CN114500070A - MQTT protocol secure communication method based on secret sharing algorithm - Google Patents

MQTT protocol secure communication method based on secret sharing algorithm Download PDF

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CN114500070A
CN114500070A CN202210123700.4A CN202210123700A CN114500070A CN 114500070 A CN114500070 A CN 114500070A CN 202210123700 A CN202210123700 A CN 202210123700A CN 114500070 A CN114500070 A CN 114500070A
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cert
topic
user
agent
devices
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CN114500070B (en
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李庆铁
熊迎军
李靖
任守纲
李延斌
顾兴健
邵天岳
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Shanghai Lanchang Automation Technology Co ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
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  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a secret sharing algorithm-based MQTT protocol secure communication method, which is used for completing one-to-many group authentication by utilizing a secret sharing-based threshold encryption algorithm aiming at a scene that one user and a plurality of devices of the MQTT protocol communicate through the same subject in the MQTT, so that the devices are safely accessed, and finally, sent messages are encrypted to realize the secure communication between the user and the devices. The method comprises the steps of firstly carrying out one-to-one authentication on a user and an agent, then completing group authentication of a plurality of devices and the agent by utilizing secret sharing, binding the authenticated user, the plurality of devices and a common theme to establish a secure channel, and finally carrying out key agreement among the user, the devices and the theme to complete encryption of transmitted information so as to complete secure communication of an MQTT protocol. The method can be suitable for one-to-many secure communication scenes in the MQTT protocol.

Description

MQTT protocol secure communication method based on secret sharing algorithm
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of computer security, in particular to a secure communication method of an MQTT protocol based on a secret sharing algorithm.
Background
Among the communication protocols of the internet of things, MQTT (message queue telemetry transport) protocol is the most popular. Its design goal is to provide a lightweight and easy-to-use communication protocol for the internet of things, so that only a few security mechanisms per se are explicitly specified, and it lacks basic security-related functions such as access control, mutual authentication, and control message security. To solve these problems, the current MQTT data transmission process can use encrypted TLS protocol to protect the communication channel between the client and the proxy, which has several problems: (1) access login control cannot be provided, such as security access control for agents and fine-grained themes in agents; (2) the TLS has a large calculation load, which results in low efficiency and is not suitable for information security transmission in a large number of devices, such as a one-to-many scenario.
Aiming at the defects of the existing security protection, the security of the MQTT protocol can be improved by the fine-grained security authentication of related subjects, and meanwhile, the group authentication based on the secret sharing algorithm is applied to the one-to-many scene under the MQTT protocol, so that the efficiency of the security authentication can be improved.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention provides a group authentication strategy, which can improve the safety authentication efficiency under one-to-many scenes of the MQTT protocol to a certain extent. And after the security authentication, carrying out key agreement to encrypt the sent message, and completing the one-to-many information security transmission from the user to the multi-device.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme.
A secret sharing algorithm-based MQTT protocol secure communication method comprises the following steps:
step 1: issuing certificates for users, equipment, agents and subjects and completing registration;
step 2: using a lightweight certificate-based authentication algorithm to complete the secure access of a user;
and step 3: the method comprises the steps that a threshold encryption algorithm based on secret sharing is used for completing the safe access authentication of a plurality of Internet of things devices, and a safe communication channel is established for a user and a plurality of devices which are authenticated to be legal;
and 4, step 4: secure encryption of messages sent between a user and a plurality of devices is accomplished using a certificate-based key agreement algorithm.
Further, step 1 specifically includes:
step 1-1: in the initialization stage, a third party Certification Authority (CA) generates certificates for users, equipment, agents and subjects;
step 1-2: the third party certifies and authorizes the calculation public key, and distributes the public key to the user, the equipment, the agent and the subject together with the certificate;
step 1-3: a user, a plurality of devices, and an agent register.
Further, the step 1-1 specifically comprises: inputting ID serial number X of user, equipment and agent to generate RX＝rXG, wherein rX∈R[1,n-1]G is a generator; third party authentication authorization selection rCA∈R[1,n-1]Generating RCA＝rCAG, final calculation output CertX＝RX+RCA(ii) a Inputting ID number of subjecttThird party certificate authority calculation Certt (l)＝rt (1)·G+rCA (1)·G＝Rt (l)+RCA (1)Wherein Certt (l)As a certificate of the ith topic, rt (1)∈R[1,n-1]，rCA (1)∈R[1,n-1](ii) a Then, the third party certifies and authorizes the computation of the private key d of the ith subjectt (l)＝wt (l)+rt (l)·H(Certt (l)||Topict) Wherein w ist (l)＝dCA+rt (l)·H(Certt (l)||Topict) (ii) a The calculation output result of this step is (d)t (l),Certt (l))。
Further, the step 1-2 is specifically: third party authentication authorization calculation DX＝DCA+CertX·H(CertX| X), wherein DCAPublic keys for authentication and authorization of third parties, DXComputing d for the public key of the user, device and agent, followed by a third party certificate authorityX＝wX+rX·H(CertX| X), wherein dXIs a private key of the user, device and agent, wX＝dCA+rCA·H(CertX| X), and finally, the third party certifies the authorization to send [ d |)X,CertX,DCA]To users, devices and agents.
Further, the steps 1 to 3 are specifically as follows: subject certificate along with InfoB＝(B、IPB、PortB、CertB) Safely deliver to X ═ Pi/Sj) Wherein IPBAnd PortBRespectively representing the IP address and port number of the proxy, and changing ACL to { ACLt|TopictE.g. T } to the agent, wherein ACLt＝{Topict,P(Topict),S(Topict) For each Topic }tE.g. T, send [ Topict,Certt (l),InfoB]Giving user X ∈ P (Topic)t) Sending [ Topic ]t,dt (l),InfoB]Giving the device S ∈ S (Topic)t)。
Further, step 2 specifically includes:
step 2-1: derivation of session key:
generation of session key SKXTo be at user PiAnd the agent, and the user and the agent respectively provide { [ d { [X,CertX,DCA],[Topict,Certt (l),InfoB]And { [ d ]B,CertB,DCA]ACL }, SK is calculatedX＝kdf(dX·DB||TSX)＝kdf(dB·DX||TSX)；
Step 2-2: one-to-one identity authentication is performed between a user and an agent:
the user will be (X, Cert)X,TSX,...,MIC(SKX) "represents the original message field of a standard connection control message, MIC (SK)X) Indicating the use of SKXMessage integrity codes, TS, calculated for all preceding fields in a messageXA timestamp of X; when the proxy receives it, it also obtains the session key SKXAnd verifies TSXWhether fresh value and MIC (SK)X) Whether it is valid; if the verification is successful, the session state of X will be created at the proxy and the proxy will use MIC (SK)X) Responding to the protected connect control message; finally, X successfully verifies the MIC (SK) of the returned responseX) And the two parties finish one-to-one identity authentication.
Further, step 3 specifically comprises:
step 3-1: the generation phase of Token:
assume a total of n devices, i.e., group members Un＝{Ui1, 2.. n.the agent generates a secret share in (t, n) threshold secret sharing for each device as its Token, and first, the agent randomly selects two large prime numbers p and q to satisfy p>q+nq2Agent at FpRandomly selecting t-1 value ai，i＝1,2,3,...,t-1，at-1Not equal to 0 and in FpUpper selection a0As a secret s, a random polynomial f (x) of degree t-1 is generated0+a1x+a2x2+...+at-1xt-1(modp) where group secret s ═ a0F (0), then the proxy uses device member UiPublic identity information x of (1, 2.. multidot.n)iCalculating f (x)i) And calculating the result f (x) through a secure channeli) Secret is sent to UiAs its Token Ti＝f(xi) Finally, the agent calculates the one-way hash value Hash(s) of the secret s and broadcasts the one-way hash value Hash(s) to all the devices;
step 3-2: a random component construction stage:
suppose that m group members participate in the verification, Uim＝{UijI 1 ≦ j ≦ m } due to the need for authentication in this scenario, let m ≦ n, i.e., it is necessary to verify whether m devices belong to the same group as each other, and any participant U thereinij(public identity is x)ij(ii) a ) By passing through at FqUp generating a random number riAnd calculate
Figure BDA0003499428310000031
To construct a random number;
step 3-3: a verification stage:
each participant exchanges the random component with other participants through the private channel, when receiving the random components of all participants, namely Cij＝{CijAfter 1,2, ·, m |, U ═ j ═ U ·ijComputing
Figure BDA0003499428310000032
If Hash (s') ═ Hash(s), it indicates that all participants belong to the same group; otherwise, it can be concluded that at least one illegal participant exists among the participants. At this point, group authentication of a plurality of devices is completed.
Further, step 4 specifically includes:
step 4-1: derivation of subject key:
for one user Pi∈P(Topict) And a set of devices S ∈ S (Topic)t) Between defines a subject key, user P, for end-to-end securityiHold { [ d ]i,Certi,DCA],[Topict,Certt (l)]A plurality of devices S hold { [ d ]i,Certi,DCA],[Topict,dt (l)]}, according to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key Exchange (ECDH) key protocol, calculating TotictSubject key of (2): kit (l)＝kdf(di·Dt (l))＝kdf(dt (l)·Di) Wherein D ist (l)＝DCA+Certt·H(Certt||Totict)，Di＝DCA+Certi·H(Certi||Pi)；
Step 4-2: and a key negotiation stage:
user sending control message (tic)tSecure message, … …, MIC (SK)i) Wherein the secure message contains [ P ]i,Certi,TSi(message) Kit (l),MIC(Kit (l))]Upon receipt of a control message, the proxy first bases on ACLt＝(Topict,P(Topict),S(Topict) And validate MIC (SK)i) If both items are verified successfully, the agent will store the safe message until S (Topic)t) The device in (1) requests a secure message, and the agent then sends a control message to (S)j∈S(Topict) Checking MIC (SK)j) Then, S (Topic)t) In each device using dt (l)And DiObtaining a subject key Kit (l)Based on which MIC (K) can be verifiedit (l)) And obtains the validity of user P thereiniThe content of the message sent.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that: 1. the invention uses the threshold encryption algorithm based on secret sharing, can complete the security access proxy authentication of a plurality of Internet of things devices at one time, improves the authentication efficiency and lays a foundation for realizing one-to-many security communication.
2. The invention uses the lightweight key negotiation algorithm based on the certificate aiming at the theme in the agent, provides finer-grained encryption protection for the information transmitted by the MQTT protocol, reduces the complexity and the load of operation in the encryption process and improves the communication efficiency.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a one-to-many information secure transmission method of an MQTT protocol based on a secret sharing algorithm, which is disclosed by the invention;
fig. 2 is a one-to-many secure communication scenario of the MQTT protocol applied by the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in detail below with reference to the drawings and specific examples.
A secret sharing algorithm-based MQTT protocol one-to-many secure communication method comprises the following steps:
step 1: third party Certification Authorities (CAs) generate certificates for users, devices, agents, and subjects.
Step 1-1: inputting ID serial numbers X of users, devices and agents to generate RX＝rXG, wherein rX∈R[1,n-1]And G is a generator. CA selection of rCA∈R[1,n-1]Generating RCA＝rCAG, final calculation output CertX＝RX+RCA。
Entering Topic ID Serial number TopictCA calculation of Certt (l)＝rt (1)·G+rCA (1)·G＝Rt (l)+RCA (1)Wherein Certt (l)As a certificate of the ith topic, rt (1)∈R[1,n-1]，rCA (1)∈R[1,n-1]. Next, the CA calculates the private key d of the ith topict (l)＝wt (l)+rt (l)·H(Certt (l)||Topict) Wherein w ist (l)＝dCA+rt (l)·H(Certt (l)||Topict). The calculation output result of this step is (d)t (l),Certt (l))。
Step 1-2: CA calculation DX＝DCA+CertX·H(CertX| X), wherein DCAIs the public key of CA, DXPublic keys for users, devices and agents. Then, CA calculates dX＝wX+rX·H(CertX| X), wherein dXIs a private key of the user, device and agent, wX＝dCA+rCA·H(CertX| X). Finally, the CA sends [ d ]X,CertX,DCA]To users, devices and agents.
Step 1-3: subject matter certificate is connected withInfoB＝(B、IPB、PortB、CertB) Safely deliver to X ═ Pi/Sj) Wherein IPBAnd PortBRespectively representing the IP address and port number of the agent. Converting ACL to { ACLt|TopictE.g. T } to the agent, wherein ACLt＝{Topict,P(Topict),S(Topict)}. For each TopictE.g. T, send [ Topict,Certt (l),InfoB]Giving X ∈ P (Topic) to usert) Sending [ Topic ]t,dt (l),InfoB]Giving the device S ∈ S (Topic)t)。
The step 2 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 2-1: in the key derivation phase, a session key SK is generatedXTo be at user PiAnd the agent, and the user and the agent respectively provide { [ d { [X,CertX,DCA],[Topict,Certt (l),InfoB]And { [ d ]B,CertB,DCA]ACL }, SK is calculatedX＝kdf(dX·DB||TSX)＝kdf(dB·DX||TSX)。
Step 2-2: in the authentication phase, the user will be (X, Cert)X,TSX,...,MIC(SKX) "represents the original message field of a standard connection control message, MIC (SK)X) Indicating the use of SKXMessage integrity codes, TS, calculated for all preceding fields in a messageXTime stamp of X. When the proxy receives it, it also obtains the session key SKXAnd verifies TSXWhether fresh value and MIC (SK)X) Whether it is valid. If the verification is successful, the session state of X will be created at the proxy and the proxy will use MIC (SK)X) The protected connect control message responds. Finally, X successfully verifies the MIC (SK) of the returned responseX) And the two parties finish one-to-one identity authentication.
The step 3 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 3-1:in the Token generation phase, a total of n devices, i.e., group members U, are assumedn＝{Ui1, 2.. times.n.the agent generates a secret share in a (t, n) threshold secret share for each device as its Token. Firstly, the agent randomly selects two large prime numbers p and q to satisfy p>q+nq2. Agent at FpRandomly selecting t-1 value ai，i＝1,2,3,...,t-1，at-1Not equal to 0 and in FpUpper selection a0As a secret s, a random polynomial f (x) of degree t-1 is generated0+a1x+a2x2+...+at-1xt-1(modp) where group secret s ═ a0F (0). Next, the proxy uses the device member UiPublic identity information x of (1, 2.. multidot.n)iCalculating f (x)i) And calculating the result f (x) through a secure channeli) Secret is sent to UiAs its Token Ti＝f(xi). Finally, the proxy computes a one-way hash value hash(s) of the secret s and publishes it to each participating device.
Step 3-2: in the random component construction phase, assuming that m group members participate in the verification, Uim＝{UijI 1 ≦ j ≦ m } because of the need for authentication in this scenario, let m equal to n. I.e. it needs to verify whether m devices belong to the same group, any participant U thereinij(public identity is x)ij(ii) a ) By passing through at FqUp generating a random number riAnd calculate
Figure BDA0003499428310000051
To construct a random number.
Step 3-3: in the authentication phase, each participant exchanges a random component with other participants over a private channel. When random components of all participants are received, i.e. Cij＝{CijAfter 1,2, ·, m |, U ═ j ═ U ·ijComputing
Figure BDA0003499428310000052
If Hash (s') ═ Hash(s), it indicates that all participants belong to the same group; otherwise, it can be concluded that at least one illegal participant exists among the participants. To this endGroup authentication of a plurality of devices is completed.
The step 4 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 4-1: for one user Pi∈P(Topict) And a set of devices S ∈ S (Topic)t) The end-to-end security between them defines a subject key. User PiHold { [ d ]i,Certi,DCA],[Topict,Certt (l)]A plurality of devices S hold { [ d ]i,Certi,DCA],[Topict,dt (l)]}, according to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key Exchange (ECDH) key protocol, calculating TotictSubject key of (1): kit (l)＝kdf(di·Dt (l))＝kdf(dt (l)·Di) Wherein D ist (l)＝DCA+Certt·H(Certt||Totict)，Di＝DCA+Certi·H(Certi||Pi)。
Step 4-2: user sending control message (tic)tSecure message, … …, MIC (SK)i) Wherein the secure message contains [ P ]i,Certi,TSi(message) Kit (l),MIC(Kit (l))]. Upon receipt of a control message, the proxy first bases on the ACLt＝(Topict,P(Topict),S(Topict) And validate MIC (SK)i) Whether it is valid or not. If both items are successfully verified, the agent will store the secure message until S (Topic)t) The device in (1) requests a secure message. Next, the agent sends a control message to Sj∈S(Topict). Check MIC (SK)j) Then, S (Topic)t) In each device using dt (l)And DiObtaining a subject key Kit (l)Based on which MIC (K) can be verifiedit (l)) And obtains the validity of user P thereiniThe content of the message sent.

Claims (8)

1. An MQTT protocol secure communication method based on secret sharing algorithm is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: issuing certificates for users, equipment, agents and subjects and completing registration;
step 2: using a lightweight certificate-based authentication algorithm to complete the secure access of the user;
and step 3: the method comprises the steps that a threshold encryption algorithm based on secret sharing is used for completing the safe access authentication of a plurality of Internet of things devices, and a safe communication channel is established for a user and a plurality of devices which are authenticated to be legal;
and 4, step 4: secure encryption of messages sent between a user and a plurality of devices is accomplished using a certificate-based key agreement algorithm.
2. The MQTT protocol secure communication method based on secret sharing algorithm according to claim 1, wherein step 1 specifically includes:
step 1-1: in the initialization stage, a third party Certification Authority (CA) generates certificates for users, equipment, agents and subjects;
step 1-2: the third party certifies and authorizes the calculation public key, and distributes the public key to the user, the equipment, the agent and the subject together with the certificate;
step 1-3: a user, a plurality of devices, and an agent register.
3. The MQTT protocol secure communication method based on the secret sharing algorithm according to claim 2, wherein the step 1-1 specifically comprises the following steps: inputting ID serial number X of user, equipment and agent to generate RX＝rXG, wherein rX∈R[1,n-1]G is a generator; third party authentication authorization selection rCA∈R[1,n-1]Generating RCA＝rCAG, final calculation output CertX＝RX+RCA(ii) a Entering Topic ID Serial number TopictThird party certificate authority calculation Certt (l)＝rt (1)·G+rCA (1)·G＝Rt (l)+RCA (1)Wherein Certt (l)As the first themeCertificate of rt (1)∈R[1,n-1]，rCA (1)∈R[1,n-1](ii) a Then, the third party certifies and authorizes the computation of the private key d of the ith subjectt (l)＝wt (l)+rt (l)·H(Certt (l)||Topict) Wherein w ist (l)＝dCA+rt (l)·H(Certt (l)||Topict) (ii) a The calculation output result of this step is (d)t (l),Certt (l))。
4. The MQTT protocol secure communication method based on the secret sharing algorithm according to claim 3, wherein the steps 1-2 are specifically as follows: third party authentication authorization calculation DX＝DCA+CertX·H(CertX| X), wherein DCAPublic keys for authentication and authorization of third parties, DXComputing d for public key of user, equipment and agent, and third party authentication authorizationX＝wX+rX·H(CertX| X), wherein dXIs a private key of the user, device and agent, wX＝dCA+rCA·H(CertX| X). Finally, the third party authenticates the authorization to send [ d ]X,CertX,DCA]To users, devices and agents.
5. The MQTT protocol secure communication method based on the secret sharing algorithm according to claim 4, wherein the steps 1-3 are specifically as follows: subject certificate along with InfoB＝(B、IPB、PortB、CertB) Safely deliver to X ═ Pi/Sj) Wherein IPBAnd PortBRespectively representing the IP address and port number of the proxy, and changing ACL to { ACLt|TopictE.g. T } to the agent, wherein ACLt＝{Topict,P(Topict),S(Topict) For each Topic }tE.g. T, send [ Topict,Certt (l),InfoB]Giving user X ∈ P (Topic)t) Sending [ Topic ]t,dt (l),InfoB]Giving the device S ∈ S (Topic)t)。
6. The MQTT protocol secure communication method based on the secret sharing algorithm according to the claim 1 or 5, wherein the step 2 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 2-1: derivation of session key:
generation of session key SKXTo create an external secure channel between the user and the agent, provided by the user and agent, respectively { [ d { [X,CertX,DCA],[Topict,Certt (l),InfoB]And { [ d ]B,CertB,DCA]ACL }, SK is calculatedX＝kdf(dX·DB||TSX)＝kdf(dB·DX||TSX)；
Step 2-2: one-to-one identity authentication is performed between a user and an agent:
the user will be (X, Cert)X,TSX,...,MIC(SKX) "represents the original message field of a standard connection control message, MIC (SK)X) Indicating the use of SKXMessage integrity codes, TS, calculated for all preceding fields in a messageXA timestamp of X; when the proxy receives it, it also obtains the session key SKXAnd verifies TSXWhether fresh value and MIC (SK)X) Whether it is valid; if the verification is successful, the session state of X will be created at the proxy and the proxy will use MIC (SK)X) Responding to the protected connect control message; finally, X successfully verifies the MIC (SK) of the returned responseX) And the two parties finish one-to-one identity authentication.
7. The MQTT protocol secure communication method based on secret sharing algorithm according to claim 1, wherein step 3 specifically comprises:
step 3-1: the generation phase of Token:
assume a total of n devices, i.e., group members Un＝{Ui1, 2.. n.the agent generates a secret share in (t, n) threshold secret sharing for each device as its Token, and first, the agent randomly selects two large prime numbers p and q to satisfy p>q+nq2Agent at FpRandomly selecting t-1 value ai，i＝1,2,3,...,t-1，at-1Not equal to 0 and is at FpUpper selection a0As a secret s, a random polynomial f (x) of degree t-1 is generated0+a1x+a2x2+...+at-1xt-1(modp) where group secret s ═ a0F (0), then the proxy uses device member UiPublic identity information x of (1, 2.. multidot.n)iCalculating f (x)i) And calculating the result f (x) through a secure channeli) Secret is sent to UiAs its Token Ti＝f(xi) Finally, the agent calculates a one-way hash value Hash(s) of the secret s and broadcasts the one-way hash value Hash(s) to each participating device;
step 3-2: a random component construction stage:
suppose that m group members participate in the verification, Uim＝{UijI 1 ≦ j ≦ m } due to the need for authentication in this scenario, let m ≦ n, i.e., it is necessary to verify whether m devices belong to the same group as each other, any of the participants U in itijPublic identity xij(ii) a By passing through at FqUp generating a random number riAnd calculate
Figure FDA0003499428300000021
To construct a random number;
step 3-3: a verification stage:
each participant exchanges the random component with other participants through the private channel, when receiving the random components of all participants, namely Cij＝{CijAfter 1,2, ·, m |, U ═ j ═ U ·ijComputing
Figure FDA0003499428300000022
If Hash (s') ═ Hash(s), it indicates that all participants belong to the same group; otherwise, it can be concluded that at least one illegal participant exists among the participants.At this point, group authentication of a plurality of devices is completed.
8. The MQTT protocol secure communication method based on secret sharing algorithm according to claim 1, wherein step 4 specifically comprises:
step 4-1: derivation of subject key:
for one user Pi∈P(Topict) And a set of devices S ∈ S (Topic)t) Between defines a subject key, user P, for end-to-end securityiHold { [ d ]i,Certi,DCA],[Topict,Certt (l)]A plurality of devices S hold { [ d ]i,Certi,DCA],[Topict,dt (l)]}, according to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key Exchange (ECDH) key protocol, calculating TotictSubject key of (1): kit (l)＝kdf(di·Dt (l))＝kdf(dt (l)·Di) Wherein D ist (l)＝DCA+Certt·H(Certt||Totict)，Di＝DCA+Certi·H(Certi||Pi)；
Step 4-2: and a key negotiation stage:
user sending control message (tic)tSecure message, … …, MIC (SK)i) Wherein the secure message contains [ P ]i,Certi,TSi(message) Kit (l),MIC(Kit (l))]When receiving a control message, the proxy first bases on the ACLt＝(Topict,P(Topict),S(Topict) And validate MIC (SK)i) If both items are verified successfully, the agent will store the safe message until S (Topic)t) The device in (1) requests a secure message, and then the agent sends a control message to (S)j∈S(Topict) Checking MIC (SK)j) Then, S (Topic)t) In each device using dt (l)And DiObtaining a subject key Kit (l)Based on which MIC (K) can be verifiedit (l)) And obtains the validity of user P thereiniThe content of the message sent.
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