CN113572788A - BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication safety method - Google Patents
BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication safety method Download PDFInfo
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- CN113572788A CN113572788A CN202110899578.5A CN202110899578A CN113572788A CN 113572788 A CN113572788 A CN 113572788A CN 202110899578 A CN202110899578 A CN 202110899578A CN 113572788 A CN113572788 A CN 113572788A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 15
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 24
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
- 239000002131 composite material Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
Abstract
A safety method for authenticating BACnet/IP protocol device includes adding time stamp information to session key request authenticated by original BACnet/IP protocol device and setting safety time threshold in authentication mechanism for judging whether time stamp is in accordance with safety requirement or not. If not, the data packet is discarded to terminate the authentication, and if yes, the next stage of authentication is entered. And finally, encrypting the session key Ks, the device number IDB of the device B, the generated random number Rn and the time stamp information by using the key Ka of the device A and sending the encrypted session key Ks, the generated random number Rn and the time stamp information to the device A. After obtaining the session key Ks, the device a initiates an authentication request, and adds Pseudo Random Number, Rn and timestamp information to the request. After receiving the authentication request message, the device B firstly verifies whether Rn is consistent, and then modifies the Pseudo Random Number into a Modified Random Number according to a certain rule. And finally feeding back a complexACK message to the device A.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of intelligent building communication protocol equipment authentication and data confidentiality and security.
Background
BACnet/IP is a new interconnection protocol defined by BACnet standard and fused with IP protocol, and in order to complete mutual remote control and data sharing between multiple devices and multiple platforms, the protocol adds IP protocol in simplified OSI-RM architecture of original BACnet protocol and defines a new protocol layer between application layer and physical layer, called BACnet Virtual Link Layer (BVLL), and its main function is to realize mutual fusion of BACnet protocol and IP protocol. As a supplement to the BACnet protocol standard, the building automatic control system using the BACnet/IP protocol communication can realize real-time monitoring and operation of the monitoring object of the BAS through the Internet without being limited by regions
The BACnet/IP protocol standard defines 6 functional classes of services: object access services, file access services, alarm and event services, remote device management services, virtual terminal services, and network security services. The BACnet/IP network security service mainly provides security mechanisms in terms of device authentication, data source authentication, operator identity authentication, and data confidentiality and integrity, and does not provide communication security mechanisms such as access control and Non-repudiation (Non-repudiation).
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication security method.
The invention relates to a BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication safety method, which comprises the following steps:
step (1) the device A, B generates respective private keys Ka, Kb through DES algorithm, the private key of the device only leaves a record in the key store of the local key server except the device itself;
step (2) assuming that device a is the requesting authenticator, it needs to send a "RequestKey" request to the key server before establishing communication with the responding device B. The request is used to inform the key server of the session key Ks generated and distributed by the communications between the devices A, B; the request message contains the transmitted timestamp information and the identity of the equipment A and the equipment B;
step (3) the key server decrypts the received request message by using the private key Ka of the locally stored device A, and then judges whether the timestamp meets the safety requirement; if the data packet does not meet the requirements, discarding the data packet to stop the authentication process, continuing to generate a session key Ks by using a DES algorithm and encrypting the session key Ks, the equipment number IDA of the equipment A requesting authentication and the timestamp information by using the private key Kb of the equipment B in the local key library, and sending the encrypted session key Ks, the equipment number IDA and the timestamp information to the equipment B;
step (4), the device B decrypts the received message by using Kb and then judges whether the timestamp meets the safety standard, if so, the device B acquires a session key Ks distributed by the key server and a device number of the device which wants to establish communication with the device B from a data packet; then the equipment B stores the received useful information, encrypts the equipment number IDB of the equipment B, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information and feeds the encrypted information back to the key distributor for verification;
step (5) after the key server receives the response message of the device B, the Kb is used again to decrypt the message; comparing the IDB in the response message with the IDB in the authentication request of the equipment A, and if the two equipment numbers are completely matched, indicating that both communication parties are clear; finally, the private key Ka of the equipment A is used for encrypting the session key Ks, the equipment number IDB of the equipment B, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information, and then the encrypted session key Ks, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information are used as a response of the session key request and are sent to the equipment A;
step (6), the device a acquires the session key Ks from the response data packet, which means that the identity authentication of the device B can be started; at this stage, device a will initiate an authentication request and will add Pseudo Random Number, Rn and timestamp information to this request. The device A encrypts the request by using the session key Ks and sends the encrypted request to the device B;
step (7) after receiving the authentication request message sent by the device a, the device B decrypts the message by using the previously stored session key Ks, verifies whether the Rn is consistent, and then takes out the Pseudo Random Number from the decrypted session key Ks and modifies the Pseudo Random Number into a Modified Random Number according to a certain rule; finally, a ComplexACK message is encrypted and packaged by using the session key Ks and is fed back to the equipment A;
step (8), device a decrypts the response message, and if it finds that the Modified Random Number included in the ComplexACK message conforms to the expectation of device a, it means that the device authentication is successful, and device a and device B can directly start communication.
The invention has the advantages that:
(1) preventing replay attacks
The time stamp information of the key distribution phase and the security threshold determination of device A, B may ensure that the received message is not subject to replay attacks. The generated random number RN in each authentication process has uniqueness, so that the session information received by the equipment B in the equipment authentication stage is not attacked by replay.
(2) Preventing spoofing attacks
The spoofing attack can be effectively prevented. When an attacker launches a deception attack, the composite message needs to be decomposed and the composite user needs to be forged to carry out communication, the time spent is far longer than the normal communication processing time, and the communication can be guaranteed to be interrupted when the deception attack is received through reasonable setting of the time threshold.
(3) Preventing information tampering
The scheme can effectively prevent information tampering. The random number RN is generated mainly for the purpose that the device B can ensure that the received message is sent by the device a without being attacked by tampering in the device authentication phase.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a process schematic diagram of a BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication security method.
Detailed Description
The invention relates to a BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication safety method, which comprises the following steps:
step (1) the device A, B generates respective private keys Ka, Kb through DES algorithm, the private key of the device only leaves a record in the key store of the local key server except the device itself;
step (2) assuming that device a is the requesting authenticator, it needs to send a "RequestKey" request to the key server before establishing communication with the responding device B. The request is used to inform the key server of the session key Ks generated and distributed by the communications between the devices A, B; the request message contains the transmitted timestamp information and the identity of the equipment A and the equipment B;
step (3) the key server decrypts the received request message by using the private key Ka of the locally stored device A, and then judges whether the timestamp meets the safety requirement; if the data packet does not meet the requirements, discarding the data packet to stop the authentication process, continuing to generate a session key Ks by using a DES algorithm and encrypting the session key Ks, the equipment number IDA of the equipment A requesting authentication and the timestamp information by using the private key Kb of the equipment B in the local key library, and sending the encrypted session key Ks, the equipment number IDA and the timestamp information to the equipment B;
step (4), the device B decrypts the received message by using Kb and then judges whether the timestamp meets the safety standard, if so, the device B acquires a session key Ks distributed by the key server and a device number of the device which wants to establish communication with the device B from a data packet; then the equipment B stores the received useful information, encrypts the equipment number IDB of the equipment B, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information and feeds the encrypted information back to the key distributor for verification;
step (5) after the key server receives the response message of the device B, the Kb is used again to decrypt the message; comparing the IDB in the response message with the IDB in the authentication request of the equipment A, and if the two equipment numbers are completely matched, indicating that both communication parties are clear; finally, the private key Ka of the equipment A is used for encrypting the session key Ks, the equipment number IDB of the equipment B, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information, and then the encrypted session key Ks, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information are used as a response of the session key request and are sent to the equipment A;
step (6), the device a acquires the session key Ks from the response data packet, which means that the identity authentication of the device B can be started; at this stage, device a will initiate an authentication request and will add Pseudo Random Number, Rn and timestamp information to this request. The device A encrypts the request by using the session key Ks and sends the encrypted request to the device B;
step (7) after receiving the authentication request message sent by the device a, the device B decrypts the message by using the previously stored session key Ks, verifies whether the Rn is consistent, and then takes out the Pseudo Random Number from the decrypted session key Ks and modifies the Pseudo Random Number into a Modified Random Number according to a certain rule; finally, a ComplexACK message is encrypted and packaged by using the session key Ks and is fed back to the equipment A;
step (8), device a decrypts the response message, and if it finds that the Modified Random Number included in the ComplexACK message conforms to the expectation of device a, it means that the device authentication is successful, and device a and device B can directly start communication.
Description of the symbols:
ka: device a master key, Kb: device B master key, IDa: device a identity, IDb: identity of device B, Rn: random number, Ks: session key, timestamp: time stamp information.
As shown in fig. 1, in the BACnet/IP protocol device authentication security method, the device A, B generates respective private keys Ka, Kb by DES algorithm, the private key of the device leaving a record only in the key repository of the local key server except for the device itself. Assuming that device a is the requesting authenticator, a "RequestKey" request must be sent to the key server before communication is established with the responding device B. The request is used to inform the key server of the session key Ks generated and distributed between the devices A, B. The request message contains the timestamp information of the transmission and the identities of device a and device B. The key server decrypts the received request message by using the locally stored private key Ka of the device a, and then judges whether the timestamp meets the security requirement. If the data packet does not conform to the data packet, the data packet is discarded to stop the authentication process, if the data packet conforms to the data packet, the DES algorithm is continuously utilized to generate a session key Ks, the private key Kb of the equipment B in the local key library is used for encrypting the session key Ks, the equipment number IDA of the equipment A requesting authentication and the timestamp information, and the session key Ks, the equipment number IDA of the equipment A requesting authentication and the timestamp information are sent to the equipment B. After receiving the response message of device B, the key server decrypts the message again using Kb. And comparing the IDB in the response message with the IDB in the authentication request of the equipment A, and if the two equipment numbers are completely matched, indicating that the two communication parties are clear. Finally, the session key Ks, the device number IDB of the device B, the generated random number Rn, and the time stamp information are encrypted using the private key Ka of the device a, and then sent to the device a as a response to the session key request. The device a acquires the session key Ks from the response packet, which means that the device B can start to be authenticated. At this stage, device a will initiate an authentication request and will add Pseudo Random Number, Rn and timestamp information to this request. Device a encrypts the request with the session key Ks and sends it to device B. After receiving the authentication request message sent by the device a, the device B decrypts the message by using the previously stored session key Ks, verifies whether Rn is consistent, and then takes out the Pseudo Random Number from the message and modifies the Pseudo Random Number into a Modified Random Number according to a certain rule. Finally, a ComplexACK message is encrypted and encapsulated by using the session key Ks and is fed back to the device A. Device a decrypts the response message, and if it is found that the Modified Random Number included in the ComplexACK message conforms to the expectation of device a, it means that the device authentication is successful, and device a and device B can directly start communication.
Claims (1)
- A BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication security method is characterized by comprising the following steps:step (1) the device A, B generates respective private keys Ka, Kb through DES algorithm, the private key of the device only leaves a record in the key store of the local key server except the device itself;step (2) assuming that device a is the requesting authenticator, it needs to send a "RequestKey" request to the key server before establishing communication with the responding device B. The request is used to inform the key server of the session key Ks generated and distributed by the communications between the devices A, B; the request message contains the transmitted timestamp information and the identity of the equipment A and the equipment B;step (3) the key server decrypts the received request message by using the private key Ka of the locally stored device A, and then judges whether the timestamp meets the safety requirement; if the data packet does not meet the requirements, discarding the data packet to stop the authentication process, continuing to generate a session key Ks by using a DES algorithm and encrypting the session key Ks, the equipment number IDA of the equipment A requesting authentication and the timestamp information by using the private key Kb of the equipment B in the local key library, and sending the encrypted session key Ks, the equipment number IDA and the timestamp information to the equipment B;step (4), the device B decrypts the received message by using Kb and then judges whether the timestamp meets the safety standard, if so, the device B acquires a session key Ks distributed by the key server and a device number of the device which wants to establish communication with the device B from a data packet; then the equipment B stores the received useful information, encrypts the equipment number IDB of the equipment B, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information and feeds the encrypted information back to the key distributor for verification;step (5) after the key server receives the response message of the device B, the Kb is used again to decrypt the message; comparing the IDB in the response message with the IDB in the authentication request of the equipment A, and if the two equipment numbers are completely matched, indicating that both communication parties are clear; finally, the private key Ka of the equipment A is used for encrypting the session key Ks, the equipment number IDB of the equipment B, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information, and then the encrypted session key Ks, the generated random number Rn and the timestamp information are used as a response of the session key request and are sent to the equipment A;step (6), the device a acquires the session key Ks from the response data packet, which means that the identity authentication of the device B can be started; at this stage, device a will initiate an authentication request and will add Pseudo Random Number, Rn and timestamp information to this request. The device A encrypts the request by using the session key Ks and sends the encrypted request to the device B;step (7) after receiving the authentication request message sent by the device a, the device B decrypts the message by using the previously stored session key Ks, verifies whether the Rn is consistent, and then takes out the Pseudo Random Number from the decrypted session key Ks and modifies the Pseudo Random Number into a Modified Random Number according to a certain rule; finally, a ComplexACK message is encrypted and packaged by using the session key Ks and is fed back to the equipment A;step (8), device a decrypts the response message, and if it finds that the Modified Random Number included in the ComplexACK message conforms to the expectation of device a, it means that the device authentication is successful, and device a and device B can directly start communication.
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| CN202110899578.5A CN113572788A (en) | 2021-08-06 | 2021-08-06 | BACnet/IP protocol equipment authentication safety method |
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN114071460A (en) * | 2021-11-17 | 2022-02-18 | 兰州理工大学 | Wireless HART industrial Wireless communication protocol security improvement method based on Wireless |
| CN115426138A (en) * | 2022-08-14 | 2022-12-02 | 兰州理工大学 | LonTalk-SA protocol authentication method |
| CN116582277A (en) * | 2023-05-24 | 2023-08-11 | 兰州理工大学 | Identity authentication method based on BACnet/IP protocol |
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2021
- 2021-08-06 CN CN202110899578.5A patent/CN113572788A/en active Pending
Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN114071460A (en) * | 2021-11-17 | 2022-02-18 | 兰州理工大学 | Wireless HART industrial Wireless communication protocol security improvement method based on Wireless |
| CN114071460B (en) * | 2021-11-17 | 2024-02-06 | 兰州理工大学 | Security improvement method based on Wireless HART industrial Wireless communication protocol |
| CN115426138A (en) * | 2022-08-14 | 2022-12-02 | 兰州理工大学 | LonTalk-SA protocol authentication method |
| CN116582277A (en) * | 2023-05-24 | 2023-08-11 | 兰州理工大学 | Identity authentication method based on BACnet/IP protocol |
| CN116582277B (en) * | 2023-05-24 | 2023-10-10 | 兰州理工大学 | Identity authentication method based on BACnet/IP protocol |
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Application publication date: 20211029 |