CN114548649A - Active reactor cavity water injection system availability evaluation method combined with passive reactor cavity water injection system - Google Patents
Active reactor cavity water injection system availability evaluation method combined with passive reactor cavity water injection system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of safety evaluation of nuclear power plants, and particularly relates to an active reactor cavity water injection system availability evaluation method combined with non-active power. The method comprises the following steps: 1) drawing a simplified flow chart of the reactor cavity water injection cooling system; 2) constructing a system availability fault tree logic diagram: and constructing a system failure fault tree logic diagram according to a reactor cavity water injection cooling system simplified flow diagram by adopting an AND gate, an OR gate and a transfer gate, wherein the state of the terminal equipment is used as a basic event of the fault tree: 3) acquiring equipment state parameters: acquiring state parameters of each device in the reactor cavity water injection cooling system, wherein the device can be represented by 0, and the device cannot be represented by 1; 4) through logic calculation of the fault tree, when the result is 0, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is available; when the result is 1, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is not available. The invention saves the time for evaluation, improves the accident decision efficiency and has accurate availability evaluation.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of safety evaluation of nuclear power plants, and particularly relates to an active reactor cavity water injection system availability evaluation method combined with non-active power.
Background
The reactor cavity water injection cooling system has the functions that after a serious accident of reactor core melting occurs, the heat of reactor core melt is taken away by cooling the outer wall of the pressure vessel, the temperature of the outer wall of the reactor pressure vessel is reduced, the integrity of the pressure vessel is maintained, the reactor core melt in the pressure vessel is retained, and radioactive melt is prevented from being leaked into a containment. Therefore, the equipment running state of the reactor cavity water injection cooling system must be acquired in real time.
According to the terms of the nuclear power plant major accident management guide (SAMG), technical support personnel of the power plant are required to manually check the states of equipment such as a water supply source, a pump, a valve, a power supply and the like of the reactor cavity water injection cooling system one by one according to a chart in the guide as shown in a table 1, and then the availability of the system is comprehensively judged.
The main disadvantages of this method are (1) long time for judgment and low efficiency; (2) obtaining such device status or availability information is time consuming; (2) occupy more personnel and energy, under the accident operating mode, need more manpower.
Based on the problems in the prior art, an improved method for evaluating the usability of the active reactor cavity water injection system in combination with the passive reactor cavity water injection system is urgently needed.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an active reactor cavity water injection system availability evaluation method combined with a passive reactor cavity, which can quickly obtain system availability evaluation in real time under accident conditions and improve the safety level of a nuclear power plant.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a usability evaluation method of a passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system comprises the following steps:
1) drawing a simplified flow chart of the reactor cavity water injection cooling system;
2) constructing a system availability fault tree logic diagram: adopting an AND gate, an OR gate and a transfer gate, constructing a system failure fault tree logic diagram according to the reactor cavity water injection cooling system simplified flow diagram in the step 1), and taking the state of the terminal equipment as a basic event of the fault tree:
3) acquiring equipment state parameters: acquiring state parameters of each device in the reactor cavity water injection cooling system through a nuclear power plant information system and a data interface, wherein the device can be represented by 0, and the device cannot be represented by 1;
4) usability evaluation: through logic calculation of the fault tree, when the result is 0, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is available; when the result is 1, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is not available.
The reactor cavity water injection cooling system in the step 1) comprises an active reactor cavity water injection system and a passive reactor cavity water injection system which are arranged in parallel; the passive reactor cavity water injection system comprises a reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank and two passive water injection pipelines; the reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank is connected with the pressure vessel through two passive water injection pipelines which are arranged in parallel; the cooling water of the reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank realizes passive reactor cavity injection by means of gravity.
The active reactor cavity water injection system comprises a refueling water tank, an A-row active water injection pipeline and a B-row active water injection pipeline which are arranged in parallel; the refueling water tank is connected with the pressure vessel through an A/B row active water injection pipeline arranged in parallel.
Each path of active water injection pipeline comprises an electric valve, a check valve, a manual valve, an electric water taking pump, a normally closed electric valve, a second check valve and a second manual valve which are sequentially connected, wherein the left side of the electric valve is connected with the material changing water tank, and the right side of the second manual valve is connected with the pressure container. The fire-fighting water is connected with the third manual valve and then is connected with the active water injection pipeline.
Fire water is arranged between the check valve and the manual valve of each path of the active water injection pipeline.
The active reactor cavity water injection system also comprises a water injection pump, an alternating current/direct current power supply and an equipment cooling system.
Setting the initial value of the pipeline equipment in the step 3) as 0, and setting the state parameter of the pipeline equipment as 1 when the pipeline is damaged and loses functions in the event site feedback; the initial values of the manual valve and the check valve are 0, and the state parameter is set to 1 when the equipment is unavailable; the availability of the water tank is judged by the liquid level of the water tank, and when the liquid level is higher than 2.1m, the equipment state is 0; when the liquid level is less than 2.1m, the equipment state is 1, and the equipment is regarded as unusable.
The fault tree of the energy-dynamic reactor cavity water injection system in the step 2) comprises three layers of basic events: the first layer of basic events comprise failure of a water injection valve, failure of water taking of a material changing water tank and failure of water taking of a fire pool; the three basic events are in a logical or relationship.
And the second-layer basic events corresponding to the failure of the water injection valve comprise the failure of a manual valve and the failure of a check valve which are in logic or relationship with each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the water taking failure of the material changing water tank comprise a water taking failure of the A-row material changing water tank and a water taking failure of the B-row material changing water tank, which are in a logic and relationship with each other.
The third layer of basic events corresponding to water taking failure of the A-column refueling water tank comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water intake of the A-row refueling water tank is failed, the A-row electric water intake pump is failed, and the pipeline behind the A-row pump is failed; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate.
The third layer of basic events corresponding to water taking failure of the refueling water tank in the column B comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water intake of the B-row refueling water tank is failed, the B-row electric water intake pump is failed, and a rear pipeline of the B-row pump is failed; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate.
The second layer basic event corresponding to the water taking failure of the fire-fighting water pool comprises the water taking failure of the A-row fire-fighting water pool and the water taking failure of the B-row fire-fighting water pool which are in logic and relation with each other. The third layer of basic events corresponding to the water intake failure of the A-column fire pool comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the A-row fire pool water taking is invalid, the A-row electric water taking pump is invalid, and the A-row post-pump pipeline is invalid; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate. The third layer of basic events corresponding to water intake failure of the fire-fighting water pool in the column B comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water intake of the fire-fighting water pool in the B row fails, the electric water intake pump in the B row fails, and a pipeline behind the pump in the B row fails; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate.
The failure fault tree of the water taking line of the refueling water tank in the A row or the B row comprises four layers of basic events. The first layer of basic events comprise the failure of a refueling water tank, the failure of an electric valve and the failure of a water taking pipeline which are in a logic or relationship with each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the refueling water tank comprise blockage of a refueling water tank filter screen and low water level of the refueling water tank, wherein the blockage is in a logic and relation with each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the water taking pipeline failure comprise manual valve failure, check valve failure, electric valve failure and pipeline failure which are in logic or relationship with each other.
The third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve comprise the failure of the electric valve power supply and the failure of the electric valve body, which are in a logic OR relationship with each other. The third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve power supply comprise the loss of power of a 380V alternating current power supply, the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply and the loss of power of a 48V direct current power supply which are in a logical OR relationship with each other.
The A/B water pump failure fault tree includes two layers of base events. The first layer of basic events includes pump body failure, pump power loss, pump cooling water loss, which are logical or relationships to each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the loss of the pump power supply comprise the loss of power of a 6.6kV emergency alternating current power supply and the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply which are in a logic or relation with each other.
The post pump water line failure fault tree for column a or B includes four base events. The first layer of basic events includes an in-containment line valve failure, a pipe failure, an out-of-containment line valve failure that are logical or relationships to each other. And the second layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the pipeline valve in the containment vessel comprise the failure of a check valve and the failure of a manual valve which are in a logic and relationship with each other. And the second layer basic events corresponding to the failure of the containment external pipeline valve comprise the failure of a manual valve, the failure of an A/B column electric valve and the failure of a check valve which are in a logic or relationship with each other. The third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the A/B column of electric valves comprise the failure of electric valve power supply and the failure of electric valve body which are in logic or relationship with each other. The fourth layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve power supply comprise the loss of power of a 380V alternating current power supply, the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply and the loss of power of a 48V direct current power supply which are in a logic OR relationship with each other.
The failure fault tree of the fire water intake pipeline of the A or B line comprises three layers of basic events. The first floor of basic events includes manual valve failure, pipeline failure, fire water production/distribution system pipeline failure that are logical or relationships to each other. And the second layer of basic events corresponding to the pipeline failure of the fire-fighting water production/distribution system comprise the failure of a manual valve of the nuclear island fire-fighting water production system and the failure of a manual valve of the nuclear island fire-fighting water distribution system which are in logic or relationship with each other. The manual valve failure of the nuclear island fire-fighting water production system comprises the manual valve 1 failure and the third manual valve failure which are in logic and relation with each other.
The usability evaluation method of the passive reactor cavity water injection system can also be used for evaluating the usability of the passive reactor cavity water injection system.
The beneficial effects obtained by the invention are as follows:
1. the usability evaluation is accurate;
2. the time for evaluation is saved, the accident decision efficiency is improved, and the system availability is quickly obtained in real time under the accident working condition;
3. the evaluation result is helpful for making a strategy for alleviating water injection to the reactor cavity in a severe accident stage;
4. the fault tree method is convenient to popularize and apply.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a prior art method of confirming the availability of water injection equipment to a reactor cavity;
FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a method for evaluating the availability of an active reactor cavity water injection system combined with a passive reactor cavity;
FIG. 3 is a simplified flow diagram of a reactor cavity water injection cooling system;
FIG. 4 is a fault tree of the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system;
FIG. 5 is a failure tree for water intake from the refueling water tank of the A/B row;
FIG. 6 is a tree of failure of the A/B water intake pump;
FIG. 7 is a fault tree for a water intake line failure after an A/B row of pumps;
FIG. 8 is a fault tree in the failure of the A/B line fire water intake pipeline;
fig. 9 is a device status parameter definition table.
In the figure: 11: logic or gate, 12: basic event, 13: logical and gate, 14: a transfer door; 1: electric valve, 2: check valve, 3: a manual valve, 4; electric water intake pump, 5: a normally closed electric valve.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
As shown in FIG. 1, the invention provides a method for evaluating the availability of a passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system, which comprises the following steps:
1) drawing a simplified flow chart of the reactor cavity water injection cooling system;
2) constructing a system availability fault tree logic diagram: adopting an AND gate, an OR gate and a transfer gate, constructing a system failure fault tree logic diagram according to the simplified flow diagram of the reactor cavity water injection cooling system in the step 1), and taking the state of the terminal equipment as a basic event of the fault tree:
3) acquiring equipment state parameters: acquiring state parameters of each device in the reactor cavity water injection cooling system through a nuclear power plant information system and a data interface, wherein the device can be represented by 0, and the device cannot be represented by 1;
4) usability evaluation: through logic calculation of the fault tree, when the result is 0, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is available; when the result is 1, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is not available.
The reactor cavity water injection cooling system in the step 1) comprises an active reactor cavity water injection system and a passive reactor cavity water injection system which are arranged in parallel; the passive reactor cavity water injection system comprises a reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank and two passive water injection pipelines; the reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank is connected with the pressure vessel through two passive water injection pipelines which are arranged in parallel; the cooling water of the reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank realizes passive reactor cavity injection by means of gravity.
The active reactor cavity water injection system comprises a refueling water tank, an A-row active water injection pipeline and a B-row active water injection pipeline which are arranged in parallel; the refueling water tank is connected with the pressure vessel through an A/B row active water injection pipeline arranged in parallel.
Each path of active water injection pipeline comprises an electric valve 1, a check valve 2, a manual valve 3, an electric water taking pump 4, a normally closed electric valve 5, a second check valve and a second manual valve which are connected in sequence, wherein the left side of the electric valve 1 is connected with a material changing water tank, and the right side of the second manual valve is connected with a pressure container. The fire-fighting water is connected with the third manual valve and then is connected with the active water injection pipeline.
Fire water is arranged between the check valve 2 and the manual valve 3 of each path of the active water injection pipeline.
The active reactor cavity water injection system also comprises a water injection pump, an alternating current/direct current power supply and an equipment cooling system.
Each row of the A row of active water injection pipelines and the B row of active water injection pipelines is provided with a 380V emergency alternating current power supply, a 110V direct current power supply, a 48V direct current power supply and a 6.6kV emergency alternating current power supply.
Setting the initial value of the pipeline equipment in the step 3) as 0, and setting the state parameter of the pipeline equipment as 1 when the pipeline is damaged and loses functions in the event site feedback; the initial values of the manual valve and the check valve are 0, and the state parameter is set to 1 when the equipment is unavailable; the availability of the water tank is judged by the liquid level of the water tank, and when the liquid level is higher than 2.1m, the equipment state is 0; when the liquid level is less than 2.1m, the equipment state is 1, and the equipment is regarded as unusable. The status parameters of each device are shown in fig. 9. The available judgment standard of the 380V emergency alternating current power supply of the A/B column is that the voltage is larger than or equal to 342V. The available judgment standard of the A/B column 110V direct current power supply is that the voltage is larger than 102.3V. The available judgment standard of the A/B column 48V direct current power supply is that the voltage is more than 30V. The available judgment standard of the A/B column 6.6kV emergency alternating-current power supply is that the voltage is more than 0.8 Un. The available judgment standard of the cooling water of the electric pump is that the cooling water flow of a pump motor winding is more than 0.8Qn and the winding temperature is less than or equal to 95 ℃; the unavailable judgment standard is that the cooling water flow of the pump motor winding is less than or equal to 0.8Qn or the winding temperature is more than 95 ℃.
The fault tree of the energy-dynamic reactor cavity water injection system in the step 2) comprises three layers of basic events: the first layer of basic events comprise failure of a water injection valve, failure of water intake of a material replacing water tank and failure of water intake of a fire pool; the three basic events are in a logical or relationship.
The second layer basic events corresponding to the failure of the water injection valve comprise the failure of a manual valve and the failure of a check valve which are in logic or relationship with each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the water taking failure of the material changing water tank comprise a water taking failure of the A-row material changing water tank and a water taking failure of the B-row material changing water tank, which are in a logic and relationship with each other.
The third layer of basic events corresponding to water taking failure of the A-column refueling water tank comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water intake of the A-row refueling water tank is failed, the A-row electric water intake pump is failed, and the pipeline behind the A-row pump is failed; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate.
The third layer of basic events corresponding to water taking failure of the refueling water tank in the column B comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water intake of the B-row refueling water tank is failed, the B-row electric water intake pump is failed, and a rear pipeline of the B-row pump is failed; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate.
The second layer basic event corresponding to the water taking failure of the fire-fighting water pool comprises the water taking failure of the A-row fire-fighting water pool and the water taking failure of the B-row fire-fighting water pool which are in logic and relation with each other. The third layer of basic events corresponding to the water intake failure of the A-column fire pool comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the A-row fire pool water taking is invalid, the A-row electric water taking pump is invalid, and the A-row post-pump pipeline is invalid; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate. The third layer of basic events corresponding to water intake failure of the fire-fighting water pool in the column B comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water intake of the fire-fighting water pool in the B row fails, the electric water intake pump in the B row fails, and a pipeline behind the pump in the B row fails; the three basic events described above are each provided with a transfer gate.
The failure fault tree of the water taking pipeline of the refueling water tank in the A line or the B line comprises four layers of basic events. The first layer of basic events comprise the failure of a refueling water tank, the failure of an electric valve and the failure of a water taking pipeline which are in a logic or relationship with each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the refueling water tank comprise blockage of a refueling water tank filter screen and low water level of the refueling water tank, wherein the blockage is in a logic and relation with each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the water taking pipeline failure comprise manual valve failure, check valve failure, electric valve failure and pipeline failure which are in logic or relationship with each other.
The third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve comprise the failure of the electric valve power supply and the failure of the electric valve body, which are in a logic OR relationship with each other. The third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve power supply comprise the loss of power of a 380V alternating current power supply, the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply and the loss of power of a 48V direct current power supply which are in a logical OR relationship with each other.
The A/B water pump failure fault tree includes two layers of base events. The first layer of basic events includes pump body failure, pump power loss, pump cooling water loss, which are logical or relationships to each other.
The second layer of basic events corresponding to the loss of the pump power supply comprise the loss of power of a 6.6kV emergency alternating current power supply and the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply which are in a logic or relation with each other.
The post pump water line failure fault tree for column a or B includes four base events. The first layer of basic events include an in-containment line valve failure, a pipe failure, an out-of-containment line valve failure that are logical or relationships to each other. And the second layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the pipeline valve in the containment vessel comprise the failure of a check valve and the failure of a manual valve which are in a logic and relationship with each other. And the second layer basic events corresponding to the failure of the containment external pipeline valve comprise the failure of a manual valve, the failure of an A/B column electric valve and the failure of a check valve which are in a logic or relationship with each other. The third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the A/B column of electric valves comprise the failure of electric valve power supply and the failure of electric valve body which are in logic or relationship with each other. The fourth layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve power supply comprise the loss of power of a 380V alternating current power supply, the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply and the loss of power of a 48V direct current power supply which are in a logic OR relationship with each other.
The failure fault tree of the fire water intake pipeline of the A or B line comprises three layers of basic events. The first floor of basic events includes manual valve failure, pipeline failure, fire water production/distribution system pipeline failure that are logical or relationships to each other. And the second layer of basic events corresponding to the pipeline failure of the fire-fighting water production/distribution system comprise the failure of a manual valve of the nuclear island fire-fighting water production system and the failure of a manual valve of the nuclear island fire-fighting water distribution system which are in logic or relationship with each other. The manual valve failure of the nuclear island fire-fighting water production system comprises the manual valve 1 failure and the third manual valve failure which are in logic and relation with each other.
The usability evaluation method of the passive reactor cavity water injection system can also be used for evaluating the usability of the passive reactor cavity water injection system.
Claims (10)
1. A usability evaluation method of a passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system is characterized by comprising the following steps: the method comprises the following steps:
1) drawing a simplified flow chart of the reactor cavity water injection cooling system;
2) constructing a system availability fault tree logic diagram: adopting an AND gate, an OR gate and a transfer gate, constructing a system failure fault tree logic diagram according to the reactor cavity water injection cooling system simplified flow diagram in the step 1), and taking the state of the terminal equipment as a basic event of the fault tree:
3) acquiring equipment state parameters: acquiring state parameters of each device in the reactor cavity water injection cooling system through a nuclear power plant information system and a data interface, wherein the device can be represented by 0, and the device cannot be represented by 1;
4) and (3) availability evaluation: through logic calculation of the fault tree, when the result is 0, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is available; when the result is 1, the active reactor cavity water injection cooling system is not available.
2. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 1, wherein: the reactor cavity water injection cooling system in the step 1) comprises an active reactor cavity water injection system and a passive reactor cavity water injection system which are arranged in parallel; the passive reactor cavity water injection system comprises a reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank and two passive water injection pipelines; the reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank is connected with the pressure vessel through two passive water injection pipelines which are arranged in parallel; the cooling water of the reactor cavity water injection cooling water tank realizes passive reactor cavity injection by means of gravity.
3. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 2, wherein: the water injection system of the energy-driven reactor cavity in the step 1) comprises a material changing water tank, an A-row active water injection pipeline and a B-row active water injection pipeline which are arranged in parallel; the refueling water tank is connected with the pressure vessel through an A/B row active water injection pipeline arranged in parallel; each active water injection pipeline comprises an electric valve (1), a check valve (2), a manual valve (3), an electric water taking pump (4), a normally closed electric valve (5), a second check valve and a second manual valve which are connected in sequence, wherein the left side of the electric valve (1) is connected with a material changing water tank, and the right side of the second manual valve is connected with a pressure container; fire fighting water is arranged between the check valve (2) and the manual valve (3) of each active water injection pipeline; the fire-fighting water is connected with the third manual valve and then is connected with the active water injection pipeline.
4. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 3, wherein: in the step 3), the initial value of the pipeline equipment is set to be 0, and when the equipment is unavailable, the state parameter is set to be 1; the initial values of the manual valve and the check valve are 0, and the state parameter is set to 1 when the equipment is unavailable; the availability of the water tank is judged by the liquid level of the water tank, and when the liquid level is higher than 2.1m, the equipment state is 0; when the liquid level is less than 2.1m, the equipment state is 1.
5. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 4, wherein: the fault tree of the energy-driven reactor cavity water injection system in the step 2) comprises three layers of basic events: the first layer of basic events comprise failure of a water injection valve, failure of water taking of a material changing water tank and failure of water taking of a fire pool, and the three basic events are in a logical OR relationship; the second layer basic events corresponding to the failure of the water injection valve comprise the failure of a manual valve and the failure of a check valve which are in logic or relationship with each other; the second layer of basic events corresponding to the water taking failure of the refueling water tank comprise a water taking failure of the A-row refueling water tank and a water taking failure of the B-row refueling water tank which are in a logic and relationship with each other; the third layer of basic events corresponding to water taking failure of the A-column refueling water tank comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water taking failure of the A-row refueling water tank, the failure of the A-row electric water taking pump and the failure of a pipeline behind the A-row pump are all provided with a transfer door; the third layer of basic events corresponding to water taking failure of the refueling water tank in the column B comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the water taking failure of the B-row refueling water tank, the failure of the B-row electric water taking pump and the failure of a pipeline behind the B-row pump are all provided with a transfer door; the second layer of basic events corresponding to the water taking failure of the fire pool comprise a water taking failure of an A-row fire pool and a water taking failure of a B-row fire pool which are in a logic and relationship with each other; the third layer of basic events corresponding to the water intake failure of the A-column fire pool comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the method comprises the following steps that A row of fire-fighting water pools fail to take water, A row of electric water taking pumps fail to take water, and A row of rear pipelines fail to take water, and a transfer door is arranged in each of the three basic events; the third layer of basic events corresponding to water intake failure of the fire-fighting water pool in the column B comprise three basic events which are in logic or relationship with each other: the three basic events comprise that the water intake of the fire-fighting water pool in the row B is failed, the electric water intake pump in the row B is failed, and a pipeline behind the pump in the row B is failed, wherein a transfer door is arranged in each of the three basic events.
6. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 5, wherein: the failure fault tree of the water taking pipeline of the refueling water tank in the row A or the row B in the step 2) comprises four layers of basic events; the first layer of basic events comprise failure of a refueling water tank, failure of an electric valve and failure of a water taking pipeline which are in a logic or relation with each other; the second layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the refueling water tank comprise blockage of a refueling water tank filter screen and low water level of the refueling water tank, which are in a logic and relationship with each other; the second layer of basic events corresponding to the water taking pipeline failure comprise manual valve failure, check valve failure, electric valve failure and pipeline failure which are in logic or relationship with each other; the third layer of basic events corresponding to the electric valve failure comprise the electric valve power failure and the electric valve body failure which are in a logic or relation with each other; the third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve power supply comprise the loss of power of a 380V alternating current power supply, the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply and the loss of power of a 48V direct current power supply which are in a logical OR relationship with each other.
7. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 6, wherein: the failure fault tree of the water taking pump in the step 2) comprises two layers of basic events; the first layer of basic events comprise failure of a pump body, loss of power supply of the pump and loss of cooling water of the pump which are in logic or relationship with each other; the second layer of basic events corresponding to the loss of the pump power supply comprise the loss of power of a 6.6kV emergency alternating current power supply and the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply which are in a logic or relation with each other.
8. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 7, wherein: the failure fault tree of the water intake pipeline behind the A or B row of pumps in the step 2) comprises four layers of basic events; the first layer of basic events comprise pipeline valve failure, pipeline failure and pipeline valve failure outside the containment vessel which are in a logical or relationship with each other; the second layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the pipeline valve in the containment vessel comprise the failure of a check valve and the failure of a manual valve which are in a logic and relationship with each other; the second layer basic events corresponding to the failure of the containment outer pipeline valve comprise failure of a manual valve, failure of an A/B column electric valve and failure of a check valve which are in a logic or relationship with each other; the third layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the A/B row of electric valves comprise the failure of electric valve power supplies and the failure of electric valve bodies which are in a logic or relationship with each other; the fourth layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the electric valve power supply comprise the loss of power of a 380V alternating current power supply, the loss of power of a 110V direct current power supply and the loss of power of a 48V direct current power supply which are in a logic OR relationship with each other.
9. The method for evaluating the availability of the passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to claim 8, wherein: the failure fault tree of the fire water intake pipeline of the A or B line in the step 2) comprises three layers of basic events; the first layer of basic events comprise manual valve failure, pipeline failure and fire water production/distribution system pipeline failure which are in logic or relationship with each other; the second layer of basic events corresponding to the failure of the fire-fighting water production/distribution system pipeline comprise the failure of a manual valve of the nuclear island fire-fighting water production system and the failure of a manual valve of the nuclear island fire-fighting water distribution system which are in logic or relation with each other; the manual valve failure of the nuclear island fire-fighting water production system comprises the failure of a manual valve (3) and the failure of a three-way manual valve which are in a logic and relation with each other.
10. The method for evaluating the availability of a passive combined active reactor cavity water injection system according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein: the comprehensive utilization method of the energy of the tidal power generation-based cluster nuclear power plant can also be used for evaluating the availability of a passive reactor cavity water injection system.
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