CN114077740A - Bidirectional authentication trusted boot system and method based on TPCM chip - Google Patents
Bidirectional authentication trusted boot system and method based on TPCM chip Download PDFInfo
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- CN114077740A CN114077740A CN202111244483.6A CN202111244483A CN114077740A CN 114077740 A CN114077740 A CN 114077740A CN 202111244483 A CN202111244483 A CN 202111244483A CN 114077740 A CN114077740 A CN 114077740A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/575—Secure boot
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
- G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
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Abstract
The invention discloses a two-way authentication credible starting system and a method based on a TPCM chip, wherein a main SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with a slave SPI interface of a FLASH storage chip, the slave SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with a main SPI interface of a CPU chip, and the main SPI interface of the CPU chip is connected with a slave SPI interface of the FLASH storage chip; the GPIO output pin of the TPCM chip is connected with a RESET pin of the CPU chip and is used for realizing the starting control of the CPU chip; the STATE pin of the TPCM chip is connected with the GPIO pin of the CPU chip and used for informing the CPU whether the measuring process is finished, and the TPCM is in an SPI master mode or an SPI slave mode. The invention prevents all authentication information from being held by the same party in the identity authentication process, realizes the safety verification of the TPCM chip, and ensures the safety of the equipment operation environment from the source.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a bidirectional authentication trusted boot system and method based on a TPCM chip, belonging to the technical field of computer security.
Background
The trusted computing system structure establishes an actual and effective hardware trusted root in the system, and establishes a trusted chain from the trusted root through a layer-by-layer trusted expansion mode, so as to finally realize the trust of the system operating environment. The root of trust is assumed to be unconditionally trusted and the system does not detect root of trust behavior. Therefore, whether the trusted root is really trustworthy or not and whether the trusted root is tampered and replaced by an attacker are the key for confirming the credibility of the system.
A Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM) is a Trusted root of an active immune Trusted system, is a Trusted source point of the system and is a basis for establishing a Trusted chain. The basic principle of trusted boot is: the method is initiated from the TPCM initial trust state, the initial trust state is expanded to each link of system starting one by one through a trust expansion technology, and then a complete trust chain is constructed when the system is started so as to guarantee the initial trust state of the operating environment after the system is started. However, most of the current trusted starting methods do not verify the self security of the TPCM chip, once the TPCM chip is tampered, the whole system is lost, and the security of the computing environment cannot be guaranteed.
Disclosure of Invention
The purpose is as follows: in order to overcome the defects in the prior art, the invention provides a bidirectional authentication trusted boot system and a method based on a TPCM chip.
The technical scheme is as follows: in order to solve the technical problems, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
in a first aspect, a bidirectional authentication trusted boot system based on a TPCM chip includes: TPCM chip, FLASH memory chip and CPU chip.
The TPCM chip includes: the main SPI interface, follow the SPI interface, FLASH memory chip includes: from the SPI interface, the CPU chip includes: a primary SPI interface; the main SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with the slave SPI interface of the FLASH memory chip, the slave SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with the main SPI interface of the CPU chip, and the main SPI interface of the CPU chip is connected with the slave SPI interface of the FLASH memory chip; the GPIO output pin of the TPCM chip is connected with a RESET pin of the CPU chip and is used for realizing the starting control of the CPU chip; the STATE pin of the TPCM chip is connected with the GPIO pin of the CPU chip and used for informing the CPU whether the measuring process is finished, and the TPCM is in an SPI master mode or an SPI slave mode.
Preferably, the TPCM chip pre-stores a forward measurement reference value, a forward verification public key, and a reverse measurement reference value.
As a preferred scheme, the FLASH memory chip pre-stores a reverse authentication public key.
Preferably, the TPCM chip has a unique forward verification public key and a unique reverse verification private key.
Preferably, the forward metric reference value is a digital signature value obtained by performing digital signature on the bootstrap program by using a forward verification private key under a clean running environment; the reverse measurement reference value is a digital signature value obtained by carrying out digital signature on the unique FLASH ID of the FLASH memory chip by using a reverse verification private key under a clean operating environment.
In a second aspect, a bidirectional authentication trusted boot method based on a TPCM chip includes the following steps:
after the system is powered on, the TPCM chip acquires the master control right of the system and controls the CPU chip to be in a reset state.
The TPCM chip carries out forward measurement on the bootstrap program in the FLASH storage chip, if the measurement is successful, the TPCM releases a reset signal of the CPU chip, and the CPU chip starts and loads the bootstrap program.
And after the CPU chip finishes the loading of the bootstrap program, the reverse measurement is executed on the TPCM chip, and if the measurement is successful, the bootstrap program loads the kernel and starts the operating system.
Preferably, the TPCM chip measures the forward direction of the bootstrap program in the FLASH memory chip, if the measurement fails, the TPCM keeps the reset signal of the CPU chip, terminates the starting, and executes the starting failure processing.
Preferably, the bootstrap program includes: BOOT, PMON, or BIOS.
Preferably, after the CPU chip finishes loading the boot program, the CPU chip performs reverse measurement on the TPCM chip, and if the measurement fails, stops loading the kernel, terminates the start of this time, and performs a start failure process.
Preferably, the method for the TPCM chip to perform forward measurement on the boot program in the FLASH memory chip includes the following steps:
the TPCM chip uses an SPI master device interface to communicate with an SPI slave device interface of the FLASH storage chip, the TPCM chip reads boot program data and a boot program signature value from the FLASH storage chip, a forward verification public key in the TPCM chip is used for verifying and signing the boot program data and the boot program signature value, if the verification and signing are successful, the TPCM chip releases the control right of the FLASH storage chip, the working mode of the TPCM chip is switched from an SPI master mode to an SPI slave mode, a STATE STATE line is switched from a high level to a low level, the TPCM chip informs the CPU chip that the measurement is finished at present and the TPCM chip is switched to the SPI slave mode through the STATE STATE line, and then a CPU chip reset pin is released through a GPIO to start the CPU chip.
If the signature verification fails, the loading process is stopped, the CPU chip is controlled to be in a reset state all the time, the TPCM chip records an audit log, an alarm is given to the outside, and related personnel are informed to perform subsequent exception handling.
Preferably, the method for performing reverse measurement on the TPCM chip after the CPU chip completes loading of the boot program includes the following steps:
after the CPU chip is started, the CPU chip obtains the control right of the FLASH storage chip by using the SPI main device interface, the CPU chip works in the SPI main mode, and the bootstrap data is loaded from the FLASH storage chip.
After the bootstrap program is started, the CPU reads the FLASH ID and the reverse verification public key of the FLASH storage chip.
After the CPU reads successfully, if the STATE STATE line is in a low level, the CPU obtains the control right of the TPCM chip by using the SPI main equipment interface, reads a reverse verification reference value in the TPCM chip, and verifies the label by using a reverse verification public key, and if the label verification is successful, the kernel file is measured and the operating system is started; if the signature verification fails, stopping the loading process, recording an audit log, giving an alarm, and informing related personnel to perform subsequent exception handling; and if the STATE STATE line is at a high level, waiting for the TPCM chip to be available, and recording an audit log.
Has the advantages that: the two-way authentication trusted starting system and the method based on the TPCM chip can realize the two-way identity authentication of the TPCM chip and a CPU bootstrap program, prevent all authentication information from being held by the same party in the identity authentication process by introducing a third party trusted factor, realize the safety verification of the TPCM chip, and ensure the safety of the equipment operation environment from the source.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a trusted boot system of the device of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of the bidirectional authentication process of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be further described with reference to the following examples.
As shown in fig. 1, a bidirectional authentication trusted boot system based on a TPCM chip includes a trusted platform control module TPCM chip, a FLASH chip storing a system boot program, and a system central processing unit CPU chip.
The TPCM chip, the FLASH memory chip and the CPU chip are interconnected through SPI interfaces of the respective chips. Wherein, the TPCM chip contains a master and a slave which have two paths of SPI interfaces altogether, the FLASH chip has one path of slave SPI interface, and the CPU chip has one path of master SPI interface. When the SPI interfaces are interconnected, the main SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with the slave SPI of the FLASH chip, the slave SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with the main SPI interface of the CPU chip, and the main SPI interface of the CPU chip is connected with the slave SPI interface of the FLASH chip. In addition, the TPCM chip is connected to a RESET pin of the CPU chip through a GPIO output pin so as to realize the starting control of the CPU chip. The TPCM chip is connected with GPIO pin of CPU chip through STATE pin to inform CPU whether the measurement process is finished, TPCM is in SPI master mode or SPI slave mode.
The starting time sequence control process after the system is powered on comprises the following steps: after power-on, the TPCM chip is started before the CPU chip, and the TPCM controls the output of the GPIO to enable the CPU chip to be in a reset state; at the moment, a main SPI interface of a TPCM chip acquires the control right of a slave SPI interface of the FLASH chip, the TPCM chip actively measures a system boot program stored in the FLASH chip, if the measurement result of the TPCM is successful, the TPCM chip releases the control right of the FLASH chip to enable STATE to output a logic level with successful measurement, the TPCM is switched from an SPI master device STATE to an SPI slave device STATE, then the reset of a CPU chip is released to enable the CPU chip to be started; if the TPCM measurement result is failure, the CPU chip is kept in a reset state, and an audit log is recorded and an alarm is given.
Before the system is formally started and operated, a forward measurement reference value, a forward verification public key and a reverse measurement reference value are stored in a TPCM chip in advance at the factory debugging stage of a newly produced board card, and a reverse verification public key is stored in a FLASH chip. The forward verification public key and the forward verification private key are generated by an upper computer; the reverse verification public key and the private key are generated by the TPCM chip, and each TPCM chip can be considered to have a unique public key and a unique private key; the forward measurement reference value is a digital signature value obtained by carrying out digital signature on the bootstrap program by using a forward verification private key under a clean running environment; the reverse measurement reference value is a digital signature value obtained by carrying out digital signature on the unique FLASH ID of the FLASH chip by using a reverse verification private key under a clean operating environment.
After the preparation work is completed, the system can be started up in a trusted manner, and as shown in fig. 2, the bidirectional authentication trusted starting method based on the TPCM chip is performed according to the following steps:
step 1: after the system is powered on, the power-on time sequence control circuit ensures that the TPCM chip firstly acquires the master control right of the system and controls the CPU to be in a reset state. Sequentially switching to the step 2 to execute the forward authentication and the step 3 to execute the reverse authentication;
step 2: the TPCM chip carries out forward measurement on a BOOT program (BOOT/PMON/BIOS and the like) prestored in the FLASH storage chip, if the measurement is successful, the TPCM releases a reset signal of a CPU, then the CPU starts and loads the BOOT program, and the step 3 is executed; if the measurement fails, the TPCM keeps the reset signal of the CPU, stops the starting and executes the starting failure processing;
and step 3: after the CPU finishes the loading of the bootstrap program, the CPU executes reverse measurement on the TPCM chip, if the measurement is successful, the bootstrap program loads a kernel, and an operating system is started; and if the measurement fails, stopping loading the kernel, terminating the starting and executing the starting failure treatment.
The step 2 is forward authentication, the step 3 is reverse authentication, and the forward authentication and the reverse authentication jointly form a bidirectional authentication method, which comprises the following steps:
step A1: after power-on, the TPCM chip is started before the CPU, the CPU is in a reset STATE, the TPCM chip uses an SPI main device interface to communicate with an SPI slave device interface of the FLASH memory chip, and a STATE STATE line is in a high level;
step A2: the TPCM chip reads the bootstrap data and the bootstrap signature value from the FLASH memory chip, then checks the signature of the bootstrap data and the bootstrap signature value by using a forward verification public key pre-stored in the TPCM chip, and if the signature is successfully checked, the step A3 is carried out; if the signature verification fails, stopping the loading process, controlling the CPU to be always in a reset state, recording an audit log by the TPCM chip, giving an alarm to the outside, and informing related personnel of subsequent exception handling;
step A3: the TPCM chip releases the control right on the FLASH memory chip, the working mode of the TPCM chip is switched from an SPI main mode to an SPI auxiliary mode, a STATE STATE line is switched from a high level to a low level, the TPCM chip informs a CPU that the measurement is finished at present and the TPCM chip is switched to the SPI auxiliary mode through the STATE STATE line, and then a CPU reset pin is released through a GPIO to start the CPU;
step A4: after the CPU is started, the CPU is used as SPI main equipment to obtain the control right of a FLASH storage chip, the CPU works in an SPI main mode, and a bootstrap file is loaded from the FLASH storage chip;
step A5: after the bootstrap program is started, the CPU reads the FLASH ID and the reverse verification public key of the FLASH storage chip;
step A6: after the CPU reads successfully, whether the TPCM chip is available is judged through the STATE STATE line, and if the STATE STATE line is in a low level, the step A7 is executed; if the current level is high, waiting for the TPCM chip to be available, and recording an audit log;
step A7: after the CPU is used as SPI main equipment to obtain the control right of the TPCM chip, reading a reverse verification reference value in the TPCM chip, using a reverse verification public key to verify the signature, and if the signature verification is successful, measuring the kernel file and starting an operating system; and if the signature verification fails, stopping the loading process, recording an audit log, giving an alarm, and informing related personnel of carrying out subsequent exception handling.
Example 1:
the invention carries out reverse identity authentication on the TPCM chip after the boot program is started, supervises the trusted root and ensures the authenticity and credibility of the TPCM chip. The storage chip FLASH ID is used as a third-party credible factor, so that a public factor in identity authentication is removed, and the public factor can be prevented from being stolen or tampered in the interaction process. The credible verification of the credible chain source is realized, and the safety of the equipment operation environment is ensured.
As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, embodiments of the present application may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the application. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and it should be noted that: it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and adaptations can be made without departing from the principles of the invention and these are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Claims (10)
1. The utility model provides a mutual authentication credible start-up system based on TPCM chip which characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps: TPCM chip, FLASH memory chip and CPU chip;
the TPCM chip includes: the main SPI interface, follow the SPI interface, FLASH memory chip includes: from the SPI interface, the CPU chip includes: a primary SPI interface; the main SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with the slave SPI interface of the FLASH memory chip, the slave SPI interface of the TPCM chip is connected with the main SPI interface of the CPU chip, and the main SPI interface of the CPU chip is connected with the slave SPI interface of the FLASH memory chip; the GPIO output pin of the TPCM chip is connected with a RESET pin of the CPU chip and is used for realizing the starting control of the CPU chip; the STATE pin of the TPCM chip is connected with the GPIO pin of the CPU chip and used for informing the CPU whether the measuring process is finished, and the TPCM is in an SPI master mode or an SPI slave mode.
2. The two-way authentication trusted boot system based on TPCM chip as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the TPCM chip prestores a forward measurement reference value, a forward verification public key and a reverse measurement reference value.
3. The two-way authentication trusted boot system based on TPCM chip as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the FLASH memory chip is prestored with a reverse verification public key.
4. The two-way authentication trusted boot system based on TPCM chip as claimed in claim 2, wherein: the TPCM chip is provided with a unique forward verification public key and a unique reverse verification private key.
5. The two-way authentication trusted boot system and method based on TPCM chip as claimed in claim 2, wherein: the forward measurement reference value is a digital signature value obtained by carrying out digital signature on the bootstrap program by using a forward verification private key under a clean running environment; the reverse measurement reference value is a digital signature value obtained by carrying out digital signature on the unique FLASH ID of the FLASH memory chip by using a reverse verification private key under a clean operating environment.
6. A bidirectional authentication credible starting method based on TPCM chip is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
after the system is powered on, the TPCM chip acquires the master control right of the system and controls the CPU chip to be in a reset state;
the TPCM chip carries out forward measurement on the bootstrap program in the FLASH storage chip, if the measurement is successful, the TPCM releases a reset signal of the CPU chip, and the CPU chip starts to load the bootstrap program;
and after the CPU chip finishes the loading of the bootstrap program, the reverse measurement is executed on the TPCM chip, and if the measurement is successful, the bootstrap program loads the kernel and starts the operating system.
7. The TPCM chip-based mutual authentication trusted boot method according to claim 6, wherein: the TPCM chip measures the positive direction of the bootstrap program in the FLASH memory chip, if the measurement fails, the TPCM keeps the reset signal of the CPU chip, the starting is terminated, and the starting failure processing is executed.
8. The TPCM chip-based mutual authentication trusted boot method according to claim 6, wherein: and after the CPU chip finishes the loading of the bootstrap program, executing reverse measurement on the TPCM chip, if the measurement fails, stopping loading the kernel, terminating the starting, and executing the failed starting processing.
9. The TPCM chip-based mutual authentication trusted boot method according to claim 7, wherein: the method for the TPCM chip to carry out forward measurement on the bootstrap program in the FLASH storage chip comprises the following steps:
the TPCM chip uses an SPI main device interface to communicate with an SPI slave device interface of the FLASH storage chip, the TPCM chip reads boot program data and a boot program signature value from the FLASH storage chip, a forward verification public key in the TPCM chip is used for verifying and signing the boot program data and the boot program signature value, if the verification and signing are successful, the TPCM chip releases the control right of the FLASH storage chip, the working mode of the TPCM chip is switched from an SPI main mode to an SPI slave mode, a STATE STATE line is switched from a high level to a low level, the TPCM chip informs the CPU chip that the measurement is finished at present and the TPCM chip is switched to the SPI slave mode through the STATE STATE line, and then a CPU chip reset pin is released through a GPIO to start the CPU chip;
if the signature verification fails, the loading process is stopped, the CPU chip is controlled to be in a reset state all the time, the TPCM chip records an audit log, an alarm is given to the outside, and related personnel are informed to perform subsequent exception handling.
10. The TPCM chip-based mutual authentication trusted boot method according to claim 8, wherein: the method for executing reverse measurement on the TPCM chip after the CPU chip finishes the loading of the bootstrap program comprises the following steps:
after the CPU chip is started, the CPU chip obtains the control right of the FLASH storage chip by using an SPI main device interface, the CPU chip works in an SPI main mode, and bootstrap program data are loaded from the FLASH storage chip;
after the bootstrap program is started, the CPU reads the FLASH ID and the reverse verification public key of the FLASH storage chip;
after the CPU reads successfully, if the STATE STATE line is in a low level, the CPU obtains the control right of the TPCM chip by using the SPI main equipment interface, reads a reverse verification reference value in the TPCM chip, and verifies the label by using a reverse verification public key, and if the label verification is successful, the kernel file is measured and the operating system is started; if the signature verification fails, stopping the loading process, recording an audit log, giving an alarm, and informing related personnel to perform subsequent exception handling; and if the STATE STATE line is at a high level, waiting for the TPCM chip to be available, and recording an audit log.
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN114816549A (en) * | 2022-05-27 | 2022-07-29 | 国网电力科学研究院有限公司 | Method and system for protecting bootloader and environment variable thereof |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN114816549A (en) * | 2022-05-27 | 2022-07-29 | 国网电力科学研究院有限公司 | Method and system for protecting bootloader and environment variable thereof |
| CN114816549B (en) * | 2022-05-27 | 2024-04-02 | 国网电力科学研究院有限公司 | Method and system for protecting bootloader and environment variable thereof |
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