CN113887886A - Method for identifying design expansion working condition list without melting in heap based on risk importance degree - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to a method for identifying a design expansion working condition list without melting in heap based on risk importance, which comprises the following steps: establishing a probability safety analysis model for designing extended working condition analysis; establishing an outcome analysis case according to the category of the initial event; establishing a system event group in the probability safety analysis model so as to identify a system to which a basic event in the probability safety analysis belongs; calculating to obtain a quantitative result of each consequence case and an importance value of each system event group in each consequence case; calculating the possibility of overlapping each system failure after each initial event occurs according to the result of each result case quantization and the importance value of each system event group; and screening the failure condition of each initial event superposition system according to the occurrence possibility, grouping according to the grouping characteristics of the design expansion working conditions, and finally obtaining a design expansion working condition list. The invention does not need to research and process a huge number of cut set results, can ensure the accuracy of the results and obviously improve the analysis efficiency.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the design technology of nuclear power plants, and particularly relates to a method for identifying a design expansion working condition list without melting in heap based on risk importance.
Background
The principle requirements for determining the design extension working condition (DEC-A) without melting down are given in the documents of design safety provisions of nuclear power plants (HAF102-2016), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) design extension working condition technical guide (IAEA-TECDOC-1791) and the like, but a specific method for identifying the DEC-A by using Probability Safety Analysis (PSA) in more detail is not provided. In practice, DEC-a is generally determined by analytical merging of the resulting cut sets, sequences, etc., by modification and re-quantification of the PSA model. However, because PSA models are highly complex (e.g., cut-set results are typically hundreds of thousands or even millions), the analysis often takes a lot of time and is prone to omissions and errors.
Therefore, a technical method for conveniently and rapidly identifying the DEC-A working condition by using the PSA model is needed to improve the analysis efficiency and ensure the result accuracy.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method for identifying a design expansion working condition list without melting due to risk importance according to the analysis requirement of a DEC-A list aiming at the defects of the prior art, so that the accuracy of a result is ensured, and the analysis efficiency can be improved.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows: a method for identifying a design expansion working condition list without melting in heap based on risk importance comprises the following steps:
(1) establishing a probability safety analysis model for designing extended working condition analysis;
(2) establishing an outcome analysis case according to the category of the initial event;
(3) establishing a system event group in the probability safety analysis model so as to identify a system to which a basic event in the probability safety analysis belongs;
(4) calculating to obtain a quantitative result of each consequence case and an importance value of each system event group in each consequence case;
(5) calculating the possibility of overlapping each system failure after each initial event occurs according to the obtained result case quantization result and the importance value of each system event group;
(6) and screening the failure condition of each initial event superposition system according to the occurrence possibility, grouping according to the grouping characteristics of the design expansion working conditions, and finally obtaining a design expansion working condition list.
Further, according to the method for identifying the design extension working condition list without the melting heap based on the risk importance, in the step (1), in the probabilistic safety analysis model, the non-safety system is set to be in failure, the phenomenon exceeding the range of the safety system is set to be in an undesirable consequence state, and the personnel exceeding the range of the safety system is set to be in failure.
Further, the step (1) sets a non-safety system as failure in the probabilistic safety analysis model, wherein the non-safety system includes an event tree top event, a system fault tree branch fault tree and a basic event corresponding to some equipment in the probabilistic safety analysis model.
Further, according to the method for identifying the design extension working condition list without the melting pile based on the risk importance, in the step (2), the initial events are classified according to the classification mode of the probability safety analysis model, the consequence analysis case is established, and necessary boundary conditions are set.
Further, according to the method for identifying the design extended operating condition list without the melting heap based on the risk importance, in the step (3), the basic event of the equipment related to the system and the operation of the personnel related to the system are added into the system event group by adding the system event group definition into the probabilistic safety analysis model.
Further, according to the method for identifying the design extension working condition list without the melting heap based on the risk importance, the quantitative result and the importance value in the step (4) are obtained by performing cut set analysis and importance analysis through probability safety analysis software.
Further, in the method for identifying the design extended operating condition list without the melting heap based on the risk importance, in the step (5), the formula for calculating the possibility of overlapping each system failure after each initiating event occurs is as follows:
PSYS＝ISYS*MCSIE
wherein, PSYSPossibility of system failure for superposition of originating events, ISYSFor system importance, MCSIEThe likelihood of consequences for the originating event.
Further, according to the method for identifying the design extended working condition list without the heap fusion based on the risk importance, in the step (6), a cutoff value is set according to the analysis requirement, the situation that the occurrence probability is higher than the cutoff value is reserved, and the situation that the occurrence probability is higher than the cutoff value is grouped according to the state of the power plant to obtain the design extended working condition list. The setting of the cutoff value is determined according to the nuclear plant probability safety objective, suggested to be around 1% of that required by nuclear safety regulations (i.e., around 1E-7/heap year).
The invention has the following beneficial effects: according to the analysis requirement of a design expansion working condition (DEC-A) list, the DEC-A is analyzed by using a Probabilistic Security Analysis (PSA) model, and under the condition of meeting the regulatory requirement of design safety regulations of a nuclear power plant (HAF102-2016), the large cut set results do not need to be researched and processed, so that the result accuracy can be ensured, and the analysis efficiency can be obviously improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for identifying a list of design expansion conditions without melting down based on risk importance according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
According to the analysis requirement of design extended working condition (DEC-A), the situation that some safety system is completely lost after various kinds of initial events are overlapped needs to be identified, and the possibility of occurrence is quantified. From the PSA analysis, it can be seen that the complete loss of the safety systems that mitigate the incident upon the occurrence of each type of originating event can be expressed as follows:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
for the total cut set, IEi∑iSYSAiFor partial cut sets containing System A, IEi∑jSYSBjFor containing cut sets, IE, of system Bi∑kSYSA*SYSBkThe cut sets containing systems A and B, other related systems and combinations of systems, and so on. Considering IEi∑kSYSA*SYSBkIs much lower than IEi∑iSYSAiOr IEi∑jSYSBjIt is negligible in the calculation, so the above equation can be simplified as follows:
thus, according to the importance System definition in the PSA model, importance ISYSNamely a system in
The portion ofThe balance. The above formula can be converted into the following expression:
therefore, the product of the total cut-set result and the system importance is the probability that the originating event overlaps a system failure. The above is the calculation principle of the method of the present invention.
The method for identifying the design expansion working condition list without melting down based on the risk importance degree is shown in FIG. 1 and comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: establishing PSA model for DEC-A analysis
This step is based on the complete PSA model, building a PSA model for DEC-a analysis.
The analytical items in this step are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1 PSA model for DEC-A analysis
Step two: establishing an outcome analysis case
This step is to establish an outcome analysis case based on the originating event category.
The analysis items in this step are shown in table 2.
TABLE 2 case for the outcome analysis
Step three: creating a system event group
This step is to build a set of system events in the PSA model to identify the system to which the underlying event in the PSA belongs.
The analysis items in this step are shown in table 3.
TABLE 3 creating System event groups
Step four: calculating to obtain result quantization result and importance value
The step is to develop calculation and analysis to obtain the quantitative result of each consequence case and the importance value of each system event group in each consequence case.
The analysis items in this step include the calculation result values and the importance values of each system event group, and can be obtained by performing cut-set analysis and importance analysis through PSA analysis software, which is a known technique.
Step five: calculating likelihood of originating event overlap-and-add system failure based on importance
In the step, the possibility of overlapping each system failure after each initiating event occurs is calculated according to the obtained result case quantification result and each system importance value.
The calculation can be made according to the following formula:
PSYS＝ISYS*MCSIE
PSYS is the possibility of overlapping failure of a certain system for an initial event, ISYS is the importance of the certain system, and MCSIE is the possibility of consequences caused by the initial event.
Step six: grouping to obtain DEC-A list
The method comprises the steps of screening the situations of the superposition system failure of each initiating event according to the occurrence possibility, and grouping according to the grouping characteristics of DEC-A to finally obtain a DEC-A list.
The analysis items in this step are shown in table 4.
TABLE 4 grouping to obtain DEC-A List
Examples
The following describes the steps of the present invention, taking the typical DEC-A determination of a nuclear power plant as an example.
(1) Establishing PSA model for DEC-A analysis
The PSA model was modified to a model for DEC-a analysis by:
setting the non-safety system as failure: setting an emergency boron injection function event, a diversity triggering system fault tree top event, a primary circuit charging and discharging cooling function event and the like as TRUE;
setting the phenomenon out of range of the safety system to an undesirable consequence state: the induced SGTR sequence is set as a CD consequence, the total loss hot-trap sequence is set as a CD consequence, the plant blackout sequence is set as a CD consequence, and the like;
setting the operation of the person beyond the range of the safety system as failure: the operation of a first loop charge and discharge cooling personnel, the operation of a second loop rapid cooling personnel and the like are set as TRUE.
(2) Establishing an outcome analysis case
The result analysis case is established according to the category of the originating event, and the result case established in the embodiment is as follows:
LOOP: loss of off-plant power;
LOW MFW: loss of primary feed water;
SLOCA: a small break in the loop.
(3) Creating a system event group
A system event group is established in the PSA model according to the nuclear power plant system settings, and the present embodiment illustrates an example as follows:
safety injection System (SI): equipment such as a pump, a valve, a water tank and the like comprising a safe injection system;
power supply system (EP): the device comprises a normal power supply, an emergency power supply and the like;
atmospheric emission system (AR): including associated atmospheric relief valves and the like;
auxiliary water supply system (AFW): comprises a pump, a valve, a water tank and other equipment of an auxiliary water supply system.
(4) Calculating to obtain result quantization result and importance value
According to the established result analysis case, the related result is calculated, and the description of the embodiment is as follows:
| case numbering | Case description | Analysis results |
| LOOP | Loss of power supply outside plant | 2.83E-05/Stack year |
| LOMFW | Bereaved water supply | 6.42E-06/Stack year |
| SLOCA | Small opening of loop | 4.53E-07/Stack year |
(5) Calculating likelihood of originating event overlap-and-add system failure based on importance
The importance of the system is calculated, and the possibility of the failure of the system for overlapping the initial events is calculated by combining the result case analysis.
LOOP consequence case:
| serial number | System group | Degree of importance | Consequence results | Sequence possibilities (importance consequences) |
| 1 | EP | 9.79E-01 | 2.83E-05 | 2.77E-05 |
| 2 | AR | 1.20E-02 | 2.83E-05 | 3.40E-07 |
| 3 | AFW | 6.04E-04 | 2.83E-05 | 1.71E-08 |
Low mfw consequence case:
| serial number | System group | Degree of importance | Consequence results | Sequence possibilities (importance consequences) |
| 1 | AR | 4.45E-01 | 6.42E-06 | 2.86E-06 |
| 2 | AFW | 1.88E-02 | 6.42E-06 | 1.21E-07 |
| 3 | EP | 1.79E-02 | 6.42E-06 | 1.15E-07 |
The consequences of SLOCA are:
| serial number | System group | Degree of importance | Consequence results | Sequence possibilities (importance consequences) |
| 1 | SI | 3.04E-01 | 4.53E-07 | 1.02E-07 |
| 2 | AR | 2.01E-01 | 4.53E-07 | 6.77E-08 |
(6) Grouping to obtain DEC-A list
In this embodiment, with 1.00E-08/heap year as a cutoff value, based on the analysis in step (5), the loss-of-function scenarios contained in the effect cases are as follows:
LOOP: LOOP superposition power failure and LOOP superposition secondary side belt thermal failure;
LOW MFW: the low MFW superposed secondary side belt thermal failure and the low MFW superposed power supply failure;
SLOCA: SLOCA superposition safety injection failure and SLOCA superposition secondary side belt thermal failure.
According to the loss of function scenario, the list of DEC-A is grouped as follows:
it will be evident to those skilled in the art that the invention is not limited to the details of the foregoing illustrative embodiments, and that the present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential attributes thereof. The present embodiments are therefore to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive, the scope of the invention being indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description, and all changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are therefore intended to be embraced therein. Any reference sign in a claim should not be construed as limiting the claim concerned.
Furthermore, it should be understood that although the present description refers to embodiments, not every embodiment may contain only a single embodiment, and such description is for clarity only, and those skilled in the art should integrate the description, and the embodiments may be combined as appropriate to form other embodiments understood by those skilled in the art.
Claims (8)
1. A method for identifying a design expansion working condition list without melting in heap based on risk importance comprises the following steps:
(1) establishing a probability safety analysis model for designing extended working condition analysis;
(2) establishing an outcome analysis case according to the category of the initial event;
(3) establishing a system event group in the probability safety analysis model so as to identify a system to which a basic event in the probability safety analysis belongs;
(4) calculating to obtain a quantitative result of each consequence case and an importance value of each system event group in each consequence case;
(5) calculating the possibility of overlapping each system failure after each initial event occurs according to the obtained result case quantization result and the importance value of each system event group;
(6) and screening the failure condition of each initial event superposition system according to the occurrence possibility, grouping according to the grouping characteristics of the design expansion working conditions, and finally obtaining a design expansion working condition list.
2. The method for identifying the list of design expansion conditions without melting down based on the risk importance degree of claim 1, wherein in the step (1), the non-safety system is set to fail, the phenomenon beyond the range of the safety system is set to be an undesirable consequence state, and the personnel beyond the range of the safety system is set to operate as fail in the probabilistic safety analysis model.
3. The method for identifying the unleveled design expansion operating condition list based on the risk importance degree as claimed in claim 2, wherein the step (1) sets a non-safety system as failure in the probabilistic safety analysis model, and the non-safety system comprises an event tree top event, a system fault tree branch fault tree and basic events corresponding to some equipment in the probabilistic safety analysis model.
4. The method for identifying the design extension working condition list without the melting heap based on the risk importance degree as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step (2), the initial events are classified according to the classification mode of the probabilistic safety analysis model, the consequence analysis case is established, and necessary boundary condition setting is performed.
5. The method for identifying the unleveled design extended operating condition list based on the risk importance degree as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step (3), the basic events of the equipment related to the system and the operation of the personnel related to the system are added into the system event group by adding the system event group definition into the probabilistic safety analysis model.
6. The method for identifying the unleveled design expansion operating condition list based on the risk importance degree as claimed in claim 1, wherein the quantitative result and the importance degree value in the step (4) are obtained by performing cut set analysis and importance degree analysis through probability safety analysis software.
7. The method for identifying an unleveled design expansion operating condition list based on risk importance degree as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step (5), the formula for calculating the possibility of overlapping each system failure after each initiating event occurs is as follows:
PSYS＝ISYS*MCSIE
wherein，PSYSPossibility of system failure for superposition of originating events, ISYSFor system importance, MCSIEThe likelihood of consequences for the originating event.
8. The method for identifying the design extended working condition list without the melting heap based on the risk importance degree as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step (6), a cutoff value is set according to the analysis requirement, the situation that the occurrence probability is higher than the cutoff value is kept, and the situation that the occurrence probability is higher than the cutoff value is grouped according to the power plant state to obtain the design extended working condition list.
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