CN114362139A - Source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method with new energy consumption as target - Google Patents

Source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method with new energy consumption as target Download PDF

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CN114362139A
CN114362139A CN202111443048.6A CN202111443048A CN114362139A CN 114362139 A CN114362139 A CN 114362139A CN 202111443048 A CN202111443048 A CN 202111443048A CN 114362139 A CN114362139 A CN 114362139A
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new energy
load
source
storage
multilateral
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周强
王维洲
吴悦
韩旭杉
张彦琪
马志程
马彦宏
吕清泉
王定美
张金平
李津
张睿骁
刘淳
保承家
张健美
张珍珍
高鹏飞
刘丽娟
郑翔宇
刘海伟
申自裕
刘文颖
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STATE GRID GASU ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
North China Electric Power University
State Grid Gansu Electric Power Co Ltd
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STATE GRID GASU ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
North China Electric Power University
State Grid Gansu Electric Power Co Ltd
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Abstract

The invention discloses a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method taking new energy consumption as a target. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring the day-ahead prediction data of new energy, the new energy, and relevant parameters and relevant cost price of each enterprise, namely source-charge-storage; establishing a new energy consumption demand side income model; establishing a source-load-storage each consumer income model; establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining; and solving a game decision model, and outputting the adjusted capacity, the incentive electricity price and the income balance solution of the supply and demand parties. The source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method based on new energy consumption is characterized in that a new energy consumption demand party and source-load-storage (traditional power supply/adjustable load/energy storage power station) consumption parties are balanced in profitability on the basis of guaranteeing new energy consumption, the enthusiasm of supply and demand parties participating in new energy consumption is improved, new energy consumption is further improved, and meanwhile, the transaction fairness of a new energy consumption auxiliary service market is promoted.

Description

Source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method with new energy consumption as target
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of electric power market transaction of an electric power system, and particularly relates to a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method with new energy consumption as a target.
Background
In recent years, the installed capacity of new energy in China is further expanded, the power supply capacity is totally surplus, but the proportion of the traditional power supply is reduced, the peak regulation capacity of a power grid is insufficient, the problem of consumption of the new energy is obvious, and a large amount of wind and light are abandoned. Meanwhile, the high-capacity energy storage power station has strong new energy consumption capacity due to excellent charge and discharge characteristics, and the energy saving capacity of the high-capacity adjustable load and the deep peak regulation capacity of the traditional power supply can promote the new energy to be further consumed. How to fully and fairly utilize the excellent regulating capacity of the source-load-storage three to improve the consumption of the hindered new energy is an urgent problem to be solved.
The large-capacity energy storage power station, the large-capacity adjustable load such as electrolytic aluminum, silicon carbide and the like and the deep peak regulation capacity of the traditional power supply can be effectively adjusted in a form of electrovalence excitation so as to fairly and fully absorb the blocked new energy. The new energy consumption demander and supplier trade electricity at agreed price is one of the feasible directions of current electric power market reform. However, much research is currently focused on trading both suppliers and suppliers in a centralized bidding format, in which the benefits of the parties cannot be guaranteed. In the technical aspect, source-load-storage coordination is realized to consume new energy to the maximum extent, but the economic problem of the process is not considered, and each new energy consumption supplier can provide effective new energy consumption service only on the premise that the benefits of both trading parties are guaranteed.
In summary, the present invention provides a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method targeting new energy consumption based on the existing research, and a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining is established by using nash equilibrium theory, so as to guarantee the equilibrium of interests of each main body based on new energy consumption, promote the new energy consumption provider to provide the enthusiasm of new energy consumption service, and further improve the new energy consumption.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention aims to provide a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method aiming at new energy consumption, which is used for solving the problem of fully and fairly utilizing the excellent regulation capacity of the source-load-storage three to improve the new energy consumption.
1. A source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method taking new energy consumption as a target comprises the following steps:
s1: acquiring new energy day-ahead prediction data, new energy sources, source-charge-storage enterprise related parameters and related cost electricity prices;
s2: establishing a new energy consumption demand side income model;
s3: establishing a source-load-storage each consumer income model;
s4: establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining;
s5: and solving a game decision model, and outputting peak regulation capacity, incentive electricity price and income balance solution of the supply and demand parties.
2. The S1 includes the steps of:
s101: acquiring new energy day-ahead prediction data including wind power day-ahead output prediction PW.FAnd photovoltaic day-ahead power output prediction PPV.F(ii) a Acquiring cost related parameters of a new energy consumption demand party and source-load-storage enterprises;
s102: and acquiring related parameters and cost electricity prices of the new energy consumption supplier, including the maximum deep peak load regulation capacity and cost related parameters of the traditional power supply enterprise, the maximum adjustable capacity and cost related parameters of the adjustable load, and the maximum charging capacity and cost related parameters of the energy storage power station.
3. The S2 includes the steps of:
s201: the new energy enterprise obtains income by purchasing auxiliary peak shaving electric quantity from the power grid, so that a new energy consumption demand side, namely a new energy enterprise income model is established;
4. the S3 includes the steps of:
s301: the traditional power supply power generation enterprise obtains income by providing deep peak regulation capacity for a power grid, so that an income model of the traditional power supply power generation enterprise is established;
s302: the adjustable load enterprise obtains profits by increasing electricity consumption in the new energy blocked period, and accordingly an adjustable load enterprise profit model is established;
s303: the energy storage power station obtains earnings through charging in the new energy blocked time period and discharging in other time periods, and accordingly an energy storage power station earnings model is established;
5. the S4 includes the steps of:
s401: establishing a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining income model;
s402: introducing a Nash equilibrium theory, and establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining;
6. the S5 includes the steps of:
s501: solving a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining by adopting an iterative search method;
s502: outputting a deep peak regulation excitation electricity price and deep peak regulation capacity equilibrium solution of a traditional power supply enterprise, a peak regulation electricity utilization excitation electricity price and peak regulation electricity consumption equilibrium solution of an adjustable load, a charge-discharge differential price and peak regulation charge-discharge capacity equilibrium solution of an energy storage power station, an excitation electricity price equilibrium solution and a peak regulation capacity equilibrium solution of a new energy power generation enterprise purchasing new energy absorption service, and the maximum income of each party in an equilibrium state;
drawings
The technical solution of the present invention is further described in detail by the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a source-load-store multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method aiming at consuming new energy provided by the invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a regional power grid including a wind power photovoltaic generator, a conventional power supply unit, an energy storage power station and an adjustable load centralized access;
FIG. 3 is a diagram of a new energy pre-day output prediction;
Detailed Description
In order to clearly understand the technical solution of the present invention, a detailed structure thereof will be set forth in the following description. It is apparent that the specific implementation of the embodiments of the present invention is not limited to the specific details familiar to those skilled in the art. Exemplary embodiments of the invention are described in detail below, and other embodiments in addition to those described in detail are possible.
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
Example 1
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method aiming at consuming new energy provided by the invention. In fig. 1, a flow chart of a source-load-store multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method aiming at consuming new energy provided by the present invention includes:
s1: acquiring the day-ahead predicted data of new energy, source-charge-storage related parameters of each enterprise and related cost electricity prices;
s2: establishing a new energy consumption demand side income model;
s3: establishing a source-load-storage new energy consumption party income model;
s4: establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining;
s5: and solving a game decision model, and outputting peak regulation capacity, incentive electricity price and income balance solution of the supply and demand parties.
2. The S1 includes the steps of:
s101: acquiring new energy day-ahead prediction data including wind power day-ahead output prediction PW.FAnd photovoltaic day-ahead power output prediction PPV.F(ii) a Acquiring cost related parameters of a new energy consumption demand party and source-load-storage enterprises;
s102: and acquiring related parameters and cost electricity prices of the new energy consumption party, including the maximum deep peak load regulation capacity and cost related parameters of the traditional power supply enterprise, the maximum adjustable capacity and cost related parameters of the adjustable load, and the maximum charging capacity and cost related parameters of the energy storage power station.
3. The S2 includes the steps of:
s201: the new energy enterprise obtains income by purchasing auxiliary peak shaving electric quantity from the power grid, so that a new energy consumption demand side, namely a new energy enterprise income model is established as follows:
Figure BDA0003383307880000051
in the formula:
Figure BDA0003383307880000052
the income of the new energy electric field in the time period t;
Figure BDA0003383307880000053
the method comprises the steps of (1) obtaining the purchased peak shaving service electric quantity for the increased blocked new energy electric quantity;
Figure BDA0003383307880000054
the online electricity price of the new energy power generation enterprise is obtained; cW0The generation amount of the unit power generation of the new energy power generation enterpriseThen, the process is carried out;
Figure BDA0003383307880000055
peak shaving excitation electricity price paid to a power grid for new energy power generation enterprises;
Figure BDA0003383307880000056
paying the net charge to the power grid company for the new energy power generation enterprises.
4. The S3 includes the steps of:
s301: traditional power generation enterprises obtain profits by providing deep peak shaving capacity, and accordingly a traditional power generation enterprise profit model is established as follows:
Figure BDA0003383307880000057
in the formula:
Figure BDA0003383307880000058
the benefits of auxiliary services are provided for the traditional power generation enterprises within the time period t;
Figure BDA0003383307880000059
the electric quantity for deep peak regulation of the traditional power generation enterprises is obtained;
Figure BDA00033833078800000510
the method is characterized in that the method provides deep peak shaving excitation electricity price for traditional power generation enterprises; cG0The cost of deep peak shaving for traditional power generation enterprises.
S302: the adjustable load enterprise obtains income by increasing electricity consumption in the new energy blocked period, and accordingly the income model of the adjustable load enterprise is established as follows:
Figure BDA0003383307880000061
in the formula:
Figure BDA0003383307880000062
for enterprises with adjustable load in time period tIncome, Yuan of;
Figure BDA0003383307880000063
the output of products of a load-adjustable enterprise is adjustable;
Figure BDA0003383307880000064
selling price for unit product;
Figure BDA0003383307880000065
stimulating the electricity price for the peak shaving electricity utilization of the adjustable load enterprise;
Figure BDA0003383307880000066
the unit production cost of the load-adjustable enterprise is adjustable; and theta is the capacity equivalent conversion coefficient of the adjustable load enterprise.
S303: the energy storage power station obtains the income through charging in the new energy blocked time period and discharging in other time periods, and accordingly the income model of the energy storage power station is established as follows:
Figure BDA0003383307880000067
in the formula:
Figure BDA0003383307880000068
the profit of the energy storage power station in the time period t;
Figure BDA0003383307880000069
the peak-shaving charging and discharging capacity of the energy storage power station;
Figure BDA00033833078800000610
the peak-shaving charging and discharging difference is equal to the standard discharging electricity price minus the peak-shaving charging electricity price;
Figure BDA00033833078800000611
the cost of charging and discharging of the energy storage power station.
5. The S4 includes the steps of:
s401: establishing a source-charge-storage multilateral bargaining income model, wherein the model is a function of peak-shaving excitation electricity price and peak-shaving capacity of each party, and can be abbreviated as follows:
Figure BDA00033833078800000612
wherein the equivalence relationship exists as follows:
Figure BDA00033833078800000613
Figure BDA0003383307880000071
the model shows that the profits of both a consumption party and a demand party are influenced by peak-shaving excitation electricity price and peak-shaving capacity and cannot be solved independently, the determined price relation is the core of the multilateral bargaining economic problem, and the game theory is an effective method for solving the problem.
S402: and (3) introducing a Nash equilibrium theory, and establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining.
The traditional power generation enterprises, the load-adjustable enterprises and the energy storage power stations are a multilateral yield mutual association and restriction game process, and the process is analyzed by applying the Nash equilibrium principle as follows.
The new energy power generation enterprise takes the paid peak shaving excitation electricity price and peak shaving capacity as the strategy, the income of the new energy power generation enterprise is taken as the payment function of the new energy power generation enterprise, the deep peak shaving excitation electricity price and the deep peak shaving capacity of the traditional power generation enterprise are taken as the strategy, the income of the traditional power generation enterprise is taken as the payment function of the traditional power generation enterprise, the adjustable load enterprise takes the peak shaving electricity utilization excitation electricity price and the peak shaving electricity consumption as the strategy, the income of the adjustable load enterprise is taken as the payment function of the adjustable load enterprise, the energy storage power station takes the charging and discharging difference price and the peak shaving charging and discharging capacity of the energy storage power station as the strategy, and the income of the energy storage power station is taken as the payment function of the energy storage power station. Each party of the multi-party bargaining continuously adjusts the countermeasures according to the strategy of other parties and the principle that the maximum income of the party is the maximum, and plays games repeatedly until Nash equilibrium is reached. And obtaining the optimal peak-shaving electric quantity, the electricity price and the maximum benefit under the balanced state.
According to the multilateral game process analysis, a source-load-storage and absorption blocked new energy decision model based on Nash equilibrium is established as follows:
set of decision makers
Figure BDA0003383307880000072
: the new energy power generation enterprises, the traditional power generation enterprises, the load-adjustable enterprises and the energy storage power stations play multilateral games;
set of decision maker payment functions
Figure BDA0003383307880000073
: economic benefits of new energy power generation enterprises, traditional power generation enterprises, load-adjustable enterprises and energy storage power stations;
policy collection
Figure BDA0003383307880000081
: the peak shaving capacity purchased by the new energy power generation enterprise to each supplier and the peak shaving incentive electricity price of each supplier;
the equilibrium equation is:
Figure BDA0003383307880000082
6. the S5 includes the steps of:
s501: an iterative search method is adopted to solve a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining, and the specific steps are as follows:
firstly, establishing a profit model of each main body. Acquiring relevant parameters of new energy power generation enterprises, traditional power generation enterprises, load-adjustable enterprises and energy storage power stations, and calculating the income of each main body in each time period
Figure BDA0003383307880000083
And setting an initial value. Setting the iteration mark k to be 0, and setting the initial value of the deep peak regulation capacity purchased by the new energy power generation enterprise
Figure BDA0003383307880000084
Purchased initial value of electricity consumption of adjustable load
Figure BDA0003383307880000085
Initial value of charge and discharge capacity of purchased energy storage power station
Figure BDA0003383307880000086
Taking a random number;
and calculating the excitation electricity price of each supplier. Aiming at new energy enterprises, traditional power generation enterprises, load-adjustable enterprises and energy storage power stations, countermeasures are respectively provided
Figure BDA0003383307880000087
Respectively in self-income
Figure BDA0003383307880000088
Maximizing the objective, optimizing the calculation to generate countermeasures
Figure BDA0003383307880000089
Judging whether the equilibrium state is reached. Will be provided with
Figure BDA00033833078800000810
Substituting a formula (8), if the formula is established, balancing, and turning to the sixth step; if not, turning to the fifth step;
and fifthly, iterative solution. Let k be k +1, new energy enterprise aims at traditional power generation enterprise, adjustable load enterprise and the produced traditional power generation enterprise of a round of iteration degree of depth peak regulation excitation price of electricity in energy storage power station
Figure BDA00033833078800000811
Adjustable load peak regulation electricity price with electric excitation
Figure BDA0003383307880000091
Peak regulation charge-discharge differential price of energy storage power station
Figure BDA0003383307880000092
To gain themselves
Figure BDA0003383307880000093
Maximizing the objective, optimizing the calculation to generate countermeasures
Figure BDA0003383307880000094
Turning to the third step, and performing iterative computation;
output depth peak-regulation excitation electrovalence equilibrium solution
Figure BDA0003383307880000095
Peak regulation using electricity to excite electrovalence equilibrium solution
Figure BDA0003383307880000096
Peak-shaving charge-discharge differential equilibrium solution
Figure BDA0003383307880000097
And deep peak shaving capacity equalization solution
Figure BDA0003383307880000098
Capacity equalization for peak shaving
Figure BDA0003383307880000099
Peak shaving charge-discharge capacity equalization solution
Figure BDA00033833078800000910
And seventhly, calculating the electricity price and the electric quantity balance solution of the peak regulation service purchased by the new energy power generation enterprise. Calculating an excitation electricity price equilibrium solution of the peak shaving service of the new energy power generation enterprise according to the equivalent relation and the equivalent relation
Figure BDA00033833078800000911
And peak shaving capacity equalization solution
Figure BDA00033833078800000912
Calculating the maximum profit under the equilibrium state
Figure BDA00033833078800000913
S502: outputting a deep peak regulation excitation electricity price and deep peak regulation capacity equilibrium solution of a traditional power supply enterprise, a peak regulation electricity utilization excitation electricity price and peak regulation electricity consumption equilibrium solution of an adjustable load, a charge-discharge differential price and peak regulation charge-discharge capacity equilibrium solution of an energy storage power station, an excitation electricity price equilibrium solution and a peak regulation capacity equilibrium solution of a new energy power generation enterprise purchasing new energy absorption service, and the maximum income of each party in an equilibrium state;
example 2
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a regional power grid including a wind power photovoltaic generator, a conventional power supply unit, an energy storage power station, and an adjustable load centralized access, and taking this as an example, the present invention provides a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method with a new energy consumption as a target:
s1: acquiring the day-ahead prediction data of new energy, the new energy, and relevant parameters and relevant cost price of each enterprise, namely source-charge-storage;
the prediction curve of the day-ahead output of the new energy (wind power photovoltaic) is shown in the attached figure 3, the installed capacities of wind power and photovoltaic power in a regional power grid are respectively 5926MW and 2800MW, the installed capacity of a traditional power supply is 7300MW, the total adjustable load capacity is 1430MW, and the installed capacity of an energy storage power station is 120MW/480 MWh; the maximum adjustable capacity of the load-adjustable enterprise is 1600MWh, the maximum deep peak-shaving capacity of the traditional power supply enterprise is 5900.8MWh, the maximum charging capacity of the energy storage power station is 480MWh, the total quantity of new energy consumption auxiliary service product requirements is 7966.3MWh, and the electricity price of the related cost of the traditional power supply/adjustable load/energy storage is shown in the following table:
Figure BDA0003383307880000101
s2: establishing a new energy consumption demand side income model;
and establishing a new energy consumption demand party, namely a new energy power generation enterprise income model, aiming at obtaining income by purchasing auxiliary peak shaving electric quantity from the power grid, wherein parameters involved in the model are shown in a cost power price table in the step S1.
S3: establishing a source-load-storage new energy consumption party income model;
establishing a traditional power supply power generation enterprise profit model by providing deep peak shaving capacity for obtaining profits for a power grid; the method comprises the steps of establishing an adjustable load enterprise income model by increasing electricity consumption in a new energy blocked period to obtain income; the method comprises the steps of establishing an energy storage power station profit model according to profits obtained by charging in a new energy blocked time period and discharging in other time periods; the parameters involved in the model are shown in the cost price table in step S1.
S4: establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining;
and applying a Nash equilibrium principle to establish a game decision model of source-charge-storage multilateral bargaining with the maximum new energy consumption electric quantity as a target under the condition of equilibrium profits of all parties.
S5: solving a game decision model, and outputting peak regulation capacity, incentive electricity price and income balance solutions of the supply and demand parties;
solving the model to obtain the deep peak regulation excitation electricity price and the deep peak regulation capacity equilibrium solution of the traditional power supply enterprise, the peak regulation electricity utilization excitation electricity price and the peak regulation electricity consumption equilibrium solution of the adjustable load, the charge-discharge difference price and the peak regulation charge-discharge capacity equilibrium solution of the energy storage power station, the excitation electricity price equilibrium solution and the peak regulation capacity equilibrium solution of the new energy power generation enterprise purchasing new energy absorption service, and the maximum income of each party in the equilibrium state are shown in the following table:
from the above table, it can be known that the source-charge-stored income game decision model for electricity price guidance is solved by the Nash equilibrium method
Figure BDA0003383307880000111
The balance solution of the traditional power supply, the adjustable load, the energy storage power station and the new energy enterprise on the supply and demand capacity, the incentive electricity price and the income is obtained. The traditional power supply enterprise excitation power price is 0.24 yuan/kWh, the adjustable load enterprise excitation power price is 0.18 yuan/kWh, and the grid/charge side energy storage power station excitation power price is 0.16 yuan/kWh. Under the balanced solution, the new energy consumption capacity is 6448.64MWh, the technical maximum value is not reached, but the maximum value under the balanced state is reached, the main bodies of supply and demand of all parties have benefits and the benefits are balanced, the enthusiasm of the supply and demand parties participating in new energy consumption is greatly improved, and the effectiveness of the method is proved.
Finally, it should be noted that: although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can make modifications and equivalents to the specific embodiments of the invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, which is set forth in the claims appended hereto.

Claims (6)

1. A source-load-storage multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method taking new energy consumption as a target comprises the following steps:
s1: acquiring new energy day-ahead prediction data, new energy sources, source-charge-storage enterprise related parameters and related cost electricity prices;
s2: establishing a new energy consumption demand side income model;
s3: establishing a source-load-storage each consumer income model;
s4: establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining;
s5: and solving a game decision model, and outputting peak regulation capacity, incentive electricity price and income balance solution of the supply and demand parties.
2. The source-load-store multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method for targeting consumption of new energy according to claim 1, wherein said S1 comprises the steps of:
s101: acquiring the day-ahead prediction data of new energy, the new energy, and relevant parameters and cost price of source-charge-storage enterprises;
s102: and acquiring related parameters and cost price of the new energy consumption party, including related parameters and cost price of a traditional power supply power generation enterprise/adjustable load enterprise/energy storage power station.
3. The source-load-store multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method for targeting consumption of new energy according to claim 1, wherein said S2 comprises the steps of:
s201: and establishing a new energy consumption demand party, namely a new energy enterprise income model.
4. The source-load-store multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method for targeting consumption of new energy according to claim 1, wherein said S3 comprises the steps of:
s301: establishing a traditional power supply power generation enterprise income model;
s302: establishing an adjustable load enterprise income model;
s303: and establishing a revenue model of the energy storage power station.
5. The source-load-store multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method for targeting consumption of new energy according to claim 1, wherein said S4 comprises the steps of:
s401: establishing a source-load-storage multilateral bargaining income model;
s402: and (3) introducing a Nash equilibrium theory, and establishing a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining.
6. The source-load-store multilateral bargaining day-ahead response control method for targeting consumption of new energy according to claim 1, wherein said S5 comprises the steps of:
s501: solving a game decision model of source-load-storage multilateral bargaining by adopting an iterative search method;
s502: outputting the deep peak-shaving excitation electricity price and deep peak-shaving capacity equilibrium solution of a traditional power supply enterprise, the peak-shaving electricity utilization excitation electricity price and peak-shaving electricity consumption equilibrium solution with adjustable load, the charge-discharge difference price and peak-shaving charge-discharge capacity equilibrium solution of an energy storage power station, the excitation electricity price equilibrium solution and peak-shaving capacity equilibrium solution of a new energy power generation enterprise purchasing new energy absorption service, and the maximum income of each party in an equilibrium state.
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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN115018171A (en) * 2022-06-15 2022-09-06 广州海洋地质调查局 Combined operation method and system for new energy field station group and energy storage power station

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN115018171A (en) * 2022-06-15 2022-09-06 广州海洋地质调查局 Combined operation method and system for new energy field station group and energy storage power station

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