CN113114689B - Authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment - Google Patents
Authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention relates to an authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment, which comprises the following steps of 1, initializing a system; step 2, registering equipment; step 3, identity authentication and step 4 attribute authentication. The authentication scheme of the invention designs an authentication model with two stages aiming at privacy protection of users in a fog computing environment, wherein the identity authentication of the first stage utilizes an elliptic curve and a bilinear pairing technology to help the users to effectively identify credible fog nodes in the environment, and meanwhile, attacks of external camouflage nodes can be intercepted to reduce the risk of leakage of privacy data of the users; the attribute authentication of the second stage can enable a user to quickly find the fog node host meeting the functional requirements of the user under the condition that the user terminal and the fog node host do not expose the functional attributes mutually, and meanwhile, the calculation overhead of the terminal equipment in the authentication process is reduced by simplifying the functional attribute vector.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the cross technical field of edge calculation, privacy security, identity authentication and the like, in particular to a two-stage authentication method based on a bilinear mapping and dot product protocol, and particularly relates to a two-stage authentication method based on the bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment.
Background
With the architecture of mist computing proposed for the first time in cisco 2011, a user gradually migrates data from a traditional cloud computing data center to mist node equipment with a closer deployment distance, so that the data analysis and processing efficiency is improved, and the network transmission pressure is reduced. Fog calculation is a novel calculation paradigm, and can provide more efficient and high-quality medical services for patients by deploying an intelligent medical security system. Smart medicine requires the storage and sharing of patient physiological data in the fog node for online diagnosis.
ZL 2013104960890 discloses a WPKI and timestamp based mobile terminal identity authentication method and system, which adopts SSL communication protocol based on ECC algorithm to guarantee the security of the whole link, but uses a timestamp server interface of a third party to use the data of the glasses user, but the timestamp server only plays a role in checking time difference and preventing duplicate submissions.
ZL200710303753X discloses an identity authentication system and method based on secret keys and time stamps, current time information is added into authentication information of a terminal generation authentication server, so that identity authentication information of each time is different, a user secret key is stored in a mobile IC, and great potential safety hazards exist in storage of the secret key.
ZL 2017111328117 discloses an anonymous authentication method and system based on identity, the method only achieves authentication of a server to a user, a safety channel between the server and the user can be established after the authentication, the user cannot authenticate the server, and location privacy is easy to leak.
Therefore, if the intelligent medical fog node lacks an effective security mechanism, the privacy data of the user can be stolen by a malicious user. In addition, fog computing also faces new challenges, such as computing and storage resource limitation of mobile terminals in the internet of things and internal attack by adversaries.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a two-stage authentication scheme based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocols, which aims to solve the privacy protection problem of a patient user in intelligent medical treatment and help the user to obtain safe and reliable fog computing service.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
the invention relates to an authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment, which comprises the following steps:
step 1: initializing a system: the operation of the whole system is managed and guided by a third-party trusted center TC, and three multiplication cyclic groups G with the order q are selected firstly 1 ，G 2 And G T The method is used for constructing bilinear pairs, simultaneously introducing a JPBC function library, calling a Gen function to generate system parameters sp, and then sending the system parameters to all registered user intelligent terminals and the fog node equipment.
Step 2: equipment registration: user U i ID to set itself i And password PW i Sending to the trust center TC, TCAdding user U in user information table after receiving i And calculating its encrypted private key K s And sends the private key K s And returning the system parameters to the user U i . Fog node F i SID its own unique identity i (such as physical MAC address) is sent to a trusted center TC, and the TC adds a fog node F in a fog node information table after receiving the fog node F i And calculates its access control key AK i ；
And 3, step 3: identity authentication: user U i Using a private key K s To encrypt bilinear mapping results in system parameters e And simultaneously calculates the identity authentication voucher Auth of the user i Then user U i Will Auth i Sending to the fog node F waiting for authentication i 。F i Using a control key AK upon receipt of a message i Restoring the mapping result, encrypting the mapping result by combining the current time stamp TS, and returning the encrypted result and the time stamp TS to the user U i . User U i After receiving the message with the timestamp of TS ', calculating the difference value between TS and TS', rejecting the authentication message if the difference value is not within the expected transmission delay range, otherwise, comparing the received result with the mapping result e stored locally. If the two are equal, the fog node F i The authentication is considered to pass, otherwise the authentication fails.
And 4, step 4: and (3) attribute authentication: user U i And fog node F i Is represented in the form of a binary vector. User U i A threshold value theta is defined to indicate that the functional attributes of both are expected to be the same amount, and then for the user U i And fog node F i Is calculated by a dot product protocol. If the return value of the dot product operation is larger than or equal to theta, the fog node F i It is considered to pass the functional attribute authentication and to be able to receive the private data sent by the user.
Wherein: the step 1 of system initialization specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1-1: the trust center TC selects a security parameter C and generates bilinear parameters (q, G, G) by running the generator Gen (C) T E) whereinG and G T All are cyclic groups, q is the order of the cyclic group G, G is the generator of the cyclic group G, e shows a mapping relation G 1 ×G 2 →G T ；
Step 1-2: selecting a secure Hash function Hash:
in addition, two random numbers are selected
As a master key, and a random element G in the group G r And calculating X = g i ， e(g，g) j Where element X is the authentication parameter of the registered user, e (g, g) j The generator G in the group G is in the group G T The TC then issues the system parameter systems parameters = (q, G) T ，e，Hash，g r ，X，e(g，g) j )。
Wherein: step 2, the equipment registration specifically comprises the following steps:
step 2-1: user U i Setting own unique identity ID i And a password PW i Simultaneously generating a random number r _ a and calculating a cipher text HPW i ＝h(PW i | r _ a), and then register the information { ID |) i ，HPW i Sending it to the trusted center TC, which will check the ID first after receiving the registration request i If the user U exists in the user information table, if the user U does not exist in the user information table, calculating the user U i Encrypted private key K of s ＝h(ID i I) and initialize user U i Is then K s And system parameters are returned to the user U i If ID is i If the request exists, the trusted center rejects the registration request;
step 2-2: fog node F i SID its own unique identity i If the physical MAC address is sent to the trust center TC, the trust center TC will check the SID first after receiving the registration request i Whether the device information exists in the fog node information table or not, if not, recording the device information in the table and initializingFog node F i While selecting random numbers
Calculate fog node F i Encrypted private key K of f ＝h(SID i | a), access control key AK = (AK) 1 ，ak 2 ，ak 3 ) Wherein
Then returning the access control key AK to the fog node F i If SID i If so, the trusted center will deny the registration request.
Wherein: the identity authentication specifically comprises the following steps:
step 3-1: user U i First of all, using a locally stored encryption private key K s Separately calculating mapping results
And identity voucher Auth i ＝(auth 1 ，auth 2 )，
Then the user U i Auth identity certificate i Sending to the fog node F waiting for authentication i After receiving the identity certificate Auth i Rear fog node F i Access control key AK using it i ＝(ak 1 ，ak 2 ，ak 3 ) Calculating
Step 3-2: fog node F i Obtaining a result after the calculation is finished
And returns the current time stamp TS to the user U in the form of Token | | TS i Suppose user U i Received at time stamp TS', to avoid retry attacksClick on user U i The time difference between these two timestamps will be checked, if | TS' -TS ≦ Δ t, which represents the expected effective transmission time interval, user U i It will receive, otherwise reject, and once successfully received, user U i Identity SID using fog nodes to be authenticated i Computing
Then, whether E is equal to E 'is compared, and if the E is equal to E', the fog node passes identity authentication and is considered to be a trusted node.
Wherein: the step 4 of attribute authentication specifically comprises the following steps:
step 4-1: user U i Is abstracted into
Fog node F to be authenticated i Is abstracted into
Wherein element 0 represents that the function is not available and element 1 represents that the function is available;
step 4-2: first user U i Selecting two large prime numbers alpha and beta, and initializing a parameter P =0; b =0; i =1; j =1, if the large prime number α, β satisfies that the length of α is equal to 2 n+2 Bit, β being greater than (n + 1). Alpha 2 Then a random length of not more than 2 is generated n+1 Array of bits Z, attribute vector to user at the same time
Go through the traversal if the element x in the vector i Equal to 1, a length of 2 is randomly selected n Random number of bits r i And calculate A i ＝α+z i +r i Beta, otherwise calculate A i ＝α+z i +r i β, needs to compute p for each traversal i ＝r i ·β-z i ，P＝P+p i . Finally, the user sends the message (alpha, beta, P, A) 1 ，A 2 ，…，A n ) Sending the P and the beta to a POX controller, storing the P and the beta locally and (alpha, A) after the P and the beta are received by the POX controller 1 ，A 2 ，…，A n ) Forward to fog node F i . Fog node F i Received back pair attribute vector
Go through the traversal if the element y in the vector i Equal to 1, calculate B j ＝α·A i Otherwise, calculate B j ＝A j After traversal is completed, the fog node F i All B are j The sum B is returned to POX, the POX uses the received B and local P, beta to calculate K = B + P mod beta, and finally
The result sigma is the same attribute number of the user and the fog node, and then the user U i Comparing the dot product result sigma with a threshold theta, and if sigma is smaller than theta, determining that the fog node cannot meet the functional requirements of the user, and failing to authenticate; otherwise, the authentication is successful.
The code for this step is as follows:
according to the invention, the privacy and the safety of the user are considered, and the user can authenticate the required fog nodes according to the self function requirement, so that the user can change the authentication result by dynamically adjusting the threshold value theta. For example, when the number of successfully authenticated fog nodes of the user is large under a certain threshold θ, the size of the current threshold θ may be appropriately increased to reduce the number of fog nodes that pass authentication, so as to achieve the purpose of reducing the risk of privacy data leakage. When the number of the mist nodes is small and the current calculation requirement cannot be met after the user authentication is successful, the size of the current threshold value theta can be reduced to ensure the reliability of the mist calculation. In addition, the safety of the message in the transmission process is ensured by technical means such as hash encryption, time stamping and the like.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
(1) The invention designs an identity authentication scheme by utilizing an elliptic curve and a bilinear mapping technology, so that a user U can be ensured 0 After the authentication, the node F 0 And then, authentication is required to be continuously initiated to other fog nodes, the tuple P does not need to be repeatedly calculated, the authentication can be carried out only by regenerating the timestamp, and the calculation cost in the authentication is reduced.
(2) According to the invention, each authentication message is encrypted through the time stamp TS and the hash function, so that retry attacks can be effectively blocked.
(3) The invention abstracts the functional attributes of the user and the fog nodes into a binary vector form, simplifies fussy modular exponentiation operation compared with the traditional dot product protocol, and reduces the resource consumption of the user intelligent terminal.
(4) The invention allows the user to change the size of the threshold theta according to the actual requirement, and improves the flexibility of authentication.
The invention solves the problem of trusted computing among different functional entities in the intelligent medical environment, so as to ensure that a patient user obtains safe and effective fog computing service when an emergency occurs.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of the inventive authentication method.
Fig. 2 is a practical scenario of the authentication scheme according to the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a flowchart of an authentication method based on elliptic curve and dot product protocol according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerous implementation details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention. It should be understood, however, that these implementation details are not to be interpreted as limiting the invention. That is, in some embodiments of the invention, such implementation details are not necessary.
The invention relates to a two-stage authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment, which comprises the following steps:
step 1: can be prepared byThe trust center TC selects a security parameter C and generates bilinear parameters by running a generator Gen (C), where G and G T All are cyclic groups, q is the order of the cyclic group G, G is the generator of the cyclic group G, e shows a mapping relation G 1 ×G 2 →G T ；
Step 2: selecting a secure Hash function Hash:
in addition, two random numbers are selected
As a master key, and a random element G in the group G r And calculating X = g i ， e(g，g) j Where element X is the authentication parameter of the registered user, e (g, g) j The generator G in the group G is in the group G T Mapping result on, then TC publishes system parameters = (q, G) T ，e，Hash，g r ，X，e(g，g) j )。
And step 3: user U i Setting own unique identity ID i And password PW i Simultaneously generating a random number r _ a and calculating a cipher text HPW i ＝h(PW i | r _ a), and then register the information { ID |) i ，HPW i Sending it to the trusted center TC, which will check the ID first after receiving the registration request i If the user U exists in the user information table, if the user U does not exist in the user information table, calculating the user U i Is encrypted private key K s ＝h(ID i I) and initialize user U i Is then K s And returning the system parameters to the user U i If ID is i If the request exists, the trusted center rejects the registration request;
and 4, step 4: fog node F i SID its own unique identity i If the physical MAC address is sent to the trust center TC, the trust center TC will check the SID first after receiving the registration request i Whether or not it exists in the node information table, and if not, recording the device information in the table and initializing the fogNode F i While selecting random numbers
Calculate fog node F i Encrypted private key K of f ＝(h(SID i | a), access control key AK = (AK) 1 ，ak 2 ，ak 3 ) In which
Then returning the access control key AK to the fog node F i If SID i If so, the trusted center will deny the registration request.
And 5: user U i First of all, using a locally stored encryption private key K s Separately calculating mapping results
And identity voucher Auth i ＝(auth 1 ，auth 2 )
Then the user U i Auth identity certificate i Sending to the fog node F waiting for authentication i After receiving the identity certificate Auth i Rear fog node F i Access control key AK using it i ＝(ak 1 ，ak 2 ，ak 3 ) Calculating
And 6: fog node F i Obtaining a result after the calculation is finished
And returns the current time stamp TS to the user in the form of Token | | | TSHousehold U i Suppose user U i Received with time stamp TS', user U to avoid retry attacks i The time difference between these two timestamps will be checked if TS' -TS ≦ Δ t, which represents the expected effective transmission time interval, user U i It will receive, otherwise reject, and once successfully received, user U i Identity SID using a fog node to be authenticated i Computing
Then, whether E is equal to E 'is compared, and if the E is equal to E', the fog node passes identity authentication and is considered to be a trusted node.
And 7: user U i Is abstracted into
Fog node F to be authenticated i Is abstracted into
Wherein element 0 represents that the function is not available and element 1 represents that the function is available;
and step 8: first of all, the user U i Selecting two large prime numbers alpha and beta, and initializing a parameter P =0; b =0; i =1; j =1, if the large prime number α, β satisfies that the length of α is equal to 2 n+2 The length of the bit, beta, is greater than (n + 1). Alpha 2 Then a random length of not more than 2 is generated n+1 Array of bits Z, attribute vector to user at the same time
Go through the traversal if the element x in the vector i Equal to 1, then randomly choose a length of 2 n Random number r of bits i And calculate A i ＝α+z i +r i Beta, otherwise calculate A i ＝α+z i +r i β, p needs to be calculated for each traversal i ＝r i ·β-z i ，P＝P+p i . Finally, the user sends the message (alpha, beta, P, A) 1 ，A 2 ，…，A n ) Sending the P and the beta to a POX controller, storing the P and the beta locally and (alpha, A) after the P and the beta are received by the POX controller 1 ，A 2 ，…，A n ) Forward to fog node F i . Fog node F i Received pair attribute vector
Go through the traversal if the element y in the vector i Equal to 1, calculate B j ＝α·A j Otherwise, calculate B j ＝A j After traversal is completed, fog node F i All B are mixed j The sum B is returned to POX, the POX uses the received B and local P, beta to calculate K = B + P mod beta, and finally
The result sigma is the same attribute number of the user and the fog node, and then the user U i Comparing the dot product result sigma with a threshold theta, and if sigma is smaller than theta, determining that the fog node cannot meet the functional requirements of the user, and failing to authenticate; otherwise, the authentication is successful.
The code for this step is as follows:
in a specific implementation, fig. 2 is a practical scenario in which the authentication scheme is applied.
In the intelligent medical field, the user collects medical data including blood pressure, heart rate, body temperature, metabolism and the like through various wearable devices, and then transmits the medical data to the intelligent terminal by using Bluetooth to calculate and analyze the health condition of the user. Once the computing resources of the user intelligent terminal are occupied in a large amount, the medical data cannot be computed in time, so that the user cannot send early warning information to a medical center when an emergency condition occurs. In this case, the user needs to send the private data of the user to the nearby fog node, balance the calculation load of the intelligent terminal by using edge calculation, and meanwhile, the user wants that the private data of the user can meet the corresponding functional requirements while not being leaked. Therefore, the user needs to obtain a secure and reliable fog computing service meeting functional requirements through identity authentication and functional attribute authentication.
FIG. 3 is a flowchart of authentication in the present embodiment, assuming that the user U is a user 0 Firstly, an identity ID and a password PW of an intelligent terminal are set in the intelligent terminal for registration, and after a registration request is received by a trusted center TC, system parameters (q, G, G) are utilized T ，e，Hash，g r ，X，e(g，g) j ) Calculating the corresponding encrypted private key K s H (ID | | i) and returns the private key and system parameters to the user. After the registration is completed, the user U 0 Encrypting the mapping result in the system parameter by using the private key thereof, and calculating
Then, generating own identity voucher, and calculating Auth0= (Auth) 1 ，auth 2 )，
Then the user U 0 Auth identity certificate 0 Sending to the fog node F waiting for authentication 0 Fog node F 0 Using access control key AK after reception 0 Restore the mapping result
And use its own private key K f ＝h(SID 0 The mapping result is encrypted, and an authentication token for identity authentication is calculated
Returned to the user, user U 0 After receiving the authentication token, firstly, the authentication token passes through a Hash function Hash in system parameters and a fog node F to be authenticated 0 Identity SID of 0 Calculate h (SID) 0 ) Then calculate
To restore the node F 0 The calculated mapping result E 'is finally compared whether E is equal to E'And if the two are equal, the fog node passes identity authentication.
User U after passing identity authentication 0 Initializing its own attribute vector
And setting an expected attribute similarity threshold theta, assuming a fog node F to be authenticated 0 Is an attribute vector of
User U 0 First of all, calculate
A 1 ＝α+z 1 +r 1 ·β，A 2 ＝α+z 2 +r 2 ·β，A 3 ＝z 3 +r 3 ·β，A 4 ＝z 4 +r 4 ·β，A 5 ＝α+z 5 +r 5 ·β
Then the fog node F 0 Calculating out
K = B + Pmod β can then be calculated by the user:
because of the fact that
Therefore, it is not only easy to use
So 3 α 2 +(z 1 +z 2 +z 3 +z 5 ) (α -1) mod β may remove the modulo operation on β:
E＝3α 2 +(z 1 +z 2 +z 3 +z 5 )(α-1)modβ
＝3α 2 +(z 1 +z 2 +z 3 +z 5 )(α-1)
and because (z) 1 +z 2 +z 3 +z 5 )(α-1)＜α 2 Therefore, it is
Last user U 0 And comparing the threshold theta with the dot product result, if the threshold theta is less than or equal to the dot product result, the fog node passes the attribute authentication, and otherwise, the authentication fails.
The authentication scheme of the invention designs an authentication model with two stages aiming at privacy protection of users in a fog computing environment, wherein the identity authentication of the first stage utilizes an elliptic curve and a bilinear pairing technology to help the users to effectively identify credible fog nodes in the environment, and meanwhile, attacks of external camouflage nodes can be intercepted to reduce the risk of leakage of privacy data of the users; the attribute authentication in the second stage can enable a user to quickly find the fog node host meeting the functional requirements of the user under the condition that the user terminal and the fog node host do not mutually expose the functional attributes, and meanwhile, the calculation overhead of the terminal equipment in the authentication process is reduced by simplifying the functional attribute vector. The invention meets different functional requirements of the user through the two-stage authentication process on the premise of ensuring the privacy and the safety of the user.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention. Various modifications and alterations to this invention will become apparent to those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.
Claims (3)
1. An authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment is characterized in that: the authentication method comprises the following steps:
step 1: initializing a system: the credible center selects safety parameters, generates bilinear parameters and then sends the bilinear parameters to all registered user intelligent terminals and the fog node equipment;
and 2, step: equipment registration: the method comprises the steps that a user sets a unique identity and a password and sends the unique identity and the password to a trusted center, the trusted center adds user identity information and calculates an encrypted private key after receiving the user identity information and returns the encrypted private key and system parameters to the user, the fog node sends the unique identity of the fog node to the trusted center, the trusted center adds fog node identity information and calculates a fog node encrypted private key after receiving the fog node information and returns the control private key to the fog node;
and step 3: identity authentication: the user encrypts a bilinear mapping result in a system parameter by using a private key and calculates an identity authentication certificate of the user, the user sends the identity authentication certificate to a fog node waiting for authentication, the fog node restores a mapping structure by using a control secret key and returns the mapping structure to the user after being encrypted by combining a current timestamp, and after the fog node is received by the user, the user calculates a timestamp difference value between the current timestamp and the user when receiving information and compares the timestamp difference value with a locally stored mapping result for authentication, wherein the identity authentication specifically comprises the following steps:
step 3-1: user U i First of all, using a locally stored encryption private key K s Separately calculating mapping results
And identity certificate
Then the user U i Auth identity certificate i Sending to the fog node F waiting for authentication i After receiving the identity certificate Auth i Rear fog node F i Access control key AK = (AK) using it 1 ，ak 2 ，ak 3 ) Calculating
Wherein: u shape i Indicating a certain user, SID i Representing the user U i H represents a Hash function, and the mathematical expression is Hash:
K f representative fog node F i The private key used to calculate F i J represents a random positive integer;
step 3-2: fog node F i Obtaining a result after the calculation is finished
And returns the current time stamp TS to the user U in the form of Token | | | TS i Suppose user U i Received at time stamp TS', user U to avoid retry attacks i The time difference between these two timestamps will be checked and if TS' -TS ≦ Δ t, the user U i It will receive, otherwise reject, and once received successfully, user U i Identity SID using a fog node to be authenticated i Calculating out
Then, whether E is equal to E 'or not is compared, and if the E is equal to E', the fog node passes identity authentication and is considered as a credible node;
and 4, step 4: and (3) attribute authentication: the method comprises the following steps of representing the functional attributes of a user and a fog node in a binary vector mode, defining a threshold value by the user to represent that the functional attributes of the user and the fog node expect the same quantity, calculating each vector element of the user and the fog node through a dot product protocol, enabling the fog node to pass through attribute toughness and receive privacy data sent by the user, and specifically comprising the following steps of:
step 4-1: user U i Is abstracted into
Fog node F to be authenticated i Is abstracted into
Wherein element 0 represents the absence of the function, element 1 represents the presence of the function, and n represents the user U i The number of owned attributes;
step 4-2: first user U i Selecting two large prime numbers alpha and beta, and initializing a parameter P =0; b =0; i =1; j =1, if the large prime number α, β satisfies that the length of α is equal to 2 n+2 Bit, β being greater than (n + 1). Alpha 2 Then a random length of not more than 2 is generated n+1 Array of bits Z, attribute vector to user at the same time
Go through the traversal if the element x in the vector i Equal to 1, a length of 2 is randomly selected n Random number r of bits i And calculate A i ＝α+z i +r i Beta, otherwise calculate A i ＝α+z i +r i β, p needs to be calculated for each traversal i ＝r i ·β-z i ，P＝P+p i Finally, the user sends the message (alpha, beta, P, A) 1 ，A 2 ，…，A n ) Sending the P and the beta to a POX controller, storing the P and the beta locally and (alpha, A) after the P and the beta are received by the POX controller 1 ，A 2 ，…，A n ) Forward to the fog node F i Mist node F i Received pair attribute vector
Go through the traversal if the element y in the vector i Equal to 1, calculate B j ＝α·A j Otherwise, calculate B j ＝A j After traversal is completed, the fog node F i All B are mixed j The sum B is returned to POX, the POX uses the received B and local P, beta to calculate K = B + P mod beta, and finally
The result sigma is the same attribute number of the user and the fog node, and then the user U i Comparing the dot product result sigma with a threshold theta, and if sigma is smaller than theta, determining that the fog node cannot meet the functional requirements of the user, and failing to authenticate; otherwise, the authentication is successful.
2. The authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the step 1 of system initialization specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1-1: the trust center TC selects a security parameter C and generates bilinear parameters (q, G, G) by running the generator Gen (C) T E) wherein G and G T All are cyclic groups, q is the order of the cyclic group G, G is the generator of the cyclic group G, e represents a mapping relation G 1 ×G 2 →G T ；
Step 1-2: selecting a secure Hash function Hash:
in addition, two random numbers are selected
As a master key, and a random element G in the group G r And calculating X = g i ，e(g，g) j Where element X is the authentication parameter of the registered user, e (g, g) j The generator G in the group G is in the group G T Mapping result on, then TC publishes system parameters = (q, G) T ，e，Hash，g r ，X，e(g，g) j )。
3. The authentication method based on bilinear mapping and dot product protocol in intelligent medical treatment as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the step 2 of device registration specifically comprises the following steps:
step 2-1: user U i Setting own unique identity ID i And password PW i Simultaneously generating a random number r _ a and calculating a cipher text HPW i ＝h(PW i R _ a), and then register information { ID |) i ，HPW i Sending it to the trusted center TC, which will check the ID first after receiving the registration request i If the user U exists in the user information table, if the user U does not exist in the user information table, calculating the user U i Encrypted private key K of s ＝h(ID i I) and initialize user U i Is then K s And system parameters are returned to the user U i If ID is i If the request exists, the trusted center rejects the registration request;
step 2-2: fog node F i SID unique identity of oneself i Sending the information to a trusted center TC, and after receiving the registration request, the trusted center TC firstly checks the SID i Whether existing in the node information table, if not, recording the equipment information in the table and initializing the node F i While selecting random numbers
Calculate fog node F i Is encrypted private key K f ＝h(SID i | a), access control key AK = (AK) 1 ，ak 2 ，ak 3 ) Wherein
Then returning the access control key AK to the fog node F i If SID i If so, the trust center will deny the registration request.
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