CN113242235A - System and method for encrypting and authenticating railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I - Google Patents
System and method for encrypting and authenticating railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN113242235A CN113242235A CN202110500349.1A CN202110500349A CN113242235A CN 113242235 A CN113242235 A CN 113242235A CN 202110500349 A CN202110500349 A CN 202110500349A CN 113242235 A CN113242235 A CN 113242235A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- data
- certificate
- rssp
- private key
- public
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 230000006854 communication Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 59
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 55
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 31
- 230000007123 defense Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 15
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 11
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 abstract description 12
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 13
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 2
- 125000004122 cyclic group Chemical group 0.000 description 2
- 230000009466 transformation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 101100217298 Mus musculus Aspm gene Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000004075 alteration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
Abstract
The invention relates to a system and a method for encrypting and authenticating a railway signal safety communication protocol RSSP-I. The system comprises: the system comprises a registration mechanism, an authentication center, a certificate bank and a plurality of devices accessed to a rail transit system; the devices carry out encrypted communication on data through public and private key pairs, each device carries out network access registration in a registration mechanism, after registration, a certification center distributes the public and private key pairs for communication of each device, and issues certification certificates and synchronously stores the certification certificates in a certificate bank; the public and private key pair consists of a public key password string and a private key password string unique to each device, and the public key password string is recorded in the authentication certificate in a public way; the private key password string is stored in a corresponding device internal proprietary module. On the basis of the original RSSP-I security defense technology, the invention utilizes public and private key to carry out encryption communication on the original data message by using the encryption technology, thereby realizing high-performance security communication under the open network environment.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a system for realizing a secure communication protocol, in particular to a system for encrypting and authenticating a railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I.
The invention relates to a method for realizing a secure communication protocol, in particular to a method for encrypting and authenticating a railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I.
Background
In the field of urban rail transit control, communication between Safety devices often needs an RSSP-I (Railway Signal Safety Protocol, type 1) Protocol, which specifies a functional structure and a Protocol for Safety-related information interaction between Signal Safety devices in a closed transmission system, and a closed network is defined in GB/T24339.1 as a "fixed number of connected devices or a fixed maximum number of connected devices, a transmission system with known and fixed characteristics, and a risk of illegal access can be ignored for this system. "the potential threats are data frame repetition, loss, insertion, disorder, error, transmission timeout, etc.
To reduce the threat risk, RSSP-I employs a series of security defense techniques including, but not limited to, sequence numbers, timestamps, source and destination identifiers, double check algorithms, etc., by which RSSP-I ensures the true integrity and real-time ordering of data packets in a closed network environment. But this also limits the applicability of the RSSP-I communication protocol so that it can only be used in systems where network attacks are not a concern.
Considering the influence of performance such as real-time performance, the RSSP-I protocol is based on the UDP (user data packet protocol) protocol for application expansion, and research data show that when the network environment becomes better, the delay and stability of network transmission are improved, and the packet loss rate of UDP can be controlled within 5%. Therefore, in order to expand the possible application scenarios of the RSSP-I protocol in the future, an encryption technology based on identity authentication is required to ensure that the RSSP-I protocol can be used in an open network environment.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is an infrastructure that supports Public key management and services of authentication, encryption, integrity and traceability, and is a technology and specification that follows international standards, and aims to establish a widely applicable infrastructure by using theoretical knowledge of Public key cryptography, and provide comprehensive security services for various network applications, so that users between networks can perform secure communication.
At the core of PKI, Certificate services are provided, and their basic entities mainly include a Registration Authority (RA), a Certificate Authority (CA), and a Certificate Repository (CR), and the PKI is based on encryption technology. The PKI system combines the public key password and the symmetric password to realize the automatic management of the key, and establishes a safe network operation environment for users, so that the users can simply and conveniently acquire digital encryption and decryption services, and the confidentiality, the integrity, the authenticity and the non-repudiation of transaction of communication data are ensured.
Digital signatures are encryption techniques that operate on data to be sent using an encryption algorithm to generate a string of data that is sent as an attachment along with the original text. The string of data can be called a signature value, which is similar to a real handwritten signature, and after the receiving party receives the original text, the authenticity of the original text can be verified through the signature value.
In the field of railway signal control, a set of special trust entities can be set, including a railway certificate registration authority RA and a railway certificate certification authority CA, and hierarchical management is implemented to realize unified authorities of various manufacturers in the field of rail transit. Each security device using RSSP-I to communicate needs to register in RA when accessing network, a public and private key pair for communication of the device is generated by using hardware password device, after formal operation, a digital signature technology is used to sign data to be sent and to check and sign received data, and the subsequent RSSP-I security defense process is started after verification is passed. The encryption processing of the communication message is realized by adding a security encryption technology to the original RSSP-I, and the applicability of the RSSP-I protocol in an open network is ensured.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to achieve the aim, the invention provides a system for encrypting and authenticating a railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I, which comprises a registration mechanism, an authentication center, a certificate bank and a plurality of devices accessed to a rail transit system network;
each of the devices communicates using RSSP-I communication protocol;
each device is registered in a registration mechanism for network access, the registration mechanism acquires and authenticates the identity of each device and provides a certificate request to a certificate authority, and the certificate authority allocates a public and private key pair for communication of each device and issues a certificate;
the public and private key pair consists of a public key password string and a private key password string unique to each device, the public key password string is publicly recorded in the authentication certificate, and the authentication certificate is synchronously stored in a certificate bank; the private key code string is stored in a corresponding device internal proprietary module;
in the communication process among the devices, the sending end device encrypts data by using a private key password string of the sending end device, and sends the encrypted data and original data to the receiving end device; the receiving end device downloads the corresponding authentication certificate of the sending end device in the certificate library to obtain the public key password string of the sending end device, decrypts the encrypted data by using the public key password string to obtain decrypted data, compares the difference between the decrypted data and the received original data, and if the decrypted data is the same as the received original data, indicates that the data is not tampered.
According to the system for encrypting and authenticating the signal safety communication protocol RSSP-I, the invention also provides a method for encrypting and authenticating the railway signal safety communication protocol RSSP-I, which specifically comprises the following steps:
s1: each device accessed to the rail transit system network through the RSSP-I protocol performs network access registration in a registration authority, acquires an authentication certificate and acquires a corresponding public and private key pair;
the public and private key pair consists of a public key password string and a private key password string unique to each device, the public key password string is publicly recorded in the authentication certificate, and the authentication certificate is stored by a certificate bank; the private key code string is stored in a corresponding device internal proprietary module;
s2: in the communication process of each device, both communication parties carry out data encryption communication through a public and private key pair;
the data encryption communication in step S2 includes that the sending end performs encryption transmission using the private key data string data and the receiving end performs decryption reception using the public key data string.
The step S2, where the sending end encrypts and sends the data, includes the following:
s21: the method comprises the steps that sending end equipment obtains data to be sent of a user;
s22: adding RSSP-I original security defense fields to data to be transmitted according to an RSSP-I communication protocol to serve as original data messages;
s23: calculating the information abstract of the original data message by using Hash operation;
s24: the sending end device calculates a digital signature value corresponding to the information abstract by using an internal private key data string, and the digital signature value is fixed in a specific length according to the key logic;
s25: splicing the digital signature value and the original data message as an integral message;
s26: and searching the configuration information of the receiving terminal equipment and sending the spliced integral message to the receiving terminal equipment.
Further, the RSSP-I original security defense field in step S22 includes a sequence number, a source address, a destination address, a timestamp, a system check word, and a redundancy check, where the source address records the device identifier of the sending end device.
Further, if the length of the digital signature value does not meet the check in step S24, go back to step S23.
Further, the current overall message is processed in the step S25, and if there are more data to be sent, the steps S21-S25 are repeated to circularly process each data to be sent until all data are processed.
In step S2, the receiving end device decrypts and receives the content including:
s27: receiving end equipment receives the whole message, and performs offset addressing in the whole message according to the fixed length of the digital signature value, and separates out the digital signature value and the original data message;
s28: acquiring an equipment identifier of sending end equipment from an original data message, downloading an authentication certificate of the equipment from a certificate library according to the equipment identifier, and acquiring a public key password string of the equipment from the authentication certificate;
s29: carrying out decryption operation on the digital signature value by using the acquired public key password string to obtain a first abstract;
s210: performing hash operation on the original data message again by using a hash operation algorithm which is common with the sending end equipment to obtain a second abstract;
s211: comparing the first abstract with the second abstract, if the first abstract and the second abstract are not equal, proving that the original data message is tampered, and sending alarm information to sending end equipment; if the two are consistent, the verification of the whole message is proved to be effective through data, and subsequent RSSP-I security verification is carried out.
If the sending-end device sends multiple pieces of data, after the step S211 finishes processing one piece of data, the steps S27-S211 are repeated to process all pieces of data in a loop.
Further, in the step S1, when the network connection between the device and the rail transit system is interrupted and the device reenters the rail transit system network, the public and private key pair needs to be updated again; or when the device certificate naturally expires, the device certificate needs to be actively applied for certificate replacement and public and private key pair updating before the deadline.
Further, in the step S2, the device of the two communicating parties agrees in advance with a hash algorithm program, a digital signature algorithm program, the device identification information of the two communicating parties, and a storage table of each device certificate library in the rail transit network environment.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. on the basis of the original RSSP-I security defense technology, digital signature encryption authentication based on PKI is superposed, so that the encryption transformation of an RSSP-I protocol can be realized, and data transmission can be performed by two communication parties based on high-performance UDP under an open network environment;
2. since the digital signature itself can detect errors such as field jump, field tampering, etc. of the original message in network transmission, even if the original data has slight change, the two message digests finally participating in comparison will show great difference, so the original RSSP-I security defense technology, such as CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check,cyclic redundancy check) The functions can be even replaced by digital signatures, or reserved to further realize multiple checks.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a view showing the construction of the overall apparatus of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an overall principle of message transmission and reception;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a process for sending a message in accordance with the present invention;
fig. 4 is a flow chart of the received message processing of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following describes a system for authenticating railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I encryption and a method thereof according to the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings and the detailed description. The advantages and features of the present invention will become more apparent from the following description.
As shown in fig. 1, in the system for encrypting and authenticating a railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I (railway signal secure protocol 1 type), a set of proprietary trust entities may be set by an authority in the field of railway signal control, and hierarchical management is implemented, wherein lower authorities default to trust upper authorities, and then to the top authorities set by the authority. If a Chinese railway signal certificate registration mechanism RA and a railway signal certificate certification authority CA are set up, and registration mechanisms RA and certification authority CA authorities of various cities of various provinces are set up according to the administrative division of the railway field, a set of top-down certificate service authorities is formed.
When each large signal manufacturer accesses any equipment which uses RSSP-I to communicate in the field of the rail transit network, the manufacturer must first perform network access registration in the city registration authority RA, generate a public and private key pair which is accessed to the equipment in the field of rail transit for communication by using hardware password equipment such as a password machine, and issue an authentication certificate. The certificate comprises public information and a public key password string of the equipment, and the information is stored in a certificate library for being downloaded by other equipment and can be inquired or verified in a Certificate Authority (CA); meanwhile, each device also generates a unique private key password string in the password machine through a key algorithm, and the generated private key password string is directly stored in a special module in the device without any external network access, so that the unique credibility of the private key password string is ensured.
When the accessed equipment is damaged and is re-accessed to the rail transit network after the network is disconnected and repaired, in order to resist uncontrollable risk caused by the damage of the private key code string of the equipment or the updated equipment information, the equipment needs to be re-accessed to the rail transit network, a public and private key pair for communication is re-acquired, and an authentication certificate is re-issued; or when the device certificate naturally expires, the device needs to actively apply for certificate replacement and public-private key pair updating before the deadline.
By adopting the system and the method for encrypting and authenticating the railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I, disclosed by the invention, as shown in the principle of figure 2, the sending end equipment carries out Hash (Hash) operation on an original data message once to obtain a Hash value, namely an information abstract, and then uses an internally stored private key password string and an encryption algorithm to encrypt the information abstract to generate a digital signature value, and the digital signature value is attached to the original data message and is sent to the receiving end equipment. After receiving the message, the receiving end equipment firstly uses the public key password string and the decryption algorithm of the sending end equipment to decrypt the digital signature value to obtain a first abstract, then carries out the same Hash operation on the original data message once to obtain another second abstract, and if the first abstract and the second abstract obtained by the two operations are consistent, the receiving end equipment receives the original data message which is not maliciously tampered.
The sending end device encryption sending process is specifically shown in fig. 3, and includes the following steps:
s21: the sending terminal equipment obtains data UserData to be sent by a user through a functional interface and other forms;
s22: according to an RSSP-I communication protocol, adding an RSSP-I original security defense field to data to be sent to generate an original data message Msg; the original security defense field comprises a serial number SN, a source address SrcID, a destination address DestID, a TimeStamp TimeStamp, a system check word ChkWord and a redundancy check CRC, and the equipment identification ID of the sending end equipment can be obtained from the source address SrcID;
s23: calculating an information summary MsgDig of the original data message Msg by utilizing Hash operation;
s24: the sending end equipment encrypts the message digest MsgDig by using an internally stored private key password string, calculates a corresponding digital signature value DigSig, fixes the digital signature value DigSig at a certain specific length according to key logic, returns to the step S23 if the length of the current digital signature value DigSig does not accord with verification, and performs hash operation on the original data message Msg again to obtain the message digest;
s25: splicing the digital signature value DigSig and the original data message Msg as an integral message; after the data is processed, if a plurality of pieces of data which are not transmitted remain, repeating the steps S21-S25 for a plurality of times to circularly package the data to be transmitted until all data packages are completed, and forming a plurality of spliced integral messages;
s26: and searching the configuration information of the receiving terminal equipment and sending all spliced integral messages to the receiving terminal equipment.
The decryption receiving process of the receiving end device is specifically shown in fig. 4, and includes the following steps:
s27: receiving end equipment receives the whole message, performs offset addressing in the whole message according to the fixed length of the digital signature value, and separates out a digital signature value DigSig and an original data message Msg;
s28: acquiring an equipment Identification (ID) of sending end equipment from an original data message Msg, determining an authentication certificate storage position of the sending end equipment from an authentication Center (CA) according to the equipment Identification (ID), downloading the authentication certificate to a specified certificate bank, and acquiring a public key password string of the sending end equipment from the authentication certificate;
when the authentication certificate is acquired, the CA can position whether the authentication certificate of the sending end equipment exists in the CA of the current stage or the CA of the upper stage according to the equipment identification ID of the sending end equipment, then the CA sequentially traces back until the authentication certificate of the sending end equipment is acquired, and if the CA cannot check the authentication certificate of the sending end equipment or the failure of the authentication certificate is checked up to the CA of the upper stage, the whole message is discarded and a certificate acquisition failure notice is sent to the sending end equipment;
s29: the receiving end equipment uses the acquired public key password string of the sending end equipment to carry out decryption operation on the digital signature value DigSig by using a digital signature decryption algorithm to obtain a first digest MsgDig 1;
s210: the receiving end equipment performs hash operation on the original data message Msg again by using a hash operation algorithm which is common with the sending end equipment to obtain a second abstract MsgDig 2;
s211: comparing the first abstract MsgDig1 with the second abstract MsgDig2, if the two abstracts are not equal, proving that the original data message Msg is tampered, and sending alarm information to sending end equipment; if the two are consistent, the verification of the whole message is passed and the data is valid, and subsequent RSSP-I security verification is carried out.
If the sending-end device sends multiple whole messages, the steps S27-S211 need to be repeated multiple times, and all the whole messages are processed one by one.
In the invention, the equipment of the two communication parties has a Hash algorithm program, a digital signature algorithm program, equipment identification information of the two communication parties and a storage table of each equipment certificate library in a rail transit network environment in advance.
Embodiments provided by the present invention may include the following scenarios:
scene one: and the vehicle-mounted equipment transmits and the interlocking equipment receives. For example, the vehicle-mounted device with the number SID of 0xC1 sends a data message to request the current state of the signal machine of the road segment number 1; the vehicle-mounted application program firstly assembles own data UserData and then calls a protocol entry function, the protocol firstly packages data according to a standard RSSP-I protocol, and by taking the vehicle-mounted equipment with a serial number SID of 0xC1 as an example, a source address SrcID of 0xC1, a destination address DestID of 0xB1, a serial number SN of 0x1234, a timestamp of 0x5678, a CRC of 0xABCD and the like can be set, wherein the assembled data is called an original data message Msg, then an information digest MsgDig is obtained by applying a hash algorithm to the original data message Msg, a private key string Pri _ c1 of the vehicle-mounted equipment is extracted to encrypt the information digest MsgDig to obtain a digital signature value Digsg with a fixed length of 256 bits, and finally the digital signature value Digsg and the original data message Msg are spliced to form an integral message which is sent to the interlocking equipment.
After receiving the whole message, the interlocking device temporarily stores the data, and then circularly analyzes the whole message. Firstly, separating a digital signature value DigSig and an original data message Msg according to the inherent length deviation 256bit of the digital signature value DigSig being 32 bytes, then calling a certificate library positioned from a certificate authority CA to download an authentication certificate on one hand, taking a source address SrcID being 0xC1 as an equipment identification ID to obtain a public key password string PubKey _ c1 of the vehicle-mounted equipment from the authentication certificate, and carrying out decryption operation on the digital signature value DigSig to obtain a first digest MsgDig 1; on the other hand, the interlocking device performs hash operation on the original data message Msg again to obtain a second digest MsgDig2, compares the first digest MsgDig1 with the second digest MsgDig2, and only if the two digests are completely consistent, the whole message passes verification, and is temporarily stored in a waiting queue for performing subsequent original defense verification of the RSSP-I.
The Hash algorithm for the original data packet may use a standard MD5(Message-digest algorithm5, fifth version of the Message digest algorithm) or SHA1(secure Hash algorithm), or may add a suitable check logic based on the algorithm, such as MsgDig-Hash (Msg, MD 5); the encryption operation of the message digest by the private key code string may refer to standard RSA, ECC or SM2 algorithms, such as DigSig ═ Encrypt (PriKey _ c1, MsgDig, RSA); a certificate library located from a certificate authority CA can be downloaded to a receiving end device in advance or acquired through temporary communication, a hash table HashTable can be established locally to store a mass certificate, and a public key password string is directly acquired by using a device identification ID index when the mass certificate is in use, for example, PubKey _ c1 is SearchHashTable (0xC 1); when a public key cryptogram is used for decrypting a digital signature value, the decryption operation referred to corresponds to the encryption (the same type of encryption and decryption operation, and a public and private key pair matched with equipment), such as MsgDig1 (decryption) (PubKey _ c1, DigSig, RSA); then, the second digest MsgDig2 is obtained by re-hashing (Msg, MD 5); finally, the first digest MsgDig1 and the second digest MsgDig2 are compared to determine whether the whole message is valid.
Only if the resolution is completely correct and there is no fault in the program, MsgDig 1-MsgDig 2 is obtained. For example, when analyzing a message sent from a vehicle, if the check result ckr (check result) is complex (MsgDig1, MsgDig2) is 0, which indicates that MsgDig1 is consistent with MsgDig2, the original data message Msg is transferred to a waiting queue to wait for subsequent processing.
If an original data message sent by the vehicle-mounted equipment is maliciously intercepted and fault is injected when the original data message is transmitted through a network, because the public key infrastructure PKI ensures the unique credibility of a private key password string, the first digest MsgDig1 obtained after the digital signature value DigSig is decrypted can only be a uniquely determined value, and because the Hash operation is in the relative safety of the existing stage, any bit change of the artificially attacked data message (for example, the original data message Msg is changed into Msg ^) can cause the Hash operation to obtain another digest value MsgDig2^ which is MsgDig1 ≠ MsgDig2, the verification cannot be passed, and the original data message is discarded.
If the original data message sent by the vehicle-mounted equipment has faults of random jump, invalid memory value and the like when being transmitted through a network, 1) if the faults occur in the original data message Msg, the analysis step is equal to that the original data message is maliciously attacked MsgDig1 ≠ MsgDig2^, and the original data message is discarded; 2) if the fault occurs in the digital signature value DigSig, because the digital signature value itself has changed, the decrypted value MsgDig1 of the Decrypt (PubKey _ c1, DigSig, RSA) is also another digest value MsgDig1, finally, MsgDig1 ≠ MsgDig2 is obtained, and the original data message is discarded; 3) if the fault occurs in the original data message Msg and the digital signature value DigSig at the same time, MsgDig1 ≠ MsgDig2, and the original data message is discarded. Considering the most extreme case, the fault occurs in the original data message Msg and the digital signature value DigSig at the same time, and the calculated MsgDig1^ MsgDig2^ is also made by the method, the probability is extremely low, and the method can not be considered in the existing password security field basically.
If the vehicle-mounted device has an error fault when the original data message is assembled (before network transmission), and an error message digest MsgDig and an error digital signature value DigSig are calculated according to the error message digest MsgDig and the error digital signature value DigSig, at this time, after the interlocking device receives the whole message, the interlocking device analyzes the whole message to obtain an error first digest MsgDig1 and an error second digest MsgDig2, but at this time, MsgDig1 is equal to MsgDig2, and the error per se exceeds the protection range of the digital signature, because the encryption authentication can only protect against acquired errors of the original data message, but cannot protect against original inherent errors of the original data message. However, such errors (non-user data UserData errors) can be detected by the original RSSP-I security defense technology, which causes the original RSSP-I double check to fail during the subsequent processing of the original data packet, and the original data packet is still discarded.
After the program is error-reported, the received whole message is regarded as invalid, the interlocking device can automatically determine whether to reply the message to the vehicle-mounted device or not according to the error type, or both sides agree a timeout time, and once the reply message is not received within the specified time, the vehicle-mounted device of the sender repeatedly sends the last message until action responses of other safety systems are triggered.
Scene two: and sending by the interlocking equipment and receiving by the vehicle-mounted equipment. After the interlocking device has analyzed the data message and obtained the state of the signal machine, the whole message of the interlocking device can be packaged through the encryption authentication communication protocol of the invention, for example, the current state of the signal machine number 2 (SrcID 0xB2) is sent to the vehicle number 2 (DestID 0xC2), the interlocking device can assemble the original data message Msg, then hash the original data message Msg to obtain the information digest MsgDig, extract the private key string PriKey _ b2 of the interlocking device to encrypt the information digest MsgDig to obtain the digital signature value DigSig, finally splice the digital signature value DigSig and the original data message Msg and send the result to the corresponding vehicle-mounted device.
The main flow and the processing steps are consistent with the scene of vehicle-mounted sending interlocking receiving, only the roles of a sending party and a receiving party are exchanged, and meanwhile, a public and private key pair for encrypting and decrypting the original data message is also changed into a public and private key pair of the interlocking equipment. The different steps are arranged according to the flow as follows:
MsgDig＝Hash(Msg，MD5)；
DigSig＝Encrypt(PriKey_b2，MsgDig，RSA)；
PubKey_b2＝SearchHashTable(0xB2)；
MsgDig1＝Decrypt(PubKey_b2，DigSig，RSA)；
MsgDig2＝Hash(Msg，MD5)；
after the whole message of the interlocking device is sent out and received by the vehicle-mounted device, the vehicle-mounted device finally checks whether the check result CKR ═ match (MsgDig1, MsgDig2) is 0 or not so as to detect whether the data message itself has errors or is tampered in the transmission process. The analysis that the data message is maliciously tampered in network transmission and the analysis that errors occur when the interlocking device sends the data message are similar to a scene, and finally the errors can be detected by the vehicle-mounted application, so that the safe communication of the data message is ensured.
The invention has the following beneficial effects: on the basis of the original RSSP-I security defense technology, digital signature encryption authentication based on PKI is superposed, so that the encryption transformation of an RSSP-I protocol can be realized, and data transmission can be performed by two communication parties based on high-performance UDP under an open network environment; because the digital signature can detect errors such as field jump, field tampering and the like of the original message in network transmission, even if the original data is slightly changed, the two digital signatures which finally participate in comparison show great difference, the original RSSP-I security defense technology, such as CRC and other functions, can be replaced by the digital signature, or the digital signature is reserved to further realize multiple checks.
While the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, it should be understood that the above description should not be taken as limiting the invention. Various modifications and alterations to this invention will become apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the foregoing description. Accordingly, the scope of the invention should be determined from the following claims.
Claims (10)
1. A system for secure communication protocol RSSP-I encryption authentication for railway signals, comprising: the system comprises a registration mechanism, an authentication center, a certificate bank and a plurality of devices accessed to a rail transit system network;
each of the devices communicates using RSSP-I communication protocol;
each device is registered in a registration mechanism for network access, the registration mechanism acquires and authenticates the identity of each device and provides a certificate request to a certificate authority, and the certificate authority allocates a public and private key pair for communication of each device and issues a certificate;
the public and private key pair consists of a public key password string and a private key password string unique to each device, the public key password string is publicly recorded in the authentication certificate, and the authentication certificate is synchronously stored in a certificate bank; the private key code string is stored in a corresponding device internal proprietary module;
in the communication process among the devices, the sending end device encrypts data by using a private key password string of the sending end device, and sends the encrypted data and original data to the receiving end device; the receiving end device downloads the corresponding authentication certificate of the sending end device in the certificate library to obtain the public key password string of the sending end device, decrypts the encrypted data by using the public key password string to obtain decrypted data, compares the difference between the decrypted data and the received original data, and if the decrypted data is the same as the received original data, indicates that the data is not tampered.
2. A method for encrypting and authenticating a railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I, comprising the steps of:
s1: each device accessed to the rail transit system network through the RSSP-I protocol performs network access registration in a registration authority, acquires an authentication certificate and acquires a corresponding public and private key pair;
the public and private key pair consists of a public key password string and a private key password string unique to each device, the public key password string is publicly recorded in the authentication certificate, and the authentication certificate is stored by a certificate bank; the private key code string is stored in a corresponding device internal proprietary module;
s2: in the communication process of each device, both communication parties carry out data encryption communication through a public and private key pair;
the data encryption communication in step S2 includes that the sending end device encrypts and sends data by using the private key password string, and the receiving end device decrypts and receives encrypted data by using the public key password string of the sending end device.
3. The method for encrypting and authenticating the railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I as claimed in claim 2, wherein the step S2, the sending end device encrypting and sending the data, comprises:
s21: the method comprises the steps that sending end equipment obtains data to be sent of a user;
s22: adding RSSP-I original security defense fields to data to be transmitted according to an RSSP-I communication protocol to serve as original data messages;
s23: calculating the information abstract of the original data message by using Hash operation;
s24: the sending end device calculates a digital signature value corresponding to the information digest by using an internal private key password string, and the digital signature value is fixed in a specific length according to the key logic;
s25: splicing the digital signature value and the original data message as an integral message;
s26: and searching the configuration information of the receiving terminal equipment and sending the spliced integral message to the receiving terminal equipment.
4. The method for cryptographic authentication of a railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I as claimed in claim 3, wherein the RSSP-I original security defense field of the step S22 includes a sequence number, a source address, a destination address, a timestamp, a system check word, a redundancy check, and the source address records the device identification of the sending end device.
5. The method for railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I encryption authentication as claimed in claim 3, wherein if the digital signature value length of step S24 does not conform to the check, then go back to step S23.
6. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the step S25 is completed by processing the whole message, and if there are more data to be transmitted, the steps S21-S25 are repeated to process each data to be transmitted circularly until all data are processed.
7. The method for railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I encryption authentication as recited in claim 3,
the step S2 is that the receiving end device decrypts and receives the content including:
s27: receiving end equipment receives the whole message, and performs offset addressing in the whole message according to the fixed length of the digital signature value, and separates out the digital signature value and the original data message;
s28: acquiring an equipment identifier of sending end equipment from an original data message, downloading an authentication certificate of the equipment from a certificate library according to the equipment identifier, and acquiring a public key password string of the equipment from the authentication certificate;
s29: carrying out decryption operation on the digital signature value by using the acquired public key password string to obtain a first abstract;
s210: performing hash operation on the original data message again by using a hash operation algorithm which is common with the sending end equipment to obtain a second abstract;
s211: comparing the first abstract with the second abstract, if the first abstract and the second abstract are not equal, proving that the original data message is tampered, and sending alarm information to sending end equipment; if the two are consistent, the verification of the whole message is proved to be effective through data, and subsequent RSSP-I security verification is carried out.
8. The method for performing encryption authentication on the railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I as claimed in claim 7, wherein if the sending end device sends a plurality of pieces of data, after processing one of the pieces of data in the step S211, the steps S27-S211 are repeated to process all the pieces of data in a loop.
9. The method for encrypting and authenticating the railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I as claimed in claim 2, wherein the step S1 is carried out again when the device and the rail transit system are disconnected in network connection and re-enter the rail transit system network; or when the device certificate naturally expires, the device needs to actively apply for certificate replacement and public-private key pair updating before the deadline.
10. The method for railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I encryption authentication as recited in claim 2, wherein said step S2, the devices of both communicating parties agree in advance with a hash algorithm program, a digital signature algorithm program, device identification information of communication double-transmission, and a storage table of each device certificate library in the rail transit network environment.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202110500349.1A CN113242235A (en) | 2021-05-08 | 2021-05-08 | System and method for encrypting and authenticating railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202110500349.1A CN113242235A (en) | 2021-05-08 | 2021-05-08 | System and method for encrypting and authenticating railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN113242235A true CN113242235A (en) | 2021-08-10 |
Family
ID=77132667
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202110500349.1A Pending CN113242235A (en) | 2021-05-08 | 2021-05-08 | System and method for encrypting and authenticating railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN113242235A (en) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN113904789A (en) * | 2021-08-17 | 2022-01-07 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Encryption method, equipment and storage medium of railway safety communication protocol |
| CN114745180A (en) * | 2022-04-11 | 2022-07-12 | 中国南方电网有限责任公司 | Access authentication method and device and computer equipment |
Citations (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102710605A (en) * | 2012-05-08 | 2012-10-03 | 重庆大学 | Information security management and control method under cloud manufacturing environment |
| CN103888438A (en) * | 2013-03-01 | 2014-06-25 | 上海富欣智能交通控制有限公司 | Train data communication system using information safety technology |
| CN106506470A (en) * | 2016-10-31 | 2017-03-15 | 大唐高鸿信安（浙江）信息科技有限公司 | network data security transmission method |
| CN109347886A (en) * | 2018-12-11 | 2019-02-15 | 西安理工大学 | A kind of optimization method of the cipher key center of RSSP-II agreement |
| CN110023170A (en) * | 2016-11-25 | 2019-07-16 | 西门子移动有限公司 | For running the method for the railway system and the vehicle of the railway system |
| CN111343606A (en) * | 2020-02-26 | 2020-06-26 | 中南大学 | Safety protection method and device for train data |
| CN112003691A (en) * | 2020-07-02 | 2020-11-27 | 北京交通大学 | Distributed key management system applied to urban rail transit |
| CN112769773A (en) * | 2020-12-24 | 2021-05-07 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Railway security communication protocol simulation system based on state cryptographic algorithm |
-
2021
- 2021-05-08 CN CN202110500349.1A patent/CN113242235A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102710605A (en) * | 2012-05-08 | 2012-10-03 | 重庆大学 | Information security management and control method under cloud manufacturing environment |
| CN103888438A (en) * | 2013-03-01 | 2014-06-25 | 上海富欣智能交通控制有限公司 | Train data communication system using information safety technology |
| CN106506470A (en) * | 2016-10-31 | 2017-03-15 | 大唐高鸿信安（浙江）信息科技有限公司 | network data security transmission method |
| CN110023170A (en) * | 2016-11-25 | 2019-07-16 | 西门子移动有限公司 | For running the method for the railway system and the vehicle of the railway system |
| CN109347886A (en) * | 2018-12-11 | 2019-02-15 | 西安理工大学 | A kind of optimization method of the cipher key center of RSSP-II agreement |
| CN111343606A (en) * | 2020-02-26 | 2020-06-26 | 中南大学 | Safety protection method and device for train data |
| CN112003691A (en) * | 2020-07-02 | 2020-11-27 | 北京交通大学 | Distributed key management system applied to urban rail transit |
| CN112769773A (en) * | 2020-12-24 | 2021-05-07 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Railway security communication protocol simulation system based on state cryptographic algorithm |
Non-Patent Citations (3)
| Title |
|---|
| 周婕: "PKI系统加密算法应用研究", 《计算机与数字工程》 * |
| 康剑萍等: "PKI技术在信息安全中的应用", 《自动化仪表》 * |
| 郑丽萍等: "一种基于摘要口令加密私钥的数字签名模式", 《计算机安全》 * |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN113904789A (en) * | 2021-08-17 | 2022-01-07 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Encryption method, equipment and storage medium of railway safety communication protocol |
| CN113904789B (en) * | 2021-08-17 | 2024-03-29 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Encryption method, equipment and storage medium of railway safety communication protocol |
| CN114745180A (en) * | 2022-04-11 | 2022-07-12 | 中国南方电网有限责任公司 | Access authentication method and device and computer equipment |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US11128477B2 (en) | Electronic certification system | |
| US10516662B2 (en) | System and method for authenticating the legitimacy of a request for a resource by a user | |
| US7979707B2 (en) | Secure seed generation protocol | |
| JP3858527B2 (en) | Data generation apparatus, data verification apparatus and method | |
| US7584505B2 (en) | Inspected secure communication protocol | |
| EP1635502B1 (en) | Session control server and communication system | |
| CN113923044B (en) | Cross-chain system and method based on trusted execution environment | |
| JP2018121328A (en) | Event certificate for electronic device | |
| US20100228968A1 (en) | Split termination of secure communication sessions with mutual certificate-based authentication | |
| US20070257813A1 (en) | Secure network bootstrap of devices in an automatic meter reading network | |
| TW201412075A (en) | Secure key storage systems, methods and apparatuses | |
| CN111614621B (en) | Internet of things communication method and system | |
| US10586065B2 (en) | Method for secure data management in a computer network | |
| CN111080299B (en) | Anti-repudiation method for transaction information, client and server | |
| CN109905384B (en) | Data migration method and system | |
| CN106470103B (en) | Method and system for sending encrypted URL request by client | |
| KR20030019344A (en) | Confidential data communication method | |
| CN113242235A (en) | System and method for encrypting and authenticating railway signal secure communication protocol RSSP-I | |
| CN111884811A (en) | Block chain-based data evidence storing method and data evidence storing platform | |
| JP2001177513A (en) | Authenticating method in communication system, center equipment, and recording medium with authentication program recorded thereon | |
| CN113709734A (en) | Unmanned aerial vehicle distributed identity authentication method based on block chain | |
| CN104468074A (en) | Method and equipment for authentication between applications | |
| CN110995671A (en) | Communication method and system | |
| CN110830413A (en) | Communication method, client, server, communication device and system | |
| CN114422266A (en) | IDaaS system based on dual verification mechanism |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |
Application publication date: 20210810 |
|
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |