CN113012476A - Unmanned area control method and equipment based on no-fly zone - Google Patents
Unmanned area control method and equipment based on no-fly zone Download PDFInfo
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- CN113012476A CN113012476A CN202110099047.8A CN202110099047A CN113012476A CN 113012476 A CN113012476 A CN 113012476A CN 202110099047 A CN202110099047 A CN 202110099047A CN 113012476 A CN113012476 A CN 113012476A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
- G08G5/0047—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft
- G08G5/0069—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft specially adapted for an unmanned aircraft
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/015—Arrangements for jamming, spoofing or other methods of denial of service of such systems
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
- H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/82—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection
- H04K3/825—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection by jamming
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/90—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to allowing or preventing navigation or positioning, e.g. GPS
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- Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
Abstract
The invention provides a regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method and a device based on a no-fly area, wherein the regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method comprises the following steps: and transmitting a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time so as to interfere the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and tampering the positioning result of the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle into a specific no-fly zone, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start the no-fly zone strategy. The positioning result of the unmanned aerial vehicle is tampered into the specific no-fly area by using the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly area and is synchronous with the current time, the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start the no-fly area strategy and only can be forced to land or can not take off, and the purposes that the unmanned aerial vehicle is effectively controlled and cannot fly over the protected area in the specific area are achieved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle management and control, in particular to a regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control method and device based on a no-fly zone.
Background
In recent years, the unmanned aerial vehicle technology is fast and widely diffused, a large number of various remote control helicopters and multi-rotor unmanned aerial vehicles which are easy to control appear, but accidents related to the unmanned aerial vehicles frequently occur, the unmanned aerial vehicles can randomly take candid shots, steal privacy information in the coverage area of the unmanned aerial vehicles or have great hidden dangers such as putting dangerous goods, and the like, and challenges are formed on security, safety management and the like.
At present, traditional anti-unmanned aerial vehicle mode is with catching, destroy unmanned aerial vehicle and is leading, uses traditional air defense weapons such as guided missile, shell to hit down unmanned aerial vehicle, perhaps launches the interception net and entangles the target, makes its manipulation and driving system malfunctioning to catch unmanned aerial vehicle. The measures are applied more in the military field, and if the measures are directly applied to the field of civil unmanned aerial vehicles, other associated injuries are easily caused, and the application is more limited.
The deception satellite navigation interference technology induces a receiver to capture and track deception signals by broadcasting forged navigation deception signals, so that the receiver calculates wrong position and time information. The satellite navigation deception jamming technology is utilized to enable the receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle to calculate a specific error positioning result, and the purpose of effectively controlling the unmanned aerial vehicle in a specific area can be achieved by combining the flight control strategy of the unmanned aerial vehicle.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method and device based on a no-fly zone, and aims to solve the problem that other associated injuries are easily caused when a military anti-unmanned aerial vehicle mode is directly applied to a civil unmanned aerial vehicle.
The invention provides a regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method based on a no-fly zone, which comprises the following steps: and transmitting a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time so as to interfere the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and tampering the positioning result of the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle into a specific no-fly zone, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start the no-fly zone strategy.
Further, the multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of a no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time is transmitted towards a certain distance range of 360 degrees around by adopting the omnidirectional antenna.
Further, a directional antenna is adopted to transmit a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of a no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time towards the unmanned aerial vehicle tracked in the coverage range of the wave beam.
Further, the power of the emitted multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time is larger than the power of the real satellite navigation signal.
Further, the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal is a multimode composite satellite navigation signal simulating GPS + GLONASS.
Further, the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal is a multimode composite satellite navigation signal simulating GPS + GLONASS + Beidou.
The invention also provides a regional unmanned aerial vehicle control device based on the no-fly zone, which is used for transmitting the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time so as to interfere the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle and tamper the positioning result of the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle into the specific no-fly zone, thereby forcing the unmanned aerial vehicle to start the no-fly zone strategy.
Further, an omnidirectional antenna is arranged on the regional unmanned aerial vehicle control equipment and used for transmitting a multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of a no-fly area and is synchronous with the current time within a certain distance range of 360 degrees around.
Further, a directional antenna is arranged on the regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control equipment and used for transmitting a multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of a no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time to the unmanned aerial vehicle tracked in the beam coverage range of the directional antenna.
Further, the power of the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which is emitted by the regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control equipment and simulates the flight prohibition region position and is synchronous with the current time is larger than the power of the real satellite navigation signal.
In summary, due to the adoption of the technical scheme, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. the positioning result of the unmanned aerial vehicle is tampered into the specific no-fly area by using the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly area and is synchronous with the current time, the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start the no-fly area strategy and only can be forced to land or can not take off, and the purposes that the unmanned aerial vehicle is effectively controlled and cannot fly over the protected area in the specific area are achieved. And the invention can not cause other associated injuries.
2. The invention can provide omnidirectional and/or directional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control according to requirements.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate some embodiments of the present invention, and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope, and for those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without inventive efforts.
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control based on a no-fly zone in an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic view of an omnidirectional control area scene according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic view of a directional control area scene according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a screenshot of a control APP when the positioning result of the macro drone is tampered from the current position to the airport no-fly zone in the specific example of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is a screenshot of a control APP for a macro drone to start a no-fly zone policy in a specific example of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some, but not all, embodiments of the present invention. The components of embodiments of the present invention generally described and illustrated in the figures herein may be arranged and designed in a wide variety of different configurations.
Thus, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention, presented in the figures, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, as claimed, but is merely representative of selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The design idea of the invention is as follows:
governments around the world have been provided with no-fly zones in major cities and airports because of the need for policy or for safeguarding personal and property safety. After the white palace of unmanned aerial vehicle in great jiang falls the incident, forbidden area of flying has been demarcated in unmanned aerial vehicle's factory setting by most of manufacturers, and forbidden area's scope can be updated through the mode of forcing system's upgrading moreover. The unmanned aerial vehicle can not take off in the no-fly zone, and can automatically land even if the unmanned aerial vehicle reaches the no-fly zone. By utilizing the characteristics and combining with the navigation deception technology, the regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method based on the no-fly zone can be realized, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle cannot fly over the protected region, and the purpose of protecting the specific region is achieved.
At present, unmanned aerial vehicles of mainstream consumer-grade unmanned aerial vehicle manufacturers such as Xinjiang, zero-degree and hundred million voyages are provided with a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicle no-fly areas in the global range, and once a satellite navigation receiver on the unmanned aerial vehicle is positioned and calculated to be in the no-fly areas, the unmanned aerial vehicle can automatically land stably immediately and cannot take off again. Taking the maximum occupied rate of the Dajiang unmanned aerial vehicle in the current market as an example, the Dajiang company sets some airport restricted flight areas and special flight restricted areas as restricted flight areas, and publishes a special area list which is covered by the flight restriction function in the world on the official website of the Dajiang. The flight control strategy and the prompt information of the UAV in the no-fly area are shown in Table 1.
Table 1:
therefore, most unmanned aerial vehicles cannot take off in the no-fly zone, and can automatically land even if the unmanned aerial vehicles reach the no-fly zone. If the positioning result of the unmanned aerial vehicle can be tampered into the no-fly area by using the satellite navigation interference signal simulating the no-fly area position, the built-in no-fly area strategy of the unmanned aerial vehicle can be started, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to land or cannot take off. In order to implement the management and control method, a navigation deception jamming signal stronger than a real satellite navigation signal needs to be generated to carry out position deception jamming on the target unmanned aerial vehicle.
The deceptive jamming to the navigation receiver is to replace the real satellite navigation signal with the false satellite navigation signal which has the same carrier frequency, the same modulation mode and the same pseudo code sequence as the navigation signal, so that the receiver can mistakenly assume that the receiver works normally, and actually, the obtained false information is wrong information, thereby causing the wrong positioning of the receiver.
Deceptive jamming of a navigation system can be realized by giving false navigation information or increasing signal delay time, and can be generally divided into two jamming modes of a generating type jamming mode and a forwarding type jamming mode. The generated interference is generated interference for compiling false navigation messages by simulating a real signal form of a satellite; the repeater interference is to increase the transmission delay of the navigation signal by repeating the navigation signal, so that the receiver calculates the wrong pseudo range, thereby obtaining the wrong position information.
As the commercial unmanned aerial vehicle generally adopts the civil C/A code of the navigation signal for positioning, the encrypted military code cannot be used, and all information (such as a frame structure, a synchronization head and the like) of the civil C/A code is published externally through the corresponding ICD file, the navigation deception interference on the civil unmanned aerial vehicle can be carried out by adopting a mode of autonomously generating the false navigation signal.
To sum up, as shown in fig. 1, the method for controlling an area unmanned aerial vehicle based on a no-fly zone provided in this embodiment includes: and transmitting a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time so as to interfere the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and tampering the positioning result of the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle into a specific no-fly zone, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start the no-fly zone strategy. After the unmanned aerial vehicle starts the strategy of the no-fly zone, the unmanned aerial vehicle flying in the air can automatically land on the ground, and the unmanned aerial vehicle landing on the ground can not take off. Specifically, the method comprises the following steps:
(1) time synchronization
The multimode composite false satellite navigation signal in the embodiment comprises position information and time information, wherein the position information is the position of the simulated no-fly zone; the time information means that the simulated scene time and the current time are synchronous, that is, the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal is generated under the constraint condition that the time synchronization is satisfied. Because the time information has an important role in the deception effect, the synchronism of the scene time simulated by the emitted multimode composite false satellite navigation signal and the current time is the key for the success of the deception, and whether the unmanned aerial vehicle can use the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal for positioning is directly determined. Therefore, the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal in this embodiment provides, in addition to the position information of the simulated no-fly zone position, time information of the simulated scene time synchronized with the current time, so that the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal can successfully interfere with the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and tamper the positioning result of the navigation receiver with a specific no-fly zone, thereby forcing the unmanned aerial vehicle to start the no-fly zone policy of the unmanned aerial vehicle.
(2) Multimode compounding
At present, most commercial unmanned aerial vehicles receive multimode composite satellite navigation signals for positioning, namely, the unmanned aerial vehicles at least receive GPS and GLONASS dual-mode satellite navigation signals and even also receive Beidou satellite navigation signals for multimode composite navigation positioning, so that the unmanned aerial vehicles cannot be effectively navigated and deceived in real time by only transmitting false satellite navigation signals simulating a satellite system. Thus, the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal of the present embodiment is as follows:
a) the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal is a multimode composite satellite navigation signal simulating GPS and GLONASS, namely, the requirement of carrying out navigation deception on an unmanned aerial vehicle carrying out multimode composite navigation positioning by receiving the GPS and GLONASS dual-mode satellite navigation signal is met.
b) The multimode composite false satellite navigation signal is a multimode composite satellite navigation signal simulating GPS, GLONASS and Beidou, and therefore navigation deception of the unmanned aerial vehicle which carries out multimode composite navigation positioning by receiving GPS, GLONASS and Beidou three-mode satellite navigation signals is met.
(3) Transmitting power
And if the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal can interfere the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the power of the transmitted multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time is greater than the power of the real satellite navigation signal. Therefore, the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle preferentially receives the transmitted multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal, the positioning result of the navigation receiver can be tampered into a specific no-fly zone, and the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start a no-fly zone strategy.
For the above control method for the regional unmanned aerial vehicle based on the no-fly zone, in combination with the time range of the protected region to be protected, whether target unmanned aerial vehicle position guidance equipment (including radar, photoelectric and other detection and tracking equipment) is matched, the control method for the regional unmanned aerial vehicle can implement protection by adopting two modes, namely omnidirectional and directional:
(1) omnidirectional radio
When the protected area completely prohibits the drone from flying over within a certain time frame, or there is no cooperation of the target drone position directing device, as shown in fig. 2, at this time, the omni-directional antenna may be used to transmit a multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal that simulates the location of the no-fly zone and is synchronized with the current time within a certain distance range of 360 ° around, so as to form an omni-directional control area within a certain distance range, and the power of the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal in the omnidirectional control area is larger than the power of the real satellite navigation signal, the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle receives the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal and uses the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal for positioning, the positioning result is tampered into a specific no-fly zone, at the moment, the unmanned aerial vehicle starts a no-fly zone strategy, unmanned aerial vehicles flying in the air will automatically land on the ground, while unmanned aerial vehicles landing on the ground cannot take off. During the multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal transmitting period, the omni-directional control area becomes a no-fly area of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the unmanned aerial vehicle can be effectively controlled in the omni-directional control area, and the unmanned aerial vehicle can not fly over a protected area.
(2) Orientation
When the protected area is provided with the target unmanned aerial vehicle position guide equipment, the invading unmanned aerial vehicle can be found and tracked in time, as shown in fig. 3, at this time, a directional antenna may be adopted to transmit a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal that simulates the position of a no-fly zone and is synchronized with the current time towards a tracked drone in the beam coverage area thereof, to form a directional control area in the beam coverage area thereof, and the power of the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal in the directional control area is larger than the power of the real satellite navigation signal, the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle receives the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal and uses the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal for positioning, the positioning result is tampered into a specific no-fly zone, at the moment, the unmanned aerial vehicle starts a no-fly zone strategy, unmanned aerial vehicles flying in the air will automatically land on the ground, while unmanned aerial vehicles landing on the ground cannot take off. During the multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal emission period, the directional control area is to become a no-fly area of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the unmanned aerial vehicle can be effectively controlled in the directional control area, and the unmanned aerial vehicle can not fly over the protected area.
The embodiment also realizes a regional unmanned aerial vehicle control device based on a no-fly zone, wherein the regional unmanned aerial vehicle control device is used for transmitting a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time so as to interfere a navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and a positioning result of the navigation receiver is tampered to be a specific no-fly zone, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start a no-fly zone strategy.
Further, an omnidirectional antenna is arranged on the regional unmanned aerial vehicle control equipment and used for transmitting a multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of a no-fly area and is synchronous with the current time within a certain distance range of 360 degrees around.
Further, a directional antenna is arranged on the regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control equipment and used for transmitting a multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of a no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time to the unmanned aerial vehicle tracked in the beam coverage range of the directional antenna.
Further, the power of the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which is emitted by the regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control equipment and simulates the flight prohibition region position and is synchronous with the current time is larger than the power of the real satellite navigation signal.
The specific implementation principle of the area unmanned aerial vehicle control device based on the no-fly zone in this embodiment is consistent with that of the area unmanned aerial vehicle control method, and is not described herein again.
Specific examples are as follows:
(1) a test scene is set up in a non-flight-forbidden area according to the method shown in figure 2, area unmanned aerial vehicle control equipment and an omnidirectional antenna are placed in the center of a protected area, and the area unmanned aerial vehicle control equipment transmits a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of a flight-forbidden area and is synchronous with the current time in a certain distance range of 360 degrees around through the omnidirectional antenna, so that an omnidirectional control area in a large circle range in figure 2 is formed.
2) And remotely controlling the unmanned plane in Xinjiang to take off outside the range of the omnidirectional control area, and remotely controlling the unmanned plane to fly towards the direction of the protected area to enter the range of the omnidirectional control area.
3) After the big jiang unmanned aerial vehicle enters the regional scope of omnidirectional control, receive the influence of the compound false satellite navigation signal of multimode, the true satellite navigation signal of the normal receipt originally loses, and big jiang unmanned aerial vehicle's control APP screenshot is shown in figure 4, and the airport no-fly zone is tampered with from the current position to the location result of unmanned aerial vehicle after the short time.
4) And triggering the start of the no-fly zone strategy because the positioning result of the UAV in the Xinjiang is tampered as the no-fly zone of the airport. From the control APP screenshot of figure 5, it can be seen that the unmanned plane of Xinjiang has started the timer to the suggestion automatic descent will be forced to the aircraft after the timing, and the operation remote controller also can't control the throttle, can only adjust the horizontal direction in order to avoid the barrier.
5) After the timing is finished, the unmanned aerial vehicle in the Xinjiang province automatically descends to the ground in the omnidirectional control area, the remote controller is operated after the aircraft falls to the ground, the unmanned aerial vehicle cannot take off again, the unmanned aerial vehicle is effectively controlled in the omnidirectional control area, and the unmanned aerial vehicle cannot fly over the protected area.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and changes may be made by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. A regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method based on a no-fly area is characterized by comprising the following steps: and transmitting a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time so as to interfere the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and tampering the positioning result of the navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle into a specific no-fly zone, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start the no-fly zone strategy.
2. The no-fly zone based regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method of claim 1, wherein an omnidirectional antenna is adopted to transmit a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the no-fly zone position and is synchronous with the current time within a certain distance range of 360 degrees around.
3. The no-fly zone based regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method of claim 1, wherein a directional antenna is adopted to transmit a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the no-fly zone position and is synchronous with the current time towards the unmanned aerial vehicle tracked in the beam coverage range.
4. The no-fly zone based regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method of any one of claims 1-3, wherein the power of the transmitted multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal simulating the no-fly zone position and synchronized with the current time is greater than the real satellite navigation signal power.
5. The no-fly zone based regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method of claim 1, wherein the multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal is a multi-mode composite satellite navigation signal simulating GPS + GLONASS.
6. The no-fly zone based regional unmanned aerial vehicle control method of claim 1, wherein the multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal is a multi-mode composite satellite navigation signal simulating GPS + GLONASS + beidou.
7. The regional unmanned aerial vehicle control equipment based on the no-fly zone is characterized in that the regional unmanned aerial vehicle control equipment is used for transmitting a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the position of the no-fly zone and is synchronous with the current time so as to interfere a navigation receiver of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and a positioning result of the navigation receiver is tampered to be a specific no-fly zone, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to start a no-fly zone strategy.
8. The no-fly zone based regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control device of claim 7, wherein an omnidirectional antenna is arranged on the regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control device, and the omnidirectional antenna is used for transmitting a multi-mode composite false satellite navigation signal which simulates the no-fly zone position and is synchronous with the current time to a certain distance range of 360 degrees around.
9. The no-fly zone based regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control device of claim 7, wherein a directional antenna is disposed on the regional unmanned aerial vehicle management and control device, and the directional antenna is configured to transmit a multimode composite false satellite navigation signal that simulates a no-fly zone position and is synchronized with a current time towards an unmanned aerial vehicle tracked within a beam coverage range of the directional antenna.
10. The no-fly zone based regional drone management and control device of any one of claims 7-9, wherein the power of the multimode composite false satellite navigation signal that simulates the no-fly zone location and is synchronized with the current time transmitted by the regional drone management and control device is greater than the real satellite navigation signal power.
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| CN106683492A (en) * | 2016-12-26 | 2017-05-17 | 南京柏康机电科技有限公司 | Method and device for unmanned aerial vehicle control based on pseudo GPS satellite positioning system |
| CN106952505A (en) * | 2017-03-21 | 2017-07-14 | 华东师范大学 | A kind of method of many mobile devices invasion prevented based on satellite navigation system |
| CN107607965A (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2018-01-19 | 桂林电子科技大学 | A kind of black winged Navigation of Pilotless Aircraft deception system and method |
| CN210038548U (en) * | 2019-04-11 | 2020-02-07 | 北京卫信杰科技发展有限公司 | Synchronous type deception unmanned aerial vehicle |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN106683492A (en) * | 2016-12-26 | 2017-05-17 | 南京柏康机电科技有限公司 | Method and device for unmanned aerial vehicle control based on pseudo GPS satellite positioning system |
| CN106952505A (en) * | 2017-03-21 | 2017-07-14 | 华东师范大学 | A kind of method of many mobile devices invasion prevented based on satellite navigation system |
| CN107607965A (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2018-01-19 | 桂林电子科技大学 | A kind of black winged Navigation of Pilotless Aircraft deception system and method |
| CN210038548U (en) * | 2019-04-11 | 2020-02-07 | 北京卫信杰科技发展有限公司 | Synchronous type deception unmanned aerial vehicle |
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