CN113895638A

CN113895638A - Method for preventing misoperation when aeroengine fails

Info

Publication number: CN113895638A
Application number: CN202111150844.0A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 王军; 牛晓英; 朱瑶; 李飞; 陈甜甜; 王媛
Original assignee: Commercial Aircraft Corp of China Ltd
Current assignee: Commercial Aircraft Corp of China Ltd; Shanghai Aircraft Design and Research Institute Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd
Priority date: 2021-09-29
Filing date: 2021-09-29
Publication date: 2022-01-07

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for preventing misoperation of a throttle platform device under the condition of single shot of a civil aircraft engine. Specifically, the invention utilizes the different information coding forms of the left engine and the right engine, and simultaneously locks the throttle lever of the normally working engine when single failure occurs by adding a locking device, and prevents the throttle lever from being mistakenly received or the normally working engine from being mistakenly closed.

Description

Method for preventing misoperation when aeroengine fails

Technical Field

The invention relates to the field of design of aeronautical engineering airplane bodies, in particular to a method for preventing misoperation when an aeroengine breaks down.

Background

In the process of taking off a flight, the No. 2 engine fails, the flight unit closes the No. 1 engine by mistake, and the airplane is damaged and the people die, and the operation logic is shown in figure 1, namely the pilot takes the operation logic of the right branch. This is mainly because the throttle levers and ignition switches used to control the left and right engines on current aircraft throttle station devices (as shown in fig. 2), such as a350 and B787, are of the same color, causing pilot misoperation in emergency situations.

In particular, on the throttle table devices currently used on civil aircraft, the two engine display and control devices have the same information code and do not have a throttle lever locking device. Under the condition that the engine has single-engine failure, the flight unit can only judge which engine fails according to the information displayed by an engine instrument (N1 or N2 with the rotating speed of 0 or 0), and then searches for a corresponding throttle lever and a parking handle, so that misoperation is easy to occur to receive the wrong throttle lever or the wrong engine is turned off, and further, an aviation unsafe artificial event is caused.

Accordingly, there is a need for systems and methods that ameliorate the deficiencies of the prior art.

Disclosure of Invention

This summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the detailed description. This summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.

The invention provides a method for preventing misoperation of a throttle stand device under the condition of failure of an aircraft engine. In the present invention, engine faults include, but are not limited to, engine shut down.

Specifically, when the engine of the airplane stops in one shot and the airplane is automatically judged to be lifted off the ground through a wheel-mounted signal, the locking device additionally arranged on the throttle lever automatically increases the throttle lever operation resistance feeling (larger than the normal operation force) corresponding to the normal engine and prompts the unit to lock the engine corresponding to the unit on the display of an engine instrument, so that the pilot is prevented from mistakenly receiving the normally-working engine (when the airplane does not lift off the ground, the unit may execute the take-off interruption operation, and at the moment, the two engine throttle levers are required to be simultaneously received back to the slow car, so that the throttle levers cannot be locked under the condition).

When the throttle lever corresponding to the abnormal working engine is pulled to a slow parking place, the throttle lever corresponding to the normal working engine can be automatically unlocked (locking information on the display of an engine instrument disappears), and a pilot or an FMS (flight control system) can normally operate the throttle lever of the normal working engine. The automatic locking device on the accelerator platform only increases the operating force of the accelerator lever of the engine working normally, the unit does not lose the control on the accelerator lever, and the unit can still control the thrust of the airplane under the condition that the locking device fails and cannot be unlocked.

When the single-shot failure condition occurs, when the unit needs to withdraw the throttle stick of the abnormal engine and turn off the fuel switch of the abnormal engine, the pilot can distinguish and judge the display and control devices of the left engine and the right engine, namely the instrument display and control components (the engine instrument display information, the throttle stick and the fuel control switch) by using different information codes in an intuitive and error-prone mode. The display and control device for distinguishing the left engine from the right engine through two different information coding forms is beneficial to managing errors by the engine group (the possibility of error occurrence is reduced, and the errors can be found and recovered in time), so that the flight safety of the aircraft is ensured. Meanwhile, the automatic locking device and the automatic unlocking device are arranged on the throttle lever, so that the throttle lever of the normally working engine is automatically locked when single-shot failure occurs, misoperation of the flight unit is prevented, the throttle lever is mistakenly received and the normally working engine is mistakenly closed, and accordingly flight safety of the aircraft is ensured.

In one embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a method of preventing malfunction when an aircraft engine malfunctions, the method comprising:

automatically locking a throttle lever corresponding to a normal engine;

determining an abnormal engine and an information code corresponding to the abnormal engine;

the throttle lever with the information code is retracted to the slow parking place;

automatically unlocking a throttle lever corresponding to the normal engine;

automatically increasing the rotation speed of the normal engine; and

and cutting off the fuel control switch with the information code.

Other aspects, features and embodiments of the present invention will become apparent to those ordinarily skilled in the art upon review of the following description of specific exemplary embodiments of the invention in conjunction with the accompanying figures. While features of the invention may be discussed below with respect to certain embodiments and figures, all embodiments of the invention can include one or more of the advantageous features discussed herein. In other words, while one or more embodiments may have been discussed as having certain advantageous features, one or more of such features may also be used in accordance with the various embodiments of the invention discussed herein. In a similar manner, although example embodiments may be discussed below as device, system, or method embodiments, it should be appreciated that such example embodiments may be implemented in a variety of devices, systems, and methods.

Drawings

So that the manner in which the above recited features of the present disclosure can be understood in detail, a more particular description of the disclosure, briefly summarized above, may be had by reference to aspects, some of which are illustrated in the appended drawings. It is to be noted, however, that the appended drawings illustrate only certain typical aspects of this disclosure and are therefore not to be considered limiting of its scope, for the description may admit to other equally effective aspects.

FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of the operating logic of a prior art aircraft engine operating on a single engine.

Fig. 2 is a schematic view of a prior art throttle station arrangement in an aircraft cockpit.

Fig. 3 shows a schematic diagram of the correspondence between engine gauge display information, throttle lever, fuel control switch formed by information encoding according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

FIG. 4 illustrates a flow diagram of a method of preventing false operation when an aircraft engine fails according to one embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 5 shows a flow chart of system operation after a one-sided engine shutdown, according to one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 6 shows a flow chart of unit operation after a one-sided engine shutdown, according to one embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed Description

Various embodiments will now be described more fully hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings, which form a part hereof, and which show specific exemplary embodiments. Embodiments may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of these embodiments to those skilled in the art. Embodiments may be implemented as a method, system or device. Accordingly, embodiments may take the form of a hardware implementation, an entirely software implementation, or an implementation combining software and hardware aspects. The following detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense.

The steps in the various flowcharts may be performed by hardware (e.g., processors, engines, memory, circuitry), software (e.g., operating systems, applications, drivers, machine/processor-executable instructions), or a combination thereof. As one of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate, methods involved in various embodiments may include more or fewer steps than those shown.

Various aspects of the disclosure are described in detail below with reference to block diagrams, apparatus diagrams, and method flow diagrams.

FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of the operating logic of a prior art aircraft engine operating on a single engine. In the prior art, on an aircraft with double engine, if a single engine stop is encountered (such as failure of the right engine No. 2) and the aircraft is in the air, normal operation should be to judge the failed engine (i.e., the rotation speed of the right engine No. 2N 1 or N2 is "0") by the engine speed (N1, N2) and execute a left logic sequence, i.e., to retract the throttle lever of the abnormal engine (i.e., to retract the throttle lever of the right engine No. 2) and to turn off the fuel switch of the abnormal engine (i.e., to turn off the fuel cut switch of the right engine No. 2), so as to enable single-engine safe flight. However, since the instrument displays, the throttle levers and the fuel control switches corresponding to the two engines are not sufficiently distinguished in appearance (as shown in fig. 2), the pilot may perform a malfunction in a high-load operating state, i.e., execute the logic of the right branch in fig. 1, and erroneously retract the throttle lever of the normal engine (i.e., retract the throttle lever of the engine No. 1 on the left), resulting in a dangerous situation in which the aircraft loses power.

The invention avoids the misoperation of a pilot by automatically locking the throttle lever of a normal engine and distinguishing and judging the corresponding relation between the engine display information and the engine control equipment (engine instrument display information, the throttle lever and a fuel control switch) by utilizing different information codes.

The engines of aircraft are generally defined in digital form from left to right, for example: 1. 2, 3 and 4, while the engines of twin aircraft are conventionally used to distinguish between left and right engines. And misjudgment is easily caused under an emergency condition, so that the unit is operated by mistake. Different information codes are used for distinguishing display information and corresponding control equipment of different engines, and misoperation of the flight unit can be effectively avoided.

In one embodiment of the present invention, the left and right sides of the aircraft engine display and control device (engine gauge display information, throttle lever, fuel control switch) are respectively provided with different information codes (by way of example and not limitation, the information codes can be colors such as left blue, right black and the like) to distinguish the left and right engines, and the flight crew directly sends out a password with a characteristic information code through the information code corresponding to the failed engine display information, such as: "blue parking". And the crew confirms the stopped engine according to the same information code, withdraws the throttle lever with the same information code and turns off the fuel control switch with the same information code. Particularly, the pilot can effectively prevent mistaken accelerator reception and mistaken engine closing under the single-shot emergency condition of takeoff or low-altitude missed approach, so that the pilot is prevented from artificial errors, and the flight safety of the aircraft is ensured.

Specifically, in the present invention, the specific control logic and corresponding unit operation of the locking device are as follows:

when the aircraft engine stops for one shot and the aircraft is lifted off (when the aircraft is not lifted off for one shot, the unit may execute an interrupted take-off operation, at which time the two engine throttle levers are required to be retracted into the slow vehicle at the same time, so that the throttle levers cannot be locked in this case), the locking device starts to operate automatically:

the first step is as follows: the throttle lever corresponding to the engine working normally is automatically locked, and the damping force sense corresponding to the throttle lever is increased.

The second step is that: based on the engine speed, left and right position in the engine gauge display and the displayed information code (such as color), the flight crew determines the engine that has been parked and its information code, for example:

Firstly, as shown in the left graph in FIG. 3, according to the condition that the rotating speed of the engine N1 on the left side is 0 and the information displayed by the engine meter is coded into blue, the rotating speed of the engine N1 on the right side is 73.3 and the information displayed by the engine meter is coded into black, the left side blue-emitting parking is determined;

secondly, as shown in the right graph in FIG. 3, according to the condition that the rotating speed of the right side N1 is 0 and the information displayed by the engine instrument is coded into black, the rotating speed of the left side N1 is 73.3 and the information displayed by the engine instrument is coded into blue, the right side black hair parking is determined;

the third step: the step is executed after the flying height of the airplane is more than or equal to 400 feet, and the flight crew member retracts the throttle lever with the information code of the abnormal engine to a slow parking space:

firstly, as shown in the left image in fig. 3, if the left side is blue-emitting to park, the left side blue-colored throttle lever is collected to the slow parking space;

secondly, as shown in the right diagram in fig. 3, if the vehicle is parked on the right side with black hair, the black throttle lever on the right side is retracted to a slow parking place.

The fourth step: when the throttle lever of the abnormal working engine is retracted to the slow parking place, the throttle lever corresponding to the normal working engine is automatically unlocked and whether the automatic unlocking is successful is judged:

1. if the automatic unlocking is successful:

firstly, as shown in the left graph in fig. 3, if the blue throttle lever on the left side is retracted to a slow parking space, the black throttle lever on the right side is automatically unlocked, the locking information displayed on the black engine instrument on the right side disappears, and the rotating speed of the black hair on the right side is automatically increased so as to compensate the thrust lost by a single hair;

secondly, as shown in the right diagram in fig. 3, if the black throttle lever on the right side is retracted to a slow parking space, the blue throttle lever on the right side is automatically unlocked, the locking information displayed on the blue engine instrument on the left side disappears, and the rotating speed of the blue engine on the left side is automatically increased to compensate the thrust lost by a single engine.

2. If the automatic unlocking fails:

firstly, as shown in the left diagram in fig. 3, if the right black throttle lever fails to be unlocked automatically:

1) pressing a right black throttle lever off button (not shown) unlocks the right black throttle lever;

2) pressing AT on button (not shown) on FMCP plate;

3) the rotating speed of the black hair on the right side is automatically increased to compensate the thrust lost by the single hair.

Secondly, as shown in the right diagram of fig. 3, if the left blue throttle lever fails to be unlocked automatically:

1) pressing a left blue door lever off button (not shown) unlocks the left blue door lever;

2) pressing AT on button (not shown) on FMCP plate;

3) the rotating speed of the left blue hair is automatically increased to compensate the thrust lost by the single hair.

The fifth step: flight crew member manual work cuts off fuel control switch:

firstly, as shown in the left graph in fig. 3, if the left side is parked in a blue engine, the left side blue fuel control switch is manually switched to an OFF position;

② if the vehicle stops in the dark right side, the black fuel control switch on the right side is manually switched to the OFF position as shown in the right diagram of the figure 3.

Therefore, flight crew completes the single-shot operation procedure, and the airplane flies safely.

FIG. 4 shows a flow diagram of a method 400 of preventing false operation when an aircraft engine fails according to one embodiment of the invention.

In one embodiment of the invention, the method 400 begins execution when the aircraft has lifted off the ground and the single shot failed. As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, method 400 may begin under other suitable conditions, such as where more than one engine of a four-aircraft is shut down, and so forth.

In step 402, a throttle lever corresponding to a normal engine is automatically locked. As shown in fig. 3, in the left side diagram, since the information code corresponding to the rotation speed of 0 in the meter display is blue, that is, the engine corresponding to blue is stopped, the throttle lever of the engine corresponding to black, that is, the black throttle lever, is automatically locked; in the right graph, since the information code corresponding to the rotation speed of 0 in the meter display is black, that is, the engine corresponding to black is stopped, the throttle lever of the engine corresponding to blue, that is, the blue throttle lever, is automatically locked.

In one embodiment of the present invention, the automatic locking operation is performed by an automatic locking device in the throttle stand device or the like, and the automatic locking device simply increases the operation resistance of the throttle lever of the abnormal engine to be greater than the normal operation force to prevent the throttle lever from losing control when the lock cannot be opened (for example, the throttle of the normal engine cannot be increased to increase the thrust).

In step 404, an abnormal engine and a message code corresponding to the abnormal engine are determined. In one embodiment of the present invention, the abnormal engine may refer to a parked engine, i.e., an engine having an engine speed of 0. As shown in fig. 3, in the left side diagram, the meter at which the engine speed is 0 displays that the ground color is blue, i.e., the information corresponding to the abnormal engine is encoded in blue; in the right graph, the meter at which the engine speed is 0 displays that the ground color is black, i.e., information corresponding to an abnormal engine is encoded in black. Therefore, the display information and the operation equipment related to each engine can be distinguished by different information codes, so that misoperation can be prevented.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the present invention is not limited to the two types of information encoding, blue and black, nor to the color encoding, but may employ any suitable information encoding that is capable of prompting the unit for proper operation in an intuitive and error-prone manner.

At step 406, the throttle lever with the information code is retracted to the slow slot. The information code here refers to the information code corresponding to the abnormal engine determined in step 404. As shown in fig. 3, in the left side view, when the engine corresponding to blue is stopped, the blue throttle lever is retracted to the slow parking space according to the correspondence of the information code; in the right graph, the black throttle lever is retracted to the slow parking place according to the corresponding relation of the information codes under the condition that the engine corresponding to the black is parked. Thus, the characteristic of information coding distinction is utilized to ensure that the crew member correctly withdraws the throttle lever of an abnormal (parked) engine.

In one embodiment of the present invention, step 406 is performed with the aircraft having a flight altitude of 400 feet or greater.

In step 408, the throttle lever corresponding to the normal engine is automatically unlocked. In one embodiment of the present invention, when the automatic unlocking of the throttle lever corresponding to the normal engine fails, the pilot may press the corresponding throttle lever off button to manually unlock the throttle lever of the normal engine, and then may press the AT on button on the FMCP board, increasing the rotational speed of the normal engine for compensating for the thrust lost due to the failure of one engine.

In step 410, the normal engine speed is automatically increased. In one embodiment of the present invention, when the automatic unlocking of the throttle lever corresponding to the normal engine fails, the rotational speed of the normal engine may be increased by pressing the AT-on button on the FMCP plate after the manual unlocking for compensating for the thrust loss due to the failure of one engine.

At step 412, the fuel control switch with the information code is turned off. The information code here refers to the information code corresponding to the abnormal engine determined in step 404. As shown in fig. 3, in the left side view, the blue fuel control switch is switched to the OFF position according to the correspondence of the information code when the engine corresponding to blue stops; in the right diagram, the black fuel control switch is switched to the OFF position according to the correspondence of the information code when the engine corresponding to black is stopped.

After step 412, the method 400 ends, i.e., the single-shot procedure is completed and safe flight of the aircraft is ensured.

The method of preventing false operation in the event of a failure of an aircraft engine according to an embodiment of the invention will be described in further detail below in both the system and the crew dimensions.

FIG. 5 shows a flowchart of system operation 500 after a one-sided engine shutdown, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

In one embodiment of the invention, the system operations 500 begin to be performed when the aircraft is already airborne and the single shot fails. In this embodiment, a left blue engine stop is assumed (as shown in FIG. 4), and those skilled in the art will appreciate that a right engine stop may also be assumed, and that only a left engine stop is provided as an example in this disclosure for simplicity.

In step 502, the right black throttle lever, i.e., the throttle lever corresponding to a normal engine, is automatically locked. As shown in fig. 3, in the left side diagram, since the information code corresponding to the rotation speed of 0 in the meter display is blue, that is, the engine corresponding to blue is stopped, the throttle lever of the engine corresponding to black, that is, the black throttle lever, is automatically locked. After the automatic locking is completed, the unit executes the operation program after single sending, namely, the left blue color door rod is retracted to the slow parking space.

Subsequently, the right black throttle lever is automatically unlocked at step 504, and it is determined whether the right black throttle lever is automatically unlocked successfully at step 506. When the right black throttle lever fails to unlock automatically, the process may proceed to a right logic sequence, AT which point the pilot may press the corresponding throttle lever off button to manually unlock the throttle lever of the right black engine, and may then press the AT on button on the FMCP board, increasing the speed of the normal engine to compensate for the thrust lost due to one engine failure.

If it is determined at decision block 506 that the automatic unlocking of the right black throttle lever is successful, flow continues to step 508 where the speed of the right black engine is automatically increased to compensate for the thrust lost due to one engine failure.

Upon completion of step 508, the system operational flow 500 ends.

FIG. 6 shows a flow chart of unit operation 600 after a single-sided engine shutdown, according to one embodiment of the invention.

In one embodiment of the present invention, crew operation 500 begins when the aircraft is already airborne and the single shot fails. In this embodiment, the left blue engine is assumed to be stopped, corresponding to fig. 5 described above.

In step 602, a failed engine is determined based on engine speeds (N1, N2). In one embodiment of the invention, the failed engine may refer to a parked engine, i.e., an engine with an engine speed of 0. As shown in fig. 3, in the left graph, the meter in which the engine speed is 0 displays that the ground color is blue, i.e., the information corresponding to the failed engine is encoded in blue. Therefore, the display information and the operation equipment related to each engine can be distinguished by different information codes, so that misoperation can be prevented.

At step 604, the left blue door lever is retracted to the slow parking space. After determining the failed engine and its corresponding information code in step 602, the throttle lever with the information code (i.e., the left blue throttle lever) is retracted to the slow spot. As shown in fig. 3, in the left side view, when the engine corresponding to blue is stopped, the blue throttle lever is retracted to the slow space in accordance with the correspondence of the information code. Thus, the characteristic of information coding differentiation is utilized to ensure that the crew properly retrieves the throttle lever of a failed (parked) engine.

At step 606, it is determined whether the right black throttle lever is automatically unlocked.

In one embodiment of the present invention, when the right black throttle lever is automatically unlocked successfully, as determined by the yes at decision block 606, the process may continue to step 608 where the left blue fuel control switch is turned off at step 608. As shown in fig. 3, in the left side view, when the engine corresponding to blue is stopped, the blue fuel control switch is switched to the OFF position according to the correspondence of the information code.

In another embodiment of the present invention, when the automatic unlocking of the right black throttle lever fails, i.e., no as determined at decision block 606, the process adds two steps 610 and 612 between

steps

606 and 608. The pilot may press the corresponding throttle lever off button to manually unlock the right black engine throttle lever AT step 610, and then press the AT on button on the FMCP board AT step 612, increasing the normal engine speed to compensate for the thrust lost due to one engine failure, and then the process continues to step 608 where the crew turns off the left blue fuel control switch.

After step 608, the unit operation process 600 ends, i.e., the single shot operation procedure is completed.

In conclusion, after the airplane is parked in the air, the locking device and the information coding mode are added to ensure that the flight crew correctly withdraws the throttle lever of the engine which does not normally work, and the corresponding fuel control switch is closed, so that the identification capability and the situational awareness of the flight crew are effectively improved, the human error is avoided, and the flight safety of the airplane is ensured.

Embodiments of the present invention are described above with reference to block diagrams and/or operational illustrations of methods, systems, and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. The functions/acts noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in any flowchart. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality/acts involved.

The above description is only for the preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present invention are included in the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method of preventing false operation in the event of a failure of an aircraft engine, comprising:

automatically locking a throttle lever corresponding to a normal engine;

automatically unlocking a throttle lever corresponding to the normal engine;

automatically increasing the rotation speed of the normal engine; and

and cutting off the fuel control switch with the information code.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method is performed beginning when a single stop of an aircraft engine occurs and the aircraft has lifted off the ground, and wherein the retrieving is performed at a flight altitude of 400 feet or greater.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the abnormal engine is determined by engine speed in an instrument display.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the information code is a color and includes a color of a meter display corresponding to the engine, a color of a throttle lever corresponding to the engine, and a color of a fuel control switch corresponding to the engine.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the automatic locking is performed by an automatic locking device in a throttle stand device, and wherein the automatic locking device increases an operating resistance of a throttle lever of the normal engine to be greater than a normal operating force.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein in the event of a failure of the automatic unlocking, the method further comprises pressing a disconnect button of a throttle lever corresponding to the normal engine to manually unlock the throttle lever.

7. The method of claim 6, further comprising increasing the normal engine speed by pressing an AT on button on the FMCP board.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein switching OFF a fuel control switch having the information encoding comprises switching a fuel control switch of the abnormal engine to an OFF position.

9. The method of claim 1, further comprising issuing a password using an information code corresponding to the abnormal engine as the characterizing information code.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein after automatically unlocking a throttle lever corresponding to the normal engine, the throttle lever can be normally operated to enable an increase in the rotational speed of the normal engine.