CN113190584A - Concealed trace query method based on oblivious transmission protocol - Google Patents
Concealed trace query method based on oblivious transmission protocol Download PDFInfo
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- CN113190584A CN113190584A CN202110369782.6A CN202110369782A CN113190584A CN 113190584 A CN113190584 A CN 113190584A CN 202110369782 A CN202110369782 A CN 202110369782A CN 113190584 A CN113190584 A CN 113190584A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
- G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
- G06F16/24—Querying
- G06F16/245—Query processing
- G06F16/2457—Query processing with adaptation to user needs
- G06F16/24578—Query processing with adaptation to user needs using ranking
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6227—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
- G06F21/6254—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes by anonymising data, e.g. decorrelating personal data from the owner's identification
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q40/00—Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
- G06Q40/03—Credit; Loans; Processing thereof
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of computer information, and particularly relates to an implicit track query method for an accidental transmission protocol. The method and the device solve the technical problems that the user privacy data plaintext transmission is easy to steal by hackers and easy to steal by other banks or other loan institutions in the prior art. The invention combines the cryptography and the multi-party safety theory and can simultaneously solve the defects. In the invention, before inquiring the third-party data of a certain user, the bank management system sets K-1 pieces of identification number information different from the identification number to be inquired, and the bank sends N identification numbers to a three-party data company for inquiry, wherein N is K. And simultaneously, the three-party data company returns the encrypted sensitive information of the N users. The risk that the private data of the plaintext transmission user can be stolen by a hacker is avoided through encryption; through the mode of careless transmission, let the third party data platform can't know the concrete customer who of bank is who, avoided the danger that the big data asset of bank was stolen.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of computer information, and particularly relates to an implicit track query method for an accidental transmission protocol.
Background
In the field of banks, current policy processing such as wind control, fraud prevention, money laundering prevention and the like depends on credit investigation records of users, and meanwhile, data of the users in various third-party data companies are required to be used, so that various risk indexes of the users can be calculated more accurately, and the data of the third-party data companies play an increasingly important role in the bank industry.
At present, the method for acquiring third-party data is mainly called through a remote API, a bank informs a third-party data company by sending sensitive information of a user, and after receiving user identification information, the third-party data company inquires the third-party data of the user in a big data system of the third-party data company and returns the third-party data to the bank.
The bank acquires the third-party data of the user in the above way, and has the following two disadvantages:
1. the clear text transmission of the private data of the user is easy to steal by hackers;
2. the three-party data company can know which users are the customers of the bank by recording the calling record of the bank, thereby possibly leading the customer data of the bank to be stolen by other banks or other loan institutions.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides an implicit track query method based on an oblivious transmission protocol, which aims to solve the technical problems that the user privacy data plaintext transmission mentioned in the prior art is easy to be stolen by hackers and other banks or other loan institutions.
An implicit track query method based on an oblivious transmission protocol comprises the following steps:
step 1: the management system prepares the identity card number of the client to be checked and sets K-1 identity card numbers different from the identity card number of the client to be checked, wherein K is more than or equal to 2; meanwhile, the management system needs to generate a large random number r at the moment;
step 2: the management system sends N identification numbers to a third-party data platform in a list form, wherein N is equal to K, and the N comprises the identification number of the client to be checked and K-1 identification numbers which are different from the identification number of the client to be checked and are set by the management system; meanwhile, the management system records an index label i of a client to be checked in the list;
and step 3: the third-party data platform inquires the sensitive data corresponding to the N clients and assembles the sensitive data into a list in sequence;
and 4, step 4: the third-party data platform generates public key-secret key pairs of N asymmetric encryption algorithms, encrypts sensitive data of N users respectively according to the sequence, assembles the encrypted information into a list elist according to the sequence, assembles N encrypted public keys into a list plist according to the sequence, and sends the elist and the plist to a bank simultaneously;
and 5: the management system records the index number i in the step 2, extracts a corresponding encryption private key plist [ i ] from the received plist, encrypts the maximum random number R generated in the step 1 by using the public key to obtain R, and then sends the R to a third-party data platform;
step 6, the third-party data platform respectively uses the N private keys to decrypt the received R, and respectively carries out XOR on the decryption results of the N private keys to obtain an XOR list xor _ list which is sent to the management system;
and 7: and (3) directly acquiring the data xor _ list [ i ] of the corresponding index of the received XOR list by the management system according to the index number i in the step (2), executing r ^ xor _ list [ i ] by the bank to obtain a private key capable of decrypting the elist [ i ], and then decrypting the elist [ i ] to obtain the information of the client x to be checked.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that: when the three-party data interface returns, data are encrypted, and the danger that private data of a plaintext transmission user can be stolen by a hacker is avoided; and by means of manufacturing of the confusion data, a third-party data platform cannot know who a specific customer of a bank is, so that the danger that big data assets of the bank are stolen is avoided.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the principles of the present invention;
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The management system of the present invention is a bank management system, but the present invention is not limited thereto, and the present invention is not limited to the bank management system.
Referring to fig. 1, the method for track-hiding query based on an oblivious transmission protocol according to the present invention includes the following steps:
step 1: the management system prepares the identity card number of the client to be checked and sets K-1 identity card numbers different from the identity card number of the client to be checked, wherein K is more than or equal to 2; meanwhile, the management system needs to generate a large random number r at the moment;
step 2: the management system sends N identification numbers to a third-party data platform in a list form, wherein N is equal to K, and the N comprises the identification number of the client to be checked and K-1 identification numbers which are different from the identification number of the client to be checked and are set by the management system; meanwhile, the management system records an index label i of a client to be checked in the list;
and step 3: the third-party data platform inquires the sensitive data corresponding to the N clients and assembles the sensitive data into a list in sequence;
and 4, step 4: the third-party data platform generates public key-secret key pairs of N asymmetric encryption algorithms, encrypts sensitive data of N users respectively according to the sequence, assembles the encrypted information into a list elist according to the sequence, assembles N encrypted public keys into a list plist according to the sequence, and sends the elist and the plist to a bank simultaneously;
and 5: the management system records the index number i in the step 2, extracts a corresponding encryption private key plist [ i ] from the received plist, encrypts the maximum random number R generated in the step 1 by using the public key to obtain R, and then sends the R to a third-party data platform;
step 6, the third-party data platform respectively uses the N private keys to decrypt the received R, and respectively carries out XOR on the decryption results of the N private keys to obtain an XOR list xor _ list which is sent to the management system;
and 7: and (3) directly acquiring the data xor _ list [ i ] of the corresponding index of the received XOR list by the management system according to the index number i in the step (2), executing r ^ xor _ list [ i ] by the bank to obtain a private key capable of decrypting the elist [ i ], and then decrypting the elist [ i ] to obtain the information of the client x to be checked.
The invention is further described below by way of example:
the management system is a bank management system;
corresponding to the step 1: when the k is 2, the customer identification number to be checked displayed in the bank management system is x, and 1 real identification number y different from the customer identification number x to be checked is set; simultaneously generating a large random number r with 1024 bits; the value range of the large random number r is preferably between 1024 bits and 2048 bits; the problem that the system efficiency is low due to overlarge random numbers is avoided;
corresponding to the step 2: the bank management system sends the list [ y, x ] to a third-party data platform; when the index number i is 1; the bank management system records the index number;
corresponding to the step 3: the third-party data platform respectively inquires the user information Y of the Y and the user information X of the X; obtaining an information list [ Y, X ] according to the list sequence received in the step 2;
corresponding to the step 4: the third party data platform generates public-private key pairs for two RSAs: (Pub1, Pri1) and (Pub2, Pri2), then E1(Y) of the information Y is encrypted using Pub 1; encrypting information X with Pub2 to obtain E2(X), and assembling elist ═ E1(Y), E2(X) ] and plist ═ Pub1, Pub2 in sequence and sending to a bank management system; at this time, the bank management system has no private key, so that both encrypted information in elist can not be decrypted, but because the bank records that i is 1 in step 2, the bank knows that the information of the client X to be checked is stored in E2(X), and only the bank can not decrypt the information temporarily;
corresponding to the step 5: extracting a corresponding encryption public key plist [ i ] from the received plist by the index number i recorded in the step 2 of the bank management system, encrypting the large random number R generated in the step 1 by using the public key to obtain R, and then sending the R to a third-party data platform by the bank management system;
corresponding to the step 6: the third party data platform decrypts R using Pri1 and Pri2, respectively, with D1(R) and D2(R), respectively, and then since the bank management system is encrypted using Pub2, it is clear that D2(R) ═ R, and D1(R) is an unpredictable value for both parties. And then, the third-party data platform respectively performs exclusive or operation on the private keys according to the decryption result to obtain a list: [ D1(R) ] Pri1, and D2(R) ] Pri2 ═ xor _ list are sent to the bank management system.
Corresponding to the step 7: the bank management system receives [ D1(R) ] Pri1, D2(R) ] Pri2], and the bank management system knows that D2(R) · R, then directly extracts D2(R) ] Pri2 according to the record of i ═ 1 in step 2, and directly xors it with. From the exclusive or characteristic, it is known that R ≦ D2(R) ≦ Pri2 ≦ R ≦ Pri2 ≦ Pri 2. The bank then takes the decryption private key of E2(X) and decrypts the last tape query client information X of E2(X) by Pri 2.
Since D1(R) is data obtained by encrypting with Pub2 and then decrypting with Pri1, it is impossible for the bank management system to calculate Pri1 from the information it grasps. Meanwhile, for the third-party data platform, because only one random number R encrypted by a certain public key is received in step 6, the third-party data platform knows that the bank management system can only unlock one piece of information, and only does not know which one.
The invention adopts asymmetric encryption, preferably adopting RSA type encryption scheme and Paillier encryption; when an RSA type encryption scheme is adopted, a public key and a private key can be one-time pad; when Paillier encryption is adopted, only one-time public key and one-time private key are generated, random numbers are generated during encryption and transmitted, and one-time pad can be achieved.
The step 1 also comprises desensitizing and coding the N identification numbers by technical means such as SHA-256 or MD 5; further protecting the privacy of the user; and the N comprises the identity card number of the client to be checked and K-1 identity card numbers which are set by the management system and are different from the identity card number of the client to be checked.
All returned data are asymmetrically encrypted, and other people cannot crack the data without a private key.
It will be evident to those skilled in the art that the invention is not limited to the details of the foregoing illustrative embodiments, and that the present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential attributes thereof. The present embodiments are therefore to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive, the scope of the invention being indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description, and all changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are therefore intended to be embraced therein. Any reference sign in a claim should not be construed as limiting the claim concerned.
Furthermore, it should be understood that although the present description refers to embodiments, not every embodiment may contain only a single embodiment, and such description is for clarity only, and those skilled in the art should integrate the description, and the embodiments may be combined as appropriate to form other embodiments understood by those skilled in the art.
Claims (5)
1. An implicit track query method based on an oblivious transmission protocol is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
step 1: the management system prepares the identity card number of the client to be checked and sets K-1 identity card numbers different from the identity card number of the client to be checked, wherein K is more than or equal to 2; meanwhile, the management system needs to generate a large random number r at the moment;
step 2: the management system sends N identification numbers to a third-party data platform in a list form, wherein N is equal to K, and the N comprises the identification number of the client to be checked and K-1 identification numbers which are different from the identification number of the client to be checked and are set by the management system; meanwhile, the management system records an index label i of a client to be checked in the list;
and step 3: the third-party data platform inquires the sensitive data corresponding to the N clients and assembles the sensitive data into a list in sequence;
and 4, step 4: the third-party data platform generates public key-secret key pairs of N asymmetric encryption algorithms, encrypts sensitive data of N users respectively according to the sequence, assembles the encrypted information into a list elist according to the sequence, assembles N encrypted public keys into a list plist according to the sequence, and sends the elist and the plist to a bank simultaneously;
and 5: the management system records the index number i in the step 2, extracts a corresponding encryption private key plist [ i ] from the received plist, encrypts the maximum random number R generated in the step 1 by using the public key to obtain R, and then sends the R to a third-party data platform;
step 6, the third-party data platform respectively uses the N private keys to decrypt the received R, and respectively carries out XOR on the decryption results of the N private keys to obtain an XOR list xor _ list which is sent to the management system;
and 7: and (3) directly acquiring the data xor _ list [ i ] of the corresponding index of the received XOR list by the management system according to the index number i in the step (2), executing r ^ xor _ list [ i ] by the bank to obtain a private key capable of decrypting the elist [ i ], and then decrypting the elist [ i ] to obtain the information of the client x to be checked.
2. The implicit trace query method based on an oblivious transmission protocol as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: the step 1 also comprises desensitizing and coding the N identification numbers by using an SHA-256 or MD5 technical means; and the N comprises the identity card number of the client to be checked and K-1 identity card numbers which are set by the management system and are different from the identity card number of the client to be checked.
3. The implicit trace query method based on an oblivious transmission protocol as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: the asymmetric encryption adopts RSA or Paillier encryption.
4. The implicit trace query method based on an oblivious transmission protocol according to claim 3, characterized in that: when Paillier encryption is adopted, a public key and a private key are generated only once, and random numbers are generated and transmitted in the encryption process.
5. The implicit trace query method based on an oblivious transmission protocol as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: the large random number r ranges from 1024 bits to 2048 bits.
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Cited By (5)
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| CN114143000A (en) * | 2021-11-29 | 2022-03-04 | 百保(上海)科技有限公司 | Secret trace query method and device based on careless transmission protocol and secret sharing |
| CN114611152A (en) * | 2022-05-10 | 2022-06-10 | 富算科技(上海)有限公司 | Query method and query system |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN114691759A (en) * | 2022-06-01 | 2022-07-01 | 平安科技（深圳）有限公司 | Data query statistical method, device, computer equipment and storage medium |
| CN114691759B (en) * | 2022-06-01 | 2022-09-06 | 平安科技（深圳）有限公司 | Data query statistical method, device, computer equipment and storage medium |
| CN114840866A (en) * | 2022-07-01 | 2022-08-02 | 北京融数联智科技有限公司 | Data query method, device and system based on blind signature data confusion |
| CN114840866B (en) * | 2022-07-01 | 2022-10-11 | 北京融数联智科技有限公司 | Data query method, device and system based on blind signature data confusion |
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| CN113190584B (en) | 2022-06-21 |
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