CN114006715A - Method for setting attack counterscript based on transparent proxy - Google Patents
Method for setting attack counterscript based on transparent proxy Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN114006715A CN114006715A CN202011617862.0A CN202011617862A CN114006715A CN 114006715 A CN114006715 A CN 114006715A CN 202011617862 A CN202011617862 A CN 202011617862A CN 114006715 A CN114006715 A CN 114006715A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- honeypot
- attack
- attacker
- transparent
- script
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1491—Countermeasures against malicious traffic using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a method for setting an attack counterscript based on a transparent agent, which comprises the following steps: the honeypot trap application is mapped to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, when an attacker accesses the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway conducts transparent proxy forwarding, an access request of the attacker is forwarded to the honeypot trap application, and after the honeypot trap application replies a response packet, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway forwards the response packet replied by the relevant honeypot trap application to the attacker; the transparent honeypot proxy gateway is used as a man-in-the-middle of an attacker and a honeypot trap service, and an attack countering script is inserted into a response packet of the honeypot trap service as required, so that the effect of countering the attack of the attacker is achieved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of computers, in particular to a method for setting an attack counter script based on a transparent agent.
Background
The honeypot trap application can attract an attacker to access, in order to realize attack countering on the attacker, an attack countering script needs to be set in advance on the honeypot trap application, and when the attacker accesses the honeypot trap application, the attack countering script on the honeypot trap application can automatically initiate attack countering behaviors on the attacker, so that identity information of the attacker, fingerprint information of attack equipment and authority of the attack equipment can be obtained, and an attack countering effect is achieved.
The traditional setting mode of the attack anti-system script needs to set the attack anti-system script into a code program of the honeypot trap application in advance to realize the attack anti-system effect, requires to set the attack anti-system script into the code program of the honeypot trap application in advance, and the setting at each time can involve the change of the code program of the trap application, and if an attacker invades the honeypot trap application, the attack anti-system script which is set in advance is easy to be discovered by the attacker. The traditional setting mode of the attack counterscript has the problems of inflexible setting and poor concealment. Therefore, it is important to solve such problems.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the problems, the invention provides a method for setting an attack countering script based on a transparent proxy, which takes a honeypot transparent proxy gateway as a man-in-the-middle of an attacker and a honeypot trap service, and inserts the attack countering script into a response packet of the honeypot trap service according to needs so as to achieve the effect of countering the attack of the attacker.
In order to realize the technical scheme, the invention provides a method for setting an attack counterscript based on a transparent agent, which comprises the following steps: the honeypot trap application is mapped to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, when an attacker accesses the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway conducts transparent proxy forwarding, an access request of the attacker is forwarded to the honeypot trap application in a transparent proxy mode, and after the honeypot trap application replies a response packet, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway forwards the response packet replied by the relevant honeypot trap application to the attacker in a transparent proxy mode.
The further improvement lies in that: the transparent proxy gateway of honeypot possesses the condition of launching man-in-the-middle attack to the attacker, and inserts different attack countering scripts in the reply data packet of honeypot trap application according to the need, so that the attacker can execute automatically in a concealed manner, and attack countering is implemented to the attacker.
The further improvement is that the method specifically comprises the following counter-reaction steps:
the method comprises the following steps: an attacker (IP: 1.1.1.1) accesses the transparent proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) of the honeypot and sends a request data packet;
step two: the transparent honeypot proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) forwards the request data packet to the honeypot trap service, the source IP address in the modification request data packet is 2.2.2.1, and the target IP address in the modification request data packet is: 2.2.2.2;
step three: after receiving the request data packet of the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot, the honeypot trap service normally returns a response packet, wherein the source IP address in the response packet is 2.2.2.2, and the target IP is 2.2.2.1;
step four: the transparent proxy gateway of honeypot receives the response packet returned by the honeypot trap service, and inserts the attack anti-system script according to the requirement, wherein the attack anti-system script 1 is inserted in the example, meanwhile, the source IP in the response packet is modified to be 2.2.2.1, and the modified target IP is the IP of an attacker: 1.1.1.1, finally forwarding the response packet to the attacker;
step five: and after receiving the response packet, the attacker automatically executes the attack countermaking script 1 and automatically returns the execution result of the attack countermaking script 1 to the honeypot.
The further improvement is that when the attacker subsequently sends access requests to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway again, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway plays the role of a middle person, and simultaneously, the attacker inserts attack counter scripts according to needs while returning response packets,
the further improvement is that the concrete reaction steps are as follows:
the method comprises the following steps: when the attacker (IP: 1.1.1.1) accesses the transparent proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) of the honeypot again, the request data packet is sent again;
step two: the transparent honeypot proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) forwards the request data packet to the honeypot trap service, the source IP address in the modification request data packet is 2.2.2.1, and the target IP address in the modification request data packet is: 2.2.2.2;
step three: after receiving the request data packet of the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot, the honeypot trap service normally returns a response packet, wherein the source IP address in the response packet is 2.2.2.2, and the target IP is 2.2.2.1;
step four: the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot receives the response packet returned by the honeypot trap service, and can insert the attack counter script according to the requirement, wherein the attack counter script 1 and the attack counter script 2 are inserted at the same time in the example. And modifying the source IP in the response packet to be 2.2.2.1, and modifying the target IP to be the attacker IP: 1.1.1.1, finally forwarding the response packet to the attacker;
step five: after receiving the response packet, the attacker can automatically execute the attack anti-system script 1 and the attack anti-system script 2 and automatically return the execution results of the attack anti-system script 1 and the attack anti-system script 2 to the honeypot.
The further improvement lies in that: the honeypot transparent proxy gateway provides a proxy for one or more honeypot trap services.
In a further improvement, the attack countering script comprises: the attack system comprises an attack countersystem script of a traceable attacker information type, an attack countersystem script of a deterrent attacker type, an attack countersystem script of a decoy download file type and an attack countersystem script of a DDoS attacker host.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. based on the transparent agent gateway of the honeypot, the attack counter script can be flexibly inserted into the response packet of the honeypot trap service according to the requirement, and compared with the traditional mode of setting the attack counter script, the method is more flexible and more concealed.
2. The transparent honeypot proxy gateway is used as a man-in-the-middle of an attacker and a honeypot trap service, and an attack countering script is inserted into a response packet of the honeypot trap service as required, so that the effect of countering the attack of the attacker is achieved. In some scenarios, the attack-countering script may also be described as attack-countering code, an attack-countering program, an attack-countering module, and so on.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to these drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a diagram of packet transmission and response according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a diagram of packet transmission and response according to a conventional technical scheme.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that the terms "center", "upper", "lower", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "inner", "outer", etc., indicate orientations or positional relationships based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the drawings, and are only for convenience of description and simplicity of description, but do not indicate or imply that the device or element being referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and thus, should not be construed as limiting the present invention. Furthermore, the terms "first," "second," "third," "fourth," and the like are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.
In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified or limited, the terms "mounted," "connected," and "connected" are to be construed broadly, e.g., as meaning either a fixed connection, a removable connection, or an integral connection; can be mechanically or electrically connected; they may be connected directly or indirectly through intervening media, or they may be interconnected between two elements. The specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood in specific cases to those skilled in the art.
According to fig. 1, the embodiment provides a method for setting an attack countering script based on a transparent agent, which includes: the honeypot trap application is mapped to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, when an attacker accesses the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway conducts transparent proxy forwarding, an access request of the attacker is forwarded to the honeypot trap application in a transparent proxy mode, and after the honeypot trap application replies a response packet, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway forwards the response packet replied by the relevant honeypot trap application to the attacker in a transparent proxy mode.
The further improvement lies in that: the transparent proxy gateway of honeypot possesses the condition of launching man-in-the-middle attack to the attacker, and inserts different attack countering scripts in the reply data packet of honeypot trap application according to the need, so that the attacker can execute automatically in a concealed manner, and attack countering is implemented to the attacker.
The further improvement is that the method specifically comprises the following counter-reaction steps:
the method comprises the following steps: an attacker (IP: 1.1.1.1) accesses the transparent proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) of the honeypot and sends a request data packet;
step two: the transparent honeypot proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) forwards the request data packet to the honeypot trap service, the source IP address in the modification request data packet is 2.2.2.1, and the target IP address in the modification request data packet is: 2.2.2.2;
step three: after receiving the request data packet of the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot, the honeypot trap service normally returns a response packet, wherein the source IP address in the response packet is 2.2.2.2, and the target IP is 2.2.2.1;
step four: the transparent proxy gateway of honeypot receives the response packet returned by the honeypot trap service, and inserts the attack anti-system script according to the requirement, wherein the attack anti-system script 1 is inserted in the example, meanwhile, the source IP in the response packet is modified to be 2.2.2.1, and the modified target IP is the IP of an attacker: 1.1.1.1, finally forwarding the response packet to the attacker;
step five: and after receiving the response packet, the attacker automatically executes the attack countermaking script 1 and automatically returns the execution result of the attack countermaking script 1 to the honeypot.
The further improvement is that when the attacker subsequently sends access requests to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway again, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway plays the role of a middle person, and simultaneously, the attacker inserts attack counter scripts according to needs while returning response packets,
the further improvement is that the concrete reaction steps are as follows:
the method comprises the following steps: when the attacker (IP: 1.1.1.1) accesses the transparent proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) of the honeypot again, the request data packet is sent again;
step two: the transparent honeypot proxy gateway (IP: 2.2.2.1) forwards the request data packet to the honeypot trap service, the source IP address in the modification request data packet is 2.2.2.1, and the target IP address in the modification request data packet is: 2.2.2.2;
step three: after receiving the request data packet of the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot, the honeypot trap service normally returns a response packet, wherein the source IP address in the response packet is 2.2.2.2, and the target IP is 2.2.2.1;
step four: the transparent proxy gateway of honeypot receives the response packet returned by the honeypot trap service, and can insert the attack counter script according to the requirement, in this example, the attack counter script 1 and the attack counter script 2 are inserted at the same time, and the source IP in the response packet is modified to be 2.2.2.1, and the target IP is modified to be the IP of the attacker: 1.1.1.1, finally forwarding the response packet to the attacker;
step five: after receiving the response packet, the attacker can automatically execute the attack anti-system script 1 and the attack anti-system script 2 and automatically return the execution results of the attack anti-system script 1 and the attack anti-system script 2 to the honeypot.
The honeypot transparent proxy gateway provides a proxy for one or more honeypot trap services.
The attack counterscript comprises: the attack system comprises an attack countersystem script of a traceable attacker information type, an attack countersystem script of a deterrent attacker type, an attack countersystem script of a decoy download file type and an attack countersystem script of a DDoS attacker host.
Example two
As shown in fig. 2, a conventional setting method of an attack counterscript specifically includes the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: an attacker (IP: 1.1.1.1) accesses the honeypot trap service (IP: 2.2.2.2) and sends a request data packet;
step two: the honeypot trap service sets two attack counter scripts in advance, and in actual use, more attack counter scripts may be set, wherein the two attack counter scripts are taken as an example, after the honeypot trap service receives a request data packet, a response packet comprises the two attack counter scripts, and an attacker executes the attack counter scripts
Step three: after receiving the response packet, the attacker can automatically execute the two attack counterscript and automatically return the execution result of the attack counterscript to the honeypot.
In the traditional setting mode of the attack countering script, the attack countering script needs to be set in advance in a code program applied by the honeypot trap, so that the attack countering effect can be realized.
In the invention, the honeypot trap application is not directly exposed to an attacker for access, but the related honeypot trap application is mapped to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, when the attacker accesses the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway performs transparent proxy forwarding, the access request transparent proxy of the attacker is forwarded to the honeypot trap application, and after the honeypot trap application replies the response packet, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway forwards the response packet replied by the related honeypot trap application to the attacker. In the process, the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot has the condition of launching the man-in-the-middle attack to the attacker, and the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot can insert different attack counterattack scripts into a reply data packet applied by a honeypot trap according to needs, so that the attacker can execute automatically in a concealed manner, and attack counterattack can be flexibly implemented to the attacker.
The invention is based on the transparent agent gateway of the honeypot, can flexibly insert the attack counter script into the response packet of the honeypot trap service according to the requirement, and is more flexible and more concealed compared with the traditional mode of setting the attack counter script.
The invention uses the transparent agent gateway of the honeypot as the middle man of the attacker and the honeypot trap service, and inserts the attack countering script into the response packet of the honeypot trap service according to the requirement, so as to achieve the effect of countering the attack of the attacker. In some scenarios, the attack-countering script may also be described as attack-countering code, an attack-countering program, an attack-countering module, and so on.
The foregoing illustrates and describes the principles, general features, and advantages of the present invention. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above, which are described in the specification and illustrated only to illustrate the principle of the present invention, but that various changes and modifications may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, which fall within the scope of the invention as claimed. The scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and equivalents thereof.
Claims (7)
1. A method for setting an attack countering script based on a transparent agent is characterized by comprising the following steps: the honeypot trap application is mapped to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, when an attacker accesses the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway conducts transparent proxy forwarding, an access request of the attacker is forwarded to the honeypot trap application in a transparent proxy mode, and after the honeypot trap application replies a response packet, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway forwards the response packet replied by the relevant honeypot trap application to the attacker in a transparent proxy mode.
2. The method for setting attack countering script based on the transparent agent according to claim 1, characterized in that: the transparent proxy gateway of honeypot possesses the condition of launching man-in-the-middle attack to the attacker, and inserts different attack countering scripts in the reply data packet of honeypot trap application according to the need, so that the attacker can execute automatically in a concealed manner, and attack countering is implemented to the attacker.
3. The method for setting the attack countering script based on the transparent agent according to the claim 1, characterized in that the method specifically comprises the following countering steps:
the method comprises the following steps: an attacker accesses the honeypot transparent proxy gateway and sends a request data packet;
step two: the transparent honeypot proxy gateway forwards the request data packet to a honeypot trap service, modifies a source IP address in the request data packet, and then modifies a target IP address in the request data packet;
step three: after receiving the request data packet of the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot, the honeypot trap service returns a response packet normally;
step four: the transparent agent gateway of the honeypot receives a response packet returned by the honeypot trap service, inserts an attack counter script 1 according to needs, modifies a source IP in the response packet and modifies a target IP into an attacker IP, and finally forwards the response packet to the attacker;
step five: and after receiving the response packet, the attacker automatically executes the attack countermaking script 1 and automatically returns the execution result of the attack countermaking script 1 to the honeypot.
4. The method for setting attack countering scripts based on the transparent proxy is characterized in that when an attacker subsequently reissues an access request to the honeypot transparent proxy gateway, the honeypot transparent proxy gateway takes the role of a man-in-the-middle, and the attack countering scripts are inserted as required while a response packet is returned.
5. The method for setting the attack countering script based on the transparent agent according to the claim 4, characterized in that the concrete countering steps are as follows:
the method comprises the following steps: when the attacker accesses the honeypot transparent proxy gateway again, the request data packet is sent again;
step two: the transparent honeypot proxy gateway forwards the request data packet to a honeypot trap service, modifies a source IP address in the request data packet, and modifies a target IP address in the request data packet;
step three: after receiving the request data packet of the transparent proxy gateway of the honeypot, the honeypot trap service returns a response packet normally;
step four: the transparent agent gateway of the honeypot receives the response packet returned by the honeypot trap service, can insert the attack counter script 2 according to the need, and modifies the source IP in the response packet, modifies the target IP as an attacker, and finally forwards the response packet to the attacker;
step five: and after receiving the response packet, the attacker automatically executes the attack counterscript 1 and the attack counterscript 2 and automatically returns the execution results of the attack counterscript 1 and the attack counterscript 2 to the honeypot.
6. The method for setting attack countering script based on the transparent agent according to claim 1, characterized in that: the honeypot transparent proxy gateway provides a proxy for one or more honeypot trap services.
7. The method for setting the attack countering script based on the transparent agent according to the claim 1, characterized in that the attack countering script comprises: the attack system comprises an attack countersystem script of a traceable attacker information type, an attack countersystem script of a deterrent attacker type, an attack countersystem script of a decoy download file type and an attack countersystem script of a DDoS attacker host.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011617862.0A CN114006715A (en) | 2020-12-31 | 2020-12-31 | Method for setting attack counterscript based on transparent proxy |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011617862.0A CN114006715A (en) | 2020-12-31 | 2020-12-31 | Method for setting attack counterscript based on transparent proxy |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN114006715A true CN114006715A (en) | 2022-02-01 |
Family
ID=79920807
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011617862.0A Pending CN114006715A (en) | 2020-12-31 | 2020-12-31 | Method for setting attack counterscript based on transparent proxy |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN114006715A (en) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN115242730A (en) * | 2022-08-18 | 2022-10-25 | 广东软易通信息科技有限公司 | Safe internet access method and system based on forward proxy technology |
| CN116668063A (en) * | 2023-04-11 | 2023-08-29 | 应急管理部大数据中心 | Network attack countering method and software system based on middleware process implantation |
Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105471883A (en) * | 2015-12-10 | 2016-04-06 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Tor network tracing system and tracing method based on web injection |
| US9350758B1 (en) * | 2013-09-27 | 2016-05-24 | Emc Corporation | Distributed denial of service (DDoS) honeypots |
| CN108134797A (en) * | 2017-12-28 | 2018-06-08 | 广州锦行网络科技有限公司 | System and method is realized in attack counter based on Honeypot Techniques |
| CN111314281A (en) * | 2019-12-04 | 2020-06-19 | 江苏天网计算机技术有限公司 | Method for forwarding attack traffic to honeypot |
| CN111885046A (en) * | 2020-07-21 | 2020-11-03 | 广州锦行网络科技有限公司 | Linux-based transparent intranet access method and device |
-
2020
- 2020-12-31 CN CN202011617862.0A patent/CN114006715A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US9350758B1 (en) * | 2013-09-27 | 2016-05-24 | Emc Corporation | Distributed denial of service (DDoS) honeypots |
| CN105471883A (en) * | 2015-12-10 | 2016-04-06 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Tor network tracing system and tracing method based on web injection |
| CN108134797A (en) * | 2017-12-28 | 2018-06-08 | 广州锦行网络科技有限公司 | System and method is realized in attack counter based on Honeypot Techniques |
| CN111314281A (en) * | 2019-12-04 | 2020-06-19 | 江苏天网计算机技术有限公司 | Method for forwarding attack traffic to honeypot |
| CN111885046A (en) * | 2020-07-21 | 2020-11-03 | 广州锦行网络科技有限公司 | Linux-based transparent intranet access method and device |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN115242730A (en) * | 2022-08-18 | 2022-10-25 | 广东软易通信息科技有限公司 | Safe internet access method and system based on forward proxy technology |
| CN116668063A (en) * | 2023-04-11 | 2023-08-29 | 应急管理部大数据中心 | Network attack countering method and software system based on middleware process implantation |
| CN116668063B (en) * | 2023-04-11 | 2024-01-30 | 应急管理部大数据中心 | Network attack countering method and software system based on middleware process implantation |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Jero et al. | Identifier binding attacks and defenses in {Software-Defined} networks | |
| CN110798471B (en) | Air conditioner management method and related device | |
| US12058148B2 (en) | Distributed threat sensor analysis and correlation | |
| US11489853B2 (en) | Distributed threat sensor data aggregation and data export | |
| CN111756712B (en) | Method for forging IP address and preventing attack based on virtual network equipment | |
| US20130283366A1 (en) | Flexible network security system and method for permitting trusted process | |
| TWI674780B (en) | Network service system and network service method | |
| CN112995151A (en) | Access behavior processing method and device, storage medium and electronic equipment | |
| CN114006715A (en) | Method for setting attack counterscript based on transparent proxy | |
| US10027627B2 (en) | Context sharing between endpoint device and network security device using in-band communications | |
| US20180302418A1 (en) | Method and system for detection and interference of network reconnaissance | |
| CN107209711B (en) | Test system for testing computers of a computer system in a test network | |
| CN112600908A (en) | Method, device, equipment and storage medium for acquiring communication link | |
| WO2015014215A1 (en) | Domain name resolution method, system and device | |
| US20210344726A1 (en) | Threat sensor deployment and management | |
| CN110912898A (en) | Method and device for disguising equipment assets, electronic equipment and storage medium | |
| KR101593897B1 (en) | Network scan method for circumventing firewall, IDS or IPS | |
| US9678772B2 (en) | System, method, and computer-readable medium | |
| CN110995763B (en) | Data processing method and device, electronic equipment and computer storage medium | |
| CN114389863B (en) | Honeypot interaction method and device, honeypot network, equipment and storage medium | |
| TWI836279B (en) | Network data packet processing device and network data packet processing method | |
| US20220337546A1 (en) | Method and system for realizing network dynamics, terminal device and storage medium | |
| CN115776517A (en) | Service request processing method and device, storage medium and electronic equipment | |
| US20230269236A1 (en) | Automatic proxy system, automatic proxy method and non-transitory computer readable medium | |
| Sørensen et al. | Automatic profile-based firewall for iot devices |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |
Application publication date: 20220201 |
|
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |