CN114499952B - Alliance chain consensus identity authentication method - Google Patents
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- CN114499952B CN114499952B CN202111592121.6A CN202111592121A CN114499952B CN 114499952 B CN114499952 B CN 114499952B CN 202111592121 A CN202111592121 A CN 202111592121A CN 114499952 B CN114499952 B CN 114499952B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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Abstract
The invention provides a alliance chain consensus identity authentication method, a user adds an access mechanism of an alliance chain into the alliance chain to form an alliance member, a supervision node operates an initialization algorithm to generate public parameters PK, meanwhile, digital identity information is generated according to unique identity identification information of the alliance member, the public parameters PK and the digital identity information are uploaded to a blockchain, and then a corresponding identity private key is generated for the alliance member of each node through a key generation algorithm. The invention has the beneficial effects that: the data transmission process can be prevented from being tampered, and the identity information of a signer can be identified; the method is applied to the development and utilization scene of public data resources, combines the technology based on identity signature, not only realizes high-efficiency safe access control, but also expands the use scene of the alliance chain, and can effectively solve the problem of rapidly and safely realizing identity authentication among the consensus nodes under the background of the alliance chain.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a alliance chain consensus identity authentication method, belongs to the technical field of block chains, and particularly relates to an alliance chain consensus authentication method applicable to a public data resource development and utilization scene.
Background
Development, utilization and construction of public data resources are carried out, so that urban digital economy development can be promoted, social folks can be guaranteed, and important effects are achieved for improving government management concepts and realizing government governmental control capability modernization. However, in the current promotion of the market value-added development process of public data, the problems of low data resource sharing efficiency, difficult guarantee of personal data privacy, difficult supervision of the data use process and the like exist, meanwhile, the support decision capability of the data resource in the fields of economic development, social management and the like is relatively weak, and the value of supporting the public data to the social side is difficult to fully release.
The blockchain realizes services such as on-chain evidence storage, anti-counterfeiting tracing, data supervision and the like, and can be divided into public chains, alliance chains and private chains, wherein the alliance chains are commonly maintained by members of an organization, and provide functions such as member management, authentication, authorization, monitoring, audit and the like, the openness of the blockchain is generally between the public chains and the private chains, a blockchain is commonly managed by a plurality of organizations, a node needs to be agreed by the organizations when the node wants to join the alliance chains, and only the node in the alliance chains has rights to read and write. Because the alliance chain has the advantages of higher speed, lower cost, partial decentralization, strong controllability, no default disclosure of data and the like, the alliance chain is widely applied to full-flow data tracing, uplink evidence storage and data credible sharing services for providing data in application scenes such as government institutions, finance, manufacturing, logistics, medical treatment, insurance and the like.
However, most of the existing public key signature algorithms based on the PKI system are adopted by the common identification authentication mechanism among the members of the alliance chain, when the alliance node signs data, a third party Certificate Authority (CA) is required to request a public key certificate, and as the alliance node becomes larger, the CA is required to maintain a large number of public key certificates. The public key cryptosystem is used as a public key cryptosystem, the traditional public key generation mode is changed, information of a unique identification identity of a user such as an identity card number, an email, a telephone number and the like is used as a public key, a public key digital certificate does not need to be applied to a CA, the problems of certificate generation, verification, storage, revocation and the like in the traditional public key cryptosystem are effectively avoided, and the dependence of the user on the public key certificate is reduced.
In summary, how to design a federation chain consensus security identity authentication method in a public data resource development and utilization scenario based on an identity cryptosystem, so as to ensure that communication between federation consensus nodes can be efficiently accessed and controlled under the support of a blockchain underlying network is a problem to be solved.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a alliance chain consensus identity authentication method
The invention is realized by the following technical scheme.
The invention provides a alliance chain consensus identity authentication method, which comprises the following steps:
(1) the user adds the public parameters PK into the system through an access mechanism of the alliance chain to form an alliance member, the supervision node operates an initialization algorithm to generate public parameters PK, meanwhile, digital identity information is generated according to unique identity identification information of the alliance member, the public parameters PK and the digital identity information are uploaded to the blockchain, and then a corresponding identity private key is generated for the alliance member of each node through a key generation algorithm;
(2) the leading node packs and verifies a batch of transactions to form a block, and uses a private key of the leading node to sign the identity of the block and send the block to the following node;
(3) after the signature is received by the slave node, verifying the signature through the digital identity public key of the leader node, if the signature passes the verification, verifying the transaction data in the block, voting the signature through the private key of the slave node, and broadcasting the voting signature to each sub-slave node in the slave node; if the verification is not passed, the verification fails, and the step (2) is returned;
(4) after receiving the voting signature, the other sub-slave nodes verify by using the public keys of the respective nodes, and store the block according to the voting result.
The identity signature comprises an initialization module, a secret key generation module, a signature module and a signature verification module.
The initialization module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) generating public parameters PK required by transmission data by a supervision node in a alliance chain, and uploading the public parameters PK to a blockchain;
(2) randomly selecting two groups G1 and G2 with prime number q, defining bilinear mapping e and hash function H 1 And H 2 ：
e：G 1 ×G 2 →G 2 ，
H 1 ：{0，1}n→G 1 ；
H 2 ：G 1 →Z q ；
(3) From finite field Z q Randomly selecting a random number s as its private key, and then selecting from group G 1 G is randomly selected as a generator, and finally, the public parameter PK is uploaded to a blockchain;
wherein:
Z q for the q-order finite field, the public parameter pk= { q, e, G 1 ，G 2 ，H 1 ，H 2 ，g}。
The key generation module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the supervision node acquires public parameters PK on a chain, generates respective private keys by running a key generation algorithm according to alliance membership information of each node, inputs unique identity information ID of a user and the public parameters PK, and outputs a private key s of the user ID And digital identity P ID And transmitting digital identity information (ID, P ID ) Uploading to the blockchain, the private key S ID Transmitting the message to a user through a secure channel;
(2) based on node federation membership information ID e {0,1} n Calculate Q ID ＝H 1 (ID)，x＝H 1 (sQ ID ) Then calculate node private key s ID =x+s, user public key P ID ＝g x+s Will private key s ID Transmitting the message to a user through a secure channel;
wherein Q is ID Is the hash value of the identity information, x is the private key s and Q of the supervision node ID Is used to generate the hash value of (a).
The signature module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the signature node obtains the public parameter PK through a chain, then operates a signature algorithm and inputs a signature private key S ID The public parameters PK and the information M to be signed, and the signature delta is output;
(2) for the information M to be signed, calculate H 1 (M) randomly selecting a random number r εZ q Using private key S ID Computing a first signatureSecond signature delta 2 ＝g r Output signature δ= (δ) 1 ,δ 2 ) And sent to the authentication node.
The signature verification module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the verification node acquires public parameters PK and digital identity information through a chain, runs a verification signature algorithm, inputs a signature delta, the public parameters PK and the digital identity information, outputs true if the signature verification is correct, and otherwise, outputs false;
(2) the verification node obtains the public key and public parameter PK of the sending node from the chain, and calculates H 1 (M) by verifying equation e (H 1 (M),δ 2 ·P ID )＝e(δ 1 G) judging whether the signature is correct or not;
the correctness of the verification equation is verified as follows:
the invention has the beneficial effects that: the data transmission process can be prevented from being tampered, and the identity information of a signer can be identified; the method is applied to the development and utilization scene of public data resources, combines the technology based on identity signature, not only realizes high-efficiency safe access control, but also expands the use scene of the alliance chain, and can effectively solve the problem of rapidly and safely realizing identity authentication among the consensus nodes under the background of the alliance chain.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the identity signature of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a flow chart of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solution of the present invention is further described below, but the scope of the claimed invention is not limited to the above.
As shown in fig. 2, a federation chain consensus identity authentication method includes the following steps:
(1) the user adds the public parameters PK into the system through an access mechanism of the alliance chain to form an alliance member, the supervision node operates an initialization algorithm to generate public parameters PK, meanwhile, digital identity information is generated according to unique identity identification information of the alliance member, the public parameters PK and the digital identity information are uploaded to the blockchain, and then a corresponding identity private key is generated for the alliance member of each node through a key generation algorithm;
(2) the leading node packs and verifies a batch of transactions to form a block, and uses a private key of the leading node to sign the identity of the block and send the block to the following node;
(3) after the signature is received by the slave node, verifying the signature through the digital identity public key of the leader node, if the signature passes the verification, verifying the transaction data in the block, voting the signature through the private key of the slave node, and broadcasting the voting signature to each sub-slave node in the slave node; if the verification is not passed, the verification fails, and the step (2) is returned;
(4) after receiving the voting signature, the other sub-slave nodes verify by using the public keys of the respective nodes, and store the block according to the voting result.
The identity signature comprises an initialization module, a key generation module, a signature module and a signature verification module, as shown in fig. 1.
The initialization module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) generating public parameters PK required by transmission data by a supervision node in a alliance chain, and uploading the public parameters PK to a blockchain;
(2) randomly selecting two groups G1 and G2 with prime number q, defining bilinear mapping e and hash function H 1 And H 2 ：
e：G 1 ×G 2 →G 2 ，
H 1 ：{0，1}n→G 1 ；
H 2 ：G 1 →Z q ；
(3) From finite field Z q Randomly selecting a random number s as its private key, and then selecting from group G 1 G is randomly selected as a generator, and finally, the public parameter PK is uploaded to a blockchain;
wherein:
Z q for the q-order finite field, the public parameter pk= { q, e, G 1 ，G 2 ，H 1 ，H 2 ，g}。
The key generation module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the supervision node acquires public parameters PK on a chain, generates respective private keys by running a key generation algorithm according to alliance membership information of each node, inputs unique identity information ID of a user and the public parameters PK, and outputs a private key S of the user ID And digital identity P ID And transmitting digital identity information (ID, P ID ) Uploading to the blockchain, and the private key s ID Transmitting the message to a user through a secure channel;
(2) based on node federation membership information ID e {0,1} n Calculate Q ID ＝H 1 (ID)，x＝H 1 (sQ ID ) Then calculate node private key s ID =x+s, user public key P ID ＝g x+s Will private key s ID Transmitting the message to a user through a secure channel;
wherein Q is ID Is the hash value of the identity information ID, x is the private key s and Q of the supervision node ID Is used to generate the hash value of (a).
The signature module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the signature node obtains the public parameter PK through a chain, then operates a signature algorithm and inputs a signature private key s ID The public parameters PK and the information M to be signed, and the signature delta is output;
(2) for the information M to be signed, calculate H 1 (M) randomly selecting a random number r εZ q Using private key s ID Computing a first signatureSecond signature delta 2 ＝g r Output signature δ= (δ) 1 ,δ 2 ) And sent to the authentication node.
The signature verification module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the verification node acquires public parameters PK and digital identity information through a chain, runs a verification signature algorithm, inputs a signature delta, the public parameters PK and the digital identity information, outputs true if the signature verification is correct, and otherwise, outputs false;
(2) verification nodeObtaining public key and public parameter PK of transmitting node from chain, and calculating H 1 (M) by verifying equation e (H 1 (M),δ 2 ·P ID )＝e(δ 1 G) judging whether the signature is correct or not;
the correctness of the verification equation is verified as follows:
in summary, compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the block chain technology is combined with an identity-based signature system, so that the binding of the user identity and the public key is realized, and the problems of difficult public key certificate management, high cost and low efficiency in the existing public key infrastructure system are avoided;
2. the digital identity is created by combining with the background of the blockchain, so that the trusted on-chain identity can be established for the alliance members, and meanwhile, a powerful technical support is provided for identity authentication;
3. the method has strong universality and high safety, and can effectively solve the problem of rapidly and safely realizing identity authentication among the consensus nodes under the background of the alliance chain.
Claims (5)
1. A alliance chain consensus identity authentication method is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
(1) the user adds the public parameters PK into the system through an access mechanism of the alliance chain to form an alliance member, the supervision node operates an initialization algorithm to generate public parameters PK, meanwhile, a user public key is generated according to unique identity identification information of the alliance member, the public parameters PK and digital identity information are uploaded to the blockchain, and then a corresponding identity private key is generated for the alliance member of each node through a key generation algorithm;
(2) the leading node packs and verifies a batch of transactions to form a block, and uses a private key of the leading node to sign the identity of the block and send the block to the following node;
(3) after the signature is received by the slave node, verifying the signature through the public key of the user of the leader node, if the signature passes the verification, verifying the transaction data in the block, voting the signature through the private key of the slave node, and broadcasting the voting signature to each sub-slave node in the slave node; if the verification is not passed, the verification fails, and the step (2) is returned;
(4) after receiving the voting signature, the other sub-slave nodes respectively verify by using the public keys of the respective nodes, and store the block according to the voting result;
the identity signature comprises an initialization module, a secret key generation module, a signature module and a signature verification module;
the key generation module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the supervision node acquires public parameters PK on a chain, generates respective private keys by running a key generation algorithm according to alliance membership information of each node, inputs unique identity information ID and public parameters PK, and outputs a user private key s ID Public key P with user ID And transmitting digital identity information (ID, P ID ) Uploading to the blockchain, and the private key s ID Transmitting the message to a user through a secure channel;
(2) based on node federation membership information ID e {0,1} n Calculate Q ID ＝H 1 (ID)，x＝H 1 (sQ ID ) Then calculate node private key s ID =x+s, user public key P ID ＝g x+s Will private key s ID Transmitting the message to a user through a secure channel;
wherein Q is ID Hash value of unique identity information, x is private key s and Q of supervision node ID Is used to generate the hash value of (a).
2. The federation chain consensus identity authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: the initialization module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) generating public parameters PK required by transmission data by a supervision node in a alliance chain, and uploading the public parameters PK to a blockchain;
(2) randomly selecting two groups G1 and G2 with prime number q, defining bilinear mapping e and hash function H 1 And H 2 ：
e：G 1 ×G 2 →G 2 ，
H 1 ：{0，1} n →G 1 ；
H 2 ：G 1 →Z q ；
(3) From finite field Z q Randomly selecting a random number s as its private key, and then selecting from group G 1 G is randomly selected as a generator, and finally, the public parameter PK is uploaded to a blockchain;
wherein:
Z q for the q-order finite field, the public parameter pk= { q, e, G 1 ，G 2 ，H 1 ，H 2 ，g}。
3. The federation chain consensus identity authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: the signature module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the signature node obtains the public parameter PK through a chain, then operates a signature algorithm and inputs a signature private key s ID The public parameters PK and the information M to be signed, and the signature delta is output;
(2) for the information M to be signed, calculate H 1 (M) randomly selecting a random number r εZ q Using private key s ID Computing a first signatureSecond signature delta 2 ＝g r Output signature δ= (δ) 1 ，δ 2 ) And sent to the authentication node.
4. The federation chain consensus identity authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: the signature verification module flow comprises the following steps:
(1) the verification node acquires public parameters PK and digital identity information through a chain, runs a verification signature algorithm, inputs a signature delta, the public parameters PK and the digital identity information, outputs true if the signature verification is correct, and otherwise, outputs false;
(2) verification nodeObtaining public key and public parameter PK of transmitting node from chain, and calculating H 1 (M) by verifying equation e (H 1 (M)，δ 2 ·P ID )＝e(δ 1 G) whether the signature is correct is judged.
5. The federation chain consensus identity authentication method according to claim 4, wherein: the correctness of the verification equation is verified as follows:
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| CN202111592121.6A CN114499952B (en) | 2021-12-23 | 2021-12-23 | Alliance chain consensus identity authentication method |
| PCT/CN2022/099577 WO2023115850A1 (en) | 2021-12-23 | 2022-06-17 | Consortium blockchain consensus identity authentication method |
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| CN114499952B (en) * | 2021-12-23 | 2024-04-09 | 中电科大数据研究院有限公司 | Alliance chain consensus identity authentication method |
| CN115085947B (en) * | 2022-08-23 | 2022-11-08 | 深圳市迪博企业风险管理技术有限公司 | Data security inspection method and system in digital twin |
| CN115967583B (en) * | 2023-03-16 | 2023-06-06 | 安羚科技(杭州)有限公司 | Key management system and method based on alliance chain |
| CN116938452B (en) * | 2023-09-15 | 2023-12-08 | 天津太极风控网络科技有限公司 | Cloud audit method for encrypted backup account set |
| CN117034356B (en) * | 2023-10-09 | 2024-01-05 | 成都乐超人科技有限公司 | Privacy protection method and device for multi-operation flow based on hybrid chain |
| CN117574440B (en) * | 2024-01-17 | 2024-04-30 | 浙江大学 | Alliance chain medical data right-determining and source-tracing method and system based on multiple signature technologies |
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