CN114462061B - System and method for protecting double authentications based on privacy of Internet of vehicles - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a system and a method for privacy protection double authentication based on internet of vehicles, wherein the system comprises a trusted center TA, a roadside unit RSU, a vehicle and a trusted module TPM; it is assumed that there are n vehicles somewhere in the system, and these vehicles form a small-range sensing network, that is, a cluster, and the road conditions sensed in the cluster are collected by the cluster head and sent to other vehicles nearby. The RSU is in two-way communication with the vehicle for selecting the vehicle to be a cluster head or reporting a variant vehicle. The TA embeds the system master private key and the required public parameters for the TPM of each vehicle, after which the vehicle needs the TPM to generate a signing key and a corresponding pseudonym for it each time it signs the transmitted information. The TPM of the malicious vehicle is locked by the TA at revocation. The invention ensures that counterfeiting attack, replay attack, witch attack and the like are well resisted in the internet of vehicles system, and simultaneously provides privacy protection for vehicle paths, thereby having high practicability.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of the Internet of vehicles (Internet of things) and the technical field of V2X communication privacy protection and authentication, and relates to a system and a method for resisting counterfeiting of malicious adversaries, modifying information and providing privacy protection in the Internet of vehicles; in particular to a system and a method for disturbing normal traffic order, improving system fault tolerance and timely detecting malicious vehicles and canceling aiming at false information sent by malicious adversaries.
Background
The Internet of vehicles is used as an important component of an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), and each vehicle is provided with an on-board system which realizes interconnection and intercommunication among all entities of the network through a special short range communication protocol (DSRC). To achieve various personalized services, vehicles need to utilize information that is mutually transmitted inside the network. However, the information receiver cannot directly identify that the sender is a legal vehicle and whether the transmitted information is real; in addition, during vehicle interaction, an adversary may trace the path of a vehicle by collecting information sent by the vehicle over time. Therefore, how to solve the above-mentioned problems, namely, message authentication and privacy protection in the internet of vehicles is an important issue.
In the existing internet of vehicles communication authentication scheme, three types of internet of vehicles communication authentication schemes can be divided, namely: cryptography-based, reputation system-based, and hardware-based.
At present, public key cryptography-based authentication schemes in the Internet of vehicles are mostly used, public key certificates are issued to vehicles through certificate issuing institutions (CA), a signer signs information by using a private key at the time of registration, and a verifier verifies the signature through the public key certificates of the signer. In such a scenario, the CA needs to keep public key certificates of all vehicles, which presents a great challenge to the storage capabilities of the CA. In addition, if the certificate is updated, the CA also considers how to revoke the old public key certificate efficiently, which also places a burden on the huge internet of vehicles system.
On the other hand, in the prior art, there is little research on authentication of message contents, and researchers basically evaluate the credibility of messages indirectly by calculating the reputation score of a vehicle. In the scheme, the vehicles are scored for experience of each interaction through direct or indirect interaction as the reputation score of the opposite vehicle, and finally the score is sent to a trusted third party, and the trusted third party updates the reputation score for the vehicle. However, in this communication mode, a vehicle interacts with a trusted third party twice during each communication, which directly causes overload of the network, and in case of packet loss, the vehicle requests to the trusted third party again, which is not acceptable for the internet of vehicles with high real-time requirements.
Hardware-based authentication schemes such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) mainly protect the security (e.g., sensing devices) of the intelligent terminal from being controlled by malicious adversaries. However, the existing internet of vehicles system is not a single node, and the protection by hardware is far from sufficient.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a system and a method for protecting double authentications based on privacy of Internet of vehicles by means of functions provided by hardware.
The system of the invention adopts the technical proposal that: a privacy protection double authentication system based on the Internet of vehicles comprises a trusted center TA, a roadside unit RSU, a Vehicle and a trusted module TPM; all vehicles in the system are registered in a trusted center TA, the trusted center TA embeds a system main private key x and required public parameters for a trusted module TPM of each vehicle, and each signing of the vehicles is generated by the trusted module TPM for generating a signing key and a corresponding pseudonym; a plurality of vehicles can form a small cluster in a certain range, and each cluster is internally provided with a vehicle designated by a roadside unit (RSU) as a cluster head of the cluster; when a vehicle enters the range of a roadside unit (RSU), the vehicle firstly inquires whether clusters conforming to the characteristics of the vehicle exist in the range, if so, the vehicle sends a cluster request to the cluster head conforming to the clusters, and after the cluster head checks, the vehicle can enter the clusters; if not, applying to the roadside unit RSU to become a cluster head in the range; a common vehicle in a cluster sends road condition information to the cluster head, and the cluster head broadcasts the road condition in the range after unifying the road condition information; if the cluster head finds that the report of vehicles in the cluster is not true, all information in the cluster is sent to a roadside unit (RSU), the RSU judges whether the unreasonable information is malicious or not, malicious vehicle information is sent to a trusted center (TA), and the trusted center (TA) locks a trusted module (TPM) of the malicious vehicle.
The technical scheme adopted by the method is as follows: a privacy protection double authentication method based on the Internet of vehicles comprises the following steps:
Step 1: generating system parameters and key pairs;
step 1.1: trusted center TA selects security parameter kappa and addition group Multiplication group
Step 1.2: trusted center TA selects system master private keyComputing system public key P pub =x·p, where P is the groupIs a generator of (1); wherein,
Step 1.3: the trusted center selects four hash functions as follows:H2:{0,1}*→{0,1}n， n represents a bit string of n bits long;
Step 1.4: the trusted center TA publishes the public parameters including
Step 2: registering an entity;
All vehicles in the system are registered in a trusted center TA, the trusted center TA embeds a system main private key x and required public parameters for a trusted module TPM of each vehicle, and each signing of the vehicles is generated by the trusted module TPM for generating a signing key and a corresponding pseudonym;
step 3: the vehicle applies for being clustered or becomes a cluster head;
A plurality of vehicles can form a small cluster in a certain range, and each cluster is internally provided with a vehicle designated by a roadside unit (RSU) as a cluster head of the cluster;
step 4: intra-cluster message interaction;
When a vehicle enters the range of a roadside unit (RSU), the vehicle firstly inquires whether clusters conforming to the characteristics of the vehicle exist in the range, if so, the vehicle sends a cluster request to the cluster head conforming to the clusters, and after the cluster head checks, the vehicle can enter the clusters; if not, applying to the roadside unit RSU to become a cluster head in the range;
step 5: and reporting and canceling the malicious vehicle.
A common vehicle in a cluster sends road condition information to the cluster head, and the cluster head broadcasts the road condition in the range after unifying the road condition information; if the cluster head finds that the report of vehicles in the cluster is not true, all information in the cluster is sent to a roadside unit (RSU), the RSU judges whether the unreasonable information is malicious or not, malicious vehicle information is sent to a trusted center (TA), and the trusted center (TA) locks a trusted module (TPM) of the malicious vehicle.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
The invention ensures that counterfeiting attack, replay attack, witch attack and the like are well resisted in the internet of vehicles system, and simultaneously provides privacy protection for vehicle paths, thereby having high practicability. The vehicle requests a pseudonym and signing key from the built-in trusted module TPM before each message is sent, the purpose of which is to achieve unlinkability. When information interaction is carried out in the cluster, the cluster head firstly carries out identity verification when receiving road condition information sent by a sender, and verifies whether the sender has legal identity and whether the sent information is tampered or not through verification signature; secondly, the cluster head executes verification of information content, and when the range is proper, the perception of road conditions in the cluster is basically the same, and the cluster head judges the road conditions, so that the accuracy of the message is ensured, the interaction times of vehicles and a trusted third party TA are reduced, and the communication efficiency is improved; in addition, the trusted module TPM inquires the public revocation list to ensure timely revocation of the malicious vehicle, and time delay is not caused because the inquiry of the revocation list and the generation of the pseudonym and the signing key are distributed. In conclusion, the invention has good practicability.
Drawings
Fig. 1: the system architecture diagram of the embodiment of the invention;
fig. 2: the method of the embodiment of the invention is a flow chart;
Fig. 3: the cluster head selection algorithm flow chart of the embodiment of the invention.
Detailed Description
In order to facilitate the understanding and practice of the invention, those of ordinary skill in the art will now make further details with reference to the drawings and examples, it being understood that the examples described herein are for the purpose of illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the invention thereto.
Referring to fig. 1, the system for protecting dual authentication based on privacy of internet of vehicles provided by the invention is characterized in that: the system comprises a trusted center (Trust Authentication, TA), a Road Side Unit (RSU), and a trusted module (Trust Platform Module, TPM);
Assuming that all vehicles in the system are registered in a TA in an off-line mode, the TA embeds a main private key of the system, required public parameters and necessary program codes for the TPM of each vehicle, and then the TPM generates a signing key and a corresponding pseudonym for each signing of the vehicles. It is assumed that several vehicles can form a small cluster within a certain range, and each cluster has a vehicle designated by the RSU as a cluster head of the cluster. When a vehicle enters a range of an RSU, the vehicle firstly inquires whether clusters conforming to the characteristics of the vehicle exist in the range, if so, the vehicle sends a cluster request to cluster hair conforming to the clusters, and after the cluster head checks, the vehicle can enter the clusters; if not, the RSU is applied to become a cluster head in this range. And the common vehicle in one cluster sends road condition information to the cluster head, and the cluster head broadcasts the road condition in the range after unifying the road condition information. If the cluster head finds that the report of vehicles in the cluster is not real, all information in the cluster is sent to the RSU, the RSU judges whether the unreasonable information is malicious or not, malicious vehicle information is sent to the TA, and the TA locks the TPM of the malicious vehicle.
Referring to fig. 2, the invention provides a privacy protection dual authentication method based on internet of vehicles, comprising the following steps:
the generation of system parameters and authentication keys involves step 1 in fig. 2.
Step 1: generating system parameters and key pairs;
step 1.1: trusted center TA selects security parameter kappa and addition group Multiplication group
Step 1.2: trusted center TA selects system master private keyComputing system public key P pub =x·p, where P is the groupIs a generator of (1); wherein,
Step 1.3: the trusted center selects four hash functions as follows:H2:{0,1}*→{0,1}n， n represents a bit string of n bits long;
Step 1.4: the trusted center TA publishes the public parameters including
Entity registration involves step 2 in fig. 2.
Step 2: registering an entity;
step 2.1: the trusted center uses the system master secret χ and the identity of the vehicle V i And vehicle attributes Prop i (government vehicles, buses, public service vehicles or private vehicles for selection of subsequent heads) are embedded into the trusted module TPM;
step 2.2: the roadside unit RSU provides the identity ID R to the trusted center TA, which returns to the roadside unit public-private key pair: pk R＝H1(IDR),skR＝x·pkr, the registration phase is sent over the secure channel.
Applying for a vehicle to cluster or become a cluster head involves step 3 in fig. 2.
Step 3: the vehicle applies for being clustered or becomes a cluster head;
step 3.1: after the vehicle V i enters a certain range, searching whether a cluster which accords with the range exists or not;
Step 3.2: if not, the vehicle V i sends request information to the roadside unit RSU, wherein the request information comprises the current state M i,1 (vehicle speed, position, direction and destination) of the vehicle V i and signature sig i,1 of the state, and the signature algorithm uses BLS short signature; after receiving the information, the RSU executes a cluster head selection algorithm;
the specific flow of the cluster head selection algorithm is shown in fig. 3, and the specific implementation comprises the following sub-steps:
step 3.3.1: the RSU obtains the attribute of the applied vehicle and various running parameters (vehicle speed, position, direction and destination) of the vehicle;
Step 3.3.2: RSU calculates cluster head factor for vehicle Wherein e and f are weight parameters, e+f=1, s i represents the distance the vehicle travels on the current road, and n i represents the number of other vehicles in the vicinity of the vehicle;
step 3.3.3: adding the cluster head factor and the attribute value of the vehicle to calculate a final fit factor, and judging whether to agree with the application of the vehicle;
If so, a tuft application is sent to the tuft head comprising the current state M i,1 (vehicle speed, position, direction, destination) of the vehicle V i and the signature sig i,1 of the state.
Intra-cluster message interaction involves step 4 in fig. 2.
Step 4: intra-cluster message interaction;
step 4.1: vehicles in the cluster sense road condition information and sign i,2 the information to send to the cluster head;
step 4.2: after receiving information sent by other vehicles in the cluster, the cluster head executes signature verification, and in order to improve efficiency, batch verification is adopted to perform the following calculation:
where e denotes a bi-directional pairing, P denotes the base point of an elliptic password curve, sig i,2 denotes the signature of the message by vehicle V i, R i,2,hi,2 represents the signature private key of the vehicle V i, the random number, the hash function value, and P pub represents the main public key of the system;
Step 4.3: if the verification is passed, the cluster head executes the verification of the message content, judges the currently received message according to the Bayesian fault-tolerant thought and synthesizes the broadcasted message.
Intra-cluster message interaction involves step 5 in fig. 3.
Step 5: reporting and canceling malicious vehicles;
step 5.1: if the vehicle report of the cluster head is not real, all information in the cluster is sent to a roadside unit (RSU);
Step 5.2: the roadside unit RSU calculates cosine similarity of the information, judges whether the vehicle is mutated or not through comparison with the similarity value of the vehicle head, and if the vehicle is mutated, sends information of the unrealistic vehicle to the trusted center TA;
step 5.3: the TA calculates the vehicle ID through the pseudonym and publishes the vehicle ID on the public revocation list;
step 5.4: after the trusted module TPM on the variant vehicle inquires that the ID of the vehicle is on the revocation list, a pseudonym and a signing key are not generated for the vehicle.
The invention realizes a privacy protection double authentication scheme based on the internet of vehicles and BLS signature authentication technology, which not only realizes the protection of the privacy of the vehicle path, but also realizes double authentication of the message, and improves the authenticity and usability of the message.
It should be understood that the foregoing description of the preferred embodiments is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, but rather to limit the scope of the claims, and that those skilled in the art can make substitutions or modifications without departing from the scope of the invention as set forth in the appended claims.
Claims (5)
1. The privacy protection double authentication method based on the Internet of vehicles is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
Step 1: generating system parameters and key pairs;
step 1.1: trusted center TA selects security parameter kappa and addition group Multiplication group
Step 1.2: trusted center TA selects system master private keyComputing system public key P puv =x·p, where P is the groupIs a generator of (1); wherein,
Step 1.3: the trusted center selects four hash functions as follows: h 1:H2:{0,1}*→{0,1}n,H3:H4: n represents a bit string of n bits long;
Step 1.4: the trusted center TA publishes the public parameters including
Step 2: registering an entity;
All vehicles in the system are registered in a trusted center TA, the trusted center TA embeds a system main private key x and required public parameters for a trusted module TPM of each vehicle, and each signing of the vehicles is generated by the trusted module TPM for generating a signing key and a corresponding pseudonym;
step 3: the vehicle applies for being clustered or becomes a cluster head;
A plurality of vehicles can form a small cluster in a certain range, and each cluster is internally provided with a vehicle designated by a roadside unit (RSU) as a cluster head of the cluster;
the specific implementation of the step 3 comprises the following sub-steps:
step 3.1: after the vehicle V i enters a certain range, searching whether a cluster which accords with the range exists or not;
Step 3.2: if not, the vehicle V i sends request information to the roadside unit RSU, wherein the request information comprises the current state M i,1 of the vehicle V i and a signature sig i,1 of the state, and the roadside unit RSU executes a cluster head selection algorithm after receiving the information; the states include vehicle speed, position, direction, and destination;
If so, sending a cluster application to the cluster hair, wherein the cluster application comprises the current state M i,1 of the vehicle V i and a signature sig i,1 of the state;
The cluster head selection algorithm in the step 3.2 specifically comprises the following sub-steps:
step 3.2.1: the RSU obtains the attribute of the application vehicle and the state of the vehicle;
step 3.2.2: RSU calculates cluster head factor for vehicle Wherein e and f are weight parameters, e+f=1, s i represents the distance the vehicle travels on the current road, and n i represents the number of other vehicles in the vicinity of the vehicle;
step 3.2.3: adding the cluster head factor and the attribute value of the vehicle to calculate a final fit factor, and judging whether to agree with the application of the vehicle;
step 4: intra-cluster message interaction;
When a vehicle enters the range of a roadside unit (RSU), the vehicle firstly inquires whether clusters conforming to the characteristics of the vehicle exist in the range, if so, the vehicle sends a cluster request to the cluster head conforming to the clusters, and after the cluster head checks, the vehicle can enter the clusters; if not, applying to the roadside unit RSU to become a cluster head in the range;
Step 5: reporting and canceling malicious vehicles;
A common vehicle in a cluster sends road condition information to the cluster head, and the cluster head broadcasts the road condition in the range after unifying the road condition information; if the cluster head finds that the report of vehicles in the cluster is not true, all information in the cluster is sent to a roadside unit (RSU), the RSU judges whether the unreasonable information is malicious or not, malicious vehicle information is sent to a trusted center (TA), and the trusted center (TA) locks a trusted module (TPM) of the malicious vehicle.
2. The internet of vehicles privacy preserving dual authentication method of claim 1, wherein the specific implementation of step 2 comprises the following sub-steps:
Step 2.1: the trusted center TA will system master private key x and identity of vehicle V i And vehicle attribute Prop i is embedded into trusted module TPM;
Step 2.2: the roadside unit RSU provides the identity ID R to the trusted center TA, which returns to the roadside unit RSU public-private key pair: pk R＝H1(IDR),skR＝x·pkr, the registration phase is sent over the secure channel.
3. The internet of vehicles privacy preserving dual authentication method of claim 1, wherein the specific implementation of step 4 comprises the following sub-steps:
step 4.1: vehicles in the cluster sense road condition information and sign i,2 the information to send to the cluster head;
step 4.2: after receiving information sent by other vehicles in the cluster, the cluster head executes signature verification, and the following calculation is performed by batch verification:
where e denotes a bi-directional pairing, P denotes the base point of an elliptic password curve, sig i,2 denotes the signature of the message by vehicle V i, R i,2,hi,2 represents the signature private key of the vehicle V i, the random number, the hash function value, and P pub represents the main public key of the system;
Step 4.3: if the verification is passed, the cluster head executes the verification of the message content, judges the currently received message according to the Bayesian fault-tolerant thought and synthesizes the broadcasted message.
4. A method for protecting dual authentication based on internet of vehicles privacy according to any one of claims 1-3, wherein the specific implementation of step 5 comprises the following sub-steps:
step 5.1: if the vehicle report of the cluster head is not real, all information in the cluster is sent to a roadside unit (RSU);
Step 5.2: the roadside unit RSU calculates cosine similarity of the information, judges whether the vehicle is mutated or not through comparison with the similarity value of the vehicle head, and if the vehicle is mutated, sends information of the unrealistic vehicle to the trusted center TA;
Step 5.3: the trusted center TA calculates the vehicle ID through the pseudonym and publishes the vehicle ID on the public revocation list;
step 5.4: after the trusted module TPM on the variant vehicle inquires that the ID of the vehicle is on the revocation list, a pseudonym and a signing key are not generated for the vehicle.
5. A system based on internet of vehicles privacy preserving double authentication, performing the method of any of claims 1-4; the method is characterized in that: the system comprises a trusted center TA, a roadside unit RSU, a Vehicle and a trusted module TPM; all vehicles in the system are registered in a trusted center TA, the trusted center TA embeds a system main private key x and required public parameters for a trusted module TPM of each vehicle, and each signing of the vehicles is generated by the trusted module TPM for generating a signing key and a corresponding pseudonym; a plurality of vehicles can form a small cluster in a certain range, and each cluster is internally provided with a vehicle designated by a roadside unit (RSU) as a cluster head of the cluster; when a vehicle enters the range of a roadside unit (RSU), the vehicle firstly inquires whether clusters conforming to the characteristics of the vehicle exist in the range, if so, the vehicle sends a cluster request to the cluster head conforming to the clusters, and after the cluster head checks, the vehicle can enter the clusters; if not, applying to the roadside unit RSU to become a cluster head in the range; a common vehicle in a cluster sends road condition information to the cluster head, and the cluster head broadcasts the road condition in the range after unifying the road condition information; if the cluster head finds that the report of vehicles in the cluster is not true, all information in the cluster is sent to a roadside unit (RSU), the RSU judges whether the unreasonable information is malicious or not, malicious vehicle information is sent to a trusted center (TA), and the trusted center (TA) locks a trusted module (TPM) of the malicious vehicle.
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| CN113609523A (en) * | 2021-07-29 | 2021-11-05 | 南京邮电大学 | Vehicle networking private data protection method based on block chain and differential privacy |
| CN113891318A (en) * | 2021-10-07 | 2022-01-04 | 桂林理工大学 | Malicious node detection method based on unmanned aerial vehicle assistance in vehicle-mounted network |
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| CN113609523A (en) * | 2021-07-29 | 2021-11-05 | 南京邮电大学 | Vehicle networking private data protection method based on block chain and differential privacy |
| CN113891318A (en) * | 2021-10-07 | 2022-01-04 | 桂林理工大学 | Malicious node detection method based on unmanned aerial vehicle assistance in vehicle-mounted network |
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