CN114491664A - Server information security detection method and device and detection equipment - Google Patents
Server information security detection method and device and detection equipment Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method, a device and a device for detecting the information security of a server, comprising the following steps: s100, generating a test key according to a lattice signature algorithm; step S200, outputting a detection signature or a detection signature and a detection state according to a public key, a message, an original private key, a test key and a state of a lattice signature algorithm; step S300, sending a detection signature or a detection signature and a state to a server; step S400, receiving a first collision message and a second collision message generated by a server according to a detection signature or the detection signature and a state and a corresponding verification signature based on a lattice signature algorithm; step S500, calculating a private key to be verified according to the verification signature; step S600, outputting the signature to be verified or the signature and the state to be verified according to the private key to be verified by using the step S200; and if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, outputting prompt information. The invention can detect the safety of the server, remind the user of maintaining the server in time and avoid large-scale information leakage of the server.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and particularly relates to a method, a device and a device for detecting information security of a server.
Background
With the large-scale application of technologies such as cloud computing and big data, the demand of the server is greatly improved, so that the safety and the reliability of the server are more and more important, and the safety of the server is a foundation stone of the safety of the whole information system. The authoritative data shows that about 80% of the data in the whole information system is processed by the server, and the dependence of the information system on the server is increased along with the continuous development of the functions and the performances of the server. In order to ensure the safety of information, the information can be encrypted by adopting an encryption technology in the process of digital transmission, and with the continuous development of a quantum computing technology, a quantum-security-resistant cryptographic algorithm is focused, wherein a Fiat-Shamir type lattice signature is an important part of the quantum-security-resistant cryptographic algorithm. In the process of information transmission, if a server based on such lattice signatures is attacked, the privacy security of user information is seriously influenced, and how to detect the security of the server based on the lattice signatures of the Fiat-Shamir type is an urgent problem to be solved.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the above problems in the prior art, the present invention provides a method for detecting server information security. The technical problem to be solved by the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
a first aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for detecting server information security, which is applied to a detection device, and includes:
step S100 generates a test key subk ═ (F, κ) according to the lattice signature algorithm1,κ2) (ii) a Wherein F represents a pseudo-random hash function
κ1,κ2Denotes a random number and k1,κ2∈{0,1}l；
Represents a polynomial ring and
x represents an independent variable, and n represents the power of x;
step S200, public key pk ═ a, t, message μ, original private key (S) according to lattice signature algorithm1,s2) The test key subk ═ F, κ1,κ2) And a state i ═ j, τ) output detection signature
Or detecting the signature and said state
Wherein a polynomial is randomly selected
Slave polynomial ring
A subset of
In randomly selecting two polynomials
And is
Polynomial t ═ as1+s2(ii) a j represents the jth signature, and τ represents an intermediate variable; detecting signatures
First partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2Are respectively represented by z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2，y1,y2Is a random number; the intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ), w ═ ay, is calculated by the hash function H1+y2；
Step S300, sending the detection signature to a server
Or the detection signature and status
Step S400, receiving the signature detected by the server
Or the detection signature and status
Generated first collision message mu1＝(μ0,p1)∈{0,1}qAnd a second collision message mu2＝(μ0,p2)∈{0,1}qAnd a corresponding verification signature sigma based on a lattice signature algorithm1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) (ii) a Wherein q is an integer and represents the length of the collision message;
step S500, according to the verification signature sigma1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Computing a private key(s) to be authenticated11,s21) Wherein, in the step (A),
step S600, according to the private key (S) to be verified11,s21) Outputting the signature to be verified or the signature and the state to be verified by using the step S200;
and if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, outputting prompt information.
Further, the specific steps of step S100 include:
receiving a security parameter l, and randomly generating a pseudo-random hash function according to a lattice signature algorithm
Random number k1,κ2And kappa1,κ2∈{0,1}l(ii) a Then the test key subk is (F, κ)1,κ2)。
Further, the specific steps of step S200 include:
step S201, receiving the public key pk ═ (a, t) of the lattice signature algorithm, and eliminatingMu, original private key(s)1,s2) The test key subk ═ F, κ1,κ2) And state ι ═ j, τ;
step S2021, j ← 0, τ ← 0, and if j ═ 0 mod 2, two numbers of first random numbers are randomly selected
Step S2022, calculating a first polynomial w ═ ay from the public key a1+y2；
Step S2023, calculating a first intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ) by the hash function H;
step S2024, based on the original private key (S)1,s2) And said first random number y1,y2Computing a first partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2，z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2；
Step S2024, execute the random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z)1,z2,cs1,cs2) If the receiving returns to 1;
let τ be c and output the detection signature
Step S2031, if the random sampling algorithm returns 0 rejection, executing the following steps:
step S2032, according to the public key a and the second random number y'1,y′2Calculating a second polynomial w '═ ay'1+y′2；
Step S2033 of inputting a message μ, where the public key pk ═ a, t and the second polynomial w ', and calculating a second intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w', μ) by a hash function H;
step S2034, according to the original private key (S)1,s2) And the second random number y'1,y′2Computing a third partial signature z1' and fourth partial signature z2'，z′1＝y′1+c′s1,z′2＝y′2+c′s2；
Step S2035, running a random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z'1,z′2,c′s1,c′s2) And returns a 1 accept;
if returning 0 and rejecting, let tau be c ═ c
j +1 and iota (j, τ), and returning
Further, the specific steps of step S500 include:
protecting a signature algorithm and the verification signature sigma according to a double authentication1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Calculating a system of linear equations
Obtaining the private key(s) to be verified11,s21) (ii) a Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
further, before the step S300, the method further includes: verification algorithm
The method comprises the following steps:
step S204, checking equation w ' ═ az ' from pk ═ (a, t) '1+z′2-c't is true;
step S205, accepting the detection signature
If and only if equation c ' holds true for H (a, t, w ', μ) and norm | | (z '1,z′2) Less than or equal to mn sigma k-sigma k; where n is a power of 2, m and σ are arbitrary integers, and k satisfies
A second aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides a server information security detection apparatus, including:
a generating module for generating a test key (sub ═ F, k) according to a lattice signature algorithm1,κ2) (ii) a Wherein F represents a pseudo-random hash function
κ1,κ2Denotes a random number and k1,κ2∈{0,1}l；
Represents a polynomial ring and
x represents an independent variable, and n represents the power of x;
an output module for generating a message mu, an original private key(s) according to the public key pk ═ a, t of the lattice signature algorithm1,s2) The test key subk ═ F, κ1,κ2) And a state i ═ j, τ) output detection signature
Or detecting the signature and said state
Wherein a polynomial is randomly selected
Slave polynomial ring
A subset of
In randomly selecting two polynomials
And is
Polynomial t ═ as1+s2(ii) a j represents the jth signature, and τ represents an intermediate variable; detecting signatures
First partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2Are respectively represented as z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2，y1,y2Is a random number; the intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ), w ═ ay, is calculated by the hash function H1+y2；
A sending module for sending the detection signature to a server
Or the detection signature and status
A receiving module for receiving the signature of the server according to the detection
Or the detection signature and state
Generated first collision message mu1＝(μ0,p1)∈{0,1}qAnd a second collision message mu2＝(μ0,p2)∈{0,1}qAnd a corresponding verification signature sigma based on a lattice signature algorithm1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) (ii) a Wherein q is an integer representing the length of the collision message;
a computing module for verifying the signatureName sigma1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Computing a private key(s) to be authenticated11,s21) Wherein, in the step (A),
a judging module for judging the private key(s) to be verified11,s21) Outputting the signature to be verified or the signature and the state to be verified by using the step S200;
and if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, outputting prompt information.
A third aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for detecting server information security, including: a memory and a processor;
the memory stores a computer program;
the processor is configured to execute the steps of the server information security detection method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 when the computer program is executed. .
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the server information security detection method can detect the security of the server, and remind a user to maintain the server in time, so that the server is prevented from large-scale information leakage.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to specific examples, but the embodiments of the present invention are not limited thereto.
In the related art, the Fiat-Shamir type lattice signature is described as follows:
s1, key generation algorithm:
s101, slave polynomial ring
In randomly selecting a polynomial
Wherein
S102, a slave polynomial ring
A subset of
In (1), two polynomials are randomly selected
Wherein
S103, calculating the polynomial t ═ as1+s2。
S104, outputting a public and private key pair (a, t); (s)1,s2). Wherein the public key is (a, t); the private key is(s)1,s2)。
S2 signature algorithm Sign (mu, a, S) for message mu1,s2T) is described as follows:
s201, polynomial ring
In randomly selecting two polynomials
S202, calculating polynomial w ═ ay1+y2。
S203, calculate c ═ H (a, t, w, μ), where the cryptographic hash function H maps to the constant c.
S204, calculating a polynomial z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2。
S205, running a random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z)1,z2,cs1,cs2) Return 1 accept, otherwise return 0 reject.
S206, outputting the signature pair (c, z)1,z2)。
S3, input message and signature pair, verification algorithm Verify (mu, a, z)1,z2T) is described as follows:
s301, test equation w ═ az1+z2-whether ct holds.
S302, accept the signature if and only if equation c ═ H (a, t, w, μ) holds and norm | (z | | (z)1,z2) Less than or equal to mn sigma k-sigma k; where n is a power of 2, m and σ are arbitrary integers, and k satisfies
The random sampling algorithm RejectionSample is described as follows:
suppose that
Hash function
The hash values of (a) are randomly distributed and the variance of (b)
Provided that there is a constant M such that the next two distributions are statistically indistinguishable and the statistical distance is
The first distribution is described as follows:
1) and taking the hash value as v ← h.
2) Randomly selected from a discrete distribution with variance σ
3) By probability
And (z, v) is output.
Another distribution is described below:
1) and taking the hash value as v ← h.
2) Randomly selected from a discrete distribution with variance σ and mean v
3) By probability
And (z, v) is output.
Example one
A first aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for detecting server information security, which is applied to a detection device, and includes:
step S100 generates a test key subk ═ (F, κ) according to the lattice signature algorithm1,κ2) (ii) a Wherein F represents a pseudo-random hash function
κ1,κ2Denotes a random number and k1,κ2∈{0,1}l；
Represents a polynomial ring and
x represents an independent variable, and n represents the power of x.
The specific steps of step S100 include:
receiving a security parameter l input by a user of the detection equipment, and randomly generating a pseudo-random hash function according to a lattice signature algorithm
Random number k1,κ2And kappa1,κ2∈{0,1}l(ii) a Then test the secretThe key is sub ═ F, k1,κ2)。
Step S200, public key pk ═ a, t, message μ, original private key (S) according to lattice signature algorithm1,s2) Test key sub ═ F, κ1,κ2) And a state i ═ j, τ) output detection signature
Or detecting signatures and states
The specific steps of step S200 include:
step S201, receiving public key pk ═ a, t of lattice signature algorithm, message μ, original private key (S)1,s2) Test key sub ═ F, κ1,κ2) And state ι ═ j, τ.
Wherein a polynomial is randomly selected
Slave polynomial ring
A subset of
In randomly selecting two polynomials
And is
Polynomial t ═ as1+s2(ii) a j denotes the j-th signature and τ denotes the intermediate variable.
Step S2021, j ← 0, τ ← 0, and if j ═ 0 mod 2, two numbers of first random numbers are randomly selected
Step S2022. Calculating a first polynomial w ay from the public key a1+y2。
In step S2023, the hash function H calculates a first intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ).
Step S2024, based on the original private key (S)1,s2) And a first random number y1,y2Computing a first partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2，z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2。
Step S2024, execute the random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z)1,z2,cs1,cs2) If the receiving returns to 1;
let τ be c and output the detection signature
Step S2031, if the random sampling algorithm returns 0 rejection, executing the following steps S2032 to S2035:
step S2032, according to the public key a and the second random number y'1,y′2Calculating a second polynomial w '═ ay'1+y′2。
Step S2033 inputs the message μ, and the public key pk ═ a, t and the second polynomial w ', and calculates the second intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w', μ) by the hash function H.
Step S2034, according to the original private key (S)1,s2) And a second random number y'1,y′2Computing a third partial signature z1' and fourth partial signature z2'，z′1＝y′1+c′s1,z′2＝y′2+c′s2。
Step S2035, running a random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z'1,z′2,c′s1,c′s2) And returns a 1 accept;
if returning 0 and rejecting, let tau be c ═ c
J +1, iota (j, τ), and return
Then executing the verification algorithm
The method comprises the following steps: step S204-step S205.
Step S204, checking equation w ' ═ az ' from pk ═ (a, t) '1+z′2-c't is true.
Step S205, accepting the detection signature
If and only if equation c 'is true and norm | | (z'1,z′2) Less than or equal to mn sigma k-sigma k; where n is a power of 2, m and σ are arbitrary integers, and k satisfies
Step S300, sending detection signature to server
Or detecting signatures and states
Step S400, receiving the signature by the server according to the detection
Or detecting signatures and states
Generated first collision message mu1＝(μ0,p1)∈{0,1}qAnd a second collision message mu2＝(μ0,p2)∈{0,1}qAnd a corresponding verification signature sigma based on a lattice signature algorithm1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) (ii) a Where q is an integer and represents the length of the collision message.
Step S500, according to the verification signature sigma1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Computing a private key(s) to be authenticated11,s21)。
The specific steps of step S500 include:
protection signature algorithm and verification signature sigma according to double authentication1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Calculating a system of linear equations
System of linear equations of four
The last unknown quantity is y1,y2,s1,s2Calculating the linear equation to obtain the private key(s) to be verified11,s21). Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
step S600, according to the private key (S) to be verified11,s21) Step S200 is used to output the signature to be verified or the signature and status to be verified. Specifically, the original private key (S) in step S200 is used1,s2) Replacement with the private key(s) to be verified11,s21) And outputting the signature to be verified or the signature and the state to be verified.
And if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, outputting prompt information. The prompt message is used for prompting the user that the server needs maintenance.
The detection signature generated by the detection equipment is sent to the server, the server can output the verification signature and return the verification signature to the detection equipment in the information transmission process according to the detection signature, the detection equipment calculates the private key to be verified according to the verification signature, the detection equipment outputs the signature to be verified according to the private key to be verified, verifies the signature to be verified and the detection signature, and if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, the server does not recognize the detection signature, so the server lacks a corresponding recognition mechanism and needs to be further maintained and updated so as to prevent the situation that the information of a user in the server is acquired by others. The server information security detection method can detect the security of the server, and remind a user of maintaining the server in time, so that the server is prevented from large-scale information leakage.
Example two
A second aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides a server information security detection apparatus, including:
a generating module for generating a test key (sub ═ F, k) according to a lattice signature algorithm1,κ2) (ii) a Wherein F represents a pseudo-random hash function
κ1,κ2Denotes a random number and κ1,κ2∈{0,1}l；
Represents a polynomial ring and
x represents an independent variable, and n represents the power of x.
The generation module is specifically configured to:
receiving a security parameter l, and randomly generating a pseudo-random hash function according to a lattice signature algorithm
Random number k1,κ2And κ1,κ2∈{0,1}l(ii) a Then testingKey subk ═ F, κ1,κ2)。
An output module for generating a message mu, an original private key(s) according to the public key pk ═ a, t of the lattice signature algorithm1,s2) Test key sub ═ F, κ1,κ2) And a state i ═ j, τ) output detection signature
Or detecting signatures and states
The output module includes:
a receiving unit for receiving a public key pk ═ a, t, a message mu, and an original private key(s) of a lattice signature algorithm1,s2) Test key sub ═ F, κ1,κ2) And state ι ═ j, τ;
a selecting unit for j ← 0, τ ← 0, and for randomly selecting two first random numbers if j ═ 0 mod 2
A first calculation unit for calculating a first polynomial w ═ ay from the public key a1+y2；
A second calculation unit configured to calculate a first intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ) by a hash function H;
a third calculation unit for calculating a third value from the original private key(s)1,s2) And a first random number y1,y2Computing a first partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2，z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2；
A first execution unit for executing a random sampling algorithm ReobjectSample (z)1,z2,cs1,cs2) If the receiving returns to 1;
let τ be c and output the detection signature
A second execution unit, configured to execute the following steps if the random sampling algorithm returns a 0 rejection:
step S2032, according to the public key a and the second random number y'1,y′2Calculating a second polynomial w '═ ay'1+y′2；
Step S2033 of inputting a message μ, where the public key pk ═ a, t and a second polynomial w ', and calculating a second intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w', μ) by a hash function H;
step S2034, according to the original private key (S)1,s2) And a second random number y'1,y′2Computing a third partial signature z1' and fourth partial signature z2'，z′1＝y′1+c′s1,z′2＝y′2+c′s2；
Step S2035, run the random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z'1,z′2,c′s1,c′s2) And returns a 1 accept;
if returning 0 and rejecting, let tau be c ═ c
J +1, iota (j, τ), and return
A verification module for executing a verification algorithm
The method comprises the following steps: a checking unit and an accepting unit;
a verification unit for verifying the equation w ' ═ az ' according to pk ═ (a, t) '1+z′2-c't is true;
an acceptance unit for accepting the detection signature
If and only if equation c ═ H (a, t, w', μ) holds andnorm | | (z'1,z′2) Less than or equal to mn sigma k-sigma k; where n is a power of 2, m and σ are arbitrary integers, and k satisfies
A sending module for sending the detection signature to the server
Or detecting signatures and states
A receiving module for receiving the signature from the server
Or detecting signatures and states
Generated first collision message mu1＝(μ0,p1)∈{0,1}qAnd a second collision message mu2＝(μ0,p2)∈{0,1}qAnd a corresponding verification signature sigma based on a lattice signature algorithm1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) (ii) a Wherein q is an integer representing the length of the collision message.
A calculation module for calculating a signature σ from the verification1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Computing a private key(s) to be authenticated11,s21) Wherein, in the step (A),
the calculation module is particularly adapted to protect the signature algorithm and to verify the signature sigma according to a double authentication1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Calculating a system of linear equations
Obtaining the private key(s) to be verified11,s21) (ii) a Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
a judging module for judging the private key(s) to be verified11,s21) Using step S200 to output the signature to be verified or the signature and state to be verified;
and if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, outputting prompt information.
EXAMPLE III
A third aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for detecting information security of a server, including: a memory and a processor;
the memory stores a computer program;
the processor is configured to execute the steps of the server information security detection method in the first embodiment when running the computer program.
In the description herein, references to the description of the term "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "an example," "a specific example," or "some examples," etc., mean that a particular feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, the schematic representations of the terms used above are not necessarily intended to refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples. Furthermore, various embodiments or examples described in this specification can be combined and combined by those skilled in the art.
The foregoing is a further detailed description of the invention in connection with specific preferred embodiments and it is not intended to limit the invention to the specific embodiments described. For those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains, several simple deductions or substitutions can be made without departing from the spirit of the invention, and all shall be considered as belonging to the protection scope of the invention.
Claims (7)
1. A server information security detection method is applied to detection equipment and comprises the following steps:
step S100 generates a test key subk ═ (F, κ) according to the lattice signature algorithm1,κ2) (ii) a Wherein F represents a pseudorandom hash function F:
κ1,κ2represents a random number and
represents a polynomial ring and
x represents an independent variable, and n represents the power of x;
step S200, public key pk ═ a, t, message μ, original private key (S) according to lattice signature algorithm1,s2) The test key subk ═ F, κ1,κ2) And a state i ═ j, τ) output detection signature
Or detecting the signature and said state
Wherein a polynomial is randomly selected
Slave polynomial ring
A subset of
In randomly selecting two polynomials
And is
Polynomial t ═ as1+s2(ii) a j represents the jth signature, and τ represents an intermediate variable; detecting signatures
First partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2Are respectively represented by z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2，y1,y2Is a random number; the intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ), w ═ ay, is calculated by the hash function H1+y2；
Step S300, sending the detection signature to a server
Or the detection signature and status
Step S400, receiving the signature detected by the server
Or the detection signature and status
Generated first collision message mu1＝(μ0,p1)∈{0,1}qAnd a second collision message mu2＝(μ0,p2)∈{0,1}qAnd corresponding label basedVerification signature sigma of name algorithm1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) (ii) a Wherein q is an integer and represents the length of the collision message;
step S500, according to the verification signature sigma1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Computing a private key(s) to be authenticated11,s21) Wherein, in the step (A),
step S600, according to the private key (S) to be verified11,s21) Outputting the signature to be verified or the signature and the state to be verified by using the step S200;
and if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, outputting prompt information.
2. The method for detecting the security of the server information according to claim 1, wherein the specific steps of the step S100 include:
receiving security parameters
Randomly generating a pseudo-random hash function F according to a lattice signature algorithm:
random number k1,κ2And is
Then the test key subk is (F, κ)1,κ2)。
3. The method for detecting the security of the server information according to claim 1, wherein the specific steps of the step S200 include:
step S201, receiving grid signature algorithmPublic key pk ═ (a, t), message mu, original private key(s)1,s2) The test key subk ═ F, κ1,κ2) And state ι ═ j, τ;
step S2021, j ← 0, τ ← 0, and if j ═ 0 mod 2, two first random numbers are randomly selected
Step S2022, calculating a first polynomial w ═ ay from the public key a1+y2；
Step S2023, calculating a first intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ) by the hash function H;
step S2024, based on the original private key (S)1,s2) And said first random number y1,y2Computing a first partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2，z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2；
Step S2024, execute the random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z)1,z2,cs1,cs2) If the receiving returns to 1;
let τ be c and output the detection signature
Step S2031, if the random sampling algorithm returns 0 rejection, executing the following steps:
step S2032, according to the public key a and the second random number y'1,y′2Calculating a second polynomial w '═ ay'1+y′2；
Step S2033 of inputting a message μ, where the public key pk ═ a, t and the second polynomial w ', and calculating a second intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w', μ) by a hash function H;
step S2034, according to the original private key (S)1,s2) And the second random number y'1,y′2Computing a third partial signature z1' and fourth partial signature z2'，z′1＝y′1+c′s1,z′2＝y′2+c′s2；
Step S2035, running a random sampling algorithm RejectionSample (z'1,z′2,c′s1,c′s2) And returns a 1 accept;
if returning 0 and rejecting, let tau be c ═ c
j +1 and iota (j, τ), and returning
4. The method for detecting the security of the server information according to claim 3, wherein the specific steps of the step S500 include:
protecting a signature algorithm and the verification signature sigma according to a double authentication1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Calculating a system of linear equations
Obtaining the private key(s) to be verified11,s21) (ii) a Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
5. the method for detecting the security of the server information according to claim 3, further comprising, before the step S300: verification algorithm
The method comprises the following steps:
step S204, checking equation w ' ═ az ' from pk ═ (a, t) '1+z′2-c't is true;
step S205, accepting the detection signature
If and only if equation c ' holds true for H (a, t, w ', μ) and norm | | (z '1,z′2) Less than or equal to mn sigma k-sigma k; where n is a power of 2, m and σ are arbitrary integers, and k satisfies
6. A server information security detection apparatus, comprising:
a generating module for generating a test key (sub ═ F, k) according to a lattice signature algorithm1,κ2) (ii) a Wherein F represents a pseudorandom hash function F:
κ1,κ2represents a random number and
represents a polynomial ring and
x represents an independent variable, and n represents the power of x;
an output module for generating a message mu, an original private key(s) according to the public key pk ═ a, t of the lattice signature algorithm1,s2) The test key subk ═ F, κ1,κ2) And a state i ═ j, τ) output detection signature
Or detecting the signature and said state
Wherein a polynomial is randomly selected
Slave polynomial ring
A subset of
In randomly selecting two polynomials
And is
Polynomial t ═ as1+s2(ii) a j represents the jth signature, and τ represents an intermediate variable; detecting signatures
First partial signature z1And a second partial signature z2Are respectively represented by z1＝y1+cs1,z2＝y2+cs2，y1,y2Is a random number; the intermediate value c ═ H (a, t, w, μ), w ═ ay, is calculated by the hash function H1+y2；
A sending module for sending the detection signature to a server
Or the detection signature and status
A receiving module for receiving the signature of the server according to the detection
Or the detection signature and status
Generated first collision message mu1＝(μ0,p1)∈{0,1}qAnd a second collision message mu2＝(μ0,p2)∈{0,1}qAnd a corresponding verification signature sigma based on a lattice signature algorithm1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) (ii) a Wherein q is an integer representing the length of the collision message;
a calculation module for calculating a signature σ from the verification1＝(c1,z11,z12),σ2＝(c1,z21,z22) Computing a private key(s) to be authenticated11,s21) Wherein, in the step (A),
a judging module for judging the private key(s) to be verified11,s21) Outputting the signature to be verified or the signature and the state to be verified by using the step S200;
and if the signature to be verified is the same as the detection signature, outputting prompt information.
7. A server information security detection apparatus, comprising: a memory and a processor;
the memory stores a computer program;
the processor is configured to execute the steps of the server information security detection method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 when the computer program is executed.
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