CN113163495B - Bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method based on cloud cluster purchase platform - Google Patents
Bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method based on cloud cluster purchase platform Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
According to the bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method based on the cloud group purchase platform, a seller reports a resource capable of being shot; the platform divides resources into resource blocks and issues resource block information; the buyer can quote price and report the buyer position information according to the self requirement and the information of the frequency spectrum resource block of the platform; the platform divides independent sets according to the position information of the buyers to form group buying groups and carries out auction; and finally, comparing the two sides of the result to finish the transaction. The buyer obtains the spectrum usage right of the period and pays. The method guarantees the benefits of both buyers and sellers, gives consideration to the fairness of distribution results, avoids the possibility that resources are monopolized by a few main bodies, distributes all spectrum resources comprehensively and reasonably, and improves the spectrum utilization rate.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of spectrum resource allocation, in particular to a cloud cluster purchase platform-based bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method.
Background
For the fifth generation (5G) and future wireless communication, network scale and traffic volume are continuously expanding in order to support ubiquitous communication of real-time mass access. The explosive growth of wireless traffic and the increasing demand for wireless spectrum resources have made the "spectrum deficit" problem increasingly prominent due to scarcity of wireless spectrum resources. Therefore, an innovative spectrum management mechanism is needed to break through the structural shortage problem of spectrum resources caused by the traditional static spectrum allocation mode, and improve the spectrum utilization rate. Dynamic spectrum sharing is considered to be one of the most direct and effective means to alleviate the spectrum resource shortage problem. Some Licensed bands are not fully utilized, leading to the idea of granting Licensed Shared Access (LSA).
In the conventional cognitive radio sharing concept, secondary users, such as secondary mobile network operators, cannot guarantee access to the authorized spectrum. In LSA, the duration and conditions of the shared spectrum are precisely defined in advance by regulatory bodies through licenses. Deploying an LSA system requires the introduction of two new architectural blocks, including an LSA database (information about the LSA frequency band, such as sharing conditions, bandwidth and duration, etc.) and an LSA controller (for controlling access to the LSA bandwidth). The invention particularly considers the reusability of frequency spectrum (base stations without interference relation can use the same frequency spectrum band at the same time), and realizes that a plurality of Base Stations (BSs) of different operators compete for LSA frequency spectrum in a limited time of a specific geographic area by a virtual ascending auction method and cloud platform operation. By way of the concept of a typical spectrum auction, the terms bidder, player and Base station are used herein to refer to buyers in an auction context. In the invention, the platform is used as a mediator to establish a spectrum pool for all idle spectrum resources to be sold by the seller to perform integration processing.
At present, the frequency spectrum auction of the LSA mainly adopts an all-or-nothing mode, namely an all-or-nothing scheme, that is, all available LSA frequency spectrums are regarded as an indivisible block and can be distributed to a buyer main body, and other buyers participating in the auction are not acquired and lack flexibility and fairness. Second, they are one-time auctions. The one-time auction mechanism consists of a single round of auctions so bidders have only one opportunity to submit bids to the auctioneer. The one-time auction mechanism also lacks flexibility and fairness, and the situation that the buyer can not obtain the auction information exists.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a cloud cluster purchase platform-based bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method, which guarantees the benefits of buyers and sellers, gives consideration to the fairness of allocation results, avoids the possibility that resources are monopolized by a few main bodies, allocates all spectrum resources comprehensively and reasonably, and improves the spectrum utilization rate.
In order to realize the technical purpose, the adopted technical scheme is as follows: the bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method based on the cloud group purchase platform comprises the following steps:
s1, the frequency spectrum auction system comprises three parties: sellers, buyers and cloud buying a spectrum platform; the cloud group purchase spectrum platform receives all spectrum resources reported by a seller and corresponding spectrum resource quotations, divides all spectrum resources into k spectrum resource blocks, and receives respective bids B of the buyer on the k spectrum resource blocks i Bid price B i The bidding values are arranged from high to low, the cloud group purchase frequency spectrum platform divides all buyers into h group purchase groups, and obtains group purchase group bidding vectors of each group purchase group for k frequency spectrum resource blocks
S2, the cloud cluster frequency spectrum purchasing platform auctions k frequency spectrum resource blocks, and frequency spectrum allocation is carried out by utilizing an ascending frequency spectrum auction method;
s3, calculating the actual payment value of each buyer for the distributed spectrum resource block according to the respective bid of the buyer in the same group purchase group distributed to the spectrum resource block and the respective bid of the buyer in other group purchase groups not distributed to the spectrum resource block;
s31, confirming the frequency a of acquiring the allocated spectrum resource blocks by one group purchase group;
s32, bidding vectors of the rest group purchase groups without obtaining the spectrum resource block
Sorting, arranging the first k values from low to high to form a competition vector
S33, obtaining the actual payment value of the buyer in the group purchase group of the b-th distributed spectrum resource block as a competitive price vector
Minus the b-th value of the rest of the buyers in the same group, b =1, 2, … …, a;
s34, repeating the steps S31-S33, and calculating the actual payment values of the spectrum resource blocks distributed by all the buyers in all the group purchase groups;
and S4, according to the actual payment value of each buyer of the same spectrum resource block obtained in the step S3, comparing the total price of all spectrum resource blocks belonging to the same spectrum resource calculated by the cloud group purchase spectrum platform with the frequency spectrum resource quotation of a seller of the spectrum resource, if the total price is higher than the frequency spectrum resource quotation, the payment is made, and if the total price is lower than the frequency spectrum resource quotation, the streaming is performed.
The group buying group is divided according to the geographical location information and the maximum transmitting power of all the buyers.
The specific implementation method of the step S2 is as follows:
s2.1, uniformly calling k spectrum resource blocks by the cloud cluster spectrum purchasing platform from p = 0;
s2.2, bidding vectors for group buying groups of each group buying group higher than the current round p value
Counting the bids of all the spectrum resource blocks in the group buying group, obtaining the number of resources which can be shot in each group buying group in turn, and removing one group buying group G in turn h Calculating the total number of the clapable resources of the rest group purchase groups and the total number of the clapable resources of all the group purchase groups;
s2.3, if the total number of the resources which can be shot of all the rest group purchase groups is more than or equal to the k value, entering the next round of auction price calling, taking the value delta added when the value p of the round is used as the value p of the next round, continuing to call the price, and repeating the step S2.2;
s2.4, if the total number of the clapable resources of one remaining group purchase group is less than the k value, and the clapable resources of all the group purchase groups are availableThe total number of the beat resources is more than k value, and the cloud cluster frequency spectrum purchasing platform divides a frequency spectrum resource block to provide the G removed in the round h ' taking the p value of the current round as the p value of the next round, subtracting 1 from the k value, continuing to call the price, and repeating the step S2.2;
and S2.5, if the total number of the resources which can be bought by the group purchase groups is equal to the number of the initial spectrum resource blocks, the cloud group purchase spectrum platform allocates the spectrum resource blocks according to the number of the resources which can be bought by the group purchase groups by the spectrum resource blocks, so that each group purchase group is ensured to obtain at least one spectrum resource block, and the pricing is finished.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. by dividing a large segment of frequency spectrum into small resource blocks for flexible transaction, resource waste is avoided. And improves the performance of the auction by a mechanism designed to increase the fairness of the allocation (as the spectrum is not necessarily allocated to one or only one group). The VCG-like payment rules are used to maintain their incentive properties (true bids). The privacy of the winning bidders is protected and the valuation is not revealed using the ascending auction. In addition, they are more transparent because each bidder can see the evolution of the auction. The auction mechanism provided by the invention can be proved to meet the economic characteristics in the aspects of authenticity, personal rationality after the fact, cost budget balance, economic efficiency and the like.
2. The invention provides a new idea for spectrum allocation based on convergence, effectiveness, transparency and privacy of bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation of a cloud buying platform.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the system of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of the actual bid versus the number of spectral resource block demands of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a graph showing actual bid for different services according to the present invention;
fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of a group purchase group composed by buyers according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method based on the cloud group purchase platform comprises the following steps: s1, the frequency spectrum auction system comprises three parts: frequency of purchase by seller, buyer and cloud groupA spectrum platform; the cloud group purchase spectrum platform receives all spectrum resources sent by a seller and corresponding spectrum resource quotations, divides all spectrum resources into k spectrum resource blocks, and receives respective bids B of the buyer on the k spectrum resource blocks i Bid price B i The bid values in the group are arranged from high to low, all buyers are divided into h group purchase groups, and group purchase group bid vectors of the group purchase groups for k spectrum resource blocks are obtained
The entire spectrum auction mechanism involves three parties, authorized spectrum holder-seller (seler), secondary spectrum user-buyer (buyer), spectrum auction cloud group buying spectrum platform-arbitrator. Secondary spectrum users, typically secondary base stations, have spectrum requirements and are the buyers of spectrum transactions. As a seller, an organization entity with authorized spectrum usage rights has a large amount of free spectrum resources in a time period and has a circulation willingness. Due to the spatial multiplexing property of the spectrum resources, different base stations far enough away can use the same spectrum at the same time. And the cloud group purchase frequency spectrum platform finishes the whole processes of auction reporting, auction and payment.
As shown in fig. 1, on one hand, the seller agent reports the base price and the spectrum resources available for short-term lease, and the cloud shopping spectrum platform integrates and divides all the spectrum resources reported by the seller and available for secondary flow into a plurality of spectrum resource blocks to form resources in the spectrum flow pool. On the other hand, the buyer base station reports information such as geographic position, power, quotation, spectrum (number of channels) requirements and the like, and the platform calculates all independent buyers to form a group buying group and corresponding group buying group quotation according to the reported information. The group purchase group quotation is obtained by summing the quotations of the buyers in the group after the quotations are arranged from high to low.
The whole auction process is carried out by a cloud cluster frequency spectrum purchasing platform, and the cloud cluster frequency spectrum purchasing platform utilizes the ascending sequence multi-resource block auction method to carry out efficient matching of the seller idle frequency spectrum and the buyer base station requirement according to the pre-sold frequency spectrum, the frequency spectrum requirement, the geographic position, the corresponding bid and other information provided by the buyer and the seller. The leasing and auction of spectrum resources is performed in fixed time periods (e.g., once per t minutes/hour), each auction period comprising a plurality of time slots, involving 4 main phases, 1. Buyer's bidding phase (to provide location, usage parameters, demand and bid information); 2. a platform virtual auction stage (completing resource matching); 3. a spectrum use stage (auction is completed, a buyer pays according to an actual purchase result and temporarily has a spectrum use permission, and a use return platform of the spectrum is closed until a specified time later); 4. and (4) ending the stage (the seller reports the spectrum leasing information of the next period, and the platform arranges the number of the spectrum resource blocks of the next round to the buyer). The next round begins and the buyer's auction continues to participate in the auction for the spectrum resource. The whole platform design realizes effective dynamic circulation of frequency spectrum resources.
We assume that each buyer agent can request multiple channels. Let Seller = [ S ] 1 ,S 2 ,...,S n ]Representing vendors Seller who will provide the spectrum resource, n = | Seller | represents the cardinality (number of elements, number of vendors) of the vector set, and the spectrum resource and corresponding quote they provide are
Representing the corresponding quote for each spectrum resource. The cloud group purchase spectrum platform establishes a spectrum pool available for auction according to spectrum resources provided by all sellers, and divides all the spectrum available for auction in the spectrum pool into k spectrum resource blocks.
Buyer Buyer = [ Ber = [) 1 ,Ber 2 ,...,Ber m ]M = | buy |, representing the number of buyers. All purchasers quote the k spectrum resource blocks according to the increment according to the demands 1 ,Β 2 ,...,Β m ]The urgency of the offer and the demand, the type of service and the time period associated, e.g. high definition video service at peak of service, offer beta m And each unit channel in the vector has higher quotation and smaller quotation difference. Each buyer Ber i has a different channel true value vector V for all the accessible channels i ＝{v i,1 ,v i,2 ,..,v i,k ,..,v i,K I =1, 2, … … m, reflecting the actual true value of Ber i for different numbers of channels. Buyer retentionBidders tend to put the bid price below their own best estimate of the value of the common pre-beat spectrum (real value) because they are concerned about "cursing winnings", i.e. losing too much. The bidding vector of each buyer is decided according to the actual business requirement, and the constraint is set in the invention, the resource block bidding function V of each buyer i i (.) a non-decreasing convex function, which will guarantee the authenticity of the bid by buyer in the auction. Since the present invention can guarantee the authenticity bid, the actual bid beta for buyer i i ＝[Β i,1 ,Β i,2 ,...,Β i,k ,...,Β i,K ]Will be related to its true value V i ＝{v i,1 ,v i,2 ,..,v i,k ,..,v i,K The same. We will consider the convexity of the estimates. We assume that the spectrum is divided into K identical spectrum resource blocks, and the buyer will quote different numbers of resource blocks according to his own needs. For each increased resource block demand, the corresponding price increment decreases as the number of resource blocks that have been acquired increases, resembling a logarithmic function, with a lower and lower rate of increase of the quote, as shown in fig. 2. First element BETA i,1 Representing a bid on the first resource block to be obtained, beta i,k And the quotation of 1 resource block is obtained after the quotation of k-1 resource blocks is obtained. This amounts to a discretization of the convex valued function of the spectrum. The non-decreasing convex function setting also accords with the economic characteristic that the marginal effect of the actual demand is decreased, but in the actual operation, V i Or BETA i The trend characteristic of the convex function may vary according to actual traffic. Different traffic may use different curve forms, as shown in fig. 3, general traffic uses curve 1, high definition spectrum uses curve 2 due to large bandwidth, and low traffic such as voice may use curve 3 due to less bandwidth.
The platform establishes a grouping group purchase mode according to the geographical position, the maximum transmitting power and the range information of the buyer, and improves the frequency spectrum use efficiency and reduces the user cost by utilizing the spatial reuse property of the frequency spectrum. The spectrum at a particular time in a particular geographic area may be used by two base stations simultaneously if they do not interfere with each otherThe bandwidth of (c). The auction platform calculates the transmission range of the base station according to the power and the position reported by the buyer base station, and establishes an interference diagram and an auction buyer independent set. The independent buyers form a group buying group, the collective bidding vectors of the group buying group are formed by adding the elements of the bidding vectors of the group members, the h group buying group bidding vector is expressed as
Wherein
Represents the sum of all the bids of the kth spectrum resource block in the h group purchase group,
represents the sum of the bids of all the buyers to the 1 st spectrum resource block in the h group purchase group. Finding the largest independent set in the graph is an NP-Hard problem, and the invention does not relate to the relevant content of interference graph establishment. As shown in fig. 4, assuming there are 5 buyers and the corresponding interference relationship, the corresponding independent set form and the composition of the group purchase group can be obtained.
Authorized spectrum holders (sellers) report spectrum transfer usage information, relating to spectrum range and corresponding time omega (S) x ,S y ,T x ,T y ). The platform side establishes a time/frequency two-dimensional frequency spectrum pool according to the information reported by the seller, and the frequency spectrum in the pool is divided into k independent non-equal channels (the channel division can be divided according to the frequency spectrum category and the local service characteristics, including the number and the range of the channels).
Secondary spectrum user (buyer) providing spectrum bid vector BETA i ＝[Β i,1 ,Β i,2 ,...,Β i,k ,...,Β i,K ]The platform judges the interference range of each base station and divides the maximum independent set of the base stations according to geographic data to form h corresponding group purchase groups G = [ G ] according to the interference range of each base station 1 ,G 2 ,...,G h ]Single group buying group G h By adding corresponding elements of the bid vectors of members of the independent setIs obtained as
S2, the cloud cluster frequency spectrum purchasing platform auctions k frequency spectrum resource blocks, and frequency spectrum allocation is carried out by utilizing an ascending frequency spectrum auction method;
the specific implementation method of the step S2 is as follows:
s2.1, uniformly calling k spectrum resource blocks by the cloud cluster spectrum purchasing platform from p = 0;
s2.2, bidding vectors for group buying groups of each group buying group higher than the current round p value
Counting the bids of all the spectrum resource blocks in the group buying group, obtaining the number of resources which can be shot in each group buying group in turn, and removing one group buying group G in turn h Calculating the total number of the clapable resources of the rest group purchase groups and the total number of the clapable resources of all the group purchase groups;
s2.3, if the total number of the resources which can be shot of all the rest group purchase groups is more than or equal to the k value, entering the next round of auction price calling, taking the value delta added when the value p of the round is used as the value p of the next round, continuing to call the price, and repeating the step S2.2;
s2.4, if the total number of the resources which can be shot of one remaining group purchase group is less than the k value and the total number of the resources which can be shot of all the group purchase groups is more than the k value, the cloud group purchase spectrum platform divides one spectrum resource block to provide the G removed in the cloud group purchase spectrum platform h ', taking the p value of the current round as the p value of the next round, subtracting 1 from the k value, continuing to call the price, and repeating the step S2.2;
and S2.5, if the total number of the resources which can be bought by the group purchase groups is equal to the number of the initial spectrum resource blocks, the cloud group purchase spectrum platform allocates the spectrum resource blocks according to the number of the resources which can be bought by the group purchase groups by the spectrum resource blocks, so that each group purchase group is ensured to obtain at least one spectrum resource block, and the pricing is finished.
The platform establishes a spectrum resource pool according to a pre-shot spectrum provided by a spectrum owner, and divides the resource in the pool into 5 channel resource blocks, wherein k =5. If the p value of the first round is 0, the group buying group is three.
First of allIndividual group purchase group G 1 Consists of two buyers, the actual bid is { (12,10,5,3,1), (15,12,10,8,2) }, and the corresponding group buying group bid vector is
Second group buying group G 2 Consists of two buyers, the actual bid is { (15,13,11,9,8), (13,12,11,8,6) }, and the corresponding group buying group bid vector is
Third group buying group G 3 The method comprises a buyer, the actual bid is { (26,20,10,9,1) }, and the corresponding group buying group bid vector is
In this case, the number of spectrum resource blocks that can be paid by p =0,3 group purchase groups is =5, and the number of resource blocks that can be sold is larger than k (larger than 5 when p = 0) regardless of the removal of any group purchase group, and there is no case where the number of existing resource blocks cannot be paid by losing a certain group purchase group. Assuming that the added price range =1 each time, the auction is continued until the existing resources cannot be played if a certain group buying group does not participate in the card.
S3, calculating the actual payment value of each buyer for the distributed spectrum resource block according to the respective bid of the buyer in the same group purchase group distributed to the spectrum resource block and the respective bid of the buyer in other group purchase groups not distributed to the spectrum resource block;
s31, confirming that one group purchase group obtains the number a of allocated spectrum resource blocks;
s32, bidding vectors of the rest group purchase groups without obtaining the spectrum resource block
Sorting, arranging the first k values from low to high to form a competition vector
S33, obtaining the actual payment value of the buyer in the group purchase group of the b-th distributed spectrum resource block as a competitive price vector
Minus the b-th value of the rest of the buyers in the same group, b =1, 2, … …, a;
s34, repeating the steps S31-S33, and calculating the actual payment values of the spectrum resource blocks distributed by all the buyers in all the group purchase groups;
and S4, according to the actual payment value of each buyer of the same spectrum resource block obtained in the step S3, comparing the total price of all spectrum resource blocks belonging to the same spectrum resource calculated by the cloud-based spectrum purchasing platform with the quotation of the spectrum resource of the seller, if the total price is higher than the quotation of the spectrum resource, the transaction is carried out, and if the total price is lower than the quotation of the spectrum resource, the streaming shooting is carried out.
The group buying group is divided according to the geographical location information and the maximum transmitting power of all the buyers.
For example: the platform establishes a spectrum resource pool according to a pre-shot spectrum provided by a spectrum owner, and divides the resource in the pool into 5 channel resource blocks, wherein k =5 and Δ =1.
First group G 1 Contains 2 persons, the member bids are { (12,11,5,3,1), (15,12,10,8,2) }
Second group G 2 Contains 2 persons, the member bids are { (15,13,11,9,8), (13,12,11,8,6) }
Third group G 3 Contains 1 person, the member bid { (26,20,10,9,1) }
According to the price quoted by each group of members, the price quoted by the group buying of three independent sets (group buying groups) can be calculated, namely the sum of the corresponding items of each vector of the group members (buyers). The group bid vectors for the three independent sets are:
with rising price, all things are
The corresponding requirement that the number in the vector is less than p is eliminated, for example, p =1, and the third group cannot obtain 5 channels, and the corresponding D is then obtained 3 ＝4。
And removing any one group purchase group from 1-14 times of calling, wherein the sum of the number D of the beatable resources exceeding p of the other two group purchase groups is more than or equal to 5 of the spectrum resources to be distributed (the situation that all resource blocks cannot be beaten out without participation of the group purchase group does not exist). And no spectrum resource block is allocated, p = p + delta, and the price continues to be called in ascending order.
At p =15, first group
If there are 3 elements in the vector not greater than 15, only 2 beats of resources are available, and if the second group is not taken into account as Gh', the total count of the first and third groups exceeding 15 is 4, and all 5 spectraThe resource blocks cannot be spent, so one spectrum resource block is allocated to the second group, and the number of spectrum resource blocks to be allocated becomes 4. At p =20, if the total count of the bid vector elements of the first and third groups exceeding 20 is 3, then 4 spectrum resource blocks to be allocated cannot be spent, one spectrum resource block is allocated again to the second group, and the number of spectrum resource blocks to be allocated becomes 3, and the auction stops at p =22 (when the total demand sum is 5, and the total number of resource blocks provided by the seller).
The table above gives the increase of p per bid, the winning group and the payment for it. And (3) calculating the number D of the resources which can be shot and exceed the price of the resource at each time to judge that the obtained channel number is less than D, and distributing the resource blocks to the frequency spectrum, wherein when p =22, 3 resource blocks are remained, D1+ D2+ D3=2+ 1=5, which is exactly equal to the number of all the resource blocks which can be shot, the second group does not participate in the auction, all the resources are just shot out, and the auction is finished. In addition, since the 15 th and 20 th G2 have been allocated with the spectrum resource block twice, and D2 is not less than 2, no new spectrum resource block needs to be allocated. At this time, the first group will get 2 resource blocks, the third group gets 1 resource block, and the whole allocation is completed.
Calculate the final payment:
when the value of the addition is increased to 15,
if the second group does not participate in the auction, the 5 channel resource blocks cannot be sold in their entirety. At this time, the second group locks its first spectrum resource block at p =15, and the payment fee of each bidder in the group purchase group is:
This actual payment pay for user 1 in the second group is:
this actual payment pay for user 2 in the second group is:
after the second group obtains one resource block, the number of resource blocks available for auction is shifted by 4.
At this point, the call continues and the p value continues to increase.
When the addition value increases to p =20,
if the second group does not participate in the auction, the 4 spectrum resource blocks cannot be sold in their entirety, and at this time, the second group locks its second spectrum resource block at p =20, and each bidder in the group pays the second group for the second time, and notices that the second bid is used at this time.
This actual payment pay of buyer 1 in the second group is pay
This actual payment pay for buyer 2 in the second group is:
after the second group obtains one resource block, the number of resource blocks available for auction is changed by 3.
At this time, the price calling is continued, and the p value is increased once to perform judgment once.
When the call-in value p =22,
and finishing the addition. At this time D 1 ＝2,D 2 ＝2,D 3 =1, the result of the final allocation is that the first group obtains 2 spectrum resource blocks, the second group obtains 2 spectrum resource blocks, and the third group or 1 spectrum resource block. Whereas the previous second group has been allocated 2 resource blocks and is therefore not participating in this allocation. Now, when calculating that the group buying group 1 obtains 2 resource blocks and the group buying group 3 obtains 1 resource block, the payment cost of each bidder in each group is:
a first group: two actual payments total
The actual payment pay for two spectrum resource blocks this time by buyer 1 in the first group is:
the actual payment pay for two spectrum resource blocks this time by buyer 2 within the first group is:
third group: first actual payment
This payment pay by buyer 1 in the third group is: ,
and adding the riveting points for 3 times to obtain a final auction result:
At this time, allocation of 5 spectrum resource blocks is completed, and three groups of accumulated resource acquisition conditions and corresponding payment are calculated. And comparing the total price of all the spectrum resource blocks belonging to the same spectrum resource, which is calculated by the cloud cluster spectrum purchasing platform, with the frequency spectrum resource quotation of the seller of the spectrum resource, if the total price is higher than the frequency spectrum resource quotation, the transaction is carried out, and if the total price is lower than the frequency spectrum resource quotation, the streaming shooting is carried out.
As can be seen from the verification example, the payment cost is less than the quotation, if the quotation is high, the resource is obtained, the payment is less, and the buyer is encouraged and ensured to carry out the true quotation. And, all spectrum resource blocks can be tapped in this process.
In summary, the present invention relates to an auction mechanism for performing short-time transaction on spectrum licenses under a limited attribute condition in an LSA scenario, which maximizes the benefits of buyers and sellers by using the spectrum reuse characteristics through the use and bid of potential spectrum buyers and a group purchase manner, improves the utilization rate of spectrum resources, and realizes the effective circulation and redistribution of wireless spectrum resources. The invention designs an auction mechanism to consider the reusability of frequency spectrum, the authenticity, the fairness and the effectiveness of transactions. In the context of LSA spectrum, each spectrum buyer should be incentivized to indicate in good faithfulness that they are willing to pay for good east and west, independently of other bidder behaviors. The method avoids the possibility that the bidder generally tries to operate the mechanism to maximize the profit of the bidder and damage the interests of other players (including an auctioneer), guarantees the interests of both the buyer and the seller, meanwhile, takes the fairness of the distribution result into consideration, and avoids the possibility that the resource is monopolized by a few subjects.
The LSA concept of the present invention has two main differences from the conventional method of allocating 3G or 4G spectrum to operators. First, because the availability of LSA spectrum will be determined by the usage status of the spectrum owner, the configuration needs to work in a shorter time (perhaps several times per hour), the regulatory bodies or public platforms allocate the spectrum under the LSA licensing mechanism by auctions, and once the spectrum owner releases his free spectrum, the spectrum will be streamed to the public spectrum pool for secondary streaming, which can greatly improve the spectrum usage efficiency. Secondly, by utilizing the spatial reuse characteristic of the frequency spectrum (secondary frequency spectrum buyers which cannot cause interference can use the same frequency spectrum band at the same time), according to the geographic and use information reported by the secondary frequency spectrum buyers, an auction platform draws a frequency-use interference relation graph between the governed coverage areas, and a plurality of operation base stations which are not interfered with each other and have similar frequency spectrum requirements are arranged in a group purchase group. If the group purchase is successful, the spectrum allocated to a group may be used by all members of the group.
Claims (2)
1. A bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method based on a cloud group purchasing platform is characterized by comprising the following steps: comprises the following steps of (a) preparing a solution,
s1, the frequency spectrum auction system comprises three parts: sellers, buyers and cloud buying a spectrum platform; the cloud group purchase spectrum platform receives all spectrum resources reported by a seller and corresponding spectrum resource quotations, divides all spectrum resources into k spectrum resource blocks, and receives respective bids B of the buyer on the k spectrum resource blocks i Bid price B i The bidding values are arranged from high to low, the cloud group purchase frequency spectrum platform divides all buyers into h group purchase groups, and obtains group purchase group bidding vectors of each group purchase group for k frequency spectrum resource blocks
S2, the cloud cluster frequency spectrum purchasing platform auctions k frequency spectrum resource blocks, and frequency spectrum allocation is carried out by utilizing an ascending frequency spectrum auction method;
s2.1, uniformly calling k spectrum resource blocks by the cloud cluster spectrum purchasing platform from p = 0;
s2.2, for each group purchase with the p value higher than the current roundGroup bid vector for group purchase group
Counting the bids of all the spectrum resource blocks in the group buying group, obtaining the number of resources which can be shot in each group buying group in turn, and removing one group buying group G in turn h Calculating the total number of the clapable resources of the rest group purchase groups and the total number of the clapable resources of all the group purchase groups;
s2.3, if the total number of the resources which can be shot of all the rest group purchase groups is more than or equal to the k value, entering the next round of auction price calling, taking the value delta added when the value p of the round is used as the value p of the next round, continuing to call the price, and repeating the step S2.2;
s2.4, if the total number of the resources which can be shot of one remaining group purchase group is less than the k value and the total number of the resources which can be shot of all the group purchase groups is more than the k value, the cloud group purchase spectrum platform divides one spectrum resource block to provide the G removed in the cloud group purchase spectrum platform h ' taking the p value of the current round as the p value of the next round, subtracting 1 from the k value, continuing to call the price, and repeating the step S2.2;
s2.5, if the total number of the resources which can be bought by the group purchase groups is equal to the initial number of the spectrum resource blocks, the cloud group purchase spectrum platform allocates the spectrum resource blocks according to the number of the resources which can be bought by the group purchase groups according to the spectrum resource blocks, ensures that each group purchase group at least obtains one spectrum resource block, and ends the pricing;
s3, calculating the actual payment value of each buyer for the distributed spectrum resource block according to the respective bid of the buyer in the same group purchase group distributed to the spectrum resource block and the respective bid of the buyer in other group purchase groups not distributed to the spectrum resource block;
s31, confirming that one group purchase group obtains the number a of allocated spectrum resource blocks;
s32, bidding vectors of the rest group purchase groups without obtaining the spectrum resource block
The inner numerical values are sorted from big to small, the first k values are arranged from low to high to form a competition vector
S33, obtaining the actual payment value of the buyer in the group purchase group of the b-th distributed spectrum resource block as a competitive price vector
B =1, 2, … …, a, minus the b-th value of the rest of the buyers in the same group;
s34, repeating the steps S31-S33, and calculating the actual payment values of the spectrum resource blocks distributed by all the buyers in all the group purchase groups;
and S4, according to the actual payment value of each buyer of the same spectrum resource block obtained in the step S3, the total price of all spectrum resource blocks belonging to the same spectrum resource, which is calculated by the cloud-based spectrum purchasing platform, is compared with the quotation of the spectrum resource of the seller, when the total price is higher than the quotation of the spectrum resource, the payment is paid for bargaining, and when the total price is lower than the quotation of the spectrum resource, the streaming shooting is performed.
2. The cloud-based platform-based bilateral dynamic multi-demand ascending auction spectrum allocation method according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the group buying group is divided according to the geographical position information and the maximum transmitting power of all the buyers.
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