CN114501427A - Travel riding matching method based on privacy protection - Google Patents

Travel riding matching method based on privacy protection Download PDF

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Publication number
CN114501427A
CN114501427A CN202111675395.1A CN202111675395A CN114501427A CN 114501427 A CN114501427 A CN 114501427A CN 202111675395 A CN202111675395 A CN 202111675395A CN 114501427 A CN114501427 A CN 114501427A
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travel
vehicle
passenger
passengers
riding
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CN114501427B (en
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孙红亮
魏林锋
刘志全
殷菊笠
伍晓峰
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Jinan University
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Jinan University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/009—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/121—Timestamp

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Traffic Control Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a travel riding matching method based on privacy protection, which comprises the following steps of: s1, TA initializes and distributes public key, private key, reputation certificate and pseudonym identity for the registration entity; s2, selecting personalized travel preference requirements by the passengers, injecting the requirements into a bloom filter, encrypting travel riding requests, calculating information signatures for the travel riding requests, verifying the reputation certificates and the validity of the information signatures of the passengers by the RSU, and broadcasting information to nearby vehicles after the verification is passed; s3, the vehicle injects the preference attribute set into a bloom filter, encrypts the travel riding response, and calculates an information signature for the travel riding response; and S4, judging whether the vehicle meets the individual requirements of the passengers or not, and carrying out travel riding matching on the vehicle and the passengers. The method is based on the intersection technology of the bloom filter and the privacy set, and is applied to the travel riding matching, so that the privacy of the passengers is protected, the calculation cost and the communication cost are reduced, and the travel riding experience of the passengers is improved.

Description

Travel riding matching method based on privacy protection
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of car networking privacy protection, and particularly relates to a travel riding matching method based on privacy protection.
Background
With the development of intelligent transportation, dynamic travel by means of the internet of vehicles becomes a new travel mode. And the dynamic travel ride is used for matching a plurality of passengers with similar travels with the target vehicle according to the travel information provided by the passengers and the vehicles. The traffic environment can be improved by taking a bus when the bus goes out, the number of vehicles on a road is reduced by improving the utilization rate of vehicle seats, the problem of traffic jam is further relieved, and the road smooth rate is improved. In addition, fuel consumption and carbon emission are reduced when the bus is taken out, and the problem of environmental pollution is further improved. However, when a passenger goes out, if the personalized requirements of the passenger are not considered, the matching error of the passenger during the trip can be caused, the service quality is reduced, and the personalized requirements of the passenger usually contain some privacy information, so that the privacy of the passenger is easily leaked due to the fact that the personalized requirements of the passenger are stolen by an attacker.
At present, scholars at home and abroad obtain certain research results in the aspect of privacy protection of travel riding matching. The clear text information based on the passengers and the vehicles is adopted for travel and riding matching in the early period, and although the matching speed is high, the matching is convenient and fast, the privacy of the passengers and the vehicles is easy to leak. In order to protect privacy of a vehicle and passengers when traveling buses are matched, in 2017, Hallgren et al propose to realize traveling bus matching through similarity and track matching of a starting point and an end point, and adopt additional homomorphic encryption and a threshold value private set intersection protocol to protect user privacy. In 2018, Li et al propose to use privacy proximity testing during travel ride matching to achieve one-to-many proximity matching while protecting the privacy of the vehicle and passengers. In 2020, Yu et al propose privacy-preserving travel ride matching that calculates distance by means of encryption and aggregation, and protects the privacy of the vehicle and passengers by means of homomorphic encryption.
The existing literature makes up for the defect of privacy protection when travelling is matched, but some problems exist. According to the existing scheme, the individual requirements of passengers are not considered when travelling and taking a bus, the balance between the accurate matching of the passengers and the vehicle and the privacy protection cannot be realized, and the matching error between the passengers and the vehicle is possibly caused, for example, the passengers who do not smoke match the vehicle driven by a smoke extraction driver, so that the passengers can perform negative feedback on the vehicle after the travelling and taking a bus, the user experience is influenced, and the travelling and taking effect is reduced.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention mainly aims to overcome the defects and shortcomings of the prior art, and provides a travel riding matching method based on privacy protection.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a trip riding matching method based on privacy protection comprises a trusted center TA, a road side unit RSU, a vehicle and passengers, wherein the TA, the RSU, the vehicle and the passengers are communicated in a wireless communication or wired communication mode, and the method comprises the following steps:
s1, initializing, namely, initializing by the trusted center and distributing a public key, a private key, a reputation certificate and a pseudonymous identity for each registered entity;
s2, making a travel request, selecting an individualized travel preference demand by a passenger, injecting the individualized travel preference demand into a bloom filter, encrypting the travel request, calculating an information signature for the travel request, verifying the validity of a reputation certificate and the information signature of the passenger by a road side unit, and broadcasting information to nearby vehicles after the verification is passed;
s3, generating a travel riding response, injecting a preference attribute set into a bloom filter by the vehicle for matching with the personalized requirements of passengers, encrypting the travel riding response by an encryption algorithm, and calculating an information signature for the travel riding response;
and S4, matching the traveling bus, verifying the certificate and the signature of the vehicle by the roadside unit, judging whether the vehicle meets the personalized requirements of the passengers or not by adopting a privacy set intersection technology based on the bloom filter, and matching the traveling bus with the passengers.
Further, step S1 is specifically:
given a safety parameter 1τThe trust center generates parameters (G)1,G2E), then TA calculates e (g)1,g2)＝F；
Wherein G is1,G2Is a cyclic group of prime order q, g1,g2Are each G1And G2G, bilinear mapping e1×G1→G2；
TA random selection
Figure BDA0003451799840000031
As master private key, i.e. MSKTT and calculate the public key PKT＝g1 tSelecting a hash function H1:
Figure BDA0003451799840000032
H2:
Figure BDA0003451799840000033
Setting a distance threshold
Figure BDA0003451799840000034
Setting passenger PiIs a unique identity identifier of
Figure BDA00034517998400000322
TA selection
Figure BDA0003451799840000035
As passenger PiA private key of, i.e.
Figure BDA0003451799840000036
And calculates the public key for the passenger
Figure BDA0003451799840000037
Setting passenger PiThe reputation certificate of
Figure BDA0003451799840000038
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0003451799840000039
the validity period of the reputation certificate;
setting passenger PiThe pseudonym identity of
Figure BDA00034517998400000310
Setting a vehicle ViIs a unique identity identifier of
Figure BDA00034517998400000311
TA random selection
Figure BDA00034517998400000312
For vehicles ViA private key of, i.e.
Figure BDA00034517998400000313
And calculating a public key for the vehicle
Figure BDA00034517998400000314
Setting a vehicle ViReputation certificate
Figure BDA00034517998400000315
Wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000316
Setting a vehicle ViThe pseudonym identity is
Figure BDA00034517998400000317
Setting a set of vehicle initial preference attributes to
Figure BDA00034517998400000318
Road side unit RiAt registration time, TA random selection
Figure BDA00034517998400000319
Is RiA private key of, i.e.
Figure BDA00034517998400000320
Computing public keys
Figure BDA00034517998400000321
Further, step S2 is specifically:
passenger PiWhen a passenger wants to go out, the passenger firstly selects individual travel preference and sets the travel preference selected by the passenger as
Figure BDA0003451799840000041
Random number r selected by passenger1By using
Figure BDA0003451799840000042
Set of travel preferences to be selected
Figure BDA0003451799840000043
Injecting into a bloom filter;
then passenger PiSelecting a starting position
Figure BDA0003451799840000044
And destination
Figure BDA0003451799840000045
Form a travel request
Figure BDA0003451799840000046
Wherein
Figure BDA0003451799840000047
A timestamp is generated for the travel taking request;
then passenger PiRequest for travelling
Figure BDA00034517998400000427
Computing signatures
Figure BDA0003451799840000048
Last passenger PiUsing ELGAMMA encryption algorithm with parameters
Figure BDA0003451799840000049
Encrypted travel request
Figure BDA00034517998400000410
Forming a ciphertext
Figure BDA00034517998400000411
Will be provided with
Figure BDA00034517998400000412
Sent to the road side unit Ri；
RiReceiving information
Figure BDA00034517998400000413
Then, a travel riding request ciphertext is decrypted by adopting a decryption algorithm and a private key, namely
Figure BDA00034517998400000414
RiVerifying a passenger PiReputation certificate equation:
Figure BDA00034517998400000415
Riverifying a passenger PiEquation for travel request signature:
Figure BDA00034517998400000416
after verification, RiWill be provided with
Figure BDA00034517998400000417
Broadcast to nearby vehicles, wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000418
Is a message
Figure BDA00034517998400000419
A timestamp of when generated.
Further, step S3 is specifically:
when the road side unit RiNearby vehicle ViReceiving travel request message
Figure BDA00034517998400000420
After that, adopt
Figure BDA00034517998400000421
Set own preference attribute
Figure BDA00034517998400000422
Injecting into a bloom filter;
then the vehicle ViSetting the maximum number of passengers CNmaxSelecting a starting position
Figure BDA00034517998400000423
And destination
Figure BDA00034517998400000424
Form a trip riding response
Figure BDA00034517998400000425
Wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000426
A timestamp generated for the trip riding response;
vehicle ViRespond to a trip by bus
Figure BDA0003451799840000051
Computing signatures
Figure BDA0003451799840000052
Finally, the vehicle adopts ELGAMMA encryption algorithm and uses parameters
Figure BDA0003451799840000053
Encrypted travel riding response
Figure BDA0003451799840000054
Forming a ciphertext
Figure BDA0003451799840000055
Will be provided with
Figure BDA0003451799840000056
Sent to the road side unit Ri。
Further, step S4 is specifically:
road side unit RiReceiving information
Figure BDA0003451799840000057
Then, the decryption algorithm and the private key are adopted for decryption, namely
Figure BDA0003451799840000058
RiValidating vehicle ViReputation certificate equation:
Figure BDA0003451799840000059
Rivalidating vehicle ViEquation for travel ride response signature:
Figure BDA00034517998400000510
after verification, RiEquation matching vehicle origin and destination:
Figure BDA00034517998400000511
last road side unit RiJudging preference attribute set of vehicle by adopting privacy set intersection technology based on bloom filter
Figure BDA00034517998400000512
And personalized travel preferences selected by the passenger
Figure BDA00034517998400000513
Whether there is an intersection IiIf I isiAnd
Figure BDA00034517998400000514
in the same way, the vehicle meets all the individual requirements, R, of the passengersiSuccessfully matching the vehicle with the passenger and sending a message
Figure BDA00034517998400000515
Wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000516
Are the communication keys of the vehicle and the passengers,
Figure BDA00034517998400000517
as information
Figure BDA00034517998400000518
A timestamp of when generated;
finally, the vehicle and the passenger employ communicationSecret key
Figure BDA00034517998400000519
And carrying out communication.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
1. according to the method, when the travel and the ride are matched, a privacy set intersection technology based on the bloom filter is adopted, whether the vehicle meets the individual requirements of the passengers or not is judged according to the travel preference selected by the passengers, and the problem of wrong matching of the travel and the ride caused by neglecting the individual requirements of the passengers is solved.
2. The trip riding matching scheme provided by the invention does not reveal the privacy of the vehicle and the passenger in the matching process, and realizes the balance between the accurate matching of the trip riding and the privacy protection. And the matching efficiency of the travel bus is improved, and the expenditure is reduced.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a conceptual model diagram of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to examples and drawings, but the present invention is not limited thereto.
Examples
The invention discloses a travel riding matching method based on privacy protection, which comprises a trusted center TA, a road side unit RSU, a vehicle and passengers; 4, the components can communicate with each other in a wireless communication or wired communication mode; the TA is mainly responsible for distributing public and private keys, certificates and the like for the registered entity; the RSU is responsible for verifying the validity of the reputation certificates and the information signatures of the vehicles and the passengers and matching the vehicles and the passengers for outgoing riding; the passenger is responsible for sending the encrypted travel riding request; the vehicle is responsible for sending encrypted travel ride responses.
In this embodiment, as shown in fig. 2, it is a schematic diagram of the conceptual model of the present invention.
As shown in fig. 1, the method of the present invention comprises the steps of:
s1, initializing, namely, the trusted center initializes and distributes a public key, a private key, a reputation certificate and a pseudonym identity for each registered entity; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
setting System safety parameters 1τ；
Generating a cyclic group G of prime order q1And G2Bilinear mapping e: G1×G1→G2；
g1And g2Are each G1And G2E (g) is calculated as the generator of1,g2)＝F；
TA Generation System Master Key and public Key (MSK)T,PKT) Wherein MSKT＝t，PKT＝g1 tSetting a distance threshold
Figure BDA0003451799840000071
TA distributing public and private keys to vehicles
Figure BDA0003451799840000072
Wherein
Figure BDA0003451799840000073
Public distribution of private keys to passengers
Figure BDA0003451799840000074
Wherein
Figure BDA0003451799840000075
Road side unit RiPublic and private key of
Figure BDA0003451799840000076
Wherein
Figure BDA0003451799840000077
TA separately calculates reputation certificates for vehicles and passengers
Figure BDA0003451799840000078
And
Figure BDA0003451799840000079
wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000710
And
Figure BDA00034517998400000711
the validity period of the reputation certificate;
TA separately calculates pseudonyms for vehicle and passenger
Figure BDA00034517998400000712
Figure BDA00034517998400000713
TA initialization of vehicle preference attribute set
Figure BDA00034517998400000714
S2, making a travel request, selecting an individualized travel preference demand by a passenger, injecting the individualized travel preference demand into a bloom filter, encrypting the travel request, calculating an information signature for the travel request, verifying the validity of a reputation certificate and the information signature of the passenger by a road side unit, and broadcasting information to nearby vehicles after the verification is passed; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
passenger PiWhen a passenger wants to go out, the passenger firstly selects individual travel preference and sets the travel preference selected by the passenger as
Figure BDA00034517998400000715
Random number r selected by passenger1By using
Figure BDA00034517998400000716
Set of travel preferences to be selected
Figure BDA00034517998400000717
Injecting into a bloom filter;
then passenger PiSelecting a starting position
Figure BDA00034517998400000718
And destination
Figure BDA00034517998400000719
Form a travel request
Figure BDA00034517998400000720
Wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000721
A timestamp is generated for the travel taking request;
then passenger PiRequest for travelling
Figure BDA00034517998400000722
Computing signatures
Figure BDA00034517998400000723
Last passenger PiUsing ELGAMMA encryption algorithm with parameters
Figure BDA00034517998400000724
Encrypted travel request
Figure BDA00034517998400000725
Forming a ciphertext
Figure BDA00034517998400000726
Will be provided with
Figure BDA00034517998400000727
Sent to the road side unit Ri；
RiReceiving information
Figure BDA0003451799840000081
Then, a travel riding request ciphertext is decrypted by adopting a decryption algorithm and a private key, namely
Figure BDA0003451799840000082
RiVerifying a passenger PiReputation certificate equation:
Figure BDA0003451799840000083
Riverifying a passenger PiEquation for travel request signature:
Figure BDA0003451799840000084
after verification, RiWill be provided with
Figure BDA0003451799840000085
Broadcast to nearby vehicles, wherein
Figure BDA0003451799840000086
Is a message
Figure BDA0003451799840000087
A timestamp of when generated.
S3, generating a travel riding response, injecting a preference attribute set into a bloom filter by the vehicle for matching personalized requirements of passengers, encrypting the travel riding response by adopting an ELGAMMA encryption algorithm, and calculating an information signature for the travel riding response; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
suppose a vehicle ViIs a set of preference attributes of
Figure BDA0003451799840000088
Vehicle ViSelecting a random number r2By using
Figure BDA0003451799840000089
Will be provided with
Figure BDA00034517998400000810
Injecting into a bloom filter;
maximum number of passengers CN for vehicle travelingmaxSelecting a starting position
Figure BDA00034517998400000811
And destination
Figure BDA00034517998400000812
Form a trip riding response
Figure BDA00034517998400000813
Wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000814
A timestamp generated for the trip riding response;
vehicle ViComputing signatures for travel ride response
Figure BDA00034517998400000815
Vehicle ViEncrypting with ELGAMMA using parameters
Figure BDA00034517998400000816
Encryption
Figure BDA00034517998400000817
Forming a ciphertext
Figure BDA00034517998400000818
Vehicle ViWill be the parameters
Figure BDA00034517998400000819
To Ri。
S4, matching traveling and taking a bus, verifying a certificate and a signature of the vehicle by the roadside unit, judging whether the vehicle meets the personalized requirements of passengers or not by adopting a privacy set intersection technology based on a bloom filter, and matching the traveling and taking the bus with the passengers; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
road side unit RiReceiving information
Figure BDA0003451799840000091
After that, decryption is adoptedAlgorithm and private key decryption, i.e.
Figure BDA0003451799840000092
RiValidating vehicle ViReputation certificate equation:
Figure BDA0003451799840000093
Rivalidating a vehicle ViEquation for travel ride response signature:
Figure BDA0003451799840000094
after verification, RiEquation matching vehicle origin and destination:
Figure BDA0003451799840000095
last road side unit RiJudging preference attribute set of vehicle by adopting privacy set intersection technology based on bloom filter
Figure BDA0003451799840000096
And personalized travel preferences selected by the passenger
Figure BDA0003451799840000097
Whether there is an intersection IiIf I isiAnd
Figure BDA0003451799840000098
in the same way, the vehicle meets all the individual requirements, R, of the passengersiSuccessfully matching the vehicle with the passenger and sending a message
Figure BDA0003451799840000099
Wherein
Figure BDA00034517998400000910
Are the communication keys of the vehicle and the passengers,
Figure BDA00034517998400000911
as information
Figure BDA00034517998400000912
A timestamp of when generated.
Finally, the vehicle and the passenger use the communication key
Figure BDA00034517998400000913
And carrying out communication.
In this embodiment, the process of verifying the correctness of the reputation certificate and the signature is as follows (hereinafter, the passenger P is referred to as the passenger P)iFor example):
verification of reputation certificate:
Figure BDA00034517998400000914
verification of correctness of the signature:
Figure BDA0003451799840000101
it should also be noted that in this specification, terms such as "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising an … …" does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises the element.
The previous description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims (5)

1. A trip riding matching method based on privacy protection is characterized by comprising a trusted center TA, a road side unit RSU, a vehicle and passengers, wherein the TA, the RSU, the vehicle and the passengers are communicated in a wireless communication or wired communication mode, and the method comprises the following steps:
s1, initializing, namely, initializing by the trusted center and distributing a public key, a private key, a reputation certificate and a pseudonymous identity for each registered entity;
s2, making a travel request, selecting an individualized travel preference demand by a passenger, injecting the individualized travel preference demand into a bloom filter, encrypting the travel request, calculating an information signature for the travel request, verifying the validity of a reputation certificate and the information signature of the passenger by a road side unit, and broadcasting information to nearby vehicles after the verification is passed;
s3, generating a travel riding response, injecting a preference attribute set into a bloom filter by the vehicle for matching with the personalized requirements of passengers, encrypting the travel riding response by an encryption algorithm, and calculating an information signature for the travel riding response;
and S4, matching the traveling bus, verifying the certificate and the signature of the vehicle by the roadside unit, judging whether the vehicle meets the personalized requirements of the passengers or not by adopting a privacy set intersection technology based on the bloom filter, and matching the traveling bus with the passengers.
2. A travel ride matching method based on privacy protection according to claim 1, wherein step S1 specifically comprises:
given a safety parameter 1τThe trust center generates parameters (G)1,G2E), then TA calculates e (g)1,g2)＝F；
Wherein G is1,G2Is a cyclic group of prime order q, g1,g2Are each G1And G2G, bilinear mapping e1×G1→G2；
TA random selection
Figure FDA0003451799830000011
As master private key, i.e. MSKTT and calculate the public key PKT＝g1 tSelecting a hash function H1:
Figure FDA0003451799830000012
H2:
Figure FDA0003451799830000013
Setting a distance threshold
Figure FDA0003451799830000014
Setting passenger PiIs a unique identity identifier of
Figure FDA0003451799830000015
TA selection
Figure FDA0003451799830000016
As passenger PiA private key of, i.e.
Figure FDA0003451799830000017
And calculates the public key for the passenger
Figure FDA0003451799830000018
Setting passenger PiThe reputation certificate of
Figure FDA0003451799830000019
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00034517998300000110
Figure FDA00034517998300000111
the validity period of the reputation certificate;
setting passenger PiIs identified by a pseudonym of
Figure FDA0003451799830000021
Setting a vehicle ViIs a unique identity identifier of
Figure FDA0003451799830000022
TA random selection
Figure FDA0003451799830000023
For vehicles ViA private key of, i.e.
Figure FDA0003451799830000024
And calculating a public key for the vehicle
Figure FDA0003451799830000025
Setting a vehicle ViReputation certificate
Figure FDA0003451799830000026
Wherein
Figure FDA0003451799830000027
Setting a vehicle ViThe pseudonym identity is
Figure FDA0003451799830000028
Setting the initial preference attribute set of the vehicle as
Figure FDA0003451799830000029
Road side unit RiAt registration time, TA random selection
Figure FDA00034517998300000210
Is RiA private key of, i.e.
Figure FDA00034517998300000211
Computing public keys
Figure FDA00034517998300000212
3. A travel ride matching method based on privacy protection according to claim 2, wherein step S2 specifically comprises:
passenger PiWhen a passenger wants to go out, the passenger firstly selects individual travel preference and sets the travel preference selected by the passenger as
Figure FDA00034517998300000213
Random number r selected by passenger1By using
Figure FDA00034517998300000214
Set of travel preferences to be selected
Figure FDA00034517998300000215
Injecting into a bloom filter;
then passenger PiSelecting a starting position
Figure FDA00034517998300000216
And destination
Figure FDA00034517998300000217
Form a travel request
Figure FDA00034517998300000218
Wherein
Figure FDA00034517998300000219
A timestamp is generated for the travel taking request;
then passenger PiRequest for travelling
Figure FDA00034517998300000220
Computing signatures
Figure FDA00034517998300000221
Last passenger PiUsing ELGAMMA encryption algorithm with parameters
Figure FDA00034517998300000222
Encrypted travel request
Figure FDA00034517998300000223
Forming a ciphertext
Figure FDA00034517998300000224
Will be provided with
Figure FDA00034517998300000225
Sent to the road side unit Ri；
RiReceiving information
Figure FDA00034517998300000226
Then, a travel riding request ciphertext is decrypted by adopting a decryption algorithm and a private key, namely
Figure FDA00034517998300000227
RiVerifying a passenger PiReputation certificate equation:
Figure FDA0003451799830000031
Riverifying passengersPiEquation for travel request signature:
Figure FDA0003451799830000032
after verification, RiWill be provided with
Figure FDA0003451799830000033
Broadcast to nearby vehicles, wherein
Figure FDA0003451799830000034
Is a message
Figure FDA0003451799830000035
A timestamp of when generated.
4. A travel ride matching method based on privacy protection according to claim 3, wherein step S3 specifically comprises:
when the road side unit RiNearby vehicle ViReceiving travel request message
Figure FDA0003451799830000036
After that, adopt
Figure FDA0003451799830000037
Set own preference attribute
Figure FDA0003451799830000038
Injecting into a bloom filter;
then the vehicle ViSetting the maximum number of passengers CNmaxSelecting a starting position
Figure FDA0003451799830000039
And destination
Figure FDA00034517998300000310
Form a trip riding response
Figure FDA00034517998300000311
Wherein
Figure FDA00034517998300000312
A timestamp is generated for the trip riding response;
vehicle ViResponding to travel by bus
Figure FDA00034517998300000313
Computing signatures
Figure FDA00034517998300000314
Finally, the vehicle adopts ELGAMMA encryption algorithm and uses parameters
Figure FDA00034517998300000315
Encrypted travel riding response
Figure FDA00034517998300000316
Forming a ciphertext
Figure FDA00034517998300000317
Will be provided with
Figure FDA00034517998300000318
Sent to the road side unit Ri。
5. The privacy protection-based travel ride matching method according to claim 4, wherein step S4 is specifically:
road side unit RiReceiving information
Figure FDA00034517998300000319
Then, the decryption algorithm and the private key are adopted for decryption, namely
Figure FDA00034517998300000320
RiValidating vehicle ViReputation certificate equation:
Figure FDA00034517998300000321
Rivalidating vehicle ViEquation for travel ride response signature:
Figure FDA0003451799830000041
after verification, RiEquation matching vehicle origin and destination:
Figure FDA0003451799830000042
last road side unit RiJudging preference attribute set of vehicle by adopting privacy set intersection technology based on bloom filter
Figure FDA0003451799830000043
And personalized travel preferences selected by the passenger
Figure FDA0003451799830000044
Whether there is an intersection IiIf I isiAnd with
Figure FDA0003451799830000045
In the same way, the vehicle meets all the individual requirements, R, of the passengersiSuccessfully matching the vehicle with the passenger and sending a message
Figure FDA0003451799830000046
Wherein
Figure FDA0003451799830000047
Are the communication keys of the vehicle and the passengers,
Figure FDA0003451799830000048
as information
Figure FDA0003451799830000049
A timestamp of when generated;
finally, the vehicle and the passenger employ the communication key
Figure FDA00034517998300000410
And carrying out communication.
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