CN113315636B - Key exchange method for secure communication between automobile ECUs - Google Patents
Key exchange method for secure communication between automobile ECUs Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3252—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
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Abstract
The invention discloses a key exchange method for secure communication between automobile ECUs, which comprises the following steps: grouping all vehicle ECUs participating in key exchange pairwise; directly transmitting required plaintext parameters and private random integers by vehicle ECUs of two communication parties; the vehicle ECU generates a public key and sends a signature; the vehicle ECU verifies the message signature and generates a group key, and group key exchange is carried out; any two logic entities are connected safely to form a new logic entity, the two logic entities mutually verify the identity and then send the existing group key, and the receiver performs power operation on the group key of the sender and the private key of each vehicle ECU in the logic entities; and merging in a parallel mode to form a logic entity, and generating a shared session key when all vehicle ECUs are in the same logic entity. The invention has the advantages of small storage resource and less calculation resource consumption for finishing the key exchange between the ECUs, and is suitable for the limited CAN bus capacity.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of automobile ECU (electronic control unit) secure communication, in particular to a key exchange method for secure communication between automobile ECUs.
Background
With the increase of the automobile interior ECUs, the communication of the automobile interior ECUs becomes more important, but the transmission of the automobile interior bus is not safe. When the automobile runs, the ECU in the automobile needs to communicate quickly, efficiently and safely so as to ensure the safety of personnel. Although the Diffie-Hellman algorithm generates the key only when needed, reducing the risk of leakage due to long-time storage of the key, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm lacks authentication and is vulnerable to third party attacks. Current encryption schemes involve key distribution, which requires a large consumption of resources. For this reason, a secure and efficient key exchange method is urgently needed in resource-limited automotive ECU and bus environments.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the defects and shortcomings of the prior art, the invention provides the key exchange method for the safe communication between the automobile ECUs.
It is a second object of the present invention to provide a key exchange system for secure communication between automotive ECUs.
A third object of the present invention is to provide a storage medium.
It is a fourth object of the invention to provide a computing device.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
the invention provides a key exchange method for secure communication between automobile ECUs (electronic control units), which comprises the following steps:
grouping all vehicle ECUs participating in key exchange pairwise;
directly transmitting required Diffie-Hellman plaintext parameters p and g and private random integers a and b by vehicle ECUs of two communication parties, wherein the vehicle ECUs of the two communication parties comprise an ECU of a sender1And a receiver ECU2Sender ECU1And a receiver ECU2Calculating the variable E individually1＝gamod p、E2＝gbmod p；
Based on a BLS short signature method, the vehicle ECU generates a public key and sends a signature;
the vehicle ECU verifies the message signature and generates a group key, group key exchange is carried out, and the sender ECU after the group key exchange1And a receiver ECU2Are the same logical entity;
any two logic entities are connected safely to form a new logic entity, when one logic entity is combined with the other logic entity, the two logic entities mutually verify identities and then send an existing group key, and after a receiver receives the group key, the group key of the sender and the private key of each vehicle ECU in the logic entity are subjected to power operation;
and merging in a parallel mode to form a logic entity, and generating a shared session key when all vehicle ECUs are in the same logic entity.
As a preferred technical solution, all vehicle ECUs participating in the key exchange are grouped into two groups, each group is used as a logical entity, and if the number of all ECUs is odd, the remaining ECUs are used as separate logical entities.
As a preferred technical solution, the vehicle ECU generates a public key and sends a signature, and the specific steps include:
sender ECU1Selecting receiver ECU2Elliptic curve generating point G1Generating a public key P1＝a×G1Using elliptic curve hash function H (E)1) Calculating a signature S1＝a×H(E1) Then, the sender ECU1Sign the digit S1To the receiver ECU2；
Receiver ECU2Selecting sender ECU1Elliptic curve generating point G2Generating a public key P2＝b×G2Using elliptic curve hash function H (E)2) Calculating a signature S2＝b×H(E2) Rear, receiver ECU2Sign the digit S2To the sender ECU1。
As a preferred technical solution, the vehicle ECU verifies the message signature and generates a group key, and the specific steps include:
receiver ECU2ECU receiving sender1When signing information, calculating bilinear mapping function e by using BLS short signature method, if satisfying e (P)1，H(E1))＝e(G1，S1) Receiving signature information;
receiver ECU2After receiving the information, decrypting E1And calculate
Wherein,
is a group key that is a key of the group,
represents E1B-th power of (1);
sender ECU1Receiving side ECU2If e (P) is satisfied in signing the information of (1)2,H(E2))＝e(G2,S2) Receiving signature information;
sender ECU1After receiving the information, decrypting E2And calculates a group key
Wherein,
is a group key that is a key of the group,
represents E2To the power of a;
if it is
Is equal to
The exchanged group key
As a preferred technical solution, the secure connection of any two logic entities to form a new logic entity specifically includes the following steps:
the first logic entity internal ECU respectively has a private key a1,a2,a3,…aiThe private key of the ECU in the second logic entity is b1,b2,b3,…bjThe number i of ECUs in the first logic entity and the number j of ECUs in the second logic entity meet the relation that | i-j | is less than or equal to 1;
the shared session key is represented as:
BK*＝power(BK2,a1a2a3…ai)mod p＝power(BK1,b1b2b3…bj)mod p
wherein power represents a digital power function, BK1A group key, BK, representing a first logical entity2A group key representing the second logical entity.
In order to achieve the second object, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a key exchange system for secure communication between automotive ECUs, comprising: the system comprises a grouping module, a parameter transmission module, a variable calculation module, a signature verification module, a group key generation and exchange module, a logic entity merging module and a shared session key output module;
the grouping module is used for grouping the ECUs of all vehicles participating in key exchange pairwise;
the parameter transmission module is used for transmitting Diffie-Hellman plaintext parameters p and g and private random integers a and b required by vehicle ECUs of two communication parties, and the vehicle ECUs of the two communication parties comprise an ECU of a sender1And a receiver ECU2；
The variable calculation module is used for calculating the variable E independently1＝gamod p、E2＝gbmod p；
The signature module is used for generating a public key and a signature of the vehicle ECU based on a BLS short signature method;
the signature checking module is used for checking the message signature;
the group key generating and exchanging module is used for generating a group key and exchanging the group key, and the sender ECU after exchanging the group key1And a receiver ECU2Are the same logical entity;
the logic entity merging module is used for safely connecting any two logic entities to form a new logic entity, when one logic entity is merged with the other logic entity, the logic entities of the two parties mutually verify identities and then send an existing group key, and after the receiving party receives the group key, the group key of the sending party and the private key of each vehicle ECU in the logic entities are subjected to power operation;
the shared session key output module is used for outputting shared session keys, combining the shared session keys in a parallel mode to form a logic entity, and generating the shared session keys when all the vehicle ECUs are in the same logic entity.
In order to achieve the third object, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a storage medium storing a program which, when executed by a processor, implements the key exchange method for secure communication between automotive ECUs as described above.
In order to achieve the fourth object, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a computing device comprises a processor and a memory for storing processor executable programs, and when the processor executes the programs stored in the memory, the key exchange method for the safe communication between the automobile ECUs is realized.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
(1) the invention is used for the resource-limited automobile internal environment and has the following advantages: the method of the invention is light weight, requires less storage resources and less calculation resources for completing the key exchange between the ECUs, and is suitable for the limited CAN bus capacity.
(2) Compared with the traditional Diffie-Hellman algorithm, the invention CAN effectively prevent man-in-the-middle attacks by means of the BLS (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham) short signature and protect the safety of the CAN bus.
(3) The key exchange based on Diffie-Hellman algorithm and BLS is suitable for the broadcast communication environment of CAN bus, and the shared key with byte length CAN be directly written into the CAN frame, thus avoiding the overload of the bus in the key exchange process and improving the compatibility of the invention and the existing CAN protocol.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a key exchange method for secure communication between automotive ECUs according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a key exchange scheme for an automotive ECU according to the present invention;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating the generation of the car sharing session key according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
Examples
As shown in fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a key exchange method for secure communication between automotive ECUs, which makes the communication between ECUs more secure through key exchange in an environment with limited resources in an interior network, and combines the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and BLS short signature scheme to absorb the authentication method of BLS short signature, thereby avoiding the disadvantage that the traditional Diffie-Hellman algorithm is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack, and at the same time, the present invention adopts parallel ECU packets to quickly implement key exchange under ECU identity authentication, including the following steps:
s1: grouping all ECUs participating in key exchange pairwise;
all ECUs of the embodiment are grouped in pairs, so that the key exchange of a limited number of ECUs in the group can be quickened, and the group key can be conveniently and concurrently calculated.
If the number of all the ECUs in this embodiment is odd, the remaining ECUs are regarded as a single logical entity, and each of the rest groups is regarded as a logical entity. Two ECUs within an entity can communicate securely by means of the group key that has been exchanged.
S2: the ECUs of both communication parties select plaintext parameters p and g and private random integers a and b required by direct transmission;
Diffie-Hellman plaintext parameters p and g in this embodiment are integers acknowledged by both communication ECUs, p is a prime number, g is an original root of p, a is a random integer smaller than p generated by a sender ECU, b is a random integer smaller than p generated by a receiver ECU, and the sender ECU generates the random integer smaller than p1And a receiver ECU2Calculating the variable E individually1＝gamod p，E2＝gbmod p, as shown in FIG. 2, the ECUs within and between groups can both send signatures and complete verification in synchronization.
S3: the vehicle ECU generates a public key P and sends a signature S;
according to BLS short signature method, sender ECU1Selecting receiver ECU2Elliptic curve generating point G1Generating a public key P1＝a×G1Using elliptic curve hash function H (E)1) Calculating a signature S1＝a×H(E1) Rear, ECU1Immediately sign the digit S1Sent to the ECU2. Meanwhile, the receiver ECU2Selecting sender ECU1Elliptic curve generating point G2Generating a public key P2＝b×G2Using elliptic curve hash function H (E)2) Calculating a signature S2＝b×H(E2) Rear, ECU2Immediately sign the digit S2Sent to the ECU1。
S4: the vehicle ECU verifies the message signature and generates a group key;
receiver ECU2ECU receiving sender1When signing information, calculating bilinear mapping function e by using BLS short signature method, if satisfying e (P)1，H(E1))＝e(G1，S1) The signature information is received, otherwise it is discarded. Receiver ECU2After receiving the information, decrypting E1And calculate
Is a group key that is a key of the group,
represents E1To the power of b, p is the prime number mentioned in step S2. Sender ECU1Receiving side ECU2When signing the information, if e (P)2,H(E2))＝e(G2,S2) The signature information is received, otherwise it is discarded. Sender ECU1After receiving the information, decrypting E2And calculates a group key
Is a group key that is a key of the group,
represents E2To the power of a. If it is
Is equal to
The exchanged group key
At this time, the ECU1And ECU2Are treated as the same logical entity; if it is
Is not equal to
The group key exchange fails.
The ECU group key length of the present embodiment depends on the selected elliptic curve, and when the elliptic curve is selected, the key length is not affected by the number of generation points and ECUs. The larger the number of digits of the elliptic curve, the larger the key length, the higher the security level, but the longer the calculation time. The length of the secret key CAN meet the CAN bus safety requirement by selecting 256 bits in an in-vehicle communication environment, is smaller than the upper limit of 64 bytes of a data field in a CAN-FD message, and is compatible with the existing protocol.
S5: and merging the logic entities to generate a unified shared session key, wherein the shared session key of the embodiment is generated by merging the logic entities.
Any two logic entities are connected safely to form a new logic entity. In a parallel manner, when the first packet is forming a logical entity, the second packet also forms a logical entity. Likewise, other new logical entities are also generated in parallel at this time. When all ECUs are in the same logic entity, a shared session key is generated, each ECU has a private key and shares the same shared session key, and all ECUs can be communicated safely and efficiently.
When one logic entity is merged with another logic entity, only the BLS short signature scheme needs to be executed, and the two logic entities send the existing secret key BK after mutually authenticating the identities1、BK2And after the receiving party receives the data, performing exponentiation operation on the secret key of the sending party and the private keys of all ECUs in the logic entity. In this embodiment, the random parameter used by the exponentiation index when the ECUs in the group exchange the secret key is the private key of the ECU, that is, the private integer a is the private key of the ECU; and the exponentiation exponent is the private key of the ECU in the logic entity when the logic entities are combined.
The first logic entity has internal ECU with private key a1,a2,a3,…aiAnother logical entity internal ECU private key with the same number of or i + -1 ECUs is b1,b2,b3,…bjThen the first will generate BK equal to the second*＝power(BK2,a1a2a3…ai)mod p＝power(BK1,b1b2b3…bj)mod p。
As shown in fig. 3, the logical Entity (ECU) generates a shared session key1,ECU2) Sending Level2Group key BK1To a logical Entity (ECU)3,ECU4) Having a Level2Group key BK2Logical Entity (ECU)3,ECU4) At receiving BK1Later use private key to calculate Level1Group key
Wherein, a1、a2Representing a logical Entity (ECU)1,ECU2) Private key, simultaneous, logical Entity (ECU)3,ECU4) Transmitting group key BK2To a logical Entity (ECU)1,ECU2) Logical Entity (ECU)1,ECU2) At receiving BK2After makeComputing Level with private key1Group key
Wherein, a3、a4Representing a logical Entity (ECU)3，ECU4) A private key. If it is
BK is then5Level after merging the two logic entities1A group key. Generating BK in left subtree5In the process, the right subtree adopts the same method to generate Level in parallel1Group key BK6. Similarly, a logical Entity (ECU)1,ECU2,ECU3,ECU4) And logical Entity (ECU)5,ECU6,ECU7,ECU8) Merging to obtain Level0Group key BK*I.e. the merged shared session key.
The key exchange method of the invention has the advantages of less storage resource occupation, high signature verification speed and high efficiency of shared key generation, and meets the requirement of real-time encryption on bus messages in the vehicle driving process.
Example 2
The present embodiment provides a key exchange system for secure communication between automotive ECUs, including: the system comprises a grouping module, a parameter transmission module, a variable calculation module, a signature verification module, a group key generation and exchange module, a logic entity merging module and a shared session key output module;
in the present embodiment, the grouping module is configured to group all vehicle ECUs participating in the key exchange two by two;
in the embodiment, the parameter transmission module is used for transmitting Diffie-Hellman plaintext parameters p and g and private random integers a and b required by vehicle ECUs of two communication parties, wherein the vehicle ECUs of the two communication parties comprise an ECU of a sending party1And a receiver ECU2；
In the present embodiment, the variable calculation module is used for calculating the variable E individually1＝gamod p、E2＝gbmod p；
In the embodiment, the signature module is used for generating a public key and a signature of the vehicle ECU based on a BLS short signature method;
in this embodiment, the signature verification module is configured to verify a message signature;
in this embodiment, the group key generation and exchange module is configured to generate a group key and exchange the group key, and the sender ECU exchanges the group key1And a receiver ECU2Are the same logical entity;
in this embodiment, the logic entity merging module is configured to securely connect any two logic entities to form a new logic entity, when one logic entity is merged with another logic entity, the two logic entities verify identities of each other and then send an existing group key, and after receiving the group key, the receiver performs exponentiation on the group key of the sender and a private key of each vehicle ECU inside the logic entity;
in this embodiment, the shared session key output module is configured to output the shared session key, merge the shared session key in a parallel manner to form a logical entity, and generate the shared session key when all the vehicle ECUs are in the same logical entity.
Example 3
The present embodiment provides a storage medium, which may be a storage medium such as a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, or the like, and which stores one or more programs that, when executed by a processor, implement the key exchange method for secure communication between automotive ECUs of embodiment 1.
Example 4
The embodiment provides a computing device, which may be a desktop computer, a notebook computer, a smart phone, a PDA handheld terminal, a tablet computer, or other terminal devices with a display function, and the computing device includes a processor and a memory, where the memory stores one or more programs, and when the processor executes the programs stored in the memory, the key exchange method for secure communication between vehicle ECUs in embodiment 1 is implemented.
The above embodiments are preferred embodiments of the present invention, but the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and any other changes, modifications, substitutions, combinations, and simplifications which do not depart from the spirit and principle of the present invention should be construed as equivalents thereof, and all such changes, modifications, substitutions, combinations, and simplifications are intended to be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A key exchange method for secure communication between automotive ECUs, comprising the steps of:
grouping all vehicle ECUs participating in key exchange pairwise;
directly transmitting required Diffie-Hellman plaintext parameters p and g and private random integers a and b by vehicle ECUs of two communication parties, wherein the vehicle ECUs of the two communication parties comprise an ECU of a sender1And a receiver ECU2Sender ECU1And a receiver ECU2Calculating the variable E individually1＝gamod p、E2＝gbmod p；
Based on a BLS short signature method, the vehicle ECU generates a public key and sends a signature;
the vehicle ECU verifies the message signature and generates a group key, group key exchange is carried out, and the sender ECU after the group key exchange1And a receiver ECU2Are the same logical entity; any two logic entities are connected safely to form a new logic entity, when one logic entity is combined with the other logic entity, the two logic entities mutually verify identities and then send an existing group key, and after a receiver receives the group key, the group key of the sender and the private key of each vehicle ECU in the logic entity are subjected to power operation;
the method for forming the new logic entity by safely connecting any two logic entities comprises the following specific steps:
the first logic entity internal ECU respectively has a private key a1,a2,a3,…aiThe private key of the ECU in the second logic entity is b1,b2,b3,…bjThe number i of ECUs in the first logic entity and the number j of ECUs in the second logic entity meet the relation that | i-j | is less than or equal to 1; merging in parallel to form logic entity, and when all vehicle ECUs are in the same logic entityGenerating a shared session key;
the shared session key is represented as:
BK*＝power(BK2,a1a2a3…ai)mod p＝power(BK1,b1b2b3…bj)mod p
wherein power represents a digital power function, BK1A group key, BK, representing a first logical entity2A group key representing the second logical entity.
2. The key exchange method for secure communication between automotive ECUs as claimed in claim 1, wherein all the vehicle ECUs participating in the key exchange are grouped into two groups, each group being one logical entity, and if the number of all the ECUs is odd, the remaining ECUs being separate logical entities.
3. The key exchange method for secure communication between vehicle ECUs as claimed in claim 1, wherein the vehicle ECU generates a public key and sends a signature, the specific steps comprising:
sender ECU1Selecting receiver ECU2Elliptic curve generating point G1Generating a public key P1＝a×G1Using elliptic curve hash function H (E)1) Calculating a signature S1＝a×H(E1) Then, the sender ECU1Sign the digit S1To the receiver ECU2；
Receiver ECU2Selecting sender ECU1Elliptic curve generating point G2Generating a public key P2＝b×G2Using elliptic curve hash function H (E)2) Calculating a signature S2＝b×H(E2) Rear, receiver ECU2Sign the digit S2To the sender ECU1。
4. The key exchange method for secure communication between vehicle ECUs as claimed in claim 1, wherein the vehicle ECU verifies the message signature and generates a group key, the specific steps include:
receiver ECU2ECU receiving sender1When signing information, calculating bilinear mapping function e by using BLS short signature method, if satisfying e (P)1，H(E1))＝e(G1，S1) Receiving signature information;
receiver ECU2After receiving the information, decrypting E1And calculate
Wherein,
is a group key that is a key of the group,
represents E1B-th power of (1);
sender ECU1Receiving side ECU2If e (P) is satisfied in signing the information of (1)2,H(E2))＝e(G2,S2) Receiving signature information;
sender ECU1After receiving the information, decrypting E2And calculates a group key
Wherein,
is a group key that is a key of the group,
represents E2To the power of a;
if it is
Is equal to
The exchanged group key
5. A key exchange system for secure communication between automotive ECUs, comprising: the system comprises a grouping module, a parameter transmission module, a variable calculation module, a signature verification module, a group key generation and exchange module, a logic entity merging module and a shared session key output module;
the grouping module is used for grouping the ECUs of all vehicles participating in key exchange pairwise;
the parameter transmission module is used for transmitting Diffie-Hellman plaintext parameters p and g and private random integers a and b required by vehicle ECUs of two communication parties, and the vehicle ECUs of the two communication parties comprise an ECU of a sender1And a receiver ECU2；
The variable calculation module is used for calculating the variable E independently1＝gamod p、E2＝gbmod p；
The signature module is used for generating a public key and a signature of the vehicle ECU based on a BLS short signature method;
the signature checking module is used for checking the message signature;
the group key generating and exchanging module is used for generating a group key and exchanging the group key, and the sender ECU after exchanging the group key1And a receiver ECU2Are the same logical entity;
the logic entity merging module is used for safely connecting any two logic entities to form a new logic entity, when one logic entity is merged with the other logic entity, the logic entities of the two parties mutually verify identities and then send an existing group key, and after the receiving party receives the group key, the group key of the sending party and the private key of each vehicle ECU in the logic entities are subjected to power operation;
the method for forming the new logic entity by safely connecting any two logic entities comprises the following specific steps:
the first logic entity internal ECU respectively has a private key a1,a2,a3,…aiThe private key of the ECU in the second logic entity is b1,b2,b3,…bjThe number i of ECUs in the first logic entity and the number j of ECUs in the second logic entity meet the relation that | i-j | is less than or equal to 1; the shared session key output module is used for outputting a shared session key, combining the shared session key in a parallel mode to form a logic entity, and generating the shared session key when all the vehicle ECUs are in the same logic entity;
the shared session key is represented as:
BK*＝power(BK2,a1a2a3…ai)mod p＝power(BK1,b1b2b3…bj)mod p
wherein power represents a digital power function, BK1A group key, BK, representing a first logical entity2A group key representing the second logical entity.
6. A storage medium storing a program, wherein the program, when executed by a processor, implements the key exchange method for secure communication between automotive ECUs as recited in any one of claims 1 to 4.
7. A computing device comprising a processor and a memory for storing a program executable by the processor, wherein the processor, when executing the program stored by the memory, implements a key exchange method for secure communication between vehicle ECUs as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 4.
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