CN112926959A - Hash-RSA blind signature digital currency scheme - Google Patents

Hash-RSA blind signature digital currency scheme Download PDF

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CN112926959A
CN112926959A CN202110328187.8A CN202110328187A CN112926959A CN 112926959 A CN112926959 A CN 112926959A CN 202110328187 A CN202110328187 A CN 202110328187A CN 112926959 A CN112926959 A CN 112926959A
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digital currency
sid
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陈丽燕
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G06Q20/06—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme
    • G06Q20/065—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme using e-cash
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3823—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3825—Use of electronic signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management

Abstract

The invention discloses a digital currency scheme of Hash-RSA blind signature, belonging to the technical field of computers and software thereof, and the digital currency scheme comprises the following specific steps: (1) the user bank opens an account; (2) initializing digital currency; (3) withdrawing digital currency and signing; (4) digital currency payment and verification; (5) the merchant deposits money; the invention is favorable for guaranteeing the efficiency of calculation and communication on the premise of saving communication and calculation resources, and the invention utilizes the hash function and uses digital currency through the improved RSA blind signature algorithm, so that the digital currency with blind signature not only has high confidentiality, non-forgeability and non-repudiation, but also has anonymity, thereby being favorable for resisting repeated consumption attack, forgery attack and man-in-the-middle attack, ensuring the anonymity of the identity information of the user and further being favorable for protecting the identity privacy of the user.

Description

Hash-RSA blind signature digital currency scheme
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of computers and software thereof, in particular to a digital currency scheme of Hash-RSA blind signature.
Background
Through retrieval, the Chinese patent No. CN110751467A discloses a method and a system for generating digital currency, the invention has simple structure, ensures the legality of the generated digital currency, but has higher calculation complexity and no anonymity and untraceability; digital currency is currency which converts cash value into a series of electronic encryption serial numbers, and the security of the currency is protected by a cryptographic algorithm; the popularization of electronic commerce and digital finance is promoted by the development of modern informatization, the payment mode is rapidly and diversely transferred along with the development of science and technology, digital currency is an important transaction carrier in electronic payment and is different from the traditional entity currency, the digital currency has the main characteristics that the digital currency is independent of an entity medium, the function of the entity currency can be realized, the transaction safety of the digital currency is ensured, but the encryption technology in the existing digital currency scheme can be cracked by reverse reasoning, so that the transaction information of a user is easily exposed; therefore, the invention of the digital currency scheme of the Hash-RSA blind signature becomes more important;
most of the existing digital currency schemes are realized by relying on a digital encryption algorithm technology, but the existing encryption algorithm technology is complex in calculation and easily wastes a large amount of communication and calculation resources, and part of the digital encryption algorithm technology can be cracked by reverse reasoning, so that the existing digital currency schemes are not anonymous and untraceable, and user transaction information is easily exposed; to this end, we propose a Hash-RSA blind signed digital currency scheme.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the defects in the prior art and provides a Hash-RSA blind signature digital currency scheme.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
the Hash-RSA blind signature digital currency scheme comprises the following specific steps:
(1) opening an account by a user bank: the bank registers account opening information for users, determines respective account information, and simultaneously the users deposit money in their accounts to form digital currency [ m, H (SID), H (m | H (SID))d]；
(2) Digital currency initialization: the bank calculates through an internal encryption algorithm to obtain a private key d and a public key e, and then publishes the public key e to the outside and reserves the private key d by the bank;
(3) digital currency withdrawal and signature: when an article purchased by a user is paid, the user selects digital currency corresponding to a face value to initiate a withdrawal application to a bank according to the price of the article, the bank generates a unique serial number SID for the digital currency corresponding to the face value, meanwhile, the serial number SID is subjected to hash calculation through a one-way hash function H (X) to obtain an array [ SID, H (SID), type ], at the moment, the bank sends H (SID) to the user, the user selects a message m, blinds the message m to obtain a blinded message m ', sends the blinded message m ' to the bank, after the bank receives the application, the bank firstly confirms whether the account amount is sufficiently deducted, if so, the blinded message m ' is signed to form a signature message S ', subtracts the corresponding amount from the user account, and sends the signature message S ' to the user, otherwise, the signature is rejected, and the withdrawal is failed;
(4) digital currency payment and verification: after receiving the signature message S 'of the bank, the user removes the blindness of the signature message S' to obtain the digital currency after the blindness is removed, and simultaneously verifies the digital currency, if the verification fails, the transaction is terminated; otherwise, if the verification is passed, the digital currency corresponding to the face value is sent to the merchant, the merchant verifies the received digital currency, and if the verification is failed, the transaction is terminated; otherwise, after the verification is passed, the digital currency is proved to have no problem, and the digital currency with the corresponding face value is sent to the bank;
(5) and (3) merchant deposit: the bank receives the digital currency with the corresponding face value and then secondarily verifies the legality of the digital currency, if the verification is passed, the bank withdraws the digital currency, and meanwhile, a corresponding numerical value is added to an account of the merchant, otherwise, the user or the merchant fails to pay when the digital currency is repeatedly used.
Preferably, the digital currency [ m, H (SID) ], H (m | H (SID) ], of step (1)d]Storing the data in a bank local database; the SID is a serial number of digital currency, which comprises a withdrawal amount, a timestamp and a random code; the type is a binary flag that records whether the digital currency is redeemed.
Preferably, the internal encryption algorithm in step (2) is specifically an improved RSA algorithm, and its specific calculation flow is as follows:
s1: independently selecting two large prime numbers p and q, and calculating n ═ p × (q);
s2: calculating the Euler function value of n, and obtaining a public key e when the following formula is satisfied;
Figure BDA0002995394350000031
in the formula:
Figure BDA0002995394350000032
is a Euler function, representing the number of positive integers less than n and prime with n:
s3: calculating e-mode
Figure BDA0002995394350000033
The multiplication inverse element of (1) meets the following formula, and a private key d is obtained;
Figure BDA0002995394350000034
preferably, the blind signature process in step (3) is specifically as follows:
SS 1: blinding, converting the digital currency into an array [ SID, H (SID), type ] by using a one-way hash function, then sending H (SID) to a user by a bank, selecting a message by the user, selecting a blinding factor for calculation, and sending the blinded message to a bank:
the blind message calculation formula is as follows:
m′＝reH(m‖H(SID))modn (3)
in the formula: m represents a message, m' represents a blinded message, and r represents a blinding factor;
SS 2: signing, namely signing the blinded message by using a private key of a bank, sending the message to a user, and deducting corresponding amount from an account of the user;
the signature calculation formula is as follows:
S′＝[reH(m‖(SID))]dmodn＝
redH(m‖H(SID))dmodn＝
rH(m‖H(SID))dmodn (4)
in the formula: s' represents a signature message;
SS 3: removing blindness, the user performs blind removing calculation on signature S', and obtains digital currency [ m, H (SID), H (m | H (SID))d]；
The blindness-removing calculation formula is as follows:
S＝r-1S′modn＝H(m‖H(SID))dmodn (5)。
preferably, the specific verification formula of the secondary verification in the step (5) is as follows:
[H(m‖H(SID))d]emodn＝H(m‖H(SID))modn (6)
if finding the corresponding array [ SID, H (SID), type ] and type shows that the currency is not used, the digital currency is valid, the payment is successful, and adding corresponding amount to the account of the merchant, setting [ SID, H (SID), type ] as used, and paying for withdrawing the currency;
if the corresponding array [ SID, H (SID), type ] is found and type indicates that the cash has been used, indicating that the user or merchant is reusing the digital currency, the payment fails.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. the digital currency scheme of the Hash-RSA blind signature does not need a trusted third party to participate, and a bank generates a digital currency serial number by itself, so the calculated amount is small; meanwhile, the processing speed of initialization, withdrawal (signature) and payment (verification) is high, so that the calculation and communication efficiency is guaranteed on the premise of saving communication and calculation resources;
2. according to the digital currency scheme of the Hash-RSA blind signature, the signature of a signer is blind signed by using a private key of the signer, and the private key is not disclosed to the outside, so that the signature cannot be forged and copied, and the high confidentiality is realized; the signer is the only bank which can generate a valid blind signature, and in addition, the signature of any person is regarded as invalid, so that the scheme has the characteristic of being not counterfeitable; in addition, the signer can not deny the message signed by the signer, and once the message is signed, the signer can not deny the message signed by the signer, so that the scheme has the characteristic of non-repudiation; moreover, the signer cannot obtain the specific content of the message while signing, because the signer signs the encrypted message, and the message is blind to the signer; after the information signed by the signer is disclosed, the signer cannot determine the specific time for signing the information, and the identity information of the signer cannot be exposed when the signer uses the signature, so that the signer has the characteristic of untraceability; in addition, the signer blindly signs the signed message without knowing the specific content of the message, and the improved RSA algorithm is used, so that the efficiency is improved, the anonymity of the identity information of the signer is ensured, and the identity privacy of the user is protected.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention and not to limit the invention.
Fig. 1 is an overall flow chart of the Hash-RSA blind signature digital currency scheme proposed by the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments.
In the description of the present invention, it is to be understood that the terms "upper", "lower", "front", "rear", "left", "right", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", and the like, indicate orientations or positional relationships based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the drawings, are merely for convenience in describing the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element being referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and thus, should not be construed as limiting the present invention.
Example 1
Referring to fig. 1, the Hash-RSA blind signature digital currency scheme specifically includes the following steps:
(1) opening an account by a user bank: the bank registers account opening information for users, determines respective account information, and simultaneously the users deposit money in their accounts to form digital currency [ m, H (SID), H (m | H (SID))d]；
(2) Digital currency initialization: the bank calculates through an internal encryption algorithm to obtain a private key d and a public key e, and then publishes the public key e to the outside and reserves the private key d by the bank;
(3) digital currency withdrawal and signature: when an article purchased by a user is paid, the user selects digital currency corresponding to a face value to initiate a withdrawal application to a bank according to the price of the article, the bank generates a unique serial number SID for the digital currency corresponding to the face value, meanwhile, the serial number SID is subjected to hash calculation through a one-way hash function H (X) to obtain an array [ SID, H (SID), type ], at the moment, the bank sends H (SID) to the user, the user selects a message m, blinds the message m to obtain a blinded message m ', sends the blinded message m ' to the bank, after the bank receives the application, the bank firstly confirms whether the account amount is sufficiently deducted, if so, the blinded message m ' is signed to form a signature message S ', subtracts the corresponding amount from the user account, and sends the signature message S ' to the user, otherwise, the signature is rejected, and the withdrawal is failed;
(4) digital currency payment and verification: after receiving the signature message S 'of the bank, the user removes the blindness of the signature message S' to obtain the digital currency after the blindness is removed, and simultaneously verifies the digital currency, if the verification fails, the transaction is terminated; otherwise, if the verification is passed, the digital currency corresponding to the face value is sent to the merchant, the merchant verifies the received digital currency, and if the verification is failed, the transaction is terminated; otherwise, after the verification is passed, the digital currency is proved to have no problem, and the digital currency with the corresponding face value is sent to the bank;
(5) and (3) merchant deposit: the bank receives the digital currency with the corresponding face value and then secondarily verifies the legality of the digital currency, if the verification is passed, the bank withdraws the digital currency, and meanwhile, a corresponding numerical value is added to an account of the merchant, otherwise, the user or the merchant fails to pay when the digital currency is repeatedly used.
Step (1) digital Currency [ m, H (SID) ], H (m | H (SID))d]Storing the data in a bank local database; SID is the serial number of the digital currency, which includes the withdrawal amount, a timestamp, and a random code; type is a binary flag that records whether the digital currency is cashed.
The internal encryption algorithm in the step (2) is specifically an improved RSA algorithm, and the specific calculation flow is as follows:
s1: independently selecting two large prime numbers p and q, and calculating n ═ p × (q);
s2: calculating the Euler function value of n, and obtaining a public key e when the following formula is satisfied;
Figure BDA0002995394350000081
in the formula:
Figure BDA0002995394350000082
is a Euler function, representing the number of positive integers less than n and prime with n:
s3: calculating e-mode
Figure BDA0002995394350000083
The multiplication inverse element of (1) meets the following formula, and a private key d is obtained;
Figure BDA0002995394350000084
the blinding signature process in the step (3) is as follows:
SS 1: blinding, converting the digital currency into an array [ SID, H (SID), type ] by using a one-way hash function, then sending H (SID) to a user by a bank, selecting a message by the user, selecting a blinding factor for calculation, and sending the blinded message to a bank:
the blind message calculation formula is as follows:
m′＝reH(m‖H(SID))modn (3)
in the formula: m represents a message, m' represents a blinded message, and r represents a blinding factor;
SS 2: signing, namely signing the blinded message by using a private key of a bank, sending the message to a user, and deducting corresponding amount from an account of the user;
the signature calculation formula is as follows:
S′＝[reH(m‖(SID))]dmodn＝
redH(m‖H(SID))dmodn＝
rH(m‖H(SID))dmodn (4)
in the formula: s' represents a signature message;
SS 3: removing blindness, the user performs blind removing calculation on signature S', and obtains digital currency [ m, H (SID), H (m | H (SID))d]；
The blindness-removing calculation formula is as follows:
S＝r-1S′modn＝H(m‖H(SID))dmodn (5)。
and (5) carrying out secondary verification on the specific verification formula as follows:
[H(m‖H(SID))d]emodn＝H(m‖H(SID))modn (6)
if finding the corresponding array [ SID, H (SID), type ] and type shows that the currency is not used, the digital currency is valid, the payment is successful, and adding corresponding amount to the account of the merchant, setting [ SID, H (SID), type ] as used, and paying for withdrawing the currency;
if the corresponding array [ SID, H (SID), type ] is found and type indicates that the cash has been used, indicating that the user or merchant is reusing the digital currency, the payment fails.
Comparative example 1
The comparative example is liuxiaya, xinxiaolong, an improved blind signature electronic cash scheme [ J ]. computer engineering and application, 2011: 114-116.
Comparative example 2
The comparative example is an identity-based Elgamal blind signature scheme and application [ J ] of the scheme, namely megamilitary, Liudong nan, computer engineering and design, 2019 and 19 (40): 1201-1209.
Comparative example 3
The comparative example is zhanxuefeng, penhua, a blind signature scheme based on SM9 algorithm study [ J ] information network security, 2019,19 (8): 61-67.
Comparing the three literature schemes with the new scheme provided by the text and analyzing the efficiency, wherein for convenient comparison, E is defined as the time of exponential operation, M is the time of point multiplication operation, H is the time of one-way hash function operation, C is the time of inversion operation, and P is the time of bilinear pairwise operation; the computational complexity of each scheme in the initialization, withdrawal and payment links is shown in the following table:
scheme(s) Initialization Drawing money
Example 1 2M+C 2E+2M+C+2H
Comparative example 1 2M+C+H+E 5E+7M+H+C
Comparative example 2 2E+M+H 4E+10M+C+H
Comparative example 3 4M+2H+C E+2M+P+H
As can be seen from the above table, the new scheme proposed herein can meet the requirements of security performance, and besides, the calculated amount is small, and the processing speeds of initialization, withdrawal (signature) and payment (verification) are fast; in conclusion, compared with other schemes, the scheme has higher calculation and communication efficiency.
The above description is only for the preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art should be considered to be within the technical scope of the present invention, and the technical solutions and the inventive concepts thereof according to the present invention should be equivalent or changed within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (5)

  1. The digital currency scheme of the Hash-RSA blind signature is characterized by comprising the following specific steps:
    (1) opening an account by a user bank: the bank registers account opening information for users, determines respective account information, and simultaneously the users deposit money in their accounts to form digital currency [ m, H (SID), H (m | H (SID))d]；
    (2) Digital currency initialization: the bank calculates through an internal encryption algorithm to obtain a private key d and a public key e, and then publishes the public key e to the outside and reserves the private key d by the bank;
    (3) digital currency withdrawal and signature: when an article purchased by a user is paid, the user selects digital currency corresponding to a face value to initiate a withdrawal application to a bank according to the price of the article, the bank generates a unique serial number SID for the digital currency corresponding to the face value, meanwhile, the serial number SID is subjected to hash calculation through a one-way hash function H (X) to obtain an array [ SID, H (SID), type ], at the moment, the bank sends H (SID) to the user, the user selects a message m, blinds the message m to obtain a blinded message m ', sends the blinded message m ' to the bank, after the bank receives the application, the bank firstly confirms whether the account amount is sufficiently deducted, if so, the blinded message m ' is signed to form a signature message S ', subtracts the corresponding amount from the user account, and sends the signature message S ' to the user, otherwise, the signature is rejected, and the withdrawal is failed;
    (4) digital currency payment and verification: after receiving the signature message S 'of the bank, the user removes the blindness of the signature message S' to obtain the digital currency after the blindness is removed, and simultaneously verifies the digital currency, if the verification fails, the transaction is terminated; otherwise, if the verification is passed, the digital currency corresponding to the face value is sent to the merchant, the merchant verifies the received digital currency, and if the verification is failed, the transaction is terminated; otherwise, after the verification is passed, the digital currency is proved to have no problem, and the digital currency with the corresponding face value is sent to the bank;
    (5) and (3) merchant deposit: the bank receives the digital currency with the corresponding face value and then secondarily verifies the legality of the digital currency, if the verification is passed, the bank withdraws the digital currency, and meanwhile, a corresponding numerical value is added to an account of the merchant, otherwise, the user or the merchant fails to pay when the digital currency is repeatedly used.
  2. 2. The Hash-RSA blind signed digital currency scheme according to claim 1, characterized in that step (1) the digital currency [ m, H (sid), H (m | | H (sid))d]Storing the data in a bank local database; the SID is a serial number of digital currency, which comprises a withdrawal amount, a timestamp and a random code; the type is a binary flag that records whether the digital currency is redeemed.
  3. 3. The Hash-RSA blind signed digital currency solution according to claim 1, characterized in that the internal encryption algorithm in step (2) is specifically an improved RSA algorithm, and its specific calculation flow is as follows:
    s1: independently selecting two large prime numbers p and q, and calculating n ═ p × (q);
    s2: calculating the Euler function value of n, and obtaining a public key e when the following formula is satisfied;
    Figure FDA0002995394340000021
    in the formula:
    Figure FDA0002995394340000022
    is a Euler function, representing the number of positive integers less than n and prime with n:
    s3: calculating e-mode
    Figure FDA0002995394340000023
    The multiplication inverse element satisfies the following formula, and a private key d is obtained:
    Figure FDA0002995394340000024
  4. 4. the Hash-RSA blind signed digital currency scheme according to claim 1, characterized in that the blind signature process of step (3) is specifically as follows:
    SS 1: blinding, converting the digital currency into an array [ SID, H (SID), type ] by using a one-way hash function, then sending H (SID) to a user by a bank, selecting a message by the user, selecting a blinding factor for calculation, and sending the blinded message to a bank:
    the blind message calculation formula is as follows:
    m′＝reH(m||H(SID))modn (3)
    in the formula: m represents a message, m' represents a blinded message, and r represents a blinding factor;
    SS 2: signing, namely signing the blinded message by using a private key of a bank, sending the message to a user, and deducting corresponding amount from an account of the user;
    the signature calculation formula is as follows:
    S′＝[reH(m||(SID))]dmodn＝
    redH(m||H(SID))dmodn＝
    rH(m||H(SID))dmodn (4)
    in the formula: s' represents a signature message;
    SS 3: the user carries out blind removal calculation on the signature S' to obtain digital currency [ m, H (SID), H (m | H (SID))d]；
    The blindness-removing calculation formula is as follows:
    S＝r-1S′modn＝H(m||H(SID))dmodn (5)。
  5. 5. the Hash-RSA blindly signed digital currency solution according to claim 1, characterized in that the secondary verification specific verification formula of step (5) is as follows:
    [H(m||H(SID))d]emodn＝H(m||H(SID))modn (6)
    if finding the corresponding array [ SID, H (SID), type ] and type shows that the currency is not used, the digital currency is valid, the payment is successful, and adding corresponding amount to the account of the merchant, setting [ SID, H (SID), type ] as used, and paying for withdrawing the currency;
    if the corresponding array [ SID, H (SID), type ] is found and type indicates that the cash has been used, indicating that the user or merchant is reusing the digital currency, the payment fails.
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