CN112929164A - Hierarchical identification cipher key generation method based on global hash - Google Patents
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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Abstract
The invention discloses a hierarchical identification cipher key generation method based on global hash, wherein a root key generation mechanism root PKG carries out system initialization to generate a system main private key and a main public key, and a system public parameter Param is disclosed and issued; the root PKG establishes a meta-private key matrix M with the size of M multiplied by n according to the predicted number of the PKGspriGenerating random numbers selected by a private key by taking each node in a stored GS-HIBE system as a child node; establishing a corresponding meta-public key matrix Mpub(ii) a A root node root PKG generates a private key and a private key matrix for a first-layer PKG; the parent key generation mechanism and the root key generation mechanism generate private keys and private key matrixes for the key generation mechanisms below the first layer. The invention utilizes the idea of combining public keys to carry out the unified management of the local layer public keys of the hierarchical PKG, and uniformly stores the public and private key information randomly generated by each layer of key generator in a matrix, thereby realizing the problem of difficult authentication caused by the random number of a classical hierarchical identity-based cryptosystem, strengthening the robustness of the system and improving the anti-attack capability of the system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of computer network security, and particularly relates to a hierarchical identity identification cryptographic key generation method based on global hash.
Background
A Hierarchical identification cryptosystem (HIBC) introduces a Hierarchical concept on the basis of a single-layer IBC, disperses the load of a key generation mechanism, solves the problem of single-point invalidation of key management to a certain extent, and improves the robustness of the system.
The hierarchical identification password private key based on the global hash structure is short in length and keeps a fixed length, and has wide research and application in the fields of cloud computing, block chains, cooperative medical treatment and the like. The most notable of them is that scholars such as Gentry and Silverberg propose the GS-HIBE scheme, but the scheme has the problem of poor robustness of hierarchical private key management. In the GS-HIBE scheme, a part of a private Key generation organization PKG (private Key generator) level is generated by a random number autonomously generated by a father PKG, and the random number and corresponding public Key information thereof have no third party authentication. Therefore, if an attacker breaks any one PKG, the private keys of all users in the subtree using the PKG as the root node can be forged at will.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a hierarchical identification password generation technology based on global hash, based on a GS-HIBE algorithm framework, a root key generation mechanism root PKG performs centralized storage and unified management on local public keys of the hierarchical PKG by utilizing the idea of combining public keys, and public and private key information randomly generated by each layer of key generator (PKG) in a classic HIBE algorithm is uniformly stored in a matrix, so that the problem of difficult authentication brought by the random number of a classic hierarchical identity-based password system is solved, the robustness of the system is enhanced, and the attack resistance of the system is improved.
The invention provides a hierarchical identification cipher key generation method based on global hash, which comprises the following steps:
a root PKG (public Key Generation) of a root key generation mechanism carries out system initialization, generates a main private key and a main public key of the system, and publishes and releases a public parameter Param of the system; meanwhile, the root PKG establishes a meta-private key matrix M with the size of M multiplied by n according to the predicted number of the PKGspriGenerating random numbers selected by a private key by taking each node in a stored GS-HIBE system as a child node; establishing a corresponding meta-public key matrix Mpub；
A root node root PKG generates a private key and a private key matrix for a first-layer PKG;
the parent key generation mechanism and the root key generation mechanism generate private keys and private key matrixes for the key generation mechanisms below the first layer;
end-user key distribution for distributing end-user keys.
Further, in the system initialization step, a root key generation mechanism root PKG generates initialization system parameters according to the input system safety factor<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2,e>Wherein G is1And G2Is a q-th prime addition group, P is G1Generating element of group, GTIs a prime multiplier of order q, e is G1Upper element and G2To GTBilinear pairwise mapping of H1,H2As a secure hash function, H1:{0,1}*→G2，H2:{0,1}*→{1,...,m}n。
Further, root PKG of root key generation mechanism generates random master key s0∈ZqAnd calculates the master public key Ppub＝[s0]·P。
Further, root PKG establishes M × n private key matrix M with proper size according to the predicted number of PKGspri：
Wherein r isi,jAt ZqInternally selecting randomly;
establishing corresponding meta-public key matrices simultaneously
Wherein [ P]Is a matrix with only one element P;
root PKG update parameter Param ═<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2,e,Ppub,Mpub>And published.
Further, in the step of generating the private key and the private key matrix for the first layer PKG by the root node root PKG, when the root PKG distributes the keys, the root PKG is marked as<ID1>I.e. the first layer PKG or the user generated private key S1，
S1＝[s0]·H1(ID1)。
Furthermore, if the first layer node is a PKG node, the PKG node will request the root PKG node to generate its own private key matrix M at the same time1For generating a private key for the lower level node; root PKG calculation matrix
And returned to the first tier nodes.
Further, in the step of generating a private key and a private key matrix for the key generation mechanisms below the first level by the parent key generation mechanism and the root key generation mechanism, the hierarchical identity private key S is heldiAnd a private key matrix MiParent Key Generation organization (identity: ID)<ID1,...,IDi>) Giving the subkey generating organization (ID is<ID1,...,IDi,IDi+1>) Generating a private key, wherein
Calculating a combined private key s by a parent key generating mechanismi+1:
si+1＝(af1(ID),1+...+afn(ID),n)
fi(ID) corresponds to H2(ID1,...,IDi) Generated ith value, afn(ID),nRepresents MiThe middle subscript is (f)n(ID),n) The value of the element, then the parent key generation mechanism incorporates the own key SiGenerating a private key for the child key generation authority:
Si+1＝Si+[si+1]。
further, a subkey generation mechanism<ID1,...,IDi,IDi+1>Request root PKG for its private key matrix Mi+1The root PKG is calculated to obtain a generating matrix Mi+1：
And returned to the requesting node.
The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention can be combined, and the technical features of the embodiments can also be combined to form a new technical solution.
Has the advantages that: the root key generation mechanism root PKG utilizes the idea of combining public keys to carry out centralized storage and unified management on the local layer public keys of the hierarchical PKG, and public and private key information randomly generated by each layer of key generator (PKG) in the classic HIBE algorithm is uniformly stored in a matrix, so that the problem of difficulty in authentication caused by the random number of a classic hierarchical identity-based cryptosystem is solved, the robustness of the system is enhanced, and the anti-attack capability of the system is improved.
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FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a hierarchical identification key generation method according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a detailed flow chart of the hierarchical identification key generation method of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a domain name address used in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The terms "first," "second," "third," "fourth," and the like (if any) or "left," "right," "front," "back," "top," "bottom" in the description and in the claims of the present invention are used for distinguishing between similar elements or for facilitating a structural description of the present invention and are not necessarily used to describe a particular order or sequence or to limit structural features of the present invention. It is to be understood that the data so used is interchangeable under appropriate circumstances such that the embodiments of the invention described herein are, for example, capable of operation in sequences other than those illustrated or otherwise described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprises," "comprising," and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, system, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of steps or elements is not necessarily limited to those steps or elements expressly listed, but may include other steps or elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.
The invention aims to provide a hierarchical identification cipher key generation technology based on global hash to improve the anti-attack capability of a system. The invention will now be illustrated with reference to specific examples, without thereby limiting the scope of protection of the invention.
Examples
As shown in fig. 1, the method for generating a hierarchical identification cryptographic key based on global hash according to the present invention includes the following steps:
s10: a root PKG (public Key Generation) of a root key generation mechanism carries out system initialization, generates a main private key and a main public key of the system, and publishes and releases a public parameter Param of the system; meanwhile, the root PKG establishes a meta-private key matrix M with the size of M multiplied by n according to the predicted number of the PKGspriGenerating random numbers selected by a private key by taking each node in a stored GS-HIBE system as a child node; establishing a corresponding meta-public key matrix Mpub；
S20: a root node root PKG generates a private key and a private key matrix for a first-layer PKG;
s30: the parent key generation mechanism and the root key generation mechanism generate private keys and private key matrixes for the key generation mechanisms below the first layer;
s40: end user key distribution.
As shown in fig. 2, the method for generating a hierarchical identification cryptographic key based on global hash specifically includes the following steps:
s101: generating a system public parameter Param by a root key generating mechanism root PKG according to an input system safety factor, wherein the system public parameter Param is<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2,e>Wherein G is1And G2Is a q-th prime addition group, P is G1Of groups ofGenerator, GTIs a prime multiplier of order q, e is G1Upper element and G2To GTBilinear pairwise mapping of H1,H2As a secure hash function, H1:{0,1}*→G2，H2:{0,1}*→{1,...,m}n。
S102: root key generation mechanism root PKG generates random master key s0∈ZqWherein Z isqRepresents the modulo-q residual group and computes the master public key Ppub＝[s0]·P。
S103: the root PKG establishes an M multiplied by n private key matrix M with proper size according to the predicted number of the PKGspri：
Wherein M ispriElement r in (1)i,jAre all at ZqInternally selecting randomly;
establishing corresponding meta-public key matrices simultaneously
Wherein [ P]Is a matrix with only one element P;
root PKG update parameter Param ═<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2,e,Ppub,Mpub>And published.
S201: when the root PKG key is distributed, the root PKG is marked as<ID1>I.e. the first layer PKG or the user generated private key S1，
S1＝[s0]·H1(ID1)。
S202: if the first layer node is a PKG node, the PKG node can simultaneously request the root PKG node to generate a private key matrix M of the PKG node1For generating a private key for a lower layer node (i.e., a second layer node); root PKG calculation matrix
And returned to the first tier nodes.
S30: generating a private key matrix for a first layer of key generation mechanisms, which specifically comprises the following steps:
if the node is a PKG, execute S301: holding a hierarchical identity private key SiAnd a private key matrix MiParent Key Generation organization (identity: ID)<ID1,...,IDi>) Giving the subkey generating organization (ID is<ID1,...,IDi,IDi+1>) Generating a private key, wherein
Calculating a combined private key s by a parent key generating mechanismi+1:
si+1＝(af1(ID),1+...+afn(ID),n)
fi(ID) corresponds to H2(ID1,...,IDi) Generated ith value, afn(ID),nRepresents MiThe middle subscript is (f)n(ID),n) The value of the element, then the parent key generation mechanism incorporates the own key SiGenerating a private key for the child key generation authority:
Si+1＝Si+[si+1]。
s302: subkey generation mechanism<ID1,...,IDi,IDi+1>Request root PKG for its private key matrix Mi+1The root PKG is calculated to obtain a generating matrix Mi+1：
And returned to the requesting node.
And continuously judging whether the next-level node is a PKG, if so, continuously executing S301 and S302, and if not, executing S401.
S401: end user key distribution, distributing end user keys.
Taking the domain name address shown in fig. 3 as an example, in the hierarchical identifier encryption method based on global hash according to the present embodiment, the example specific implementation steps include:
step 1) system initialization phase: generating initialization parameters by a root key generation mechanism rootPKG, generating a system master key and a master public key, and forming a system public parameter Param<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2,e>And releasing.
Step 2) the root PKG generates a private key for the first tier node (e.g., < cn >).
And 3) distributing the domain name key of the middle layer, wherein the parent domain name mechanism and the root PKG generate private keys for the sub domain name mechanisms below the first layer.
And 4) distributing the key of the end user node.
Step 1 is further detailed as follows:
1.1) the root PKG selects a specific elliptic curve for the whole situation according to the input system safety factor. The points of the selected elliptic curve in the finite field constitute a group G1And G2Wherein P is G1A generator of the group. According to group G1And G2Constructing a bilinear map e using elliptic curves such that e: G1×G2→GT. The system parameter management module selects a hash function H1To map binary strings of arbitrary length to a cyclic addition group G2Element (ii) of (1), H1Expressed as {0,1}*→G2,{0,1}*Representing a binary string of arbitrary length; the system parameter management module selects a hash function H2Mapping domain name addresses to { 1., m }n,{1,...,m}nRepresenting n randomly chosen values from 1 to m. Initialization parameter Param ═<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2,e>。
1.2) root PKG randomly generates a master key and calculates a master public key Ppub＝[s0]·P。
1.3) root PKG determines the expected number of domain names, and establishes the M multiplied by n private key matrix M with the required corresponding sizepriSimultaneously establishing corresponding meta-public key matrix Mpub。
Step 2 is further detailed as follows:
2.1) root PKG key distribution. The root PKG generates a private key for the user identified as the first tier (e.g., < cn >, < com > etc. as shown in fig. 3, taking < cn >:
S1＝[s0]·H1(cn)
step 3 is further detailed as follows:
3.1) middle layer domain name key distribution: holding a hierarchical private key SiOf parent domain name (e.g. organization<cn>) Giving child nodes (e.g. to<cn，edu>) Generating corresponding hierarchical identity private key Si+1. When an intermediate domain name node is newly generated, root PKG is calculated to obtain a matrix MiAnd sends it to the new node to use the domain name node<cn，edu>For example, the following steps are carried out:
the parent domain name authority will utilize its own secret SiAnd through H2The result S obtained after the operationi，
si＝(af1(ID),1+...+afn(ID),n)
fi(ID) corresponds to H2(ID1,...,IDi) Generated ith value, afn(ID),nRepresents MiThe middle subscript is (f)n(ID),n) The value of the element. Generating a private key for the lower layer:
Si+1＝Si+[si]
step 4 is further detailed as follows:
4.1) end user node key distribution: and the n-1 layer domain name mechanism generates a private key for the n layer user node. Taking domain name www.nudt.edu.cn as an example, it is denoted as<cn,edu,nudt.www>The upper node is<cn,edu,nudt>. Domain name mechanism<cn,edu,nudt>Using self-keys Sn-1To give<cn,edu,nudt.www>The end user node generates a private key:
Sn＝Sn-1+[Sn-1]。
for the problem that the last layer of user has a large base number and is easy to cause linear collusion, a key generation idea of the original classical HIBE algorithm can be adopted as a feasible solution for generating a key for the last layer, and the key generation idea of the classical HIBE algorithm is the prior art and is not described herein again.
The invention has the advantages that the root key generating mechanism root PKG utilizes the idea of combining public keys to carry out centralized storage and unified management on the local layer public keys of the hierarchical PKG, and public and private key information randomly generated by each layer of key generator (PKG) in the classic HIBE algorithm is uniformly stored in a matrix, thereby realizing the problem of difficult authentication caused by the random number of the classic hierarchical identity-based cryptosystem, strengthening the robustness of the system and improving the anti-attack capability of the system.
The foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention in any way. Although the invention has been described with reference to preferred embodiments, it is not intended to be limited thereto. Those skilled in the art can make numerous possible variations and modifications to the present invention, or modify equivalent embodiments to equivalent variations, without departing from the scope of the invention, using the teachings disclosed above. Therefore, any simple modification, equivalent change and modification made to the above embodiments according to the technical spirit of the present invention should fall within the protection scope of the technical scheme of the present invention, unless the technical spirit of the present invention departs from the content of the technical scheme of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. A hierarchical identification cipher key generation method based on global hash is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s10: a root PKG (public Key Generation) of a root key generation mechanism carries out system initialization, generates a main private key and a main public key of the system, and publishes and releases a public parameter Param of the system; meanwhile, the root PKG establishes a meta-private key matrix M with the size of M multiplied by n according to the predicted number of the PKGspriGenerating random numbers selected by a private key by taking each node in a stored GS-HIBE system as a child node; establishing a corresponding meta-public key matrix Mpub；
S20: a root PKG of a root key generation mechanism generates a private key and a meta private key matrix for a first-layer PKG;
s30: the parent key generation mechanism and the root key generation mechanism generate private keys and meta private key matrixes for the key generation mechanisms below the first layer;
s40: end user key distribution.
2. The global hash-based hierarchical identity cryptographic key generation method of claim 1, wherein in the step S10, a root key generation mechanism root PKG generates the system public parameter Param according to an input system security factor, and the system public parameter Param is equal to<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2E > -, wherein G1And G2Is a q-th prime addition group, P is G1Generating element of group, GTIs a prime multiplier of order q, e is G1Upper element and G2To GTBilinear pairwise mapping of H1,H2As a secure hash function, H1:{0,1}*→G2，H2:{0,1}*→{1,...,m}n。
3. The global hash-based hierarchical identity cryptographic key generation method of claim 2, wherein the root key generation mechanism root PKG generates a random master key s0∈ZqWherein Z isqRepresents the modulo-q residual group and computes the master public key Ppub＝[s0]·P。
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the root PKG establishes an M x n private key matrix M with a proper size according to the predicted number of PKGspri：
Wherein M ispriElement r in (1)i,jAre all at ZqInternally selecting randomly;
establishing corresponding meta-public key matrices simultaneously
Wherein [ P]Is a matrix with only one element P;
root PKG update parameter Param ═<G1,G2,GT,P,H1,H2,e,Ppub,Mpub>And published.
5. The global hash-based hierarchical identity cryptographic key generation method of claim 1, wherein in the step of generating the private key and the private key matrix for the first-level PKG by the root node root PKG, the root PKG is identified as the root PKG when the root PKG key is distributed<ID1>I.e. the first layer PKG or the user generated private key S1，
S1＝[s0]·H1(ID1)。
6. The method of claim 5, wherein if the first level node is a PKG node, the PKG node will request a root PKG to generate its private key matrix M at the same time1For generating a private key for the lower level node; root PKG calculation matrix
And returned to the first tier nodes.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the hierarchical identity secret key S is held in the step of generating the secret key and the secret key matrix for the key generation mechanisms below the first level by the parent key generation mechanism and the root key generation mechanismiAnd a private key matrix MiThe parent key generation mechanism of (1), generating a private key for the child key generation mechanism, whichThe identity of the middle parent key generation mechanism is<ID1,...,IDi>The identity of the sub-key generating organization is<ID1,...,IDi,IDi+1>，
Calculating a combined private key s by a parent key generating mechanismi+1:
si+1＝(af1(ID),1+...+afn(ID),n)
fi(ID) corresponds to H2(ID1,...,IDi) Generated ith value, afn(ID), n represents MiThe middle subscript is (f)nValue of (ID), n) element, and then the parent key generation mechanism incorporates the self key SiGenerating a private key for the child key generation authority:
Si+1＝Si+[si+1]。
8. the global hash-based hierarchical identity cryptographic key generation method of claim 7, wherein the subkey generation mechanism<ID1,...,IDi,IDi+1>Request root PKG for its private key matrix Mi+1The root PKG is calculated to obtain a generating matrix Mi+1：
And returned to the requesting node.
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| US20040039925A1 (en) * | 2002-01-18 | 2004-02-26 | Mcmillan Craig | Key management |
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| US20040039925A1 (en) * | 2002-01-18 | 2004-02-26 | Mcmillan Craig | Key management |
| CN103248488A (en) * | 2013-05-14 | 2013-08-14 | 顾纯祥 | Identity-based key generation method and identity-based authentication method |
| CN108989054A (en) * | 2018-08-30 | 2018-12-11 | 武汉理工大学 | A kind of cryptographic system and digital signature method |
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