CN113037427A - Anti-cheating response method applied to friend or foe identification system - Google Patents
Anti-cheating response method applied to friend or foe identification system Download PDFInfo
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- CN113037427A CN113037427A CN202110232763.9A CN202110232763A CN113037427A CN 113037427 A CN113037427 A CN 113037427A CN 202110232763 A CN202110232763 A CN 202110232763A CN 113037427 A CN113037427 A CN 113037427A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/86—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing deceptive jamming or unauthorized interrogation or access, e.g. WLAN access or RFID reading
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
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- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
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- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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Abstract
The invention discloses a cheat-resisting response method applied to a friend or foe identification system, which comprises the following steps: s1: generating a preamble time interval parameter and a transmitting power parameter, and carrying the preamble time interval parameter and the transmitting power parameter in the inquiry signal, wherein the preamble time interval parameter is used for determining the preamble time interval of the response signal, and the transmitting power parameter is used for determining the amplitude of the response signal; s2: receiving a response signal transmitted by the response equipment for responding to the inquiry signal; s3: judging whether the preamble time interval of the response signal is determined by the preamble time interval parameter and/or judging whether the amplitude of the response signal is determined by the transmitting power parameter; s4: discarding the reply signal if the preamble time interval of the reply signal is not determined by the preamble time interval parameter or the amplitude of the reply signal is not determined by the transmit power parameter. The invention can accurately identify the deception response signal and improve the performance of the friend or foe identification system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of friend or foe identification, in particular to a cheating-resisting response method applied to a friend or foe identification system.
Background
In military environments where countermeasures are becoming increasingly intense, modern information wars are increasingly demanding on friend-foe identification systems. In order to master the instantaneously changeable battlefield information in time, the enemy and my identification system is required to quickly and accurately identify the enemy and my attributes of the target, so that misjudgment is reduced to the minimum extent, and a basis is provided for command decision. Therefore, the friend or foe identification system must have high anti-interference performance, safety and confidentiality.
However, the existing friend or foe identification system has the defects of poor confidentiality, easy utilization, cheating and the like. The interference device of the enemy can collect the response signal of the enemy for storage and forwarding, but the inquiry device of the enemy cannot effectively identify the response signal, so that the enemy and my attribute of the interference device of the enemy is judged as the own party by mistake. The existing friend or foe identification system lacks effective filtering means for deception response, causes wrong judgment of friend or foe attributes and the phenomenon of identifying friend or foe, seriously influences the performance of the friend or foe identification system and cannot provide reliable basis for commanding decision.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a cheating-resisting response method applied to a friend or foe identification system, which can accurately identify a cheating response signal and improve the performance of the friend or foe identification system.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts a technical scheme that: there is provided a spoof-proof response method applied to a friend or foe identification system, comprising the steps of:
s1: generating a preamble time interval parameter and a transmission power parameter, and carrying the preamble time interval parameter and the transmission power parameter in an inquiry signal, wherein the preamble time interval parameter is used for determining a preamble time interval of a response signal, and the transmission power parameter is used for determining an amplitude of the response signal;
s2: receiving a response signal transmitted by a response device for responding to the inquiry signal;
s3: judging whether the leading head time interval of the response signal is determined by the leading head time interval parameter and/or judging whether the amplitude of the response signal is determined by the transmitting power parameter;
s4: discarding the reply signal if a preamble time interval of the reply signal is not determined by the preamble time interval parameter or an amplitude of the reply signal is not determined by the transmit power parameter.
Preferably, the preamble time interval parameter and the transmission power parameter are randomly generated.
Preferably, the preamble time interval parameter includes a step time and a step value, the step time is a preset time, and the step value is a random value within the preset value, wherein the preset value is a positive integer, and the random value is a natural number;
the step of judging whether the preamble time interval of the response signal is determined by the preamble time interval parameter specifically comprises:
and judging whether the leading head time interval is equal to the product of the stepping time and the stepping numerical value.
Preferably, the step time is 200ns, and the preset value is 31.
Preferably, the transmission power parameter is a random transmission power gear in a plurality of transmission power gears, and the plurality of transmission power gears correspond to different transmission powers;
the step of judging whether the amplitude of the response signal is determined by the transmission power parameter specifically comprises:
and judging whether the amplitude of the response signal corresponds to the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear.
Preferably, the plurality of transmission power steps are full power, 1/2 full power, 1/4 full power, 1/8 full power and 1/16 full power, respectively.
Different from the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. aiming at the defect that the response signal of the traditional friend or foe identification system is easy to copy and utilize, the invention carries the leader time interval parameter of the response signal in the query signal of the query device, so the waveform of the response signal can not be copied, thereby achieving the aim of anti-cheating response.
2. Aiming at the defect that the response signal of the traditional friend or foe identification system is easy to copy and utilize, the invention carries the transmission power parameter of the response signal in the query signal of the query device, so the amplitude of the response signal can not be copied, thereby achieving the aim of anti-fraud response.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a spoof-proof response method applied to a friend or foe identification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, the anti-spoofing response method applied to the friend or foe identification system of the embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:
s1: generating a preamble time interval parameter and a transmission power parameter, and carrying the preamble time interval parameter and the transmission power parameter in the inquiry signal, wherein the preamble time interval parameter is used for determining the preamble time interval of the response signal, and the transmission power parameter is used for determining the amplitude of the response signal.
After receiving the inquiry signal, the response equipment receives the leader time interval parameter and the transmitting power parameter at the same time, if the response equipment belongs to the party, the response equipment can determine the leader time interval of the response signal according to the leader time interval parameter and can transmit the power parameter to determine the amplitude of the response signal, and if the response equipment belongs to the enemy, the enemy does not know the purposes of the leader time interval parameter and the transmitting power parameter.
In this embodiment, the preamble interval parameter and the transmit power parameter are randomly generated. That is, the preamble interval parameter and the transmit power parameter are different for each generation.
S2: receiving a response signal transmitted by the response device in response to the interrogation signal.
If the answering device belongs to the enemy, the answering device sends a real answer and transmits a real answer signal, and if the answering device belongs to the enemy, the answering device is likely to send a copied deception answer signal to the inquiring device of the enemy.
S3: determining whether a preamble time interval of the reply signal is determined by a preamble time interval parameter and/or determining whether an amplitude of the reply signal is determined by a transmit power parameter.
Wherein, if the answer signal is a true answer signal, the preamble time interval is determined by the preamble time interval parameter, the amplitude of the answer signal is also determined by the transmission power parameter, if the answer signal is a spoofed answer signal, the preamble time interval of the answer signal has no relation with the preamble time interval parameter, and the amplitude of the answer signal has no relation with the transmission power parameter.
Generally speaking, it is only necessary to determine whether the response signal belongs to the true response signal or the spoofed response signal by determining one of the preamble time interval and the amplitude of the response signal, but the preamble time interval and the amplitude of the response signal are both determined, so that the accurate identification capability can be further improved.
S4: discarding the reply signal if the preamble time interval of the reply signal is not determined by the preamble time interval parameter or the amplitude of the reply signal is not determined by the transmit power parameter.
Wherein, if the leading head time interval and the amplitude of the response signal are judged, the judging sequence of the leading head time interval and the amplitude of the response signal is not limited, the leading head time interval of the response signal can be judged firstly, then the amplitude of the response signal can be judged, or the amplitude of the response signal can be judged firstly, then the leading head time interval of the response signal can be judged, in the judging process, if a judging result is negative, namely the leading head time interval of the response signal is not determined by the leading head time interval parameter or the amplitude of the response signal is not determined by the transmitting power parameter, the response signal is determined to belong to a deception response signal, and then the response signal is discarded, when the judging results of the leading head time interval and the amplitude of the response signal are both yes, namely the leading head time interval of the response signal is determined by the leading head time interval parameter and the amplitude of the response signal is determined by the transmitting power parameter, the answer signal is determined to belong to the real answer signal and the answer signal is further processed.
In a practical application, the preamble time interval parameter includes a step time and a step value, the step time is a preset time, and the step value is a random value within the preset value, wherein the preset value is a positive integer, and the random value is a natural number;
the step of judging whether the preamble time interval of the response signal is determined by the preamble time interval parameter specifically comprises the following steps:
it is determined whether the preamble time interval is equal to the product of the step time and the step value.
For example, the step time is 200ns, and the preset value is 31. In generating the preamble interval parameter, the step time is 200ns, which is a definite value, and the step value is a random value within a preset value, i.e., a random value between 0 and 31, for example, the preset value is 12. Then, if the response signal is a true response signal, the preamble interval of the response signal should be 200ns × 12 ═ 2400ns, as long as the preamble interval is equal to 2400ns, it indicates that the response signal is likely to be a true response signal, and if the preamble interval is not equal to 2400ns, it indicates that the response signal is definitely a spoofed response signal.
Further, the transmission power parameter is a random transmission power gear in a plurality of transmission power gears, and the plurality of transmission power gears correspond to different transmission powers;
the step of judging whether the amplitude of the response signal is determined by the transmission power parameter specifically comprises the following steps:
and judging whether the amplitude of the response signal corresponds to the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear.
When the transmission power parameter is generated, the transmission power gear is random, if the response signal is a real response signal, the transmission power of the response signal should be the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear, the amplitude of the response signal should correspond to the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear, as long as the amplitude of the response signal corresponds to the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear, it is indicated that the response signal is possibly the real response signal, and if the amplitude of the response signal does not correspond to the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear, it is indicated that the response signal is definitely a spoofed response signal.
In the present embodiment, the plurality of transmission power steps are full power, 1/2 full power, 1/4 full power, 1/8 full power, and 1/16 full power, respectively.
And (3) judging the time interval and the amplitude of the leading head of the response signal, if the time interval of the leading head is equal to 2400ns, and the amplitude of the response signal corresponds to the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear, the response signal is definitely the real response signal.
Through the mode, the cheat-resisting response method applied to the friend or foe identification system carries the leader time interval parameter and the transmitting power parameter of the response signal when the inquiry signal is transmitted, the leader time interval parameter and the transmitting power parameter are randomly generated, after the response equipment processes the inquiry signal, the leader time interval and the transmitting power of the response signal are adjusted according to the requirement of the inquiry signal, the response equipment transmits the response signal after the adjustment is finished, after the response signal is received by the inquiry equipment, the leader time interval and the amplitude of the response signal are judged, the response signal which does not meet the requirement is discarded, the cheat-resisting response purpose is achieved, the cheat response signal can be accurately identified, and the performance of the friend or foe identification system is improved.
The above description is only an example of the present application and is not intended to limit the scope of the present application, and various modifications and changes may be made by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application. It should be noted that: like reference numbers and letters refer to like items in the following figures, and thus, once an item is defined in one figure, it need not be further defined and explained in subsequent figures.
It is noted that, herein, relational terms such as first and second, and the like may be used solely to distinguish one entity or action from another entity or action without necessarily requiring or implying any actual such relationship or order between such entities or actions. Also, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising an … …" does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises the element.
Claims (6)
1. An anti-spoofing response method applied to a friend or foe identification system, comprising the steps of:
s1: generating a preamble time interval parameter and a transmission power parameter, and carrying the preamble time interval parameter and the transmission power parameter in an inquiry signal, wherein the preamble time interval parameter is used for determining a preamble time interval of a response signal, and the transmission power parameter is used for determining an amplitude of the response signal;
s2: receiving a response signal transmitted by a response device for responding to the inquiry signal;
s3: judging whether the leading head time interval of the response signal is determined by the leading head time interval parameter and/or judging whether the amplitude of the response signal is determined by the transmitting power parameter;
s4: discarding the reply signal if a preamble time interval of the reply signal is not determined by the preamble time interval parameter or an amplitude of the reply signal is not determined by the transmit power parameter.
2. The anti-spoofing reply method of claim 1 wherein the preamble time interval parameter and the transmit power parameter are randomly generated.
3. The anti-spoof response method of claim 2 wherein the preamble time interval parameter includes a step time and a step value, the step time being a preset time and the step value being a random value within the preset value, wherein the preset value is a positive integer and the random value is a natural number;
the step of judging whether the preamble time interval of the response signal is determined by the preamble time interval parameter specifically comprises:
and judging whether the leading head time interval is equal to the product of the stepping time and the stepping numerical value.
4. A method of combating fraud answering according to claim 3, characterized in that said stepping time is 200ns and said preset value is 31.
5. The anti-spoofing response method of claim 2 wherein the transmit power parameter is a random transmit power level of a plurality of transmit power levels, the plurality of transmit power levels corresponding to different transmit powers;
the step of judging whether the amplitude of the response signal is determined by the transmission power parameter specifically comprises:
and judging whether the amplitude of the response signal corresponds to the transmission power corresponding to the random transmission power gear.
6. The anti-spoofing answering method of claim 5 wherein said plurality of transmit power steps are full power, 1/2 full power, 1/4 full power, 1/8 full power and 1/16 full power, respectively.
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