CN113497808B - Distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method - Google Patents

Distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method Download PDF

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CN113497808B
CN113497808B CN202111029581.8A CN202111029581A CN113497808B CN 113497808 B CN113497808 B CN 113497808B CN 202111029581 A CN202111029581 A CN 202111029581A CN 113497808 B CN113497808 B CN 113497808B
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cluster
nodes
node
cluster head
wormhole
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CN113497808A (en
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徐征
王文婷
马强
林琳
黄华
聂其贵
刘鑫
李世慈
姚硕望
李建坡
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
Northeast Electric Power University
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
Northeast Dianli University
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic

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Abstract

The invention discloses a distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method, which comprises a cluster head node and cluster head node wormhole attack identification method, an intra-cluster node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack identification method, and a cluster head node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack identification method. The method can ensure the network safety and reliability of the distributed power monitoring system and is based on the node density.

Description

Distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of network information security, in particular to a distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method based on node density.
Background
At present, the wormhole attack is one of common routing attacks of a distributed power monitoring system network, which can reduce the credibility of each data in the network and change the topological structure of the network. In a network clustering routing protocol of a distributed power monitoring system, an intra-cluster node is responsible for collecting data and sending the data to a cluster head node, and the cluster head node is responsible for managing and controlling member nodes in the cluster to perform data fusion, inter-cluster forwarding and other work. If the network has wormhole attack nodes, the information in the attacked cluster is disordered, and the network is in error. The adoption of the wormhole attack identification method to judge whether wormhole attack nodes exist is one of key factors for guaranteeing the safe transmission of network information.
In order to accurately judge each node and effectively identify an attack node, the traditional wormhole attack identification method adopts the arrangement of anchor nodes, obtains the hop count between two communication nodes, calculates the average distance of each hop and compares the average distance with the maximum communication radius of the node, and judges the node exceeding the maximum communication radius as the wormhole attack node.
At present, the wormhole attack identification has the following main problems:
in the process of identifying the wormhole attack, a large number of anchor nodes need to be arranged, which brings excessive equipment overhead and affects the cost of the whole network.
In the process of identifying the wormhole attack, strict clock synchronization needs to be set, which can increase the energy consumption of node information transmission and influence the survival time of the network.
In the process of identifying the wormhole attack, whether the functions of the nodes in the cluster and the cluster head nodes are different and the structural characteristics of the clustering routing protocol are adapted or not is not considered.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention mainly aims to provide a distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack recognition method, and provides a distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack recognition method based on node density, which is scientific and reasonable and can ensure the safety and reliability of a distributed power monitoring system network, aiming at the problems of incomplete considered elements, and unreasonable energy consumption and economic cost of the wormhole attack recognition method.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: a distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method comprises a cluster head node and cluster head node wormhole attack identification method, an intra-cluster node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack identification method and a cluster head node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack identification method; assuming that the nodes in the network are approximately evenly distributed,
Figure 923371DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
the nodes are arranged on the side length
Figure 61091DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Within the square region of (2), network unit area node density
Figure 913509DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
Expressed as:
Figure 402260DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
（1）。
further, the cluster head node and cluster head node wormhole attack identification method includes: when the two cluster head nodes are wormhole attack nodes, the node density per unit area under the ideal state is at least
Figure 873692DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
However, in the actual node arrangement process, the non-uniformity of node distribution is considered, and wormhole attack nodes are probably distributed at the edge of the geographic positionIntroducing a wormhole node judgment coefficient under the condition of equal conditions
Figure 131498DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
When the node judges that the actual node density per unit area is greater than the threshold value
Figure 918932DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
Then, the self is judged as a wormhole attack node and the threshold value
Figure 629399DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
The calculation formula of (2) is as follows:
Figure 904523DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
（2）
defining clusters in a network as
Figure 282415DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
Each cluster head node is
Figure 476636DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
The nodes in each cluster are
Figure 939978DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
If cluster head node in network
Figure 753213DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
And cluster head node
Figure 985611DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in each cluster
Figure 350734DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
To cluster head node
Figure 301372DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
When transmitting information, the cluster head node is passed
Figure 918298DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
With cluster head node
Figure 5203DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
Formed wormhole link is to cluster head node
Figure 806806DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
Transmitting information; in the same way, each cluster of nodes
Figure 979161DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
To cluster head node
Figure 134199DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
When transmitting information, the information can be transmitted to the cluster head node through the wormhole link
Figure 701709DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
Transmitting information, which results in cluster head nodes
Figure 284000DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
With cluster head node
Figure 943651DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
Both capable of receiving information from both clusters; to cluster head node
Figure 167959DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
With cluster head node
Figure 229456DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
Respectively calculating the node density per unit area and the threshold value
Figure 107282DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Make a comparison if
Figure 254230DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
Then it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and the head node is clustered
Figure 751070DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
With cluster head node
Figure 791707DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
All are wormhole attack nodes.
Furthermore, the method for identifying the cluster nodes and the cluster node wormhole attacks comprises the following steps: if the nodes in the cluster in the network
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 715801DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in the cluster
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
To cluster head node
Figure 209099DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
When transmitting information, the information passes through the nodes in the cluster
Figure 509631DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
And nodes in the cluster
Figure 280141DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
The formed wormhole link is connected to the nodes in the cluster
Figure 640715DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
Transmitting information; in the same way, nodes in a cluster
Figure 385423DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
To cluster head node
Figure 224066DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
When transmitting information, the information can pass through the wormhole link to the nodes in the cluster
Figure 114662DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Transmitting information resulting in cluster head nodes
Figure 646138DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 114028DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
Information, cluster head node
Figure 21941DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 767043DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Information; in order to solve the attack influence, the cluster head node needs to identify the node identification number of the received information
Figure 469420DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
Comparing with the previously recorded cluster member node list to find the nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 424607DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
If cluster head node
Figure 605052DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
By the node receiving the information
Figure 470240DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
And with
Figure 343518DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
Comparing the cluster member node lists to find out the nodes which do not belong to the cluster
Figure 786001DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
Is/are as follows
Figure 770137DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
While clustering nodes
Figure 489832DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
By pairing nodes receiving information
Figure 534011DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
And
Figure 965255DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
comparing the cluster member node lists to find out nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 753082DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
Is/are as follows
Figure 327283DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
Then, it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and the nodes in the cluster
Figure 542364DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 693859DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
All are wormhole attack nodes.
Furthermore, the cluster head node and cluster internal node wormhole attack identification method comprises the following steps: if network
Figure 285378DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Cluster head node in cluster
Figure 714085DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
And
Figure 100067DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
in-cluster node in cluster
Figure 4438DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 134068DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
To cluster head node
Figure 417282DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
When transmitting information, the cluster head node is passed
Figure 239744DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 365832DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
Formed wormhole link to intra-cluster node
Figure 33574DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
Transmitting information resulting in nodes within a cluster
Figure 436873DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
Receiving from cluster head node
Figure 430237DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
Information, in turn, leading to cluster head nodes
Figure 276577DEST_PATH_IMAGE049
Receiving information from two clusters; at the same time, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 13589DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
To cluster head node
Figure 271395DEST_PATH_IMAGE051
When transmitting information, the information can be transmitted to the cluster head node through the wormhole link
Figure 170081DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
Transmitting information resulting in cluster head nodes
Figure 270761DEST_PATH_IMAGE053
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 545884DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
Information; in order to solve the attack influence, the cluster head nodes need to calculate the density of the nodes in unit area, judge whether the density of the nodes in unit area meets the threshold condition, and meanwhile, the cluster head nodes need to receive the nodes of information
Figure 658197DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
Comparing with the cluster member node list recorded before, searching the cluster which does not belong to the clusterNode point
Figure 993363DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
Cluster head node
Figure 315760DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
With cluster head node
Figure 394574DEST_PATH_IMAGE057
Respectively calculating the node density per unit area and the threshold value
Figure 626973DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
Make a comparison if
Figure 867461DEST_PATH_IMAGE059
While clustering nodes
Figure 942733DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
With cluster head node
Figure 559659DEST_PATH_IMAGE061
By the node receiving the information
Figure 646564DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
Comparing with the self cluster member node list to discover the cluster head node
Figure 57954DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
Finding out nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 856408DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
Figure 277025DEST_PATH_IMAGE063
Then it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and the head node is clustered
Figure 218436DEST_PATH_IMAGE064
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 66306DEST_PATH_IMAGE065
All are wormhole attack nodes.
The invention has the advantages that: the method can ensure the network safety and reliability of the distributed power monitoring system and is a distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method based on the node density.
In addition to the above-described objects, features and advantages, the present invention has other objects, features and advantages. The present invention will be described in further detail below with reference to the drawings.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, are included to provide a further understanding of the invention, and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack identification method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
Referring to fig. 1, a method for identifying a cluster routing wormhole attack in a network of a distributed power monitoring system includes a cluster head node and cluster head node wormhole attack identification method, an intra-cluster node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack identification method, and a cluster head node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack identification method; assuming that the nodes in the network are approximately evenly distributed,
Figure 850592DEST_PATH_IMAGE066
the nodes are arranged on the side length
Figure 543741DEST_PATH_IMAGE067
Within the square region of (2), network unit area node density
Figure 605238DEST_PATH_IMAGE068
Expressed as:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE069
（1）。
the cluster head node and cluster head node wormhole attack identification method comprises the following steps: when the two clusters of head nodes are both wormhole attack nodes, the density of the nodes per unit area under the ideal state is at least
Figure 483064DEST_PATH_IMAGE070
However, in the actual node arrangement process, considering the conditions that the node distribution is non-uniform and the wormhole attack nodes are likely to be distributed at the edge of the geographic position, and the like, in order to reduce the misjudgment proportion of the wormhole nodes, a wormhole node judgment coefficient is introduced
Figure 364433DEST_PATH_IMAGE071
When the node judges that the actual node density per unit area is greater than the threshold value
Figure 126852DEST_PATH_IMAGE072
Then, the self is judged as a wormhole attack node and the threshold value
Figure 167489DEST_PATH_IMAGE073
The calculation formula of (2) is as follows:
Figure 357162DEST_PATH_IMAGE074
（2）
defining clusters in a network as
Figure 991406DEST_PATH_IMAGE075
Each cluster head node is
Figure 291937DEST_PATH_IMAGE076
The nodes in each cluster are
Figure 685616DEST_PATH_IMAGE077
If cluster head node in network
Figure 46190DEST_PATH_IMAGE078
And cluster head node
Figure 902151DEST_PATH_IMAGE079
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in each cluster
Figure 6373DEST_PATH_IMAGE080
To cluster head node
Figure 21603DEST_PATH_IMAGE081
When transmitting information, the information passes through the cluster head node
Figure 553078DEST_PATH_IMAGE081
With cluster head node
Figure 896335DEST_PATH_IMAGE082
Formed wormhole link is to cluster head node
Figure 538669DEST_PATH_IMAGE082
Transmitting information; in the same way, each cluster of nodes
Figure 408405DEST_PATH_IMAGE083
To cluster head node
Figure 845202DEST_PATH_IMAGE084
When transmitting information, the information can be transmitted to the cluster head node through the wormhole link
Figure 675755DEST_PATH_IMAGE085
Transmitting information, which results in cluster head nodes
Figure 246413DEST_PATH_IMAGE085
With cluster head node
Figure 111601DEST_PATH_IMAGE084
Both capable of receiving information from both clusters; to cluster head node
Figure 984879DEST_PATH_IMAGE085
With cluster head node
Figure 37149DEST_PATH_IMAGE084
Respectively calculating the node density per unit area and the threshold value
Figure 912963DEST_PATH_IMAGE086
Make a comparison if
Figure 632658DEST_PATH_IMAGE087
Then it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and the head node is clustered
Figure 676837DEST_PATH_IMAGE088
With cluster head node
Figure 216403DEST_PATH_IMAGE089
All are wormhole attack nodes.
The cluster node and cluster node wormhole attack identification method comprises the following steps: if the nodes in the cluster in the network
Figure 128864DEST_PATH_IMAGE090
And nodes in the cluster
Figure 703065DEST_PATH_IMAGE091
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 918146DEST_PATH_IMAGE092
To cluster head node
Figure 210587DEST_PATH_IMAGE093
When transmitting information, the information passes through the nodes in the cluster
Figure 661160DEST_PATH_IMAGE092
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 355446DEST_PATH_IMAGE094
The formed wormhole link is connected to the nodes in the cluster
Figure 741428DEST_PATH_IMAGE094
Transmitting information; in the same way, nodes in a cluster
Figure 255586DEST_PATH_IMAGE094
To cluster head node
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE095
When transmitting information, the information can pass through the wormhole link to the nodes in the cluster
Figure 244271DEST_PATH_IMAGE092
Transmitting information resulting in cluster head nodes
Figure 793064DEST_PATH_IMAGE096
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 349947DEST_PATH_IMAGE094
Information, cluster head node
Figure 974570DEST_PATH_IMAGE095
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 907891DEST_PATH_IMAGE092
Information; in order to solve the attack influence, the cluster head node needs to identify the node identification number of the received information
Figure 311190DEST_PATH_IMAGE097
Comparing with the cluster member node list recorded before, and searching for nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 38975DEST_PATH_IMAGE097
If cluster head node
Figure 652359DEST_PATH_IMAGE098
By pairing nodes receiving information
Figure 389371DEST_PATH_IMAGE097
And
Figure 647177DEST_PATH_IMAGE099
comparing the cluster member node lists to find out the nodes which do not belong to the cluster
Figure 545863DEST_PATH_IMAGE097
Is/are as follows
Figure 646543DEST_PATH_IMAGE100
While clustering nodes
Figure 921666DEST_PATH_IMAGE101
By pairing nodes receiving information
Figure 33979DEST_PATH_IMAGE097
And
Figure 369145DEST_PATH_IMAGE102
comparing the cluster member node lists to find out the nodes which do not belong to the cluster
Figure 691542DEST_PATH_IMAGE097
Is/are as follows
Figure 770356DEST_PATH_IMAGE103
Then it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and the nodes in the cluster
Figure 737175DEST_PATH_IMAGE103
And nodes in the cluster
Figure 243243DEST_PATH_IMAGE104
All are wormhole attack nodes.
The cluster head node and cluster internal node wormhole attack identification method comprises the following steps: if network
Figure 554401DEST_PATH_IMAGE105
Cluster head node in cluster
Figure 171327DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
And with
Figure 258232DEST_PATH_IMAGE106
In-cluster node
Figure 935201DEST_PATH_IMAGE107
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 232190DEST_PATH_IMAGE108
To cluster head node
Figure 652807DEST_PATH_IMAGE109
When transmitting information, the information passes through the cluster head node
Figure 594218DEST_PATH_IMAGE109
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 442088DEST_PATH_IMAGE110
Formed wormhole link to intra-cluster node
Figure 226374DEST_PATH_IMAGE110
Transmitting information resulting in nodes within a cluster
Figure 919523DEST_PATH_IMAGE110
Receiving from cluster head node
Figure 981020DEST_PATH_IMAGE111
Information, in turn, leading to cluster head nodes
Figure 858846DEST_PATH_IMAGE112
Receiving information from two clusters; at the same time, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 5794DEST_PATH_IMAGE113
To cluster head node
Figure 768214DEST_PATH_IMAGE114
When transmitting information, the information can be transmitted to the cluster head node through the wormhole link
Figure 684217DEST_PATH_IMAGE115
Transmitting information resulting in cluster head nodes
Figure 497059DEST_PATH_IMAGE116
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 865723DEST_PATH_IMAGE117
Information; in order to solve the attack influence, the cluster head nodes need to calculate the density of the nodes in unit area, judge whether the density of the nodes in unit area meets the threshold condition, and meanwhile, the cluster head nodes need to receive the nodes of information
Figure 166255DEST_PATH_IMAGE118
Comparing with the cluster member node list recorded before, searching for the nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 202344DEST_PATH_IMAGE118
Cluster head node
Figure 687552DEST_PATH_IMAGE119
With cluster head node
Figure 543512DEST_PATH_IMAGE120
Respectively calculating the node density of unit area and threshold
Figure 647734DEST_PATH_IMAGE121
Make a comparison if
Figure 538330DEST_PATH_IMAGE122
While clustering head nodes
Figure 194439DEST_PATH_IMAGE123
With cluster head node
Figure 537696DEST_PATH_IMAGE124
By the node receiving the information
Figure 180030DEST_PATH_IMAGE118
Comparing with the self cluster member node list to find the cluster head node
Figure 925132DEST_PATH_IMAGE125
Finding out nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 752143DEST_PATH_IMAGE118
Figure 582695DEST_PATH_IMAGE126
Then, it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and cluster head nodes
Figure 28720DEST_PATH_IMAGE127
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 628329DEST_PATH_IMAGE128
All are wormhole attack nodes.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and should not be taken as limiting the scope of the present invention, which is intended to cover any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. within the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims (1)

1. A distributed power monitoring system network clustering routing wormhole attack recognition method is characterized by comprising a cluster head node and cluster head node wormhole attack recognition method, an intra-cluster node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack recognition method and a cluster head node and intra-cluster node wormhole attack recognition method;
when the nodes in the network are uniformly distributed,
Figure 99376DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
the nodes are arranged on the side length
Figure 928660DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Within the square region of (2), network unit area node density
Figure 204921DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
Expressed as:
Figure 438456DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
（1）
the cluster head node and cluster head node wormhole attack identification method comprises the following steps:
when two cluster head nodes are both wormhole attack nodes, a wormhole node judgment coefficient is introduced
Figure 800167DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
When the node judges that the actual node density per unit area is greater than the threshold value
Figure 918296DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
Then, the self is judged as a wormhole attack node and the threshold value
Figure 49063DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
The calculation formula of (2) is as follows:
Figure 453500DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
（2）
defining clusters in a network as
Figure 427141DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
Each cluster head node is
Figure 942436DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
Nodes in each cluster are
Figure 193289DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
If cluster head node in network
Figure 768626DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
And cluster head node
Figure 245875DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in each cluster
Figure 564861DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
To cluster head node
Figure 670220DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
When transmitting information, the cluster head node is passed
Figure 541093DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
With cluster head node
Figure 99114DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
Formed wormhole link-to-cluster head node
Figure 221790DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
Transmitting information; in the same way, each cluster of nodes
Figure 181656DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
To cluster head node
Figure 974163DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
When transmitting information, the information can be transmitted to the cluster head node through the wormhole link
Figure 550638DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
Transmitting information, which results in cluster head nodes
Figure 211426DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
With cluster head node
Figure 150432DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
Both are capable of receiving information from both clusters; to cluster head node
Figure 504053DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
With cluster head node
Figure 36665DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
Respectively calculating the node density per unit area and the threshold value
Figure 642090DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
Make a comparison if
Figure 310969DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Then, it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and cluster head nodes
Figure 835491DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
With cluster head node
Figure 855400DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
All nodes are wormhole attack nodes;
the cluster node and cluster node wormhole attack identification method comprises the following steps:
if in-cluster node in network
Figure 982625DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 771589DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 467013DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
To cluster head node
Figure 708638DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
When transmitting information, the information passes through the nodes in the cluster
Figure 390286DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
With nodes in the cluster
Figure 564916DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
The formed wormhole link is connected to the nodes in the cluster
Figure 165661DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Transmitting information; in the same way, nodes in a cluster
Figure 284796DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
To cluster head node
Figure 629190DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
When information is transmitted, the wormhole link is used for transmitting information to the nodes in the cluster
Figure 392746DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
Transmitting information resulting in cluster head nodes
Figure 164393DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 521556DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Information, cluster head node
Figure 669641DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 287704DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
Information; in order to solve the attack influence, the cluster head node needs to identify the node identification number of the received information
Figure 495832DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
Comparing with the previously recorded cluster member node list to find the nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 323979DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
If cluster head node
Figure 10175DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
By pairing nodes receiving information
Figure 748324DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
And
Figure 2719DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
comparing the cluster member node lists to find out nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 193529DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
Is
Figure 683416DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
While clustering nodes
Figure 276072DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
By pairing nodes receiving information
Figure 956495DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
And
Figure 634601DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
comparing the cluster member node lists to find out the nodes which do not belong to the cluster
Figure 662600DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
Is/are as follows
Figure 250707DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
Then, it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and the nodes in the cluster
Figure 971538DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
And nodes in the cluster
Figure 136941DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
All are wormhole attack nodes;
the cluster head node and cluster internal node wormhole attack identification method comprises the following steps:
if network
Figure 968630DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Cluster head node in cluster
Figure 394932DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
And
Figure 286665DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
in-cluster node in cluster
Figure 939363DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
When the nodes are attacked by wormholes, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 309165DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
To cluster head node
Figure 606285DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
When transmitting information, the cluster head node is passed
Figure 934498DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
And nodes in the cluster
Figure 808913DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Formed wormhole link to intra-cluster node
Figure 372619DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Transmitting information resulting in nodes within a cluster
Figure 648879DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Receiving from cluster head node
Figure 882414DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
Information, in turn, leading to cluster head nodes
Figure 244126DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
Receiving information from two clusters; at the same time, the nodes in the cluster
Figure 831096DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
To cluster head node
Figure 227442DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
When transmitting information, the information can be transmitted to the cluster head node through the wormhole link
Figure 631879DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
Transmitting information resulting in cluster head nodes
Figure 871099DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
Receiving from an intra-cluster node
Figure 386394DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Information; in order to solve the attack influence, the cluster head nodes need to calculate the density of the nodes in unit area, judge whether the density of the nodes in unit area meets the threshold condition, and meanwhile, the cluster head nodes need to receive the nodes of information
Figure 637247DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
Comparing with the cluster member node list recorded before, searching for the nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 212585DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
Cluster head node
Figure 424254DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
With cluster head node
Figure 743240DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
Respectively calculating the node density of unit area and threshold
Figure 848599DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
Make a comparison if
Figure 594839DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
While clustering nodes
Figure 277493DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
With cluster head node
Figure 400169DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
By pairing nodes receiving information
Figure 360035DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
Comparing with the self cluster member node list to discover the cluster head node
Figure 277176DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
Finding out nodes not belonging to the cluster
Figure 729017DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
Figure 389805DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Then, it can be determined that the network is attacked by wormhole and cluster head nodes
Figure 204177DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
And nodes in the cluster
Figure 682432DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
All are wormhole attack nodes.
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