CN114492083A - Direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attack - Google Patents

Direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attack Download PDF

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CN114492083A
CN114492083A CN202210272522.1A CN202210272522A CN114492083A CN 114492083 A CN114492083 A CN 114492083A CN 202210272522 A CN202210272522 A CN 202210272522A CN 114492083 A CN114492083 A CN 114492083A
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attack
distributed
output
fdi
distributed generator
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郭方洪
郑祥康
吴祥
董辉
陈博
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Zhejiang University of Technology ZJUT
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
    • G06F30/20—Design optimisation, verification or simulation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02J—CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
    • H02J1/00—Circuit arrangements for dc mains or dc distribution networks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2113/00—Details relating to the application field
    • G06F2113/04—Power grid distribution networks

Abstract

The invention discloses a direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method aiming at FDI attack, which comprises the steps of constructing a direct-current microgrid model based on distributed two-layer control under network attack, constructing a controller based on a distributed sliding-mode observer, acquiring input and output of the direct-current microgrid model, utilizing the distributed sliding-mode observer to obtain an estimated attack signal in real time, and supplementing the distributed two-layer control by utilizing a compensation quantity output by the controller based on the distributed sliding-mode observer when the FDI attack occurs, so as to realize bus voltage recovery and current output distribution. The invention can counteract the influence of FDI attack, not only can realize the recovery of bus voltage, but also can realize the accurate distribution of output current.

Description

Direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attack
Technical Field
The application belongs to the technical field of microgrid safety, and particularly relates to a detection and recovery method for False Data Injection (FDI) attack on a direct current microgrid based on a distributed sliding mode observer, which can solve the problem of FDI attack and improve the safety of the microgrid.
Background
The micro-grid integrates renewable energy, an energy storage system and a local load together to form a novel power system with low and medium voltage and small range. Compared with an alternating-current micro-grid, the direct-current micro-grid can supply power more reliably and efficiently and does not generate reactive power, so that the direct-current micro-grid has more superiority. In order to realize energy management of Distributed Generators (DG), a primary current control strategy of a direct current microgrid is a hierarchical control scheme consisting of three layers of control networks. The most common method in one-layer control is droop control, and current distribution can be realized by only setting a droop coefficient. Each controller in the distributed two-layer control is communicated with the neighbor, so that effective information sharing can be realized, and voltage deviation caused by droop control can be compensated. The three-tier control considers the economic scheduling problem.
The information physical system formed by the direct current micro-grid enhances the integration capability of a physical process and a network infrastructure by means of strong computing resources and communication capability. Because the open shared network layer used in the cyber-physical system has a certain vulnerability, and the information between the distributed controllers is transmitted through the sparse communication network, the network layer is more vulnerable. FDI attacks are simpler, more efficient and more confusing through means of tampering with the data. Most of the prior methods do not defend FDI attack from the passive defense point of view, and other methods have unreasonable or limited implementation.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the defect that the prior art is difficult to meet the safety requirement of a microgrid, the invention provides a direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method aiming at FDI attack. The method can eliminate the influence of FDI attack in a limited time. The effectiveness and stability of the method are proved from theoretical analysis through system stability analysis, and the effectiveness and stability of the algorithm are proved through simulation.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the application is as follows:
a direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attack comprises the following steps:
s1, constructing a direct current micro-grid model based on distributed two-layer control under network attack;
s2, constructing a controller based on the distributed sliding mode observer, comprising:
taking a distributed sliding mode observer as shown in the following formula:
Figure BDA0003554236760000021
Figure BDA0003554236760000022
in the formula, ni1,ni2,Li∈R+Sign (. cndot.) is a sign function, v, for observer parametersiIs the intermediate variable(s) of the variable,
Figure BDA0003554236760000023
is fiI.e. the attack signal, fiFor FDI attacks to which the ith distributed generator is subjected,
Figure BDA0003554236760000024
is uiEstimated value of uiThe output voltage is controlled for the second tier of the ith distributed generator,
Figure BDA0003554236760000025
for the voltage output by the two-layer control after the ith distributed generator is attacked,
Figure BDA0003554236760000026
is v isiThe derivative of (a) of (b),
Figure BDA0003554236760000027
is composed of
Figure BDA0003554236760000028
The derivative of (a) of (b),
Figure BDA0003554236760000029
integral control coefficient, alpha, for the ith distributed generatoriGain factor for the ith distributed generator, eVIs a pressure difference of eV＝V*-Vb，VbIs the bus voltage, V*Is the nominal voltage;
therefore, a controller based on a distributed sliding mode observer is designed as follows:
Figure BDA00035542367600000210
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA00035542367600000211
a compensation voltage for the i distributed generator output for a controller based on a decentralized sliding-mode observer;
s3, acquiring input and output of the direct current microgrid model, and acquiring an estimation attack signal in real time by using the distributed sliding mode observer;
s4, comparing the estimated attack signal with a preset attack threshold value, judging whether FDI attack occurs, if the FDI attack occurs, executing a step S5, and if not, returning to execute the step S3;
and S5, supplementing the distributed two-layer control by using the compensation voltage output by the controller based on the distributed sliding-mode observer, and realizing bus voltage recovery and current output distribution.
Several alternatives are provided below, but not as an additional limitation to the above general solution, but merely as a further addition or preference, each alternative being combinable individually for the above general solution or among several alternatives without technical or logical contradictions.
Preferably, the constructing of the direct current microgrid model comprises:
s11, controlling the output voltage u of the ith two-layer control of the distributed generatoriAdding into one-layer control to solve voltage deviation problemThe obtained dynamic model of one layer of control is as follows:
Vb＝V*-(Ri+ki)Ii+ui
in the formula, RiLine resistance, k, of the ith distributed generatoriIs the droop coefficient of the ith distributed generator, IiIs the output current of the ith distributed generator;
s12, designing a dynamic model of distributed two-layer control as follows:
Figure BDA0003554236760000031
in the formula, PiIs the intermediate variable(s) of the variable,
Figure BDA0003554236760000032
Figure BDA0003554236760000033
represents the set of neighbours of the ith distributed generator, betaiIs the gain factor, u, of the ith distributed generatorjControlling the output voltage for the second layer of the jth neighbor distributed generator in the neighbor set;
s13, u after j neighbor distributed generator is attackedjCan be expressed as:
Figure BDA0003554236760000034
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA0003554236760000035
the voltage, gamma, output for the second layer control of the j-th adjacent distributed generator after being attackedjIs an attack bias value;
defining FDI attacks fiComprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0003554236760000036
the equation for obtaining distributed two-tier control under FDI attack is thus as follows:
Figure BDA0003554236760000037
Figure BDA0003554236760000038
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA0003554236760000039
the voltage of the latter two-layer control output is attacked for the ith distributed generator and compensated by the controller based on the decentralized sliding-mode observer,
Figure BDA00035542367600000310
and controlling the output voltage of the second layer after the ith distributed generator is attacked.
Preferably, the sign function sign (x) is defined as follows:
Figure BDA00035542367600000311
where x is the input to the sign function.
According to the direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attack, a direct-current microgrid model based on distributed two-layer control under network attack is constructed. And analyzing the direct-current micro-grid under attack, constructing a distributed sliding-mode observer, and estimating an attack signal in real time. And comparing the estimated attack signal with a designed threshold value, and judging whether the FDI attack occurs. And after the attack is judged to occur, compensating the two-layer control by using the compensation quantity output by the controller based on the distributed sliding mode observer. And finally, the bus voltage recovery and the current output accurate distribution are realized.
The invention has the following beneficial effects: and combining a controller based on a sliding mode observer with a distributed secondary controller to defend the FDI attack. The controller not only has the characteristics of high response speed, good transient performance and the like, but also has stronger robustness to uncertainty and external interference, and only local information owned by the two-layer controller is needed, and other additional information such as neighbor information is not needed to realize a control target. The influence of FDI attack can be offset, and not only can the recovery of bus voltage be realized, but also the accurate distribution of output current can be realized.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a direct current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attack according to the present application;
FIG. 2 is a control block diagram of the ith distributed generator under attack of the present application;
FIG. 3 is a comparison graph of output current before and after the primary control is added to the attack signal in the experiment;
FIG. 4 is a comparison graph of bus voltage before and after the primary and secondary control is added to the attack signal in the experiment of the present application;
FIG. 5 is a comparison graph of output current before and after adding an attack signal to the secondary control proposed in the present application in the experiment of the present application;
FIG. 6 is a comparison graph of bus voltage before and after adding an attack signal to the secondary control proposed in the present application in the experiment of the present application;
fig. 7 is a comparison graph of output currents before and after an attack signal is added to the secondary control proposed in the present application under the condition of accessing an additional load and an additional DG in the experiment of the present application;
fig. 8 is a comparison graph of bus voltages before and after an attack signal is added to the secondary control proposed in the present application under the condition of accessing an additional load and an additional DG in the experiment of the present application;
FIG. 9 shows the second control adding attack signal proposed by the present application in the experiment of the present application
Figure BDA0003554236760000041
Comparing the output current before and after;
FIG. 10 shows the second control adding attack signal proposed by the present application in the experiment of the present application
Figure BDA0003554236760000042
Bus voltage before and after the comparison.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present application.
Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used in the description of the present application herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the application.
As shown in fig. 1, in order to overcome the problem that the security requirement of the microgrid is difficult to meet in the prior art, the embodiment provides a method for detecting and recovering an attack of a direct-current microgrid aiming at an FDI attack.
Specifically, the method for detecting and recovering the direct-current microgrid attack aiming at the FDI attack comprises the following steps:
and S1, constructing a direct current micro-grid model based on distributed two-layer control under network attack.
Since there is analogism in the control of the distributed generators of the dc microgrid, the present embodiment is described by taking the control of the ith distributed generator as shown in fig. 2 as an example for ease of understanding.
S11, in the direct current micro-grid, droop control causes voltage deviation, and the second-layer control output voltage u of the ith distributed generator is used for controllingiThe voltage deviation problem is solved by adding the voltage deviation control model into a first-layer control model, and the obtained first-layer control dynamic model is as follows:
Vb＝V*-(Ri+ki)Ii+ui
in the formula, RiFor the ith distributed power generationLine resistance of the machine, kiIs the droop coefficient of the ith distributed generator, IiIs the output current of the ith distributed generator.
S12, designing a dynamic model of distributed two-layer control as follows:
Figure BDA0003554236760000051
in the formula, PiIs the intermediate variable(s) of the variable,
Figure BDA0003554236760000052
Figure BDA0003554236760000053
represents the set of neighbours of the ith distributed generator, betaiIs the gain factor, u, of the ith distributed generatorjAnd controlling the output voltage for the second layer of the jth neighbor distributed generator in the neighbor set.
S13, u after j neighbor distributed generator is attackedjCan be expressed as:
Figure BDA0003554236760000054
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA0003554236760000055
the voltage, gamma, output for the second layer control of the j-th adjacent distributed generator after being attackedjIs the attack bias value.
Defining FDI attacks fiComprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0003554236760000056
analyzing the attacked system to obtain the equation of distributed two-layer control under FDI attack as follows:
Figure BDA0003554236760000061
Figure BDA0003554236760000062
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA0003554236760000063
the voltage of the latter two-layer control output is attacked for the ith distributed generator and compensated by the controller based on the decentralized sliding-mode observer,
Figure BDA0003554236760000064
and controlling the output voltage of the second layer after the ith distributed generator is attacked.
And S2, constructing a controller based on the distributed sliding mode observer.
Taking a distributed sliding mode observer as shown in the following formula:
Figure BDA0003554236760000065
Figure BDA0003554236760000066
in the formula, ni1,ni2,Li∈R+Sign (. cndot.) is a sign function, v, for observer parametersiIs the intermediate variable(s) of the variable,
Figure BDA0003554236760000067
is fiI.e. the attack signal, fiFor FDI attacks to which the ith distributed generator is subjected,
Figure BDA0003554236760000068
is uiEstimated value of uiThe output voltage is controlled for the second tier of the ith distributed generator,
Figure BDA0003554236760000069
for the voltage output by the two-layer control after the ith distributed generator is attacked,
Figure BDA00035542367600000610
is v isiThe derivative of (a) of (b),
Figure BDA00035542367600000611
is composed of
Figure BDA00035542367600000612
The derivative of (a) of (b),
Figure BDA00035542367600000613
integral control coefficient, alpha, for the ith distributed generatoriGain factor for the ith distributed generator, eVIs a pressure difference of eV＝V*-Vb，VbIs the bus voltage, V*For nominal voltage, sign (x) is defined as follows:
Figure BDA00035542367600000614
therefore, a controller based on a distributed sliding mode observer is designed as follows:
Figure BDA00035542367600000615
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA00035542367600000616
is a compensation voltage for the i-th distributed generator output based on a controller of a decentralized sliding-mode observer.
And S3, acquiring input and output of the direct current microgrid model, and acquiring an estimated attack signal in real time by using the distributed sliding mode observer.
And S4, comparing the estimated attack signal with a preset attack threshold value, judging whether the FDI attack occurs, if the FDI attack occurs, executing the step S5, and if not, returning to execute the step S3.
And S5, supplementing the distributed two-layer control by using the compensation voltage output by the controller based on the distributed sliding mode observer, and performing elastic control by using the controller based on the distributed sliding mode observer to realize bus voltage recovery and current output distribution.
The effectiveness of the method of the present application is further illustrated by the following specific examples:
1) setting parameters: in the experiment, a direct-current micro-grid simulation model containing 4 DGs is built based on Simulink. The physical layer includes 3 conventional DGs (DG1, DG2, DG3) and a spare DG (DG4) as well as a resistive load and a Constant Power Load (CPL). The network layer comprises an attack module and a control module. The main electrical parameters and controller parameters are shown in table 1.
TABLE 1 Main Electrical parameters and controller parameters
Figure BDA0003554236760000071
2) Results of the experiment
As can be seen from the simulation results shown in FIGS. 3-4, attack is occurring
Figure BDA0003554236760000072
Next, the stability of the original two-layer controller is destroyed.
As can be seen from the simulation results shown in FIGS. 5-6, the method provided by the invention is used for adding attack
Figure BDA0003554236760000073
Then, the current is according to I1:I2:I3The division is performed at a ratio of 1:2:3, while the voltage output and current division are substantially unaffected after adjustment for 0.3 s.
As can be seen from the simulation results shown in FIGS. 7-8, the method provided by the invention is used to add attack
Figure BDA0003554236760000074
Changing load conditions, connecting DG4 to the DC bus with current as I1:I2:I3:I4With a 1:2:3:3 ratio distribution, it can be seen that in a short time the bus voltage returns to the nominal value and each DG can also obey the current distribution under different interference conditions.
As can be seen from the simulation results shown in FIGS. 9-10, the attack is different
Figure BDA0003554236760000075
Under the current of I1:I2:I3:I4The proposed method is still valid for a 1:2:3:3 ratio assignment.
In summary, the method provided by the application can offset the influence of the FDI attack, and not only can realize the recovery of the bus voltage, but also can realize the accurate distribution of the output current.
The technical features of the embodiments described above may be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the embodiments described above are not described, but should be considered as being within the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present application, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, which falls within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims (3)

1. A direct current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attacks is characterized in that the direct current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attacks comprises the following steps:
s1, constructing a direct current micro-grid model based on distributed two-layer control under network attack;
s2, constructing a controller based on the distributed sliding mode observer, comprising:
taking a distributed sliding mode observer as shown in the following formula:
Figure FDA0003554236750000011
Figure FDA0003554236750000012
Figure FDA0003554236750000013
in the formula, ni1,ni2,Li∈R+Sign (. cndot.) is a sign function, v, for observer parametersiIs the intermediate variable(s) of the variable,
Figure FDA0003554236750000014
is fiI.e. the attack signal, fiFor FDI attacks to which the ith distributed generator is subjected,
Figure FDA0003554236750000015
is uiEstimated value of uiThe output voltage is controlled for the second tier of the ith distributed generator,
Figure FDA0003554236750000016
for the voltage output by the two-layer control after the ith distributed generator is attacked,
Figure FDA0003554236750000017
is v isiThe derivative of (a) of (b),
Figure FDA0003554236750000018
is composed of
Figure FDA0003554236750000019
The derivative of (a) of (b),
Figure FDA00035542367500000112
integral control coefficient, alpha, for the ith distributed generatoriGain factor for the ith distributed generator, eVIs a pressure difference of eV＝V*-Vb，VbIs the bus voltage, V*Is the nominal voltage;
therefore, a controller based on a distributed sliding mode observer is designed as follows:
Figure FDA00035542367500000110
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure FDA00035542367500000111
a compensation voltage for the i distributed generator output for a controller based on a decentralized sliding-mode observer;
s3, acquiring input and output of the direct current microgrid model, and acquiring an estimation attack signal in real time by using the distributed sliding mode observer;
s4, comparing the estimated attack signal with a preset attack threshold value, judging whether FDI attack occurs, if FDI attack occurs, executing a step S5, otherwise, returning to execute the step S3;
and S5, supplementing the distributed two-layer control by using the compensation voltage output by the controller based on the distributed sliding-mode observer, and realizing bus voltage recovery and current output distribution.
2. The method for detecting and recovering against FDI attacks according to claim 1, wherein the constructing of the dc microgrid model comprises:
s11, controlling the output voltage u of the ith two-layer control of the distributed generatoriAdding into a layer of controlSolving the problem of voltage deviation, and obtaining a layer of controlled dynamic model as follows:
Vb＝V*-(Ri+ki)Ii+ui
in the formula, RiLine resistance, k, of the ith distributed generatoriIs the droop coefficient of the ith distributed generator, IiIs the output current of the ith distributed generator;
s12, designing a dynamic model of distributed two-layer control as follows:
Figure FDA0003554236750000021
in the formula, PiIs the intermediate variable(s) of the variable,
Figure FDA0003554236750000022
Figure FDA0003554236750000023
represents the set of neighbours of the ith distributed generator, betaiIs the gain factor, u, of the ith distributed generatorjControlling the output voltage for the second layer of the jth neighbor distributed generator in the neighbor set;
s13, u after j th neighbor distributed generator is attackedjCan be expressed as:
Figure FDA0003554236750000024
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure FDA0003554236750000025
the voltage, gamma, output for the second layer control of the j-th adjacent distributed generator after being attackedjIs an attack bias value;
defining FDI attacks fiComprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0003554236750000026
the equation for obtaining distributed two-tier control under FDI attack is thus as follows:
Figure FDA0003554236750000027
Figure FDA0003554236750000028
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure FDA0003554236750000029
the voltage of the latter two-layer control output is attacked for the ith distributed generator and compensated by the controller based on the decentralized sliding-mode observer,
Figure FDA00035542367500000210
and controlling the output voltage of the second layer after the ith distributed generator is attacked.
3. The method for detecting and recovering from direct current microgrid attack on FDI attack of claim 1, wherein the sign function sign (x) is defined as follows:
Figure FDA00035542367500000211
where x is the input to the sign function.
CN202210272522.1A 2022-03-18 2022-03-18 Direct-current microgrid attack detection and recovery method for FDI attack Withdrawn CN114492083A (en)

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116094769A (en) * 2022-12-22 2023-05-09 燕山大学 Port micro-grid control method for resisting false data injection attack

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116094769A (en) * 2022-12-22 2023-05-09 燕山大学 Port micro-grid control method for resisting false data injection attack
CN116094769B (en) * 2022-12-22 2024-03-01 燕山大学 Port micro-grid control method for resisting false data injection attack

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