CN113068179A - Safe time synchronization method based on node identity recognition - Google Patents

Safe time synchronization method based on node identity recognition Download PDF

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CN113068179A
CN113068179A CN201911290930.4A CN201911290930A CN113068179A CN 113068179 A CN113068179 A CN 113068179A CN 201911290930 A CN201911290930 A CN 201911290930A CN 113068179 A CN113068179 A CN 113068179A
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clock
information
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CN113068179B (en
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刘金娣
李栋
俞雪婷
李志博
杨明
王照伟
曾鹏
于海斌
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Shenyang Institute of Automation of CAS
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/009—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W56/00—Synchronisation arrangements
    • H04W56/001—Synchronization between nodes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
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Abstract

The invention relates to a wireless network communication technology, in particular to a safe time synchronization method based on node identity identification. The invention checks and filters abnormal information by utilizing the uniqueness of the relative clock slope of the sensor node, then executes a corresponding synchronization algorithm by utilizing legal information, broadcasts the current clock state information and finally realizes the time synchronization of the whole network. The traditional secure time synchronization method based on information encryption and authentication cannot compensate clock offset and slope at the same time, and additional secure protocol overhead is brought. The secure time synchronization method based on threshold detection cannot defend Sybil attacks of disguised node identities. The method screens the abnormal information by utilizing the uniqueness of the node clock slope, and solves the problem of safety time synchronization under Sybil attack on the premise of not introducing safety protocol overhead.

Description

Safe time synchronization method based on node identity recognition
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of wireless network communication, in particular to a safe time synchronization method based on node identity identification.
Background
The current research aiming at the time synchronization mechanism of the wireless sensor network mainly aims to meet the requirements of high precision, low power consumption, rapid convergence, robustness and the like in the traditional sense. However, the security problem of the wireless sensor network is also a non-negligible problem. Since sensor nodes are usually deployed in an unattended factory, communication between the nodes is realized in a wireless manner, which makes the industrial wireless sensor network vulnerable to security threats respectively aiming at the physical nodes and communication links. For time synchronization, these security threats can cause the network to generate illegal time information. Obviously, when the node updates the local clock by using the illegal time information, the time synchronization of the whole network is invalid, and further, a serious industrial production problem is caused.
Designing a safe time synchronization mechanism has a plurality of challenges, and as a method for defending all attacks against all types of networks does not exist, the method mainly defends against Sybil attacks under the adjacent node time synchronization mechanism. The Sybil attack is a type of attack with serious threats in an industrial wireless sensor network, an attacker can randomly disguise other nodes, the disguised nodes mislead legal nodes to generate wrong neighbor tables, and the attacker destroys protocols such as distributed storage, routing, data aggregation, fairness resource allocation and the like in the network by sending illegal information. Most of the existing researches on the Sybil attack defense mechanism are based on key management and neighbor time information, and more computing, communication, storage and hardware resources are consumed, so that the method is not preferable for the industrial wireless sensor network with limited resources.
In time synchronization, the witch attacker can also send illegal time information and have a disguised identifier, thereby destroying network synchronization. Existing secure time synchronization mechanisms for information manipulation attacks cannot defend Sybil attacks, because legitimate nodes can be disguised under the Sybil attacks, and the disguised legitimate nodes can be considered as malicious nodes in the existing protocols, so that synchronization with other nodes is lost. In addition, the adjacent node time synchronization mechanism has strong expandability and has a certain defense function against physical attacks on the nodes. Therefore, the invention develops research aiming at the time synchronization defense mechanism of the adjacent nodes under the Sybil attack.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention provides a safe time synchronization method based on node identity recognition, which solves the problem of safe time synchronization under Sybil attack and ensures safe and reliable operation of a wireless sensor network.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for realizing the purpose is as follows: a safe time synchronization method based on node identity recognition comprises the following steps:
receiving synchronous information: a node receives clock state information in a network;
and (3) filtering abnormal information: monitoring and screening abnormal information by utilizing the linear property of a node hardware clock;
updating a local clock: updating the local clock by utilizing legal information;
and (3) synchronous information broadcasting: and broadcasting the current clock state information, and finally realizing the time synchronization of the whole network.
The clock state information includes: hardware clock readings, logic clock slope compensation parameters, and logic clock skew compensation parameters.
The data to be stored and calculated after the synchronization information is received comprises: a logic clock slope compensation parameter, a logic clock offset compensation parameter, a hardware clock reading, a hardware clock slope, a hardware clock offset, and a relative clock slope with respect to a neighbor.
The synchronous information receiving is a process iterated according to a clock state information broadcasting cycle:
when the node i receives the information of the neighbor node j, recording a local logic clock slope compensation parameter, a logic clock offset compensation parameter and a hardware clock reading;
when the historical information of the node j exists in the node i, the relative clock slope alpha between the node i and the node j is calculatedij。
The relative clock slope is
Figure BDA0002319095100000021
Wherein k is the number of iterations; tau isj(tk) Indicating node j at time tkHardware clock reading of τi(tk) Indicating node i at time tkHardware clock reading of alphaij(k) Is the relative clock slope of nodes i and j at the kth iteration.
And filtering the abnormal information, specifically, detecting malicious information by using relative clock slope uniqueness between two nodes.
The abnormal information filtering comprises the following steps:
when the nodes i and j have credible common neighbor nodes c, the node i verifies alpha in the detection processij·αjcAnd alphaicWhether or not equal, if alphaij·αjc＝αicIf the time information with the mark j is legal information, otherwise, the time information with the mark j is suspicious abnormal information; alpha is alphaijIs the relative clock slope of nodes i and j, αjcIs the relative clock slope, α, of node j and node cicIs the relative clock slope of node i and node c.
The local clock update is updated by the following logic clock parameter update rule:
when in use
Figure BDA0002319095100000031
Time of flight
Figure BDA0002319095100000032
Figure BDA0002319095100000033
When in use
Figure BDA0002319095100000034
Time of flight
Figure BDA0002319095100000035
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002319095100000036
for node i at time tkThe updated logic clock slope compensation parameter,
Figure BDA0002319095100000037
for node i at time tkOf the logic clock slope compensation parameter, alphaij(k) The relative clock slopes of nodes i and j at the kth iteration,
Figure BDA0002319095100000038
for node i at time tkThe updated logic clock offset compensation parameter is then updated,
Figure BDA0002319095100000039
for node j at time tkThe logic clock offset compensation parameter of (a),
Figure BDA00023190951000000310
for node j at time tkOf the logic clock slope compensation parameter, τj(tk) For node j at time tkHardware clock reading.
The broadcast time of each node in the synchronous information broadcast process is related to a hardware clock value and a preset period T, and the broadcast time of each node i is
Figure BDA00023190951000000311
αiIs the hardware clock slope, beta, of node iiK represents the number of iterations for the hardware clock offset of node i.
The invention provides a node identity identification-based security time synchronization method, which fully considers the problems of the existing security time synchronization method based on information encryption and authentication and threshold detection, reduces message overhead on the premise of not introducing an additional security protocol, and realizes defense against Sybil attack disguising node identities. The concrete points are as follows:
1. the invention is based on the node identity recognition mechanism, does not introduce additional safety protocol overhead, and reduces the development cost;
2. according to the invention, the uniqueness of the relative clock slope of the sensor node is utilized to check and filter the abnormal information, no additional synchronous information needs to be sent, and the message overhead is reduced;
3. the broadcast time of each node in the synchronous information broadcast process is related to the hardware clock value and the preset period, and the broadcast time information of each node is different in time due to different hardware clock slopes of each node, so that the asynchronous transmission effectively avoids channel collision in a network, and further reduces the communication energy consumption of a synchronous algorithm.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for synchronizing a security time according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is an industrial wireless sensor network with a Sybil attacker;
fig. 3 is an example of the detection process (attacker a masquerades as node 2).
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The invention checks and filters abnormal information by utilizing the uniqueness of the relative clock slope of the sensor node, then executes a corresponding synchronization algorithm by utilizing legal information, broadcasts the current clock state information and finally realizes the time synchronization of the whole network. The traditional secure time synchronization method based on information encryption and authentication cannot compensate clock offset and slope at the same time, and additional secure protocol overhead is brought. The secure time synchronization method based on threshold detection cannot defend Sybil attacks of disguised node identities. The method screens the abnormal information by utilizing the uniqueness of the node clock slope, and solves the problem of safety time synchronization under Sybil attack on the premise of not introducing safety protocol overhead.
The method comprises four steps, wherein in order to explain each process in detail, a safe time synchronization problem needs to be modeled, a clock model and an attack model are firstly established, then the safe time synchronization problem is described, and the detection and filtration process of abnormal information is analyzed in detail by combining a simple example.
A safe time synchronization method based on node identity recognition comprises the following steps:
receiving synchronous information: a node receives clock state information in a network;
and (3) filtering abnormal information: monitoring and screening abnormal information by utilizing the linear property of a node hardware clock;
updating a local clock: utilizing legal information to execute a corresponding synchronization algorithm to update a local clock;
and (3) synchronous information broadcasting: and broadcasting the current clock state information, and finally realizing the time synchronization of the whole network.
The data to be stored and calculated after the synchronization information is received comprises: logic clock slope, offset compensation parameters, hardware time, and relative clock slope with respect to neighbors.
The synchronous information receiving process is a process iterated according to a clock state information broadcasting period, and when the node i receives the information of the neighbor node j, the local logic clock slope and offset compensation parameters and the hardware clock value are recorded. When the historical information (hardware clock reading of the previous iteration) of the node j exists in the node i, the relative clock slope alpha between the node i and the node j is calculatedij。
The exception information filtering mechanism: relative clock slope uniqueness between two nodes is employed to detect malicious information.
The abnormal information filtering mechanism is based on the assumption that when the nodes i and j have credible common neighbors c, the nodes i check alpha in the detection processij·αjcAnd alphaicWhether or not equal, if alphaij·αjc＝αicThe time information with the identification j is legal, otherwise the time information with the identification j is suspicious.
The logic clock parameter updating rule in the local clock updating process is as follows:
when in use
Figure BDA0002319095100000051
Time of flight
Figure BDA0002319095100000052
Figure BDA0002319095100000053
When in use
Figure BDA0002319095100000054
Time of flight
Figure BDA0002319095100000055
Each node broadcast time in the synchronization information broadcast procedure is related to a hardware clock value and a preset period T,each broadcast of node i is at a time of
Figure BDA0002319095100000056
1. Secure time synchronization problem modeling
Network model
Consider an industrial wireless sensor network with n security nodes and m Sybil attackers, where n>And m is selected. It is known that the convergence of time synchronization of neighboring nodes is closely related to the network density. In order to speed up the synchronization process, each node can maintain the effective number of neighbors by adopting two methods: for a target network region, node neighbors may be increased by increasing the number of nodes or node transmission power in the network. In a peer-to-peer network, the mode of communication between adjacent nodes is two-way communication. Therefore, the industrial wireless sensor network can be represented by a undirected connection graph G ═ (V, E), where V ═ {1,2, …, n + m } is the set of nodes, and E is the set of nodesijAnd (i, j) E indicates that the node i and the node j can communicate with each other. V S1,2, …, n is a set of security nodes. N is a radical ofi＝{j|j∈V,eijE represents the set of neighbor nodes of node i. In the network, the number of neighbor nodes of each node is greater than 1. There is at least one common neighbor between any nodes i and j, i.e.,
Figure BDA0002319095100000061
j∈Ni. Some important symbol definitions are referred to in table 1.
TABLE 1 symbol definitions
Figure BDA0002319095100000062
Figure BDA0002319095100000071
Clock model
The network node i maintains two clocks at the same time, namely the hardware clock:
τi(t)＝αit+βi， (1)
and a logic clock:
Figure BDA0002319095100000072
therefore, we can compensate the parameter by adjusting the logic clock
Figure BDA0002319095100000073
And
Figure BDA0002319095100000074
and realizing the synchronization of network logic clocks.
Attack model
Generally, industrial wireless sensor networks are deployed in an unattended environment, causing the time synchronization protocol to face security threats. The invention defends against Sybil attacks under the adjacent node time synchronization protocol. In a witch attack, an attacker illegally disguises multiple identities. Suppose that a witch attacker can only masquerade as its neighbor nodes. Meanwhile, illegal information cannot be diffused in a network in a multi-hop manner.
In the network initialization phase, each sensor node and adjacent nodes construct a fully distributed industrial wireless sensor network by exchanging identity information. The identity of the Sybil attacker camouflage can be obtained through two ways: neighbor identities and self-created new identities. It is known that each node periodically broadcasts local time information during synchronization, and therefore new identities randomly generated by an attacker can be detected based on a preset threshold of the broadcast period. This detection method has been widely adopted in the prior art. In addition, when more than two consecutive messages have the same self-created counterfeit identifier, this type of attack can be considered as an information manipulation attack. Meanwhile, considering the characteristic of limited resources of the industrial wireless sensor network, in the synchronization of adjacent nodes, each node usually uses the time information of 1-hop neighbors thereof to correct the local clock, and the received information cannot be further diffused. The assumptions of the present invention are therefore reasonable.
The attack model of the present invention is illustrated below in a simple example. As shown in fig. 2, node a is a witch attacker and has 4 neighbor nodes, i.e., nodes 1,2, 7, and 10. During each synchronization information broadcast, attacker a randomly selects identities 1,2, 7 and 10 as current masquerading identities and modifies the local clock information. Meanwhile, the error information sent by the attacker A can only be monitored by the 1-hop neighbor and cannot be diffused to nodes beyond the 1-hop. When the identity of a security node is disguised by a witch attacker, the node is called a suspect node.
Description of the problem
The classic adjacent node time synchronization protocol comprises an average consistency time synchronization protocol and a maximum consistency time synchronization protocol, and each node is based on time information received from a neighbor node
Figure BDA0002319095100000081
Figure BDA0002319095100000082
To update local logic clock compensation parameters
Figure BDA0002319095100000083
And
Figure BDA0002319095100000084
the purpose of average coherence and maximum coherence time synchronization is to synchronize the network clock to the average and maximum values of all node clocks, respectively. However, if the time information in the network is wrong or has an illegal identity, network synchronization cannot be achieved.
Therefore, the invention designs a safe time synchronization protocol which can screen out legal information from the information with the same identification, namely
Figure BDA0002319095100000085
2. Secure time synchronization detection mechanism
Reference [ Huang DJ, Teng WC, Wang CY, et al, clock skew based node identification in wireless sensor networks, proceedings of the IEEE Global communications Conference,2008: pp.1-5.]The research shows that the clock slope difference between other nodes and fixed nodes in the network is stable and different, each node and the fixed node are synchronized, and the root node is r. Through physical experiments, the clock slope difference alpha between each node and the root node r is foundi-αrIs unique. At this time, the ideal clock t is used to replace the root node r, and the clock slope difference alpha is obtainedi-1 is likewise unique. Therefore, the uniqueness of the node clock slope in the present invention also exists, and the relative clock slope between two nodes is a fixed constant.
Based on the above findings, relative clock slope uniqueness between two nodes can be exploited to detect malicious information. First, a relative clock slope is defined as
Figure BDA0002319095100000086
Where k is the number of iterations. Obviously, for node i, when the condition α is satisfiedij(k)＝αij(k-1), the information with the identification j is legitimate. However, under the witch attack, the information with the same mark may be a mixture of illegal information and legal information, so the node i cannot confirm the alphaijTrue reliability of the device. However, when nodes i and j have a trusted common neighbor c, node i can obtain the true α from node cjc. Thus, the true αijThe recurrence relation needs to be satisfied:
Figure BDA0002319095100000091
therefore, node i can filter illegal information using this detection process.
In this case, a simpleThe detection process of the present invention is illustrated by way of example, as shown in FIG. 3. Consider a simple network with 4 nodes, where node a is a witch attacker. Node a may masquerade as node 1 or 2 when sending illegal information, while node 3 is a common neighbor of nodes 1 and 2. In the current information broadcast cycle, it is assumed that an attacker pretends to be node 2. The information received by node 1 from nodes 2 and 3 is legitimate, denoted as a12And a13The information received from node A is illegal and is denoted as a'12The information received by the node 2 from the node 3 is denoted as a23. The node 1 cannot judge whether the information with the identifier 2 is reliable at this time, and the node 1 calculates and judges the condition α through the detection process shown in the formula (5)13＝α12·α23Whether or not this is true. If this condition is not true, then the information currently having identification 2 is not reliable.
NiSTS protocol design
Aiming at the analysis, the invention designs a safe time synchronization method based on node identity recognition, which is called NiSTS (node-identification-based secure time synchronization method) for short. It is known that the maximum value of the clock parameter can be obtained by a simple comparison, but the average value is obtained by a plurality of iterations. Therefore, the invention designs a safe time synchronization protocol based on the maximum consistency theory.
The NiSTS protocol sets registers for each node in the network for storing the latest time information for the different neighbors, including logical clock slope and offset compensation parameters, hardware time, and relative clock slope with respect to the neighbors. When a node is powered up, clock parameters are initialized, i.e.,
Figure BDA0002319095100000092
α ij1. If the current hardware time of node i satisfies the condition taui(t)＝kT，k∈N+When T is a preset broadcast period, the node i broadcasts the current time information
Figure BDA0002319095100000093
And alphaij，j∈Ni. During each iteration, the local logic clock slope and offset compensation parameters and hardware clock values are recorded each time node i receives information from neighbor j. When historical information of the node j exists, the node i calculates the relative clock slope alpha between the node i and the neighbor jij。
During the detection process, the node i checks alphaij·αjcAnd alphaicAnd c is the common neighbor of nodes i and j. If α isij·αjc＝αicThen the time information with the identification j is legal and the node i will update the logic clock parameters according to this information. The specific update rule is as follows:
when in use
Figure BDA0002319095100000101
Time of flight
Figure BDA0002319095100000102
Figure BDA0002319095100000103
When in use
Figure BDA0002319095100000104
Time of flight
Figure BDA0002319095100000105
Based on the update rule, each node synchronizes the local clock to the fastest neighbor clock in each iteration process, and further realizes the whole network synchronization. In the NiSTS protocol, each node broadcasts time information based on a hardware clock value and a preset period T. Then, the time of each broadcast of node i is
Figure BDA0002319095100000106
Since the hardware clock slope of each node is different, anβi/αiIs constant so that the time at which each node broadcasts the time information is not the same, i.e., asynchronous transmission. Obviously, asynchronous transmission effectively avoids channel collision in the network, thereby reducing the communication energy consumption of the synchronous algorithm.
It should be noted that the present invention only considers the case where the communication delay is fixed. This is because the sensor node acquires the time stamp at the physical layer, and in the high-density network, the distance between the neighboring nodes is short and the position is fixed, so the uncertain communication delay of the physical layer and the spatial link is negligible here.

Claims (9)

1. A safety time synchronization method based on node identity recognition is characterized by comprising the following steps:
receiving synchronous information: a node receives clock state information in a network;
and (3) filtering abnormal information: monitoring and screening abnormal information by utilizing the linear property of a node hardware clock;
updating a local clock: updating the local clock by utilizing legal information;
and (3) synchronous information broadcasting: and broadcasting the current clock state information, and finally realizing the time synchronization of the whole network.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the clock status information comprises: hardware clock readings, logic clock slope compensation parameters, and logic clock skew compensation parameters.
3. The method for secure time synchronization based on node identification according to claim 1, wherein the data to be stored and calculated after the synchronization information is received comprises: a logic clock slope compensation parameter, a logic clock offset compensation parameter, a hardware clock reading, a hardware clock slope, a hardware clock offset, and a relative clock slope with respect to a neighbor.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the receiving of the synchronization information is an iterative process according to a clock status information broadcast cycle:
when the node i receives the information of the neighbor node j, recording a local logic clock slope compensation parameter, a logic clock offset compensation parameter and a hardware clock reading;
when the historical information of the node j exists in the node i, the relative clock slope alpha between the node i and the node j is calculatedij。
5. The method of claim 3, wherein the relative clock slope is
Figure FDA0002319095090000011
Wherein k is the number of iterations; tau isj(tk) Indicating node j at time tkHardware clock reading of τi(tk) Indicating node i at time tkHardware clock reading of alphaij(k) Is the relative clock slope of nodes i and j at the kth iteration.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the filtering of the abnormal information is to detect malicious information by using uniqueness of relative clock slopes between two nodes.
7. The method for secure time synchronization based on node identification according to claim 1 or 6, wherein the abnormal information filtering comprises the following steps:
when the nodes i and j have credible common neighbor nodes c, the node i verifies alpha in the detection processij·αjcAnd alphaicWhether or not equal, if alphaij·αjc＝αicThen has the time letter of the identification jThe information is legal information, otherwise, the time information with the mark j is suspicious abnormal information; alpha is alphaijIs the relative clock slope of nodes i and j, αjcIs the relative clock slope, α, of node j and node cicIs the relative clock slope of node i and node c.
8. The method for secure time synchronization based on node identification according to claim 1, wherein the local clock update is updated according to the following logic clock parameter update rule:
when in use
Figure FDA0002319095090000021
Time of flight
Figure FDA0002319095090000022
Figure FDA0002319095090000023
When in use
Figure FDA0002319095090000024
Time of flight
Figure FDA0002319095090000025
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002319095090000026
for node i at time tkThe updated logic clock slope compensation parameter,
Figure FDA0002319095090000027
for node i at time tkOf the logic clock slope compensation parameter, alphaij(k) For the phases of nodes i and j at the k-th iterationIn the case of the slope of the clock,
Figure FDA0002319095090000028
for node i at time tkThe updated logic clock offset compensation parameter is then updated,
Figure FDA0002319095090000029
for node j at time tkThe logic clock offset compensation parameter of (a),
Figure FDA00023190950900000210
for node j at time tkOf the logic clock slope compensation parameter, τj(tk) For node j at time tkHardware clock reading.
9. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the broadcast time of each node in the synchronization information broadcast process is related to a hardware clock value and a preset period T, and the broadcast time of each node i is
Figure FDA00023190950900000211
αiIs the hardware clock slope, beta, of node iiK represents the number of iterations for the hardware clock offset of node i.
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