CN114070453A - Spread spectrum communication anti-interception method based on dense false cycle deception - Google Patents

Spread spectrum communication anti-interception method based on dense false cycle deception Download PDF

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CN114070453A
CN114070453A CN202111349667.9A CN202111349667A CN114070453A CN 114070453 A CN114070453 A CN 114070453A CN 202111349667 A CN202111349667 A CN 202111349667A CN 114070453 A CN114070453 A CN 114070453A
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sequence
signal
pseudo code
interception
spread spectrum
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CN114070453B (en
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杨森
梁涛
杜松懋
张花国
魏平
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University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
    • H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B1/00—Details of transmission systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04B3/00 - H04B13/00; Details of transmission systems not characterised by the medium used for transmission
    • H04B1/69—Spread spectrum techniques
    • H04B1/707—Spread spectrum techniques using direct sequence modulation
    • H04B1/7097—Interference-related aspects
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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  • Signal Processing (AREA)
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Abstract

The invention belongs to the field of electronic countermeasure, and particularly relates to a spread spectrum communication anti-interception method utilizing dense false cycle spoofing. Aiming at the detection characteristics of a pseudo code period detector of a non-partner spread spectrum communication signal processing system, the invention uses a dense pseudo period deception method to enable the pseudo code period detector to generate a plurality of gradual local optimal invariants, and uses a plurality of false pseudo code periods to intensively hide and cover a real pseudo code period, thereby improving the anti-interception performance of a spread spectrum signal. Computer simulation shows that the invention has better performance and improves the anti-interception performance of signals.

Description

Spread spectrum communication anti-interception method based on dense false cycle deception
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of electronic countermeasure, and particularly relates to a spread spectrum communication anti-interception method based on dense false cycle deception.
Background
In the field of communication, the spread spectrum communication technology is widely applied due to the advantages of interference resistance, multipath resistance, strong safety and the like. The spread spectrum communication interception technology adopted by the non-cooperative party makes the security of spread spectrum communication challenging, so the anti-interception technology of spread spectrum communication becomes a research hotspot. Under the condition that a non-partner tries to intercept the spread spectrum communication signal of the partner, the partner communication party can mislead the signal processing system of the non-partner by a method for generating an anti-interception signal on the premise of not relating to the spread spectrum communication signal.
Currently, common anti-interception methods include compression and spoofing. Among them, the spoofed signal generally adopts the similar characteristic with the spread spectrum communication signal and then plays the spoofing role to the signal processing system of the non-partner, it is the communication anti-interception method that is often used. A common deception anti-interception method is forwarding deception, but the selection of the forwarding delay of the method has a significant effect on the anti-interception effect.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a novel design method for deception anti-interception signals so as to solve the problem of anti-interception of spread spectrum communication signals. Therefore, the method researches an anti-interception technology in the spread spectrum communication process, and a main target object is a pseudo code period detector of a non-partner signal processing system. On the basis of direct spread spectrum communication modeling, a dense false period deception anti-interception method is used, so that a false code period detector generates a plurality of progressive local optimal invariants, and the anti-interception performance of signals is improved.
For ease of understanding, the DSSS signal will first be described:
DSSS signals are the most commonly used type of signal in spread spectrum communications, and utilize multiplication of a high speed pseudo code with a low speed information code to spread the original signal band. The sampled DSSS signal y (N) intercepted by the non-partner may be expressed as:
Figure BDA0003355303490000011
where, ML is the length of intercepted sample, M is the number of intercepted pseudo code sequence, L is the length of intercepted pseudo code sequence, A is the amplitude of intercepted signal, v (N) is the variance σ2White gaussian noise of (1); c (-) is pseudo codeA sequence; b (-) is an information code sequence, where G is the spreading gain,
Figure BDA0003355303490000021
the number of information symbols in the intercepted signal.
Next, a pseudo code period detector based on progressive local optimum Invariant-powerfull inverse (ALMPI) used for verifying the protection performance of the present invention is described:
before estimating the pseudo code period L', the detector needs to set the detection range [ L ] of Lmin，Lmax]. Calculate ALMPI peak for each possible L' within this range:
Figure BDA0003355303490000022
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0003355303490000023
as a function of L'.
If correct L' is detected, then:
E{T(L′)}＝A4L′M(L′-1)(2L′-1)(M-1)
wherein the content of the first and second substances,M＝(N-(N)L) A is a constant.
If incorrect L' is detected:
E{T(L′)}＜A4L′M(L′-1)(2L′-1)(M-1)
the technical problem to be solved by the invention is realized by the following technical scheme, and the BPSK modulation method is adopted for convenience of explanation, and the specific steps are as follows:
s1: generating a DSSS baseband signal:
s1.1: the length L of the pseudo code sequence c (L), m sequence or gold sequence can be generated by using a linear shift register.
S1.2: the signal sequence b (m) (symbol rate R)S) With a pseudo-code sequence c (l) (chip rate R)C) Multiplying by Kronecker to obtain a band-broadened productSpreading sequence s (t) (chip rate R)C) The signal power is P.
S2: generating K DSSS anti-interception signals with same frequency but different pseudo code lengths:
s2.1: randomly generating a length of
Figure BDA0003355303490000024
A random sequence 1 of K1, 2, …, K as a pseudo-code sequence ck(lk) Randomly generating a random sequence 2 as a false information sequence bk(mk)。
S2.2: b is tok(mk) (symbol rate RS) And ck(lk) (chip rate R)C) Performing Kronecker multiplication to obtain an anti-interception signal j with a broadened frequency band and same frequency but different pseudo code lengthsk(t) (chip rate R)C) With a signal power of Pk. And Fourier transformation is carried out on the DSSS baseband signal to a frequency domain, so that frequency domain information of the signal, including the bandwidth and the power of the signal, is obtained.
S3: the sequence s (t) and the sequence j1(t)，j2(t)，…jK(t) digitally modulating and adding to obtain a transmission signal x (t) before up-conversion.
S4: and (4) up-converting the x (t) and transmitting the frequency through an antenna.
The dense false period deception method is used to make the false code period detector generate a plurality of gradual local optimal invariants, and a plurality of false code periods are used to intensively hide and cover the real false code period, thereby improving the anti-interception performance of the signal.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the invention covers DSSS signals by using a dense period-adding deception method, and utilizes DSSS reverse interception signals with stronger power, same frequency and different pseudo-code sequence lengths to influence the judgment of a non-partner pseudo-code period detector. Computer simulation shows that the invention has better performance and plays a role in actively protecting signals.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a signal processing flow of a dense false period method.
Fig. 2 is a diagram of a DSSS signal spectrum artificially adding a certain complex gaussian noise.
Fig. 3 is a detection result of the pseudo code period detector without the addition of intensive pseudo period spoofing anti-interception.
Fig. 4 is a detection result of a pseudo code period detector when dense false period spoofing anti-interception is added.
FIG. 5 is an enlarged view of the results of the detection in the range of [1140011500] in FIG. 4.
Fig. 6 is a receiving end symbol error rate curve after the cooperative communication party implements dense false period deception anti-interception with an interference-to-signal ratio of 15dB to 20 dB.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in detail below with reference to the drawings and examples so that those skilled in the art can better understand the invention.
Example 1:
the purpose of this embodiment is to show the anti-interception effect of the present invention when intercepting a non-partner.
Taking a short code DSSS signal with a pseudo code sequence length of 4095 as an example, the pseudo code rate is 10.23Mbps, and the receiver sampling frequency of a partner side and a non-partner side is 28571KHz, and cheating is carried out according to the method of the invention. The signal processing flow of the dense false period method is shown in fig. 1.
The specific implementation is as follows:
a baseband DSSS signal is generated S1.
S1.1, obtaining a pseudo code m sequence with the length of 4095 according to the structure of the shift register.
And S1.2, carrying out Kronecker multiplication on the pseudo code sequence and the information sequence to obtain a baseband short code DSSS signal. Considering the practical situation (low SNR condition), some complex gaussian noise (SNR ═ 20dB) is artificially added, as shown in fig. 2, and in order to make the display of the subsequent figure more clear and accurate, the complex gaussian noise already added is not shown in all the figures hereafter. If my party does not cheat according to the method of the invention, the original sequence s (t) is directly digitally modulated and sent after up-conversion, the non-cooperative party adopts a pseudo code period detector based on ALMPI to detect, the detection result is shown in figure 3, and the detection peak value result is 11437. And the theoretical pseudo code period value is: 28571K/10.23 mx4095 is about 11437, and theory matches the actual value, proving that the non-partner successfully intercepted my DSSS signal.
S2, generating dense false period deception anti-interception signals, randomly generating false period DSSS signals with signal power larger than that of the DSSS signals near the theoretical false code period value 11437 by utilizing DSSS signals with different false code sequence lengths, and generating sequences j of the false period deception DSSS signals with K-6 in the simulation process at this time1(t),j2(t),…jK(t) the pseudo code sequence lengths are 4090, 4092, 4094, 4096, 4098 and 4100, respectively.
S3 comparing the sequence S (t) with the sequence j1(t),j2(t),…jK(t) digitally modulating and adding to obtain a transmission signal x (t) before up-conversion.
And S4, up-converting and transmitting the signal x (t). The non-partner intercepts and detects the signal subjected to the dense false cycle spoofing, and the detection result of the false code period detector is as shown in fig. 4, and the detection peak value is 11434, which is not in accordance with the theoretical value 11437. Fig. 5 shows the detection result of [1140011500], and it can be seen that the correct pseudo code period 11437 is masked by 6 false periods, which provides a good anti-interception spoofing effect for the signal detection of the non-partner.
Example 2
The purpose of this embodiment is to demonstrate the communication effect of the present invention on the partner.
Dense false cycle spoofing with an interference-to-signal ratio of [15dB to 20dB ] is performed on the DSSS signals, the simulation times K is 10000, the symbol error rate is calculated, and the symbol error rate curve is shown in fig. 6. The figure proves that the generated interference-to-signal ratio of the method is less than about 17dB, and the accuracy requirement of the spread spectrum communication of the partner can be completely met.

Claims (2)

1. A spread spectrum communication anti-interception method based on dense false cycle spoofing is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, generating a DSSS baseband signal:
s11, generating a pseudo code sequence c (L) with length L by using a linear shift register;
s12, setting the symbol rate as RSSignal sequence b (m) and chip rate RCThe pseudo code sequence c (l) is subjected to Kronecker product to obtain a spread spectrum sequence s (t) with a broadened frequency band, and the chip rate is RCThe signal power is P;
s2, generating K DSSS anti-interception signals with same frequency but different pseudo code lengths:
s21, randomly generating the length of
Figure FDA0003355303480000011
The first random sequence of K is used as a false pseudo code sequence ck(lk) Randomly generating a second random sequence as a false information sequence bk(mk)；
S22, setting the symbol rate as RSB of (a)k(mk) And chip rate of RCC ofk(lk) Performing Kronecker multiplication to obtain an anti-interception signal j with a broadened frequency band and same frequency but different pseudo code lengthsk(t)，jk(t) chip rate of RCSignal power of Pk(ii) a Fourier transform is carried out on the DSSS baseband signal to a frequency domain, and frequency domain information of the signal is obtained, wherein the frequency domain information comprises the bandwidth and the power of the signal;
s3, mixing the sequence S (t) and the sequence j1(t),j2(t),…jK(t) carrying out digital modulation and adding to obtain a sending signal x (t) before up-conversion;
and S4, performing up-conversion on the x (t) and transmitting the frequency through an antenna.
2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the pseudo code sequence is m sequence or gold sequence.
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