CN113794693A - Distributed SM9 key secure distribution method for preventing server number expansion - Google Patents
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- CN113794693A CN113794693A CN202110979313.6A CN202110979313A CN113794693A CN 113794693 A CN113794693 A CN 113794693A CN 202110979313 A CN202110979313 A CN 202110979313A CN 113794693 A CN113794693 A CN 113794693A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 31
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000605 extraction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000006467 substitution reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
- H04L2209/601—Broadcast encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/081—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying self-generating credentials, e.g. instead of receiving credentials from an authority or from another peer, the credentials are generated at the entity itself
Abstract
The invention discloses a distributed SM9 secret key secure distribution method for preventing server number expansion, and belongs to the technical field of secret key secure distribution. The distributed SM9 key secure distribution method for preventing server number expansion comprises the following steps: s1, generating a master key; s2, registering a user; s3, the user sends a key application to the server; s4, the server verifies the user application; s5, the server generates the share of the user key in a distributed way and returns the share of the user key to the user; s6, verifying the correctness of the key share by the user; and S7, calculating the user key. The distributed SM9 key secure distribution method for preventing server number expansion has the security characteristics of tamper resistance, key share leakage prevention and the like, and has good popularization and application values.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of key secure distribution, and particularly provides a distributed SM9 key secure distribution method for preventing server number expansion.
Background
The SM9 algorithm is an identification cipher algorithm defined in the chinese national commercial cipher standard. In the SM9 algorithm, a key generation center is required. The key generation center generates a main private key and a main public key in initialization, and generates a user key by using the main private key and the user identification when a user initiates a key request. However, such a conventional SM9 key extraction algorithm relies on a single key generation center, which once breached reveals all users' private keys, posing a significant hazard. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a distributed SM9 key distribution scheme to secure the user keys.
Most of the current distributed SM9 security key distribution schemes have the problem of expansion of the number of servers.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical task of the present invention is to provide a distributed SM9 key secure distribution method that prevents expansion of the number of servers, with security characteristics such as tamper resistance and key share leakage prevention, in view of the above-mentioned problems.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme:
a distributed SM9 key secure distribution method for preventing server number expansion comprises the following steps:
s1, generating a master key;
s2, registering a user;
s3, the user sends a key application to the server;
s4, the server verifies the user application;
s5, the server generates the share of the user key in a distributed way and returns the share of the user key to the user;
s6, verifying the correctness of the key share by the user;
and S7, calculating the user key.
Preferably, in step S1, the plurality of key generation center servers generate respective master key shares and homomorphic encryption public and private keys.
Preferably, in step S2, the user registers with the local registration authority using the identifier and password, and after the local registration authority verifies the user' S identity, the relevant information is stored in all the key generation center servers.
Preferably, in step S3, the user sends a key request with elliptic curve points and hash digests to all key generation center servers.
Preferably, in step S5, after verifying that the user request is valid through the digest, the key generation center server performs distributed key generation using the random elliptic curve points in the user request, generates the user 'S private key share and the hash digest of the share information, and returns the generated user' S private key share and hash digest to the user.
Preferably, each server broadcasts a ciphertext of the sum of the homomorphic encrypted main private key share and the identifier or a ciphertext of the main private key share, and after each server receives the ciphertexts of the other servers, each ciphertext and a random number generated by the server perform homomorphic calculation, and then the calculated ciphertext is sent to the corresponding server.
Preferably, each server calculates the product share after receiving the transmitted ciphertext, calculates the inverse share of the product of the user identifier and the main private key, calculates the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext of the inverse share of the product, and broadcasts the ciphertext.
Preferably, after receiving the ciphertexts of the other servers, each server performs corresponding homomorphic calculation on the ciphertexts, the own main private key share and the generated random number, sends the calculated ciphertexts to the corresponding server, and calculates the private key share through the sent ciphertexts.
Preferably, in step S6, after the information returned by the user authentication server is valid, key share combination is performed.
Compared with the prior art, the distributed SM9 key secure distribution method for preventing the expansion of the number of servers has the following outstanding beneficial effects: the distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing the server number from expanding carries out integrity check, can prevent the messages sent by the server and the user from being maliciously tampered, and has good security.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
Examples
As shown in fig. 1, the distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion of the present invention includes the following steps:
and S1, generating a master key.
And the plurality of key generation central servers generate respective master key shares and homomorphic encryption public and private keys.
And S2, registering the user.
The user registers with the local registration authority by using the identification and the password, and after the local registration authority verifies the user identity, the related information is stored in all the key generation center servers.
S3, the user sends a key application to the server.
The user sends a key request with elliptic curve points and hash digests to all key generation central servers.
And S4, the server verifies the user application.
And S5, the server distributively generates user key shares and returns the user key shares to the user.
And after verifying that the user request is valid through the digest, the key generation central server generates a distributed key by using the random elliptic curve points in the user request, generates the private key share of the user and the hash digest of the share information and returns the private key share and the hash digest to the user. Each server broadcasts the cryptograph of the sum of the homomorphic encrypted main private key share and the identification or the cryptograph of the main private key share, and after each server receives the cryptographs of the other servers, each cryptograph and the random number generated by the server are homomorphically calculated, and the calculated cryptograph is sent to the corresponding server. And after receiving the sent ciphertext, each server calculates and broadcasts the product share, calculates the product by the received product share, calculates the inverse share of the product of the user identifier and the main private key, calculates the ciphertext subjected to homomorphic encryption by the inverse share of the product, and broadcasts the ciphertext. And after receiving the ciphertexts of other servers, each server performs corresponding homomorphic calculation on the ciphertexts, the own main private key share and the generated random number, sends the calculated ciphertexts to the corresponding server, and calculates the private key share through the sent ciphertexts.
S6, the user verifies the correctness of the key share.
And after the user verifies that the information returned by the server is valid, performing key share combination.
And S7, calculating the user key.
Specifically, in the master key generation process, the key generation center server Si generates a random number ki, calculates a master public key share Pi ═ ki × Q2, and discloses Pi; and generating a pair of addition homomorphic encrypted public and private keys: (PKi, SKi), and discloses PKi. Subsequently, Ei () represents the encryption with PKi and Di () represents the decryption with SKi.
In the user registration process, a user registers with a local registration authority by using an identification id and a password pwd, and the local registration authority stores Hs (id) and H (pwd) Q1 in a server Si after the user registers.
In the process of sending a key application to the server Si, the user selects a random number a, calculates a ═ a × Q1, calculates Mi ═ H (hs (id), a, H (pwd) > Pi), and sends hs (id), a, Mi to the server Si.
In the process of verifying the user application by the server Si, after the Si receives Hs (id), A and Mi, verifying whether Mi is equal to H (Hs (id), A, ki H (pwd) Q1) or not: if yes, executing the step (5); and if not, informing the user that the message is tampered, and ending.
In the process that a server Si (1< ═ i < ═ n) generates user key shares in a distributed mode and returns the user key shares to a user, for S1, t 1< ═ k1+ Hs (id), and for Sj (2< ═ j < ═ n), tj < ═ kj;
the server Si calculates c1i ═ Ei (ti) and broadcasts to other servers;
the server Si generates and stores a random number ri, generates and stores a random number uij when receiving c1j sent by one server Sj, calculates c2j as ri x c1j + + ej (uij), and sends c2j to the server Sj;
the server Si sets T2 to 0 and U to 0, and calculates T2 to T2+ Di (c2j) and U to U + uij each time a c2j is received. After all c2j were received, Si calculated Li ki ri + T2-U and broadcast.
The server Si calculates L ═ L + Lj every time Lj transmitted from one server Sj is received. After all c2j are received, c3i ═ Ei (L ^ (-1) × ri) is calculated and broadcasted to other servers;
when the server Si receives c3j sent by the server Sj, generating and storing a random number vij, calculating c4j ═ ki x c3j + + Ej (vij), and sending c4j to the server Sj;
the server Si sets T4 to 0 and V to 0, and calculates T4 to T4+ Di (c4j) and V to V + vij each time a c4j is received. After all c4j are received, Si calculates wi ═ ki ^ L (-1) × ri + T4-V, Zi ═ wi a, Xi ═ H (Zi, ki × H (pwd) × Q1), and sends Zi, Xi to the user.
In the process of verifying the correctness of the key share, after receiving Zi and Xi, the user verifies whether Xi is equal to H (Zi, H (pwd) Pi): if the server shares are not equal, the server shares are tampered, and the process is ended; if equal, continue.
In the process of calculating the user key, the user calculates sk (a ^ (-1) (Z1+ Z2+ + Z3+ … … + Zn)), and the sk is the user key.
The above-described embodiments are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention, and general changes and substitutions by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present invention are included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. A distributed SM9 key secure distribution method for preventing server number expansion, characterized by: the method comprises the following steps:
s1, generating a master key;
s2, registering a user;
s3, the user sends a key application to the server;
s4, the server verifies the user application;
s5, the server generates the share of the user key in a distributed way and returns the share of the user key to the user;
s6, verifying the correctness of the key share by the user;
and S7, calculating the user key.
2. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 1, wherein: in step S1, the plurality of key generation center servers generate respective master key shares and homomorphic encryption public and private keys.
3. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 2, wherein: in step S2, the user registers with the local registration authority using the identifier and the password, and after the local registration authority verifies the user' S identity, the relevant information is stored in all the key generation center servers.
4. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 3, wherein: in step S3, the user sends a key request with elliptic curve points and hash digests to all the key generation center servers.
5. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 4, wherein: in step S5, after verifying that the user request is valid through the digest, the key generation center server performs distributed key generation using the random elliptic curve points in the user request, generates the private key share of the user and the hash digest of the share information, and returns the generated private key share and hash digest to the user.
6. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 5, wherein: each server broadcasts the cryptograph of the sum of the homomorphic encrypted main private key share and the identification or the cryptograph of the main private key share, and after each server receives the cryptographs of the other servers, each cryptograph and the random number generated by the server are homomorphically calculated, and the calculated cryptograph is sent to the corresponding server.
7. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 6, wherein: and after receiving the sent ciphertext, each server calculates and broadcasts the product share, calculates the product by the received product share, calculates the inverse share of the product of the user identifier and the main private key, calculates the ciphertext subjected to homomorphic encryption by the inverse share of the product, and broadcasts the ciphertext.
8. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 7, wherein: and after receiving the ciphertexts of other servers, each server performs corresponding homomorphic calculation on the ciphertexts, the own main private key share and the generated random number, sends the calculated ciphertexts to the corresponding server, and calculates the private key share through the sent ciphertexts.
9. The distributed SM9 key security distribution method for preventing server number expansion according to claim 8, wherein: in step S6, after the information returned by the user authentication server is valid, key share combination is performed.
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Application publication date: 20211214 |