CN114114894A - Telex flight backup control system and telex flight backup control method - Google Patents
Telex flight backup control system and telex flight backup control method Download PDFInfo
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- 238000011033 desalting Methods 0.000 claims description 4
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- 238000010612 desalination reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B9/00—Safety arrangements
- G05B9/02—Safety arrangements electric
- G05B9/03—Safety arrangements electric with multiple-channel loop, i.e. redundant control systems
Abstract
Fly-by-wire backup control systems and methods are disclosed. The fly-by-wire backup control system may include: the backup control computer receives master control system fault information, and identifies a normally working flight control computer based on the master control system fault information; and a backup remote control electronic unit (EREU) on the control surface, the EREU connected to the backup control computer, wherein the backup control computer identifies the control surface having the EREU and connected to the normally operating flight control computer as a force fighting control surface and refrains from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer to control the associated control surface actuators.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of aircrafts, in particular to a fly-by-wire flight backup control system and method.
Background
In the fly-by-wire flight control system development process, the similarity degree of the redundant electronic equipment with high complexity is high, the possibility that the redundant electronic equipment fails simultaneously due to common-mode faults cannot be completely eliminated, and the risk that the requirement that 'single failure cannot cause catastrophic results regardless of the probability magnitude' in the regulation (25.1309) is not met exists.
Although fly-by-wire flight control systems have been designed with consideration of the effects of common mode factors caused by external factors such as lightning, currently mainstream passenger aircraft have taken measures to alleviate the common mode problem in order to enhance the confidence of local parties, airliners, pilots and the public, and also in order to meet the market competition requirements and to take account of the inheritance and conservation of the design.
The measures for alleviating the common mode problem can be roughly divided into two aspects, on one hand, strict development flow control is adopted, on the other hand, architecture alleviation measures are adopted, and the damage of the common mode problem to the independence of the redundant architecture is alleviated from the perspective of the system architecture. Because of the high safety requirement of the civil aircraft flight control system, a strict development process is an indispensable measure for meeting the airworthiness requirement, and the aim of reducing development errors is achieved to a certain extent, however, the development errors are inevitable, so that the current mainstream aircraft model adopts a non-similar design, a backup control system or a combination mode of the non-similar design and the backup control system, and the damage of the common mode problem to the independence of a system redundancy architecture is further relieved.
However, the existing backup scheme has many additional backup devices, the system reconstruction difficulty is high, information needs to be exchanged between remote control electronics (REU), and the independence of a master control system and a backup control system cannot be guaranteed.
Accordingly, there is a need in the art for an improved fly-by-wire backup control system and method.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to further ensure the independence between the main control system and the backup control system, a plurality of remote control electrons on the same control surface do not need to be communicated, and the backup control computer can avoid controlling the corresponding actuators of the EREU when the main control computer normally controls other actuators on the same control surface by identifying the control surface where the Enhanced REU (EREU) is positioned. The invention provides a Backup Control System (BCS) independent of a main control channel, which effectively improves the safety margin of a flight control system.
In one embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a fly-by-wire backup control system comprising: the backup control computer receives master control system fault information, wherein the master control system fault information comprises working states of a plurality of flight control computers, the flight control computers are used for controlling a master control remote control electronic unit on a control plane, and the backup control computer identifies the flight control computers which normally work based on the master control system fault information; and a backup remote control electronic unit on the control surface, the backup remote control electronic unit being connected to the backup control computer, wherein the backup control computer identifies the control surface having the backup remote control electronic unit and having a master remote control electronic unit connected to a flight control computer that is operating normally as a force fighting control surface, the backup control computer causing the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface to refrain from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer to control a control surface actuator associated with the backup remote control electronic unit.
In one aspect, the backup control computer stores control plane allocation information indicating pairing information between the plurality of flight control computers and a control plane, and identifies the force fighting control plane based on the control plane allocation information and the master control system failure information.
In an aspect, the control surface allocation information further indicates pairing information between the backup control computer and a control surface, and the backup control computer identifies the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information and the master control system failure information.
In an aspect, the backup control computer is further configured to: receiving control surface wrap-around information from the backup remote control electronic unit, the control surface wrap-around information indicating a control surface on which the backup remote control electronic unit is located, and the backup control computer identifying the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information, the control surface wrap-around information, and the master control system failure information.
In one aspect, the backup remote control electronic unit is further connected to at least one flight control computer, and when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface receives a control instruction provided by a flight control computer that normally operates and a backup control instruction provided by the backup control computer, the backup remote control electronic unit is controlled by the flight control computer that normally operates.
In an aspect, the backup control computer is further configured to: when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface does not receive a control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works, the backup control computer sends forbidding information to the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface so that a control surface actuator associated with the backup remote control electronic unit is in a bypass state or a power-off state.
In an aspect, the backup control computer is further configured to: and identifying that no master control remote control electronic unit is connected to the control plane of the flight control computer which normally works, and sending a control plane control instruction to the backup remote control electronic unit on the identified control plane.
In an aspect, the backup control computer is further configured to: determining control surface position information based on control surface wrap information received from the backup remote control electronics unit; and desalting the control surface control command generated by the backup control computer based on the control surface position information.
In one aspect, the fly-by-wire backup control system further comprises: a reset and activate switch, wherein the backup control computer is reset or activated in response to operation of the reset and activate switch.
In one embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a fly-by-wire backup control method including: receiving master control system fault information at a backup control computer, wherein the master control system fault information comprises working states of a plurality of flight control computers; identifying a normally working flight control computer based on the fault information of the master control system; identifying a control surface having a backup remote control electronic unit connected to the backup control computer and having a master remote control electronic unit connected to a normally operating flight control computer as a force fighting control surface; and the backup control computer causing the backup remote control electronics unit on the force fighting control surface to refrain from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer to control the control surface actuator associated with the backup remote control electronics unit.
In one aspect, the backup control computer stores control plane allocation information indicating pairing information between the plurality of flight control computers and a control plane, and identifies the force fighting control plane based on the control plane allocation information and the master control system failure information.
In an aspect, the control surface allocation information further indicates pairing information between the backup control computer and a control surface, and the backup control computer identifies the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information and the master control system failure information.
In one aspect, the fly-by-wire backup control method further comprises: receiving control surface wrap-around information from the backup remote control electronic unit at the backup control computer, the control surface wrap-around information indicating a control surface on which the backup remote control electronic unit is located, and the backup control computer identifying the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information, the control surface wrap-around information, and the master control system failure information.
In one aspect, the backup remote control electronic unit is further connected to at least one flight control computer, and when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface receives a control instruction provided by a flight control computer that normally operates and a backup control instruction provided by the backup control computer, the backup remote control electronic unit is controlled by the flight control computer that normally operates.
In one aspect, the fly-by-wire backup control method further comprises: when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface does not receive a control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works, the backup control computer sends forbidding information to the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface so that a control surface actuator associated with the backup remote control electronic unit is in a bypass state or a power-off state.
In one aspect, the fly-by-wire backup control method further comprises: the backup control computer marks the control plane of the flight control computer which is not connected with the main control remote control electronic unit and works normally, and sends a control plane control instruction to the backup remote control electronic unit on the marked control plane.
In one aspect, the fly-by-wire backup control method further comprises: the backup control computer determining control plane position information based on control plane wrap information received from the backup remote control electronic unit; and desalting the control surface control command generated by the backup control computer based on the control surface position information.
In one embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a flight control system comprising: a cockpit control device; a plurality of flight control computers that generate control commands to control surface actuators based on input signals from the cockpit controls; and a fly-by-wire backup control system as described in any of the above.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a flight control system architecture according to one embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to one embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to another embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to another embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 5 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to another embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 6 is a flow chart of a fly-by-wire backup control method according to one embodiment of the invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be further described with reference to the following specific examples and drawings, but the scope of the present invention should not be limited thereto.
The invention provides a Backup Control System (BCS) independent of a main control channel, which effectively improves the safety margin of a flight control system.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a flight control system architecture 100, according to one embodiment of the invention. Flight control system architecture 100 can include one or more flight control computers 102, where flight control computers 102 can perform control law calculations based on input signals from cockpit controls 101 and generate control commands that are transmitted over data bus 111 to remote control electronics (REU)103 located on the control surface to control respective control surface actuators 104 to drive the control surface in motion. The flight control computer 102, the REU 103 and the control plane actuators 104 may constitute a master control system, and they may sometimes be referred to as a master control computer, a master control REU and master control plane actuators, respectively.
Flight control system architecture 100 may also include one or more backup control computers 106, where backup control computers 106 may perform (backup) control law calculations based on input signals from cockpit controls 101 and generate backup control commands that are transmitted over data bus 109 to backup remote control electronics (EREU)107 located on the control surface to control corresponding backup control surface actuators 108 to drive the control surface into motion. The backup control computer 106, the EREU 107 and the backup control surface actuator 108 may constitute a backup control system. The EREU 107 may sometimes be referred to as a backup REU or an enhanced REU, also referred to simply as a REU. In one embodiment, the EREU 107 may be controlled only by the backup control computer 106.
In another embodiment, the EREU 107 may receive the control command sent by the flight control computer 102 through the data bus 110 and the control command sent by the backup control computer 106 through the data bus 109 at the same time, in which case the control command sent by the flight control computer 102 has priority at the EREU 107. For example, the EREU 107 may have dual input/output (IO) interfaces, i.e., a master instruction interface and a backup instruction interface, for receiving control instructions of the flight control computer and control instructions of the backup control computer, respectively. The master command may have a control priority such that when the master command and the backup command arrive at the EREU at the same time, the EREU will execute the master command and suppress the backup command. For example, the EREU master instruction interface enables the suppression or jumper suppression of the EREU backup instruction interface through a signal, and ensures that the EREU executes the master instruction when receiving the master instruction.
The cockpit manipulating means 101 may have associated sensors to generate input signals based on manipulation of the cockpit manipulating means 101. The flight control computer 102 and the backup control computer 106 may share sensors or may each have independent sensors. In another example, the backup control computer 106 may have a backup system cockpit manipulating device independent from the cockpit manipulating device 101 of the main control system, so that pilot manipulating commands (e.g., three-axis control commands) are collected independently from the cockpit manipulating device 101 of the main control system, thereby ensuring the independence of the backup control system, and the redundancy setting of the backup system cockpit manipulating device may be set according to a specific model, thereby minimizing the complexity of the backup control system. Although not shown, both the flight control computer 102 and the backup control computer 106 may communicate with other systems, such as with an onboard avionics system, a satellite system, and so forth. Flight control computer 102 and backup control computer 106 can each be implemented using a computer, processor, integrated circuit, programmable logic device, microprocessor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine, among others.
In one embodiment of the invention, the EREU 107 may be connected to the flight control computer 102 and the backup control computer 106. The EREU 107 (also referred to as remote control electronics REU for short) may receive control commands from the flight control computer 102 and/or control commands from the backup control computer 106, and cause the backup control surface actuators 108 to drive the corresponding control surfaces to move based on the received control commands. In one embodiment, the backup control surface actuator 108 may drive the associated control surface alone or may drive the same control surface in cooperation with the control surface actuator 104.
The backup control computer 106 may receive a status signal of the flight control computer 102, when the flight control computer 102 is operating normally, the backup control computer 106 is in a backup state (e.g., only monitoring), no control commands are provided to the EREU 107, and modules (e.g., hardware and/or software modules) of the backup control computer 106 associated with flight control may be selectively in a sleep or power-off state.
And when one or more flight control computers 102 fail to cause the aircraft to fall below a Minimum Acceptable Control (MAC), the backup control computer 106 may activate backup control, energizing the EREU 107 and the backup control surface actuators 108, and take over control of the aircraft control surfaces. The backup control computer 106 may receive the feedback information (e.g., feedback commands and status data) from the EREU 107 to monitor the operational status of the backup control surface actuators 108.
The backup control computer 106 adopts a backup system architecture independent of the flight control computer 102, and when a common-mode fault occurs in a backup object and the flight control computer 102 fails, the backup control computer 106 can quickly take over aircraft control and perform independent flight control, so that the capability of the aircraft of continuously and safely flying and landing as soon as possible is provided. In one example, the backup control computer 106 may be of a non-similar design (e.g., non-similar hardware or software or a combination thereof) as compared to the master channel (the control channel in which the flight control computer 102 is located) such that a failure in the master channel does not occur in the backup system architecture.
The backup control computer 106 may automatically activate backup control based on master control system failure information for the flight control computer 102. For example, the backup control computer 106 receives master control system failure information sent by the flight control computer 102, and when the backup control computer 106 determines that part or all of the flight control computers 102 fail (the aircraft does not meet minimum acceptable control), the backup control computer 106 automatically activates backup control, so that the backup control computer 106 controls the backup control plane actuator 108 through the EREU 107, thereby ensuring safe flight and landing of the aircraft.
In another example, flight control system architecture 100 may include reset and activate switch 105. In response to the reset and activate switch 105 being operated, the backup control computer 106 may be reset or activated accordingly. For example, when the flight control computer cannot identify a fault (or cannot identify a fault), the pilot can make a decision whether to start the backup system according to the fault condition of the main system and display alarm information. When deciding to start the backup system, the pilot may activate the backup control computer 106 by resetting and activating the switch 105, and the backup control computer 106 takes over control of the aircraft. The reset and activation switch 105 may also implement functions such as restarting, latch failure clearing, etc. of the backup control computer 106 in the event of a failure of the backup control computer 106.
In one embodiment, the backup control computer 106 may receive the wrap-around information sent by the EREU 107 through the data bus 109, and after the backup control computer 106 activates backup control, the control surface control instruction generated by the backup control computer 106 may be desalinated according to the current control surface position information provided by the wrap-around information, so as to ensure smooth take-over of the control surface.
According to one embodiment of the invention, backup control computer 106 is capable of receiving failure status information for an flight control computer 102 and determining whether the corresponding flight control computer is down. When any non-faulty flight control computer 102 and the backup control computer 106 control a rudder surface at the same time, a force dispute may occur on the controlled rudder surface. To avoid a large force dispute for the control surfaces, the backup control computer 106 may identify a force dispute control surface having the EREU 107 and having the REU 103 connected to the normally operating flight control computer 102 and cause the EREU 107 to refrain from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer 106 to control the associated backup control surface actuators 108. Further, for the force fighting control surface, in order to reduce the power load of the system, the backup control computer 106 may also control the corresponding EREU 107 to close the solenoid valve (SOV) drive, so that the corresponding backup control surface actuator 108 enters a bypass state or a power-off state.
Compared with the backup scheme in the prior art, the backup control system provided by the invention is relatively independent from the master control system, the system reconstruction difficulty is low, the continuous safe flight and landing capability can be provided, and the complexity of the remote control electronic design is reduced.
FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to one embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the redundancy of the flight control computer 102 is n (≧ 2). Fig. 2 shows a control plane 217 comprising a plurality of power control units PCUs (e.g. control plane actuators) and associated REUs. The control surface 217 may be, for example, a spoiler, aileron, rudder, elevator, or the like. For example, the EREU207 is controlled by the backup control computer 206 (and optionally the flight control computer 2) to drive the movement of the control plane 217 through the PCU 216, while the REU 203 is controlled by the flight control computer 3 to drive the movement of the control plane 217 through the corresponding PCU. Flight control computer 1 and flight control computer n may control the REU and/or EREU (not shown) on other control planes.
Under normal conditions, the flight control computer 1-n receives pilot control instructions collected by a cockpit control device, and after control instruction calculation, the flight control computer 2 sends control plane control instructions to the EREU207, and the flight control computer 3 sends control plane control instructions to the REU 203, and respectively controls corresponding control plane actuators to drive the control plane 217 to deflect. Each flight control computer can also receive the control surface and actuator state information fed back by the EREU207 and the REU 203, and perform necessary monitoring.
The backup control computer 206 activates backup control in the event that some or all of the flight control computers 1-n fail and the aircraft is below a minimum acceptable control. For example, the backup control computer 206 receives the fault status signal sent by the flight control computers 1-n, and when the activation condition is determined to be satisfied, the backup control computer 106 takes over control of the PCU 216 through the EREU207 to ensure safe flight and landing of the aircraft. In addition, as described above, when the flight control computers 1 to n have faults but cannot identify themselves, the pilot can make a decision whether to start the backup system or not according to the fault condition of the main system and the display alarm information. When deciding to start the backup system, the pilot may activate the backup control system by resetting and activating switch 105, taking over control of the aircraft by backup control computer 106.
After the backup control system is activated, the backup control computer 206 sends a backup control plane control command to the EREU207 via the data bus and receives wrap-around information (which may include control plane position information and actuator status information) sent by the EREU 207. If the control surface is not monitored to be in the zero position, the control surface control instruction generated by the backup control computer 206 can be desalted. To prevent false activation of the backup control system, instructions sent by flight control computers 1-n may have priority at the EREU side, which may inhibit instructions sent by backup control computer 206.
As shown in fig. 2, when only the flight control computer 3 works normally, the aircraft is below the minimum acceptable control level, and the backup control system is activated, at this time, the control plane 217 may be controlled by the control plane control command sent by the flight control computer 3 and the control plane control command sent by the backup control computer 206 at the same time. In order to avoid the large force dispute generated by the control surface when the command difference or asynchronization (caused by command delay) from different computers or different control laws is large, the backup control computer 206 takes certain force dispute protection measures.
The backup control computer 206 may receive master control system failure information before or after activating backup control, where the master control system failure information includes operating states of the plurality of flight control computers, so that the backup control computer 206 may identify a flight control computer that is operating normally based on the master control system failure information. The backup control computer 206 may identify force fighting control surfaces (e.g., control surface 217) having backup remote control electronics (e.g., EREU 207) and having master remote control electronics (e.g., REU 203) connected to a properly functioning flight control computer.
The backup control computer 206 may store control plane allocation information indicating pairing information between the plurality of flight control computers 1-n and the control plane. For example, the control plane allocation information may store flight control computers corresponding to each control plane, such as control plane identification, corresponding flight control computer identification, optional REU identification, and other information. Accordingly, the backup control computer 206 can identify the control plane connected to a properly functioning flight control computer (or that is, a control plane having a master remote control electronic unit connected to a properly functioning flight control computer) based on the control plane allocation information and the master system failure information.
In the first embodiment, the control plane allocation information also indicates pairing information between the backup control computer 206 and the control planes, e.g. which control planes are connected to the backup control computer or have EREU, or corresponding EREU identification. Accordingly, the backup control computer 206 may identify force fighting control surfaces that are both connected to the backup control computer 206 (i.e., have backup remote control electronics) and to the normally operating flight control computers based on the control surface allocation information and the master control system failure information.
In one implementation of the first embodiment, the control plane allocation information stored by the backup control computer 206 may be control plane sharing information indicating control plane information having both REU and EREU (e.g., control plane identification, corresponding flight control computer identification, optionally including REU identification, EREU identification). Accordingly, the backup control computer 206 may identify force fighting control surfaces (i.e., those control surfaces included in the control surface sharing information and connected to the normally operating flight control computer) based on the control surface sharing information and the master control system failure information. Compared with storing a complete list of control plane allocation information, storing only control plane common information can reduce the amount of information stored in the backup control computer 206 and the retrieval time, and improve the control efficiency of the backup control computer 206.
In a second embodiment, the backup control computer 206 may receive control plane wrap information from the EREU207, which may indicate the control plane on which the EREU207 is located. Accordingly, the backup control computer 206 may identify flight control computers connected to normal operation based on the control plane allocation information and the master control system failure information, and further identify force fighting control planes 217 in conjunction with control plane wrap-around information (which indicates the control planes connected to the backup control computer).
In addition, the first embodiment and the second embodiment can be combined to realize, wherein the control surface wrapping information can help to confirm the identification of the control surface for force dispute, and the misjudgment is reduced.
After identifying the output dispute control surface 217, the backup control computer 206 may control the EREU207 on the force dispute control surface 217 such that the EREU207 refrains from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer 206 to control the control surface actuators associated with the EREU 207. In one example, the backup control computer 206 may refrain from sending backup control instructions to the EREU 207. In another example, the backup control computer 206 may send a disable signal to the EREU207 to cause the EREU207 to refrain from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer 206 to control the control plane actuators associated with the EREU 207.
In the embodiment shown in fig. 2, where flight control computer 2 is disabled (or EREU207 is not connected to flight control computer 2) and flight control computer 3 is active, backup control computer 206 identifies an output fighting control plane 217 (which has EREU207 and has REU 203 connected to a properly functioning flight control computer 3), and backup control computer 206 causes EREU207 to refrain from using backup control instructions from backup control computer 206 to control the control plane actuators associated with EREU 207. Thus, the flight control computer 3 will control the force fighting control surface 217 via the REU 203. Alternatively, since the EREU207 does not receive control instructions provided by a properly functioning flight control computer, the backup control computer 206 may learn of this situation based on the EREU207 wrap-around information or master control system failure information, and the backup control computer 206 may send a disable message to the EREU207 to place the control plane actuators (e.g., PCU 216 or solenoid valve SOV215) associated with the EREU207 in a bypass state or a power-off state.
FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to another embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment shown in fig. 3, with flight control computer 2 active and flight control computer 3 active, backup control computer 206 identifies an output fighting control plane 217 (which has EREU207 and has REU 203 connected to the flight control computer 3 operating normally), and backup control computer 206 causes EREU207 to refrain from using backup control instructions from backup control computer 206 to control the control plane actuators associated with EREU 207. For example, the backup control computer 206 may refrain from sending backup control instructions to the EREU 207. Even if the backup control computer 206 sends the backup control command, since the control command sent by the flight control computer 2 has priority at the EREU207, the EREU207 will comply with the control command sent by the flight control computer 2. In another embodiment, the backup control computer 206 may send disabling information to the EREU207 to cause the EREU207 to ignore backup control instructions from the backup control computer 206. In this case, a double guarantee may be provided that EREU207 avoids using backup control instructions from backup control computer 206, preventing inconsistent control of flight control computers 2 and 3 with backup control computer 206.
Thus, in the embodiment shown in fig. 3, the flight control computer 2 will control the PCU 216 of the control plane 217 through the EREU207, and the flight control computer 3 will control the other PCU of the control plane 217 through the REU 203.
FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to another embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment shown in fig. 4, where flight computer 2 is active and flight computer 3 is inactive, backup control computer 206 recognizes that control plane 217 is not a force fighting control plane (it has EREU207 but REU 203 is not connected to a properly functioning flight computer 3). The backup control computer 206 can send the backup control command, but since the control command sent by the flight control computer 2 has priority at the EREU207, the EREU207 will follow the control command sent by the flight control computer 2. Thus, in the embodiment shown in fig. 4, the flight control computer 2 will control the control plane 217 through the EREU 207.
FIG. 5 is a schematic illustration of a flight control system control surface configuration according to another embodiment of the invention. In the embodiment shown in fig. 5, where flight computers 2 and 3 are disabled and the other flight computer or computers n are active, the backup control computer 206 identifies that the control plane 217 is not a force fighting control plane (it has EREU207 but the REU 203 is not connected to a properly functioning flight computer 3). In contrast, since no REU and EREU are connected to a properly functioning flight control computer, the backup control computer 206 can identify the control plane 217 as a failed control plane. The backup control computer 206 may send backup control instructions to the EREU207 and the EREU207 will comply with the control instructions sent by the backup control computer 206 since the flight control computer 2 failed without sending control instructions. Thus, in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, the backup control computer 206 will control the control plane 217 through the EREU 207.
Fig. 6 is a flow diagram of a fly-by-wire backup control method 600 according to one embodiment of the invention. The method may be implemented using the backup control computer 106 or 206, or a processor, integrated circuit, programmable logic device, microprocessor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine, as described above. Fly-by-wire backup control method 600 may be performed automatically or may be performed in response to an activation operation.
At step 602, master control system failure information may be received at a backup control computer, which may include operating states of a plurality of flight control computers.
In step 603, the flight control computer that is operating normally is identified based on the master control system fault information. In one example, in response to determining that failure of one or more flight control computers results in an aircraft being below a Minimum Acceptable Control (MAC), the backup control computer may activate backup control and generate backup control instructions.
At step 604, control plane wrap-around information (e.g., control plane feedback information) may be received from the EREU at the backup control computer.
In optional step 605, the control plane on which the EREU is located may be determined based on the control plane wrap information.
At optional step 606, the stored flight control computer (or backup control computer) and control plane pairing information may be read. For example, the backup control computer stores control plane allocation information indicating pairing information between the plurality of flight control computers (and optionally the backup control computer) and the REU and EREU on the control plane or control plane. Alternatively, the control plane allocation information may indicate the control plane allocated by the flight control computer and the control plane allocated by the backup control computer.
At step 607, the backup control computer may identify a force fighting control plane having EREU connected to the backup control computer and having REU connected to the flight control computer operating normally. In one embodiment, the backup control computer identifies force fighting control surfaces based on control surface assignment information (e.g., optional step 606) and master control system failure information. In another embodiment, the backup control computer may identify force fighting control surfaces based on control surface allocation information, control surface wrap-around information (e.g., optional step 605), and master control system failure information.
At step 608, the backup control computer may control the EREU on the force fighting control surface such that the EREU inhibits the control of the force fighting control surface using the backup control instructions from the backup control computer. For example, when the EREU on the force fighting control surface receives the control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works and the backup control instruction provided by the backup control computer, the EREU is controlled by the flight control computer which normally works. When the EREU on the force fighting control surface does not receive the control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works, the backup control computer can send forbidding information to the EREU on the force fighting control surface so that a control surface actuator associated with the EREU is in a bypass state or a power-off state.
Additionally, the backup control computer may identify a control plane to which no REU is connected to a properly functioning flight control computer and send control plane control instructions to the EREU on the identified control plane to cause the EREU to use the backup control instructions from the backup control computer to control the control plane actuators associated with the EREU. Alternatively, the backup control computer may determine control plane position information based on control plane wrap information received from the EREU and perform desalination processing on the control plane control instructions generated by the backup control computer based on the control plane position information.
As described above, according to an embodiment of the present invention, in a case where the backup control system is activated, the backup control computer may identify the working states (normal or fault states) of all the main flight control computers according to the fault state information sent by the main flight control computer, and then determine the flight control computers that are working normally at that time. In addition, the working state and the control plane of the corresponding actuating mechanism (EREU + PCU) can be identified according to the wrap-around information sent by the EREU. The backup control computer can judge whether a control plane possibly has a contention state controlled by the main flight control computer and the backup control computer at the same time according to the state information of the main flight control computer, information fed back by the EREU and/or prestored control plane allocation information (for example, pairing information of the control plane allocated by the flight control computer and the backup control plane). If so, the backup control computer can enter a force fighting protection mode, namely, the backup control instruction from the backup control computer is avoided being used for controlling the corresponding control surface actuator. Further, in some cases, the backup control computer may control the corresponding EREU to close the solenoid drive, causing the corresponding PCU to enter a bypass state, or to directly power down the corresponding EREU.
The invention provides a Backup Control System (BCS) independent of a main control system, which enhances the independence between the main control system and the backup control system, a plurality of REUs on the same control surface do not need to be communicated, and a backup control computer can avoid controlling corresponding actuators of an Enhanced REU (EREU) when the main control computer normally controls other actuators on the same control surface by identifying the control surface where the REU (EREU) is positioned, thereby effectively improving the safety margin of a flight control system.
The various steps and modules of the methods and apparatus described above may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination thereof. If implemented in hardware, the various illustrative steps, modules, and circuits described in connection with the disclosure may be implemented or performed with a general purpose processor, a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or other programmable logic component, hardware component, or any combination thereof. A general purpose processor may be a processor, microprocessor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine, among others. If implemented in software, the various illustrative steps, modules, etc. described in connection with the disclosure may be stored on or transmitted over as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium. A software module implementing various operations of the present disclosure may reside in a storage medium such as RAM, flash memory, ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, cloud storage, and the like. A storage medium may be coupled to the processor such that the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium, and execute the corresponding program modules to perform the various steps of the present disclosure. Furthermore, software-based embodiments may be uploaded, downloaded, or accessed remotely through suitable communication means. Such suitable communication means include, for example, the internet, the world wide web, an intranet, software applications, cable (including fiber optic cable), magnetic communication, electromagnetic communication (including RF, microwave, and infrared communication), electronic communication, or other such communication means.
The numerical values given in the embodiments are only examples and do not limit the scope of the present invention. In addition, other components or steps not recited in the claims or specification of the invention may be present as a whole. Moreover, the singular reference of a component does not exclude the plural reference of such components.
It is also noted that the embodiments may be described as a process which is depicted as a flowchart, a flow diagram, a structure diagram, or a block diagram. Although a flowchart may describe the operations as a sequential process, many of the operations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition, the order of the operations may be rearranged.
The disclosed methods, apparatus, and systems should not be limited in any way. Rather, the present disclosure encompasses all novel and non-obvious features and aspects of the various disclosed embodiments, both individually and in various combinations and sub-combinations with each other. The disclosed methods, apparatus, and systems are not limited to any specific aspect or feature or combination thereof, nor do any of the disclosed embodiments require that any one or more specific advantages be present or that a particular or all technical problem be solved.
The present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned embodiments, which are only illustrative and not restrictive, and those skilled in the art can make many modifications without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.
Claims (18)
1. A fly-by-wire backup control system, comprising:
the backup control computer receives master control system fault information, wherein the master control system fault information comprises working states of a plurality of flight control computers, the flight control computers are used for controlling a master control remote control electronic unit on a control plane, and the backup control computer identifies the flight control computers which normally work based on the master control system fault information; and
a backup remote control electronic unit located on a control surface, the backup remote control electronic unit being connected to the backup control computer,
wherein the backup control computer identifies as a force fighting control surface a control surface having a backup remote control electronic unit and having a master remote control electronic unit connected to a normally operating flight control computer, the backup control computer causing the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface to refrain from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer to control a control surface actuator associated with the backup remote control electronic unit.
2. Fly-by-wire backup control system according to claim 1, wherein:
the backup control computer stores control plane allocation information indicating pairing information between the flight control computers and the control plane, and identifies the force fighting control plane based on the control plane allocation information and the master control system fault information.
3. Fly-by-wire backup control system according to claim 2, wherein:
the control surface allocation information also indicates pairing information between the backup control computer and a control surface, and the backup control computer identifies the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information and the master control system failure information.
4. The fly-by-wire backup control system of any of claims 2 or 3, wherein the backup control computer is further configured to:
receiving control surface wrap-around information from the backup remote control electronic unit, the control surface wrap-around information indicating a control surface on which the backup remote control electronic unit is located, and the backup control computer identifying the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information, the control surface wrap-around information, and the master control system failure information.
5. Fly-by-wire backup control system according to claim 1, wherein:
the backup remote control electronics unit is also connected to at least one flight control computer,
when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface receives the control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works and the backup control instruction provided by the backup control computer, the backup remote control electronic unit is controlled by the flight control computer which normally works.
6. The fly-by-wire backup control system of claim 1, wherein the backup control computer is further configured to:
when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface does not receive a control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works, the backup control computer sends forbidding information to the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface so that a control surface actuator associated with the backup remote control electronic unit is in a bypass state or a power-off state.
7. The fly-by-wire backup control system of claim 1, wherein the backup control computer is further configured to:
and identifying that no master control remote control electronic unit is connected to the control plane of the flight control computer which normally works, and sending a control plane control instruction to the backup remote control electronic unit on the identified control plane.
8. The fly-by-wire backup control system of claim 7, wherein the backup control computer is further configured to:
determining control surface position information based on control surface wrap information received from the backup remote control electronics unit; and
and desalting the control surface control instruction generated by the backup control computer based on the control surface position information.
9. The fly-by-wire backup control system of claim 1, further comprising:
a reset and activate switch, wherein the backup control computer is reset or activated in response to operation of the reset and activate switch.
10. A fly-by-wire backup control method, comprising:
receiving master control system fault information at a backup control computer, wherein the master control system fault information comprises working states of a plurality of flight control computers;
identifying a normally working flight control computer based on the fault information of the master control system;
identifying a control surface having a backup remote control electronic unit connected to the backup control computer and having a master remote control electronic unit connected to a normally operating flight control computer as a force fighting control surface; and
the backup control computer causes the backup remote control electronics on the force fighting control surface to refrain from using backup control instructions from the backup control computer to control the control surface actuators associated with the backup remote control electronics.
11. Fly-by-wire backup control method according to claim 10, characterized in that:
the backup control computer stores control plane allocation information indicating pairing information between the flight control computers and the control plane, and identifies the force fighting control plane based on the control plane allocation information and the master control system fault information.
12. Fly-by-wire backup control method according to claim 11, characterized in that:
the control surface allocation information also indicates pairing information between the backup control computer and a control surface, and the backup control computer identifies the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information and the master control system failure information.
13. The fly-by-wire backup control method according to any one of claims 11 or 12, further comprising:
receiving control surface wrap-around information from the backup remote control electronic unit at the backup control computer, the control surface wrap-around information indicating a control surface on which the backup remote control electronic unit is located, and the backup control computer identifying the force fighting control surface based on the control surface allocation information, the control surface wrap-around information, and the master control system failure information.
14. Fly-by-wire backup control method according to claim 10, characterized in that:
the backup remote control electronics unit is also connected to at least one flight control computer,
when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface receives the control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works and the backup control instruction provided by the backup control computer, the backup remote control electronic unit is controlled by the flight control computer which normally works.
15. The fly-by-wire backup control method of claim 10, further comprising:
when the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface does not receive a control instruction provided by the flight control computer which normally works, the backup control computer sends forbidding information to the backup remote control electronic unit on the force fighting control surface so that a control surface actuator associated with the backup remote control electronic unit is in a bypass state or a power-off state.
16. The fly-by-wire backup control method of claim 10, further comprising:
the backup control computer marks the control plane of the flight control computer which is not connected with the main control remote control electronic unit and works normally, and sends a control plane control instruction to the backup remote control electronic unit on the marked control plane.
17. The fly-by-wire backup control method of claim 16, further comprising:
the backup control computer determining control plane position information based on control plane wrap information received from the backup remote control electronic unit; and
and desalting the control surface control instruction generated by the backup control computer based on the control surface position information.
18. A flight control system, comprising:
a cockpit control device;
a plurality of flight control computers that generate control commands to control surface actuators based on input signals from the cockpit controls; and
fly-by-wire backup control system according to any of claims 1-9.
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| CN202111406026.2A CN114114894A (en) | 2021-11-24 | 2021-11-24 | Telex flight backup control system and telex flight backup control method |
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| CN202111406026.2A CN114114894A (en) | 2021-11-24 | 2021-11-24 | Telex flight backup control system and telex flight backup control method |
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