation formula matched with the characteristic information in the safe key rate calculation formula list according to the characteristic information;
according to the target secure key rate calculation formula, calculating to obtain the secure key rate of the physical device in the second state;
acquiring a secure key rate of the physical device in the first state;
calculating the ratio of the secure key rate in the second state to the secure key rate in the first state, and determining the ratio as a correction factor of the physical device in the second state.
Optionally, the calculating, according to the secure key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state, the target secure key rate includes:
and calculating the product of the secure key rate in the first state and each correction factor in the second state, and determining the product as a target secure key rate.
A computing device for secure key rate in quantum communications, the device comprising:
the first computing unit is used for computing the security key rate of the physical device in a first state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the first state representing the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes;
the characteristic acquisition unit is used for acquiring characteristic information of the physical device meeting a second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes;
the second calculation unit is used for calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state according to the characteristic information;
and the third calculation unit is used for calculating the target security key rate according to the security key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state.
Optionally, the first computing unit is specifically configured to:
and calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the first state by using a decoy-state security key rate formula of the weak coherent light pulse.
Optionally, the apparatus further comprises:
the list creation unit is used for creating a safe key rate calculation formula list according to the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state, wherein the safe key rate calculation formula list comprises a plurality of safe key rate calculation formulas, and each safe key rate calculation formula is matched with the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state.
Optionally, the second computing unit includes:
the inquiring subunit is used for inquiring a target safe key rate calculation formula matched with the characteristic information in the safe key rate calculation formula list according to the characteristic information;
the first calculating subunit is used for calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the second state according to the target security key rate calculation formula;
an acquisition subunit, configured to acquire a secure key rate of the physical device in the first state;
and the second calculating subunit is used for calculating the ratio of the security key rate in the second state to the security key rate in the first state, and determining the ratio as a correction factor of the physical device in the second state.
Optionally, the third computing unit is specifically configured to:
and calculating the product of the secure key rate in the first state and each correction factor in the second state, and determining the product as a target secure key rate.
A storage medium storing executable instructions which when executed by a processor implement a method of computing a secure key rate in quantum communications according to any one of the preceding claims.
An electronic device, comprising:
a memory for storing a program;
a processor for executing the program, the program being specifically configured to implement the method for calculating the secure key rate in quantum communication according to any one of the above.
Compared with the prior art, the invention provides a method and a device for calculating the security key rate in quantum communication, which are used for calculating the security key rate of a physical device in a first state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the first state representing the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes; acquiring characteristic information of the physical device meeting the second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes; respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state according to the characteristic information; and calculating to obtain the target security key rate according to the security key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state. According to the invention, under the condition that the attribute characteristics of the physical device do not meet the preset theoretical attribute, the correction factor of the physical device is calculated, and then the security key rate is calculated, so that the security key rate can be calculated under the condition that the actual characteristics of various devices are considered, and the purpose of improving the security key rate accuracy in quantum communication is realized.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are required to be used in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only embodiments of the present invention, and that other drawings can be obtained according to the provided drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a method for calculating a secure key rate in quantum communication according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a device for calculating a secure key rate in quantum communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is apparent that the embodiments described are only some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
The terms first and second and the like in the description and in the claims and in the above-described figures are used for distinguishing between different objects and not necessarily for describing a sequential or chronological order. Furthermore, the terms "comprise" and "have," as well as any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of steps or elements is not necessarily limited to the listed steps or elements but may include steps or elements not expressly listed.
In an embodiment of the present invention, a method for calculating a secure key rate in quantum communication is provided, referring to fig. 1, the method may include the following steps:
s101, calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the first state.
The secure key rate has been the most important core indicator in quantum communication devices. Researchers in the field have proposed and demonstrated a calculation formula of a security key rate in quantum communication, and can refer to a widely used calculation formula of a security key rate based on a decoy BB84 scheme in industry.
Only the secure key rate of the physical device in a first state, which characterizes the physical device that its property characteristics meet a preset theoretical property, is considered in the prior art. I.e. the characteristics of the physical device meet the theoretical requirements, no imperfect properties exist.
To solve this problem, the secure key rate of the physical device under theoretical requirements is calculated first in this embodiment. This approach may be a method known in the art.
S102, acquiring characteristic information of a physical device meeting a second state;
s103, respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state according to the characteristic information;
s104, calculating to obtain a target safe key rate according to the safe key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state.
Wherein the attribute characteristics of the second state characterization physical device do not satisfy a preset theoretical attribute; i.e., representing the imperfect characteristics of the physical device, which is a generic term for deviations from the theoretical framework. For example, the emission power of the laser is 1mW, but the power can generate certain fluctuation in the working process of an actual device, which is imperfect; for example, the attenuation of the attenuator is set to 10dB, but the attenuation value changes slightly at different moments, which is also a fluctuation; such as the later mentioned Trojan attack leakage, fluorescence attack leakage, etc., are all different kinds of imperfections.
Characteristic information of the physical device in the second state is first obtained so that imperfect characteristics of the physical device can be obtained. The calculation modes of the correction factors corresponding to the different imperfect characteristics are different, and the corresponding calculation modes are selected through the characteristic information in the second state.
And then calculating the security key rate by the correction factor and the security key rate in the first state. One implementation is to calculate the product of the secure key rate in the first state and the respective correction factor in the second state, and determine the product as the target secure key rate. The target security key is a final key obtained by calculation under the condition that the physical device meets the preset theoretical attribute and does not meet the preset theoretical attribute. Another implementation may also set a weight value corresponding to each feature information, then calculate the product of the weight value and the correction factor, and then multiply the product with the security key rate in the first state. This represents a proportion of the imperfect properties of the physical device.
The calculating the secure key rate of the physical device in the first state based on the above embodiment includes:
and calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the first state by using a decoy-state security key rate formula of the weak coherent light pulse.
The decoy-state security key rate formula for a weak coherent light pulse can be expressed as:
wherein,
correspondingly, Q represents the base vector selection efficiency, μ represents the signal state average photon number, ν represents the decoy state average photon number, Q μ Represents the detection rate of signal state, Q ν Represents the decoy detection rate, Q 0 Indicating the vacuum state detection rate, E μ Representing signal state error rate, E ν Represents the decoy error rate, f (E μ ) Indicating error correction efficiency, H 2 (x)＝x*log 2 (x)-(1-x)*log 2 (1-x) represents a binary Shannon function, Y 1 μ Representing the yield of single photon states in the signal state pulse,represents the error rate (upper limit) of the single photon state, e 0 =1/2 indicates the vacuum state error rate, +.>The vacuum state yield (lower limit) is indicated.
In order to facilitate obtaining a secure key rate of the physical device in said second state, embodiments of the present application further comprise:
and creating a safe key rate calculation formula list according to the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state, wherein the safe key rate calculation formula list comprises a plurality of safe key rate calculation formulas, and each safe key rate calculation formula is matched with the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state.
The secure key rate calculation formula of the physical device in the second state is stored in the secure key rate calculation formula list, so that the secure key rate calculation formula is convenient to call and search, and the processing time can be saved.
On the basis of the foregoing embodiment, the calculating, according to the feature information, correction factors of the physical device in the second state includes:
inquiring a target safe key rate calculation formula matched with the characteristic information in the safe key rate calculation formula list according to the characteristic information;
according to the target secure key rate calculation formula, calculating to obtain the secure key rate of the physical device in the second state;
acquiring a secure key rate of the physical device in the first state;
calculating the ratio of the secure key rate in the second state to the secure key rate in the first state, and determining the ratio as a correction factor of the physical device in the second state.
The present application is described below in terms of different imperfect properties of the physical devices.
Considering quantum state mode inconsistencies, the secure key rate may be calculated using the following formula:
wherein,
correspondingly ρ μ Density matrix representing signal states ρ ν The physical meaning of other parameters of the density matrix representing the decoy state is consistent with the formula (1), and the description is omitted here.
Therefore, when the inconsistency of the quantum state modes is considered, the corresponding correction factor is that
Considering the amount of Trojan light information leakage, the security key rate can be calculated using the following formula:
K 2 ＝q{-Q μ f(E μ )H 2 (E μ )+μe -μ Y 1 μ [1-H 2 (e 1 ′)]} (3)
wherein,
correspondingly, e 1 Represents the error rate, mu, of a single photon state out The average photon number of the Trojan horse emitted light which can be received by an attacker is shown, and other physical meanings of parameters are consistent with formulas (1) and (2), and are not described in detail herein.
Therefore, when the light information leakage amount of Trojan is considered, the corresponding correction factor is that
Considering the amount of detector fluorescence information leakage, the security key rate can be calculated using the following formula:
wherein,
A＝(μe -μ Y 1 μ -P E )/μe -μ Y 1 μ 。
correspondingly, e 1 Representing the error rate of a single photon state, P E And (3) indicating the leakage amount of fluorescence photon information, wherein the physical meaning of other parameters is the same as that of formulas (1) - (3).
Thus, when the leakage amount of the fluorescence information of the detector is considered, the corresponding correction factor is that
Therefore, according to the calculation method of the present invention, the secure key rate, which takes account of both pattern inconsistency and Trojan light information leakage correction, can be calculated as: r is R 1 ＝K 0 p 1 p 2 。
The secure key rate, taking into account both pattern inconsistencies and detector fluorescence leak correction, can be calculated as: r is R 2 ＝K 0 p 1 p 3 。
Meanwhile, the safe key rate for correcting the light information leakage of the Trojan horse and the fluorescence leakage of the detector can be calculated as follows: r is R 3 ＝K 0 p 2 p 3 。
Meanwhile, the safety key rate for correcting the light information leakage of the Trojan horse and the fluorescent information leakage of the detector by considering the mode inconsistency can be calculated as follows: r is R 4 ＝K 0 P 1 P 2 P 3 。
Therefore, in the present invention, the security key rate is calculated to be K under ideal conditions, firstly, irrespective of imperfect characteristics of various physical devices 0 。
Specifically, only the imperfect characteristics of the physical device 1 are considered, and the security key rate calculated by using the correlation formula is K 1 (K 1 ＜K 0 ) Then consider the secure key rate correction factor for physical device 1 as
The security key rate calculated by using the correlation formula is K considering only the imperfect characteristics of the physical device 2 2 (K 2 ＜K 0 ) Then the secure key rate correction factor is considered when the physical device 2The son is
And so on, only considering the imperfect characteristics of the physical device n, where n is a positive integer not less than 2, the security key rate calculated by the formula in the related literature is K n (K n ＜K 0 ) Then consider the secure key rate correction factor for physical device n as
Finally, the secure key rate when considering the imperfect properties of the physical devices 1, 2, … n at the same time is: k=k 0 P 1 P 2 ...P n 。
It should be noted that any two physical devices in the n physical devices may be the same physical device or may be different physical devices. The above-described method of calculating the secure key rate can be understood to take into account the different imperfect properties of the same physical device when it is the same.
The invention provides a method for calculating a safe key rate in quantum communication, which is used for calculating the safe key rate of a physical device in a first state, wherein the first state represents that the attribute characteristics of the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes; acquiring characteristic information of the physical device meeting the second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes; respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state according to the characteristic information; and calculating to obtain the target security key rate according to the security key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state. According to the invention, under the condition that the attribute characteristics of the physical device do not meet the preset theoretical attribute, the correction factor of the physical device is calculated, and then the security key rate is calculated, so that the security key rate can be calculated under the condition that the actual characteristics of various devices are considered, and the purpose of improving the security key rate accuracy in quantum communication is realized.
In an embodiment of the present invention, there is also provided a device for calculating a secure key rate in quantum communication, referring to fig. 2, the device including:
a first calculating unit 10, configured to calculate a security key rate of the physical device in a first state, where the first state characterizes that an attribute feature of the physical device meets a preset theoretical attribute;
a feature acquiring unit 20, configured to acquire feature information of a physical device that satisfies a second state, where an attribute feature of the second state characterizes the physical device does not satisfy a preset theoretical attribute;
a second calculating unit 30, configured to calculate correction factors of the physical devices in the second state according to the feature information;
a third calculating unit 40, configured to calculate a target security key rate according to the security key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state.
On the basis of the above embodiment, the first computing unit is specifically configured to:
and calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the first state by using a decoy-state security key rate formula of the weak coherent light pulse.
On the basis of the above embodiment, the apparatus further includes:
the list creation unit is used for creating a safe key rate calculation formula list according to the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state, wherein the safe key rate calculation formula list comprises a plurality of safe key rate calculation formulas, and each safe key rate calculation formula is matched with the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state.
On the basis of the above embodiment, the second calculation unit includes:
the inquiring subunit is used for inquiring a target safe key rate calculation formula matched with the characteristic information in the safe key rate calculation formula list according to the characteristic information;
the first calculating subunit is used for calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the second state according to the target security key rate calculation formula;
an acquisition subunit, configured to acquire a secure key rate of the physical device in the first state;
and the second calculating subunit is used for calculating the ratio of the security key rate in the second state to the security key rate in the first state, and determining the ratio as a correction factor of the physical device in the second state.
On the basis of the above embodiment, the third computing unit is specifically configured to:
and calculating the product of the secure key rate in the first state and each correction factor in the second state, and determining the product as a target secure key rate.
The invention provides a device for calculating a safe key rate in quantum communication, which is used for calculating the safe key rate of a physical device in a first state, wherein the first state represents that the attribute characteristics of the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes; acquiring characteristic information of the physical device meeting the second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes; respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state according to the characteristic information; and calculating to obtain the target security key rate according to the security key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state. According to the invention, under the condition that the attribute characteristics of the physical device do not meet the preset theoretical attribute, the correction factor of the physical device is calculated, and then the security key rate is calculated, so that the security key rate can be calculated under the condition that the actual characteristics of various devices are considered, and the purpose of improving the security key rate accuracy in quantum communication is realized.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a storage medium which stores executable instructions which when executed by a processor realize the method for calculating the secure key rate in quantum communication.
The embodiment of the invention also provides electronic equipment, which comprises:
a memory for storing a program;
and a processor for executing the program, wherein the program is specifically used for realizing the method for calculating the secure key rate in quantum communication.
The processor or CPU may be at least one of an application specific integrated circuit (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), a digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processor, DSP), a digital signal processing device (Digital Signal Processing Device, DSPD), a programmable logic device (Programmable Logic Device, PLD), a field programmable gate array (Field Programmable Gate Array, FPGA), a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), a controller, a microcontroller, and a microprocessor. It will be appreciated that the electronic device implementing the above-mentioned processor function may be other, and embodiments of the present application are not specifically limited.
The computer storage medium/Memory may be a Read Only Memory (ROM), a programmable Read Only Memory (Programmable Read-Only Memory, PROM), an erasable programmable Read Only Memory (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable Read Only Memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EEPROM), a magnetic random access Memory (Ferromagnetic Random Access Memory, FRAM), a Flash Memory (Flash Memory), a magnetic surface Memory, an optical disk, or a compact disk Read Only Memory (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory, CD-ROM), or the like; but may also be various terminals such as mobile phones, computers, tablet devices, personal digital assistants, etc., that include one or any combination of the above-mentioned memories.
In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method may be implemented in other ways. The above described device embodiments are only illustrative, e.g. the division of the units is only one logical function division, and there may be other divisions in practice, such as: multiple units or components may be combined or may be integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not performed. In addition, the various components shown or discussed may be coupled or directly coupled or communicatively coupled to each other via some interface, whether indirectly coupled or communicatively coupled to devices or units, whether electrically, mechanically, or otherwise.
The units described as separate units may or may not be physically separate, and units displayed as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units; some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated in one processing module, or each unit may be separately used as one unit, or two or more units may be integrated in one unit; the integrated units may be implemented in hardware or in hardware plus software functional units. Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that: all or part of the steps for implementing the above method embodiments may be implemented by hardware associated with program instructions, where the foregoing program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and when executed, the program performs steps including the above method embodiments; and the aforementioned storage medium includes: a mobile storage device, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a random access Memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, or the like, which can store program codes. In the present specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment is mainly described in a different point from other embodiments, and identical and similar parts between the embodiments are all enough to refer to each other. For the device disclosed in the embodiment, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant points refer to the description of the method section.
The previous description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.
Claims (12)
1. A method for computing a secure key rate in quantum communications, the method comprising:
calculating the security key rate of the physical device in a first state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the first state representing the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes;
acquiring characteristic information of a physical device meeting a second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes;
selecting a corresponding calculation mode according to the characteristic information, and respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state;
and calculating to obtain a target safe key rate according to the safe key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the computing the secure key rate of the physical device in the first state comprises:
and calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the first state by using a decoy-state security key rate formula of the weak coherent light pulse.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:
and creating a safe key rate calculation formula list according to the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state, wherein the safe key rate calculation formula list comprises a plurality of safe key rate calculation formulas, and each safe key rate calculation formula is matched with the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein selecting a corresponding calculation mode according to the feature information, and calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state respectively, includes:
inquiring a target safe key rate calculation formula matched with the characteristic information in the safe key rate calculation formula list according to the characteristic information;
according to the target secure key rate calculation formula, calculating to obtain the secure key rate of the physical device in the second state;
acquiring a secure key rate of the physical device in the first state;
calculating the ratio of the secure key rate in the second state to the secure key rate in the first state, and determining the ratio as a correction factor of the physical device in the second state.
5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein said calculating a target security key rate based on said security key rate in the first state and said correction factor in the second state comprises:
and calculating the product of the secure key rate in the first state and each correction factor in the second state, and determining the product as a target secure key rate.
6. A computing device for secure key rate in quantum communications, the device comprising:
the first computing unit is used for computing the security key rate of the physical device in a first state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the first state representing the physical device meet preset theoretical attributes;
the characteristic acquisition unit is used for acquiring characteristic information of the physical device meeting a second state, wherein the attribute characteristics of the physical device represented by the second state do not meet preset theoretical attributes;
the second calculation unit is used for selecting a corresponding calculation mode according to the characteristic information and respectively calculating correction factors of the physical device in the second state;
and the third calculation unit is used for calculating the target security key rate according to the security key rate in the first state and the correction factor in the second state.
7. The apparatus according to claim 6, wherein the first computing unit is specifically configured to:
and calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the first state by using a decoy-state security key rate formula of the weak coherent light pulse.
8. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the apparatus further comprises:
the list creation unit is used for creating a safe key rate calculation formula list according to the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state, wherein the safe key rate calculation formula list comprises a plurality of safe key rate calculation formulas, and each safe key rate calculation formula is matched with the attribute characteristics of the physical device in the second state.
9. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the second computing unit comprises:
the inquiring subunit is used for inquiring a target safe key rate calculation formula matched with the characteristic information in the safe key rate calculation formula list according to the characteristic information;
the first calculating subunit is used for calculating the security key rate of the physical device in the second state according to the target security key rate calculation formula;
an acquisition subunit, configured to acquire a secure key rate of the physical device in the first state;
and the second calculating subunit is used for calculating the ratio of the security key rate in the second state to the security key rate in the first state, and determining the ratio as a correction factor of the physical device in the second state.
10. The apparatus according to any one of claims 6 to 9, wherein the third computing unit is specifically configured to:
and calculating the product of the secure key rate in the first state and each correction factor in the second state, and determining the product as a target secure key rate.
11. A storage medium storing executable instructions which when executed by a processor implement a method of computing a secure key rate in quantum communications according to any one of claims 1 to 5.
12. An electronic device, comprising:
a memory for storing a program;
processor for executing said program, in particular for implementing a method of calculating a secure key rate in quantum communication according to any of claims 1-5.
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| CN108599949A (en) * | 2018-08-06 | 2018-09-28 | 山西大学 | A kind of security key rate calculations method and system |
| CN109067519A (en) * | 2018-07-25 | 2018-12-21 | 厦门科华恒盛股份有限公司 | A kind of method, system and the relevant apparatus of adjustment amount sub-key update frequency |
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| CN109067519A (en) * | 2018-07-25 | 2018-12-21 | 厦门科华恒盛股份有限公司 | A kind of method, system and the relevant apparatus of adjustment amount sub-key update frequency |
| CN108599949A (en) * | 2018-08-06 | 2018-09-28 | 山西大学 | A kind of security key rate calculations method and system |
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