CN113364502A - Physical layer secure communication method between multi-antenna equipment - Google Patents

Physical layer secure communication method between multi-antenna equipment Download PDF

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CN113364502A
CN113364502A CN202110512016.0A CN202110512016A CN113364502A CN 113364502 A CN113364502 A CN 113364502A CN 202110512016 A CN202110512016 A CN 202110512016A CN 113364502 A CN113364502 A CN 113364502A
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secret
state information
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CN113364502B (en
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刘怡良
苏洲
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Xian Jiaotong University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/02—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas
    • H04B7/04—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas using two or more spaced independent antennas
    • H04B7/0413—MIMO systems
    • H04B7/0456—Selection of precoding matrices or codebooks, e.g. using matrices antenna weighting
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L25/00—Baseband systems
    • H04L25/02—Details ; arrangements for supplying electrical power along data transmission lines
    • H04L25/03—Shaping networks in transmitter or receiver, e.g. adaptive shaping networks
    • H04L25/03006—Arrangements for removing intersymbol interference
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer

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Abstract

The invention discloses a physical layer secure communication method among multi-antenna equipment.A transmitter of confidential equipment generates a pre-coding vector according to first channel state information and generates an artificial noise signal according to the pre-coding vector; the security device receiver calculates to obtain a security signal detection vector according to the first channel state information, detects the security signal according to the security signal detection vector and eliminates the cellular user signal; and the base station receiver calculates to obtain a cellular user signal detection matrix according to the second channel state information, detects the cellular user signal according to the cellular user signal detection matrix, and eliminates the secret signal and the artificial noise signal. The invention injects artificial noise to disturb eavesdroppers when the number of the transmitting antennas is equal to that of the receiving antennas, namely, no null space exists, improves the secret transmission rate, and does not influence a secret device receiver.

Description

Physical layer secure communication method between multi-antenna equipment
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a method for physical layer secure communication among multi-antenna equipment.
Background
With the rapid development of networks, there are various means for sniffing and stealing network information, and the broadcasting characteristics of wireless communication propagation media aggravate the risk of information leakage. The physical layer security utilizes random characteristics in wireless channels, such as noise, interference and fading, to perform confidential transmission of information, has the characteristics of security in information theory and no key requirement, and has now gained wide attention in academia and industry.
The physical layer security technology has a key bottleneck of low secret transmission rate, and the reason is two reasons: 1) the gold frequency band resource is mostly allocated to a cellular network or other special networks, and the physical layer security equipment lacks spectrum resources, so that a high-speed security channel is difficult to establish. 2) The unknown wireless channel state information of the eavesdropping end causes the design optimization based on the physical layer secure communication to lack targets and constraints. For this reason, for 1), the existing physical layer is installed. Full research usually multiplexes cellular spectrum resources to establish a secure channel, but cannot deal with interference caused by spectrum multiplexing. For 2), the existing physical layer security technology generally utilizes null-space artificial noise to interfere an eavesdropper without knowing the channel state information of the eavesdropper, and the null-space artificial noise technology cannot interfere with a channel of a legal user, so that the secret transmission rate is improved.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention provides a method for the physical layer secure communication among multi-antenna equipment, which injects artificial noise to disturb an eavesdropper when the number of transmitting antennas is equal to that of receiving antennas, namely, no null space exists, improves the confidential transmission rate, and does not affect a confidential equipment receiver; in addition, the mutual interference between the security device and the cellular network caused by the spectrum reuse can be eliminated by a low-complexity detection technology.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
a method for physical layer secure communication between multi-antenna devices comprises the following steps:
the transmitter of the security equipment generates a pre-coding vector according to the first channel state information and generates an artificial noise signal according to the pre-coding vector;
the security device receiver calculates to obtain a security signal detection vector according to the first channel state information, detects a security signal according to the security signal detection vector and eliminates a cellular user signal;
the base station receiver calculates a cellular user signal detection matrix according to second channel state information, detects the cellular user signal according to the cellular user signal detection matrix, and eliminates the secret signal and the artificial noise signal;
and the transmitter of the security equipment calculates to obtain the security interruption probability according to the precoding vector and the security signal detection vector, calculates to obtain the effective security rate according to the security interruption probability, calculates to obtain the optimal security transmission rate according to the effective security rate, and performs physical layer security coding according to the optimal security transmission rate.
Further, the procedure of generating the precoding vector by the security device transmitter according to the first channel state information includes:
and the transmitter of the security equipment calculates according to the first channel state information to obtain an auxiliary null space, calculates according to the auxiliary null space to obtain an equivalent channel, and decomposes the characteristic value of the equivalent channel to obtain the precoding vector.
Further, the secret device transmitter calculates to obtain an auxiliary null space according to the first channel state information, specifically as follows:
Figure BDA0003060653870000021
in the formula, G0Is an auxiliary null space; h0＝[h1,h2,...,hM]Is channel state information of M cellular users, e.g. h1Is the channel state information of the first cellular user; i isNIs an identity matrix with rank N; n is the number of security device transmitter antennas; (.)HIs a conjugate transpose operation.
Further, the eigenvalue decomposition of the equivalent channel is performed to obtain the precoding vector, which specifically includes:
to pair
Figure BDA0003060653870000031
Performing eigenvalue decomposition, namely:
Figure BDA0003060653870000032
H1＝G0H
definition of lambda1Is composed of
Figure BDA0003060653870000033
Maximum eigenvalue, λ1The corresponding characteristic vector is b, and the transmitter of the security equipment uses b as a precoding vector;
in the formula, H1Is an equivalent channel; u is a unitary matrix composed of eigenvectors; Λ is a diagonal matrix composed of eigenvalues; eig (.) is a eigenvalue decomposition operation; h is channel state information between the security devices; h0And the set of H is the first channel state information.
Further, the generating an artificial noise signal according to the precoding vector includes:
Figure BDA0003060653870000034
h0＝wH
by pairing auxiliary vectors h0Singular value decomposition to obtain a zero space matrix GuI.e. by
[U0,S,V0]＝SVD(h0)
In the formula of U0Is h0Left singular matrix of (a); v0Is h0Right singular matrix of (d); s is a diagonal matrix composed of singular values; SVD (.) is a singular value decomposition operation; v0Vector corresponding to medium zero singular value constitutes h0Zero space matrix ofGuThe transmitter of the security device generates a random signal z and injects it into the null space GuTo obtain an artificial noise signal Guz。
Further, the secret device receiver calculates a secret signal detection vector according to the first channel state information, which is as follows:
Figure BDA0003060653870000035
in the formula, wbIs a secret signal detection vector.
Further, the base station receiver calculates a cellular user signal detection matrix according to the second channel state information, which is as follows:
Figure BDA0003060653870000041
Figure BDA0003060653870000042
in the formula, WbIs a cellular user signal detection matrix; gc＝[g1,g2,...,gM]Is uplink channel state information, e.g. g, of M cellular users to the base station1Is the uplink channel state information from the first cellular user to the base station;
Figure BDA0003060653870000043
is rank of NbThe identity matrix of (1); n is a radical ofbIs the number of base station receiver antennas; norm (.) is a column-wise normalization operation on the matrix; (.)-1Is the matrix inversion operation; the channel state information of the interference channel from the security device transmitter to the base station is defined as a matrix G; gbIs a process variable; g and GcIs referred to as second channel state information.
Further, the security device transmitter calculates a security interruption probability according to the precoding vector and the security signal detection vector, specifically as follows:
Pout(Rs)＝FZ(z)
Figure BDA0003060653870000044
Figure BDA0003060653870000045
Figure BDA0003060653870000046
Figure BDA0003060653870000047
Figure BDA0003060653870000048
Figure BDA0003060653870000049
in the formula, Pout(Rs) Is the secret outage probability; rsIs the secret transmission rate; csThe security capacity is calculated according to the precoding vector and the security signal detection vector; phiiMeans that
Figure BDA00030606538700000410
Middle ziThe coefficient of (a); gamma-shapednIs an N-dimensional vector
Figure BDA0003060653870000051
The nth element of (1); p is the transmit power of the transmitter of the security device, P1,…,PMIs the transmit power of the M cellular devices; sigmaeIs the noise power at the eavesdropping end.
Further, the effective secret rate is calculated according to the secret interruption probability, and the optimal secret transmission rate is calculated according to the effective secret rate, which is specifically as follows:
Figure BDA0003060653870000052
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA0003060653870000053
is the effective secret rate;
by the pair RsOne-dimensional search obtains R that maximizes the effective privacy ratesSaid R maximizing said effective secret ratesNoting the optimal secret transmission rate
Figure BDA0003060653870000054
Further, the physical layer security coding according to the optimal secret transmission rate is as follows:
Figure BDA0003060653870000055
where W is the volume of the physical layer secure coding space, generating a W-dimensional lattice, i.e.:
Figure BDA0003060653870000056
will be provided with
Figure BDA0003060653870000057
Is divided into 2KIndividual cosets, namely:
Figure BDA0003060653870000058
code word s ═ s of information1,...,si,...,sK},siE {0,1} and coset are mapped one by one to complete lattice coding, namely:
Figure BDA0003060653870000059
use of
Figure BDA00030606538700000510
The mesolattice encoding transmits the security information to the security device receiver.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has at least the following beneficial effects:
(1) the physical layer safety communication between the equipment of the invention reuses the frequency spectrum resource of the cellular network, relieves the problem of shortage of frequency spectrum resource, and simultaneously, the interference caused by frequency spectrum multiplexing can be eliminated by the detection of the confidential equipment receiver and the base station receiver;
(2) the artificial noise technology for equipment-to-equipment communication is provided, artificial noise can be generated under the scene that the number of antennas of a transmitter and a receiver of the security equipment is the same, namely, under the condition of no null space, an eavesdropper is interfered on the basis of not influencing the channel quality of the security equipment, and the security capacity of communication is improved;
(3) the invention provides an encoding technology based on a secret interruption probability, and the secret transmission rate is adjusted on the basis of limiting the constraint of the secret interruption probability. In addition, a physical layer security coding scheme based on one-dimensional search is provided, and the effective confidentiality rate is improved.
In summary, based on the cellular network frequency band, the information may be transmitted in a confidential manner between the devices through a physical layer security technology, and interference caused by spectrum reuse may be eliminated through a detection technology, so that the method is safe and effective.
In order to make the aforementioned and other objects, features and advantages of the present invention comprehensible, preferred embodiments accompanied with figures are described in detail below.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of a method for secure physical layer communication between multiple antenna devices according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a design diagram of artificial noise based precoding;
fig. 3 is a diagram of a security device receiver detection scheme based on precoding vectors.
Detailed Description
To make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, and it is apparent that the described embodiments are some, but not all embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
As shown in fig. 1, as a specific embodiment of the present invention, a method for physical layer secure communication between multiple antenna devices according to the present invention includes the following steps:
step 1: and the transmitter of the security equipment generates a pre-coding vector according to the first channel state information and generates an artificial noise signal according to the pre-coding vector.
Referring to fig. 2, specifically, the process of generating a precoding vector by the security device transmitter according to the first channel state information includes three processes of channel estimation, precoding vector generation and artificial noise signal generation.
1) Channel estimation
The whole system includes two N-antenna security device pairs, one security device transmitter and one security device receiver, M cellular users, one base station, and one N-antenna security deviceeAn antenna eavesdropper. The security device multiplexes uplink spectrum resources with M cellular users,the channel between the security device transmitter and the device receiver is defined as an N x N matrix H, and the interference channel from the cellular user i e { 1., M } to the security device receiver is defined as an N x 1 vector Hi，H0＝[h1,h2,...,hM]Is the channel state information for M cellular users. The uplink channel from cellular user i e { 1.,. M } to the base station receiver is defined as NbX 1 vector gi，Gc＝[g1,g2,...,gM]Is the uplink channel state information of the M cellular users to the base station receiver. The interference channel from the security device transmitter to the base station receiver is defined as NbXn matrix G. Through pilot-based channel estimation techniques, a base station may train to obtain giAnd G. Also based on the channel estimation technique of the pilot frequency, the receiver of the security device can train to obtain H and HiWherein g isiG, H and hiShared throughout the network over a broadcast link. The system also has a channel for an eavesdropper, i.e. a channel N from the transmitter of the security device to the eavesdropperexN matrix HeAnd interference channel N from cellular user i E { 1.,. M } to eavesdroppereX 1 vector hieBoth instantaneous information are not available, but H can still be obtained from historical dataeAnd hieThe statistical information of (1). H since the eavesdropper is usually hidden outside the line of sighteAnd hieIs defined as a Rayleigh fading channel, i.e. a channel with a large number of fading channels
Figure BDA0003060653870000071
And
Figure BDA0003060653870000072
H0and the set of H is first channel state information; g and GcIs referred to as second channel state information.
2) Precoding vector generation
And the transmitter of the security equipment calculates according to the first channel state information to obtain an auxiliary null space, calculates according to the auxiliary null space to obtain an equivalent channel, and decomposes the characteristic value of the equivalent channel to obtain the precoding vector.
In this embodiment, the transmitter of the security device calculates to obtain the auxiliary null space according to the first channel state information, specifically as follows:
Figure BDA0003060653870000081
in the formula, G0Is an auxiliary null space; h0＝[h1,h2,...,hM]Is channel state information of M cellular users, e.g. h1Is the channel state information of the first cellular user; i isNIs an identity matrix with rank N; n is the number of security device transmitter antennas; (.)HIs a conjugate transpose operation.
Performing eigenvalue decomposition on the equivalent channel to obtain the precoding vector, specifically as follows:
to pair
Figure BDA0003060653870000082
Performing eigenvalue decomposition, namely:
Figure BDA0003060653870000083
H1＝G0H
definition of lambda1Is composed of
Figure BDA0003060653870000084
Maximum eigenvalue, λ1The corresponding eigenvector is b, the transmitter of the security device uses b as a precoding vector, and the transmitter of the security device uses b as the precoding vector, so that the diversity gain of the MIMO antenna can be obtained.
In the formula, H1Is an equivalent channel; u is a unitary matrix composed of eigenvectors; Λ is a diagonal matrix composed of eigenvalues; eig (.) is a eigenvalue decomposition operation; h is channel state information between the security devices; h0And the set of H is the first channel state information.
3) Artificial noise signal generation
Specifically, the generating an artificial noise signal according to the precoding vector includes:
Figure BDA0003060653870000085
h0＝wH
by pairing auxiliary vectors h0Singular value decomposition to obtain a zero space matrix GuI.e. by
Figure BDA0003060653870000086
In the formula of U0Is h0Left singular matrix of (a); v0Is h0Right singular matrix of (d); s is a diagonal matrix composed of singular values; SVD (.) is a singular value decomposition operation; v0Vector corresponding to medium zero singular value constitutes h0Of the null space matrix GuThe transmitter of the security device generates a random signal z and injects it into the null space GuTo obtain an artificial noise signal Guz。
It can be seen that the secure device receiver is not affected by artifacts because wHGuz＝0。
Step 2: and the security device receiver calculates a security signal detection vector according to the first channel state information, detects a security signal according to the security signal detection vector and eliminates a cellular user signal.
Referring to fig. 3, specifically, the secret device receiver calculates a secret signal detection vector according to the first channel state information, and the process includes three processes of mixed signal reception, secret signal detection vector generation, and secret signal detection, which specifically includes the following steps:
1) mixed signal reception
The mixed signal refers to the mixture of the security signal and the interference signal of M cellular users, and the signal received by the receiver of the security device can be expressed as
y＝Hk+n
Where n is white Gaussian additive noise satisfaction
Figure BDA0003060653870000091
2) Secure signal detection vector generation
The secret signal detection vector needs to complete two processes of secret signal collection and interference elimination on multiple receiving antennas simultaneously. Therefore wbThe generation process of (a) is as follows: secure device receiver computing
Figure BDA0003060653870000092
In the formula, wbIs a secret signal detection vector. The signals of the M cellular users can be cancelled because wbH0xc0, where xcAre the signals of M cellular users. Secure device receivers are not affected by artifacts because of wbHGuAnd z is 0. w can collect the secret signals on a plurality of receiving antennas to obtain the diversity gain of MIMO, because
Figure BDA0003060653870000093
3) Secure signal detection
The receiver of the security device detects the received signal y through w and simultaneously completes the collection of the security signal on a plurality of receiving antennas and the cellular network interference elimination, and the process can be expressed as
Figure BDA0003060653870000101
Where n is white Gaussian additive noise satisfaction
Figure BDA0003060653870000102
And step 3: and the base station receiver calculates to obtain a cellular user signal detection matrix according to the second channel state information, detects the cellular user signal according to the cellular user signal detection matrix, and eliminates the secret signal and the artificial noise signal.
Specifically, the base station receiver calculates a cellular user signal detection matrix according to the second channel state information, and the process includes three processes of mixed signal reception, cellular user signal detection matrix generation, and cellular signal detection, which specifically includes the following steps:
1) mixed signal reception
The mixed signal is the interference signal of the security device received by the base station and the signals of M cellular users, and the received signals can be expressed as
Figure BDA0003060653870000103
The channel from cellular user j to the base station is defined as gjThe signal of cellular user j is defined as xjAnd satisfy power constraints
Figure BDA0003060653870000104
nbIs white gaussian additive noise satisfied
Figure BDA0003060653870000105
Here, Gk is considered to be interference due to spectrum reuse, which needs to be eliminated, and
Figure BDA0003060653870000106
considered as inter-user interference, the base station can handle this by detection techniques.
2) Cellular user signal detection matrix generation
The cellular user signal detection matrix needs to simultaneously complete two functions of multi-user signal detection and interference cancellation caused by spectrum multiplexing, and the generation process of the detection matrix can be expressed as follows:
base station receiver computation
Figure BDA0003060653870000107
Figure BDA0003060653870000108
In the formula, WbIs a cellular user signal detection matrix; gc＝[g1,g2,...,gM]Is uplink channel state information, e.g. g, of M cellular users to the base station1Is the uplink channel state information from the first cellular user to the base station;
Figure BDA0003060653870000109
is rank of NbThe identity matrix of (1); n is a radical ofbIs the number of base station receiver antennas; norm (.) is a column-wise normalization operation on the matrix; (.)-1Is the matrix inversion operation; the channel state information of the interference channel from the security device transmitter to the base station is defined as a matrix G; gbIs a process variable; g and GcIs referred to as second channel state information.
3) Cellular subscriber signal detection
Base station passing through WbThe multi-user signal detection and the interference elimination caused by the spectrum multiplexing are completed as follows
Figure BDA0003060653870000111
Wherein wibIs WbRow i of (1), nbIs white gaussian additive noise satisfied
Figure BDA0003060653870000112
And 4, step 4: and the transmitter of the security equipment calculates to obtain the security interruption probability according to the precoding vector and the security signal detection vector, calculates to obtain the effective security rate according to the security interruption probability, calculates to obtain the optimal security transmission rate according to the effective security rate, and performs physical layer security coding according to the optimal security transmission rate.
Specifically, the secret device transmitter calculates a secret interruption probability according to the precoding vector and the secret signal detection vector, and the process includes a secret interruption probability theoretical expression, effective secret rate optimization and physical security coding, which specifically includes the following steps:
1) secret interruption probability theoretical expression
Due to eavesdropping of channel state information HeAnd hieUnknown, the secret interruption probability of the precoding is needed to be pushed as the basis for setting the physical layer security code rate. The probability of a privacy disruption may be expressed as
Pout(Rs)＝FZ(z)
Figure BDA0003060653870000113
Figure BDA0003060653870000114
Figure BDA0003060653870000115
Figure BDA0003060653870000116
Figure BDA0003060653870000121
Figure BDA0003060653870000122
In the formula, Pout(Rs) Is the secret outage probability; rsIs the secret transmission rate; csThe security capacity is calculated according to the precoding vector and the security signal detection vector; phiiMeans that
Figure BDA0003060653870000123
Middle ziThe coefficient of (a); gamma-shapednIs an N-dimensional vector
Figure BDA0003060653870000124
The nth element of (1); p is the transmit power of the transmitter of the security device, P1,…,PMIs the transmit power of the M cellular devices; sigmaeIs the noise power at the eavesdropping end.
2) Efficient privacy rate optimization
Specifically, the effective secret rate is calculated according to the secret interruption probability, and the optimal secret transmission rate is calculated according to the effective secret rate, which specifically includes:
Figure BDA0003060653870000125
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure BDA0003060653870000126
is the effective secret rate;
by the pair RsOne-dimensional search obtains R that maximizes the effective privacy ratesSaid R maximizing said effective secret ratesNoting the optimal secret transmission rate
Figure BDA0003060653870000127
3) Physical security coding
As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, R is determined by the golden section methodsOne-dimensional search obtains R that maximizes the effective privacy rates。
Specifically, the physical layer security coding according to the optimal secret transmission rate specifically includes:
Figure BDA0003060653870000128
where W is the volume of the physical layer secure coding space, generating a W-dimensional lattice, i.e.:
Figure BDA0003060653870000129
will be provided with
Figure BDA00030606538700001210
Is divided into 2KIndividual cosets, namely:
Figure BDA0003060653870000131
code word s ═ s of information1,...,si,...,sK},siE {0,1} and coset are mapped one by one to complete lattice coding, namely:
Figure BDA0003060653870000132
use of
Figure BDA0003060653870000133
The mesolattice encoding transmits the security information to the security device receiver.
The invention can improve the secret transmission rate of unit frequency spectrum by means of the frequency spectrum multiplexing and artificial noise technology of the base station, carry out the safe communication between the equipment without secret keys, and eliminate the mutual interference between the secret equipment and the cellular network caused by the frequency spectrum multiplexing by utilizing the low-complexity linear detection.
This embodiment is a physical layer security transmitter between multiple antenna devices:
the transmitter of the security equipment calculates to obtain an auxiliary null space according to the first channel state information;
the transmitter of the security equipment obtains an equivalent channel according to the auxiliary zero space calculation;
and the transmitter of the security equipment decomposes the eigenvalue of the equivalent channel to obtain a precoding vector.
And the transmitter of the security equipment performs physical layer security coding according to the optimal security transmission rate to complete the transmission process of the security signal.
In this embodiment, a physical layer security receiver between multiple antenna devices:
the security device receiver calculates to obtain a security signal detection vector according to the first channel state information;
the security device receiver detects the security signal according to the security signal detection vector;
the security device receiver cancels the cellular user signal based on the security signal detection vector.
The base station receiver of the embodiment:
the base station receiver calculates to obtain a cellular user signal detection matrix according to the second channel state information;
the base station receiver detects the cellular user signal according to the cellular user signal detection matrix;
the base station receiver cancels the secret signals and the artificial noise signals according to the cellular user signal detection matrix.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above-mentioned embodiments are only specific embodiments of the present invention, which are used for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention and not for limiting the same, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, although the present invention is described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that: any person skilled in the art can modify or easily conceive the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments or equivalent substitutes for some technical features within the technical scope of the present disclosure; such modifications, changes or substitutions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present invention, and they should be construed as being included therein. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (10)

1. A method for secure physical layer communication between multiple antenna devices, comprising:
the transmitter of the security equipment generates a pre-coding vector according to the first channel state information and generates an artificial noise signal according to the pre-coding vector;
the security device receiver calculates to obtain a security signal detection vector according to the first channel state information, detects a security signal according to the security signal detection vector and eliminates a cellular user signal;
the base station receiver calculates a cellular user signal detection matrix according to second channel state information, detects the cellular user signal according to the cellular user signal detection matrix, and eliminates the secret signal and the artificial noise signal;
and the transmitter of the security equipment calculates to obtain the security interruption probability according to the precoding vector and the security signal detection vector, calculates to obtain the effective security rate according to the security interruption probability, calculates to obtain the optimal security transmission rate according to the effective security rate, and performs physical layer security coding according to the optimal security transmission rate.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the generating of the precoding vector by the secret device transmitter according to the first channel state information comprises:
and the transmitter of the security equipment calculates according to the first channel state information to obtain an auxiliary null space, calculates according to the auxiliary null space to obtain an equivalent channel, and decomposes the characteristic value of the equivalent channel to obtain the precoding vector.
3. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the transmitter of the security device calculates the auxiliary null space according to the first channel state information, specifically as follows:
Figure FDA0003060653860000011
in the formula, G0Is an auxiliary null space; h0＝[h1,h2,...,hM]Is channel state information of M cellular users, e.g. h1Is the channel state information of the first cellular user; i isNIs an identity matrix with rank N; n is the number of security device transmitter antennas; (.)HIs a conjugate transpose operation.
4. The method according to claim 3, wherein the precoding vector is obtained by performing eigenvalue decomposition on the equivalent channel, and specifically the method comprises the following steps:
to pair
Figure FDA0003060653860000021
Performing eigenvalue decomposition, namely:
Figure FDA0003060653860000022
H1＝G0H
definition of lambda1Is composed of
Figure FDA0003060653860000023
Maximum eigenvalue, λ1The corresponding characteristic vector is b, and the transmitter of the security equipment uses b as a precoding vector;
in the formula, H1Is an equivalent channel; u is a unitary matrix composed of eigenvectors; Λ is a diagonal matrix composed of eigenvalues; eig (.) is a eigenvalue decomposition operation; h is channel state information between the security devices; h0And the set of H is the first channel state information.
5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the generating of the artificial noise signal according to the precoding vector is as follows:
Figure FDA0003060653860000024
h0＝wH
by pairing auxiliary vectors h0Singular value decomposition to obtain a zero space matrix GuI.e. by
[U0,S,V0]＝SVD(h0)
In the formula of U0Is h0Left singular matrix of (a); v0Is h0Right singular matrix of (d); s is a diagonal matrix composed of singular values; SVD (.) is a singular value decomposition operation; v0Vector corresponding to medium zero singular value constitutes h0Of the null space matrix GuThe transmitter of the security device generates a random signal z and injects it into the null space GuTo obtain an artificial noise signal Guz。
6. The method as claimed in claim 5, wherein the secure device receiver calculates a secure signal detection vector according to the first channel state information, specifically as follows:
Figure FDA0003060653860000025
in the formula, wbIs a secret signal detection vector.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the base station receiver calculates a cellular user signal detection matrix according to the second channel state information, specifically as follows:
Figure FDA0003060653860000031
Figure FDA0003060653860000032
in the formula, WbIs a cellular user signal detection matrix; gc＝[g1,g2,...,gM]Is uplink channel state information, e.g. g, of M cellular users to the base station1Is the uplink channel state information from the first cellular user to the base station;
Figure FDA0003060653860000033
is rank of NbThe identity matrix of (1); n is a radical ofbIs the number of base station receiver antennas; norm (.) is a column-wise normalization operation on the matrix; (.)-1Is the matrix inversion operation; the channel state information of the interference channel from the security device transmitter to the base station is defined as a matrix G; gbIs a process variable; g and GcIs referred to as second channel state information.
8. The method as claimed in claim 6, wherein the secret device transmitter calculates the secret interruption probability according to the precoding vector and the secret signal detection vector, specifically as follows:
Pout(Rs)＝FZ(z)
Figure FDA0003060653860000034
Figure FDA0003060653860000035
Figure FDA0003060653860000036
Figure FDA0003060653860000037
Figure FDA0003060653860000038
Figure FDA0003060653860000039
in the formula, Pout(Rs) Is the secret outage probability; rsIs the secret transmission rate; csThe security capacity is calculated according to the precoding vector and the security signal detection vector; phiiMeans that
Figure FDA0003060653860000041
Middle ziThe coefficient of (a); gamma-shapednIs an N-dimensional vector
Figure FDA0003060653860000042
The nth element of (1); p is the transmit power of the transmitter of the security device, P1,…,PMIs the transmit power of the M cellular devices; sigmaeIs the noise power at the eavesdropping end.
9. The method as claimed in claim 8, wherein the effective secret rate is calculated according to the secret interruption probability, and the optimal secret transmission rate is calculated according to the effective secret rate, specifically as follows:
Figure FDA0003060653860000043
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure FDA0003060653860000044
is the effective secret rate;
by the pair RsOne-dimensional search obtains R that maximizes the effective privacy ratesSaid R maximizing said effective secret ratesNoting the optimal secret transmission rate
Figure FDA0003060653860000045
10. The method according to claim 9, wherein the physical layer security coding is performed according to the optimal secret transmission rate, specifically as follows:
Figure FDA0003060653860000046
where W is the volume of the physical layer secure coding space, generating a W-dimensional lattice, i.e.:
Figure FDA0003060653860000047
will be provided with
Figure FDA0003060653860000048
Is divided into 2KIndividual cosets, namely:
Figure FDA0003060653860000049
code word s ═ s of information1,...,si,...,sK},siE {0,1} and coset are mapped one by one to complete lattice coding, namely:
Figure FDA00030606538600000410
use of
Figure FDA00030606538600000411
The mesolattice encoding transmits the security information to the security device receiver.
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