CN112911545B - Emergency message dissemination method and system with trust management and privacy protection functions in SAGAVINS - Google Patents

Emergency message dissemination method and system with trust management and privacy protection functions in SAGAVINS Download PDF

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CN112911545B
CN112911545B CN202110122978.5A CN202110122978A CN112911545B CN 112911545 B CN112911545 B CN 112911545B CN 202110122978 A CN202110122978 A CN 202110122978A CN 112911545 B CN112911545 B CN 112911545B
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vehicle
reputation
emergency
sky
vehicles
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CN112911545A (en
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刘志全
殷菊笠
孙红亮
成玉丹
周浩
钟国轩
彭泳翔
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Jinan University
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Jinan University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract

The invention discloses an emergency message dissemination method and system in SAGEVNs for both trust management and privacy protection, wherein the method comprises the following steps: initializing a system, initializing a trusted authority TA and initializing other entities in the system; vehicle registration; request of reputation certificate, vehicle request new reputation certificate, temporary private key and secret threshold grade set from TA; spreading emergency messages, wherein when one vehicle senses the occurrence of an emergency, the emergency messages are spread to other vehicles in a V2V mode; the system comprises a reputation feedback report, a vehicle-mounted sensor and a vehicle-mounted sensor, wherein the reputation feedback report is used for sensing the actual state of an emergency and judging the correctness of the emergency when other vehicles drive into a preset range of the emergency; and updating the prestige information, and updating the prestige information of the vehicle by the TA according to the prestige feedback. The method is based on 0-1 coding and FNV hash algorithm, can give consideration to trust management and privacy protection, supports the multiplexing of pseudonyms, temporary public keys and temporary private keys in different time intervals, and has strong fault tolerance and adaptability.

Description

Emergency message dissemination method and system with trust management and privacy protection functions in SAGAVINS
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of car networking safety, and particularly relates to an emergency message dissemination method and system in SAGEVNs with trust management and privacy protection.
Background
The internet of vehicles can greatly improve road safety and traffic efficiency, and is widely supported by the industry and academia in recent years. Collaborative security applications are an important branch of the internet of vehicles, where emergency message dissemination enables each vehicle to intelligently perceive surrounding conditions and make timely decisions about potential hazards. However, due to the limited coverage of the ground infrastructure (including road side units, cellular base stations, etc.), there is no way to cover every place, especially rural, mountain or disaster areas, by means of a ground network alone. To achieve full coverage radio access services, a new network architecture must be adopted. Air-space-ground integrated internet of vehicles (SAGAVIN) is a product of applying an air-space-ground integrated network (SAGIN) architecture in the internet of vehicles, and comprises a space part (comprising satellites and the like), a sky part (comprising unmanned planes, balloons, airships and the like) and a ground part (comprising road side units, cellular base stations, vehicles and the like). However, SAGIVNs are vulnerable to external and internal attacks due to their bulky, open, heterogeneous, self-organizing, highly dynamic, etc. characteristics, which severely hamper the practical application of SAGIVNs.
Trust management and privacy protection play important roles in SAGEVNs, wherein the trust management is a key tool for constructing the trusted SAGEVNs, and the willingness of users to participate in emergency message dissemination can be greatly enhanced by realizing the privacy protection. However, there are conflicting requirements for trust management and privacy protection, and therefore how to consider trust management and privacy protection in SAGIVNs emergency message dissemination and overcome the deficiencies in the existing research is an urgent problem to be solved.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention mainly aims to overcome the defects and shortcomings in the prior art, and provides an emergency message dissemination method and system for considering both trust management and privacy protection in SAGEVNs, wherein the method is based on 0-1 coding and FNV hash algorithm and can perfectly consider both trust management and privacy protection.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
an emergency message spreading method considering trust management and privacy protection in SAGAVINS is provided with a trusted authority TA, a road side unit RSU, a cellular base station BS, a vehicle and a vehicle-mounted sensor thereof, a vehicle-mounted unit OBU, a sky component, a satellite and a ground base station corresponding to the satellite, and comprises the following steps:
initializing a system, initializing a trusted authority TA and initializing other entities in the system;
vehicle registration, when a new vehicle is accessed into the SAGAVINS, a trusted authority TA distributes a unique identifier for the new vehicle, generates a master public key and a master private key, installs a trusted platform module and sets an initial reputation score for the vehicle;
the method comprises the steps that a prestige certificate request is carried out, and a vehicle requests a new prestige certificate, a temporary private key and a secret threshold level set from a TA;
spreading emergency messages, wherein when a certain vehicle senses the occurrence of an emergency through a vehicle-mounted sensor, the emergency messages are spread to other vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle V2V mode;
the method comprises the following steps that a prestige feedback report is carried out, when other vehicles drive into a preset range of emergency occurrence, the actual state of the emergency is sensed through a vehicle-mounted sensor, and the correctness of the emergency message is judged;
and (4) updating the prestige information, and updating the prestige information of the vehicle by the TA according to the prestige feedback in the database.
Further, the initialization of the trusted authority TA specifically includes:
setting TA self-clock and generating public key Pk for TA selfTAnd private key SkTWherein SkTAlways stored secretly by the TA;
TA divides time into a series of equal-length time intervals T1,T2,., and defining n selectable prestige levels and a threshold level L1＜L2＜...＜LnWherein the length of each time interval is represented as theta, n ∈ Z+；
For each Tα∈{T1,T2,., TA from [0, λ n-1 ]]Randomly selecting n and L in interval1,L2,...,LnOrdered integers in one-to-one correspondence
Figure BDA0002922747540000031
And for each
Figure BDA0002922747540000032
Respectively calculating 0 codes
Figure BDA0002922747540000033
And 1 encoding
Figure BDA0002922747540000034
To obtain
Figure BDA0002922747540000035
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000036
all have at most
Figure BDA0002922747540000037
An element; wherein λ ∈ Z+；
TA random Generation of secret values
Figure BDA0002922747540000038
The secret value is kept secret by the TA and is
Figure BDA0002922747540000039
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000310
each element c in (1) is calculated
Figure BDA00029227475400000311
Get the corresponding set
Figure BDA00029227475400000312
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000313
if a hash collision occurs, another random one is generated
Figure BDA00029227475400000314
And regenerate
Figure BDA00029227475400000315
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000316
this detection is referred to as "collision detection-i";
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400000317
represents the pair c and
Figure BDA00029227475400000318
performing character string splicing, and performing FNV hash on a spliced result;
binary coding r of TA with random rho bits1,r2,.. fill as a new element
Figure BDA00029227475400000319
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000320
to obtain
Figure BDA00029227475400000321
Corresponding set of individual elements
Figure BDA00029227475400000322
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000323
for each rτ∈{r1,r2,., if a certain one is available
Figure BDA00029227475400000324
If true, another random value r is usedτThis detection is called "collision detection-II";
where ρ is equal to
Figure BDA00029227475400000325
The output length of (d);
TA random rearrangement
Figure BDA00029227475400000326
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000327
i.e. randomly disordering the element sequence in each set to obtain the corresponding set
Figure BDA00029227475400000328
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000329
and storing it in a database;
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400000330
and
Figure BDA00029227475400000331
are respectively called and Lβ∈{L1,L2,...,LnAt TαInner secret 0 encoding and secret 1 encoding.
Further, the initialization of other entities in the system specifically includes:
configuring a satellite and corresponding ground base stations, and establishing wired connection between each ground base station and a TA (timing advance);
configuring a sky assembly to be suspended above a roadway and to supplement a BS, wherein the sky assembly includes a drone, a balloon, and an airship;
RSUs are installed beside a road, and wired connection is established between each RSU and a TA;
BSs are installed near the road, and a wired connection is established between each BS and the TA.
Further, the vehicle registration specifically includes:
when the vehicle ViUpon registration with the TA, the TA distributes a unique identifier i for it, and the TA generates ViMaster public key of
Figure BDA0002922747540000041
And a master private key
Figure BDA0002922747540000042
And is taken as V in an off-line manneriInstalling a trusted platform module;
the trusted platform module is used for storing
Figure BDA0002922747540000043
PkTA clock synchronized with the TA, parameters shared with the TA, and cryptography and digital signature algorithms to protect the reputation certificate, the temporary private key, and the secret threshold level set from theft, manipulation, or sharing;
TA is V according to equation (1)iSetting initial reputation score
Figure BDA0002922747540000044
And will ViIs stored in the database, the formula is as follows:
Figure BDA0002922747540000045
further, the reputation certificate request comprises the steps of:
Vigenerating random values
Figure BDA0002922747540000046
And selecting a threshold level
Figure BDA0002922747540000047
Then generates the request information
Figure BDA0002922747540000048
As shown in equation (2):
Figure BDA0002922747540000049
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400000410
indicating the use of PkTTo carry outThe asymmetric encryption is carried out in such a way that,
Figure BDA00029227475400000411
indicating use of
Figure BDA00029227475400000412
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (3):
Figure BDA00029227475400000413
vehicle ViWill be connected by means of vehicle-to-infrastructure V2I or vehicle-to-sky assembly V2A or vehicle-to-satellite V2S
Figure BDA00029227475400000414
Sending the data to the TA;
receive from
Figure BDA00029227475400000415
Then, TA utilizes SkTDecryption
Figure BDA00029227475400000416
To obtain i, TlViAnd
Figure BDA00029227475400000417
and based on
Figure BDA00029227475400000418
Authentication
Figure BDA00029227475400000419
The validity of (2).
Further, the reputation certificate request further comprises the steps of:
TA obtains the Current TαAnd attempts to retrieve V from the databaseiAt TαK groups of reputation certificates, ephemeral private keys, and a secret threshold level set:
if the search result is null, TA searches V in the databaseiCurrent reputation score of
Figure BDA0002922747540000051
And convert it to the current reputation level
Figure BDA0002922747540000052
The conversion is shown in equation (4):
Figure BDA0002922747540000053
suppose that
Figure BDA0002922747540000054
Wherein L isβi∈{L1,L2,...,Ln}；
TA retrieves from the database at TαInner correspond to
Figure BDA0002922747540000055
Secret 0 encoding of
Figure BDA0002922747540000056
And is ViGenerating k sets of pseudonyms, ephemeral public keys, ephemeral private keys, and random values to form
Figure BDA0002922747540000057
Wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000058
are each ViAt TαA kth pseudonym, a kth temporary public key, a kth temporary private key, and a kth random value within;
for each kappa, TA is
Figure BDA0002922747540000059
Each element c in (1) calculates
Figure BDA00029227475400000510
Filling according to the method mentioned in TA initializationRandomly rearranging the set to obtain ViAt TαInner kth random reputation level
Figure BDA00029227475400000511
TA is ViIs generated at TαInner kth reputation certificate
Figure BDA00029227475400000512
As shown in equation (5):
Figure BDA00029227475400000513
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400000514
indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (6):
Figure BDA00029227475400000515
suppose that
Figure BDA00029227475400000516
Wherein
Figure BDA00029227475400000517
TA retrieves from the database at TαInner correspond to
Figure BDA0002922747540000061
Secret 1 encoding of
Figure BDA0002922747540000062
And using it as ViAt TαInner secret threshold level set
Figure BDA0002922747540000063
Then will be
Figure BDA0002922747540000064
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000065
storing in a database;
if the search result is not null, TA adopts the existing result set
Figure BDA0002922747540000066
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000067
without generating new ones
Figure BDA0002922747540000068
After executing corresponding operation according to the retrieval result, TA is ViGenerating a response message
Figure BDA0002922747540000069
As shown in equation (7):
Figure BDA00029227475400000610
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400000611
indicating use of
Figure BDA00029227475400000612
The asymmetric encryption is carried out and,
Figure BDA00029227475400000613
indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (8):
Figure BDA00029227475400000614
TA will be
Figure BDA00029227475400000615
Is returned to Vi；
Receive from
Figure BDA00029227475400000616
Then, ViUse of
Figure BDA00029227475400000617
Decryption
Figure BDA00029227475400000618
To obtain
Figure BDA00029227475400000619
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000620
and based on
Figure BDA00029227475400000621
Authentication
Figure BDA00029227475400000622
The validity of (2);
Vistore in its local storage
Figure BDA00029227475400000623
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000624
if ViFail to receive in time
Figure BDA00029227475400000625
The TA will be requested again with a new request message in the form of V2I or V2A or V2S.
Further, the emergency message dissemination specifically includes:
when a certain vehicle ViV when the presence of an emergency event epsilon is sensed by an on-board sensor and intentionally reported to a surrounding vehicleiFirst, the current T is derivedαRandomly selecting one kappa from {1, 2.. multidot.k }, and then selecting one kappa from the kRetrieving in local storage
Figure BDA00029227475400000626
ViGenerating an emergency message about an event epsilon
Figure BDA00029227475400000627
As shown in formula (9):
Figure BDA0002922747540000071
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000072
a description is shown with respect to the event epsilon,
Figure BDA0002922747540000073
to represent
Figure BDA0002922747540000074
The time stamp of the time when it was generated,
Figure BDA0002922747540000075
indicating use of
Figure BDA0002922747540000076
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (10):
Figure BDA0002922747540000077
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000078
is comprised in
Figure BDA0002922747540000079
Middle ViThe kth pseudonym of (1);
Viin the mode of V2V
Figure BDA00029227475400000710
Broadcast to other vehicles;
when another vehicle VjReceive from
Figure BDA00029227475400000711
VjBased on
Figure BDA00029227475400000712
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000735
separately verify
Figure BDA00029227475400000713
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000714
the effectiveness of (a) is specifically:
Vjderiving a current time interval
Figure BDA00029227475400000737
And a current time stamp
Figure BDA00029227475400000715
Respectively verified by detecting formula (11) and formula (12)
Figure BDA00029227475400000716
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000717
has not expired wherein
Figure BDA00029227475400000718
And ψ is two predefined parameters;
Figure BDA00029227475400000719
Figure BDA00029227475400000720
vehicle VjRetrieve at T in local storeαInner secret threshold level set
Figure BDA00029227475400000721
And from
Figure BDA00029227475400000722
Is prepared by
Figure BDA00029227475400000723
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000724
then is that
Figure BDA00029227475400000725
Each element c in (1) calculates
Figure BDA00029227475400000726
To obtain a corresponding set
Figure BDA00029227475400000727
And detecting
Figure BDA00029227475400000728
Whether the result is true or not;
if it is not
Figure BDA00029227475400000729
Is established, then
Figure BDA00029227475400000736
I.e. ViAt VjIt appears to be authentic, therefore VjIs based on immediately
Figure BDA00029227475400000730
Making a decision; at the same time, VjCan also be based on
Figure BDA00029227475400000731
Generating and broadcasting an emergency message to other vehicles;
if it is not
Figure BDA00029227475400000732
If not, then
Figure BDA00029227475400000733
I.e. ViAt VjIt appears to be untrusted, therefore VjCan not be aligned with
Figure BDA00029227475400000734
Making any decision;
therein, no matter whether
Figure BDA0002922747540000081
Whether or not it is true, as long as
Figure BDA0002922747540000082
Effective and unexpired, VjAll store
Figure BDA0002922747540000083
To facilitate subsequent reputation feedback reporting.
Further, the reputation feedback report specifically includes:
when a certain vehicle VjWhen the vehicle enters a preset range of the occurrence of the emergency event epsilon, the actual state of the emergency event epsilon is sensed and judged through the vehicle-mounted sensor
Figure BDA0002922747540000084
The correctness of the test;
Vjis composed of
Figure BDA0002922747540000085
Calculating a feedback score
Figure BDA0002922747540000086
Such as formula(13) Shown in the figure:
Figure BDA0002922747540000087
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000088
the actual state of the emergency event epsilon;
Vjis composed of
Figure BDA0002922747540000089
Generating prestige feedback
Figure BDA00029227475400000810
As shown in equation (14):
Figure BDA00029227475400000811
wherein, alpha,
Figure BDA00029227475400000812
And
Figure BDA00029227475400000813
are all extracted from
Figure BDA00029227475400000814
Indicating use of
Figure BDA00029227475400000815
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (15):
Figure BDA00029227475400000816
Vjstoring
Figure BDA00029227475400000817
And sends it to V2I or V2A or V2STA；
Receive from
Figure BDA00029227475400000818
After that, TA is verified by the detection equation (16)
Figure BDA00029227475400000819
Validating and deriving the current timestamp TnT；
Figure BDA00029227475400000820
TA verification by detection equation (17)
Figure BDA00029227475400000821
Where ω is a predefined parameter;
Figure BDA0002922747540000091
TA will be
Figure BDA0002922747540000092
And the unique identifier i of the emergency message broadcaster is stored in the database, and if VjIs composed of
Figure BDA0002922747540000093
Reporting a plurality of prestige feedbacks, the TA storing only the latest one;
TA is
Figure BDA0002922747540000094
Generating acknowledgement messages
Figure BDA0002922747540000095
As shown in equation (18):
Figure BDA0002922747540000096
wherein，
Figure BDA0002922747540000097
Is extracted from
Figure BDA0002922747540000098
Indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (19):
Figure BDA0002922747540000099
TA will be
Figure BDA00029227475400000910
Is returned to Vj；
Receive from
Figure BDA00029227475400000911
Rear, VjUse of
Figure BDA00029227475400000912
Decryption
Figure BDA00029227475400000913
And verify
Figure BDA00029227475400000914
Whether or not it is consistent with formula (19), decrypted
Figure BDA00029227475400000915
And is stored
Figure BDA00029227475400000916
In (1)
Figure BDA00029227475400000917
Whether they are equal; if the verification passes, VjConfirm TA has received
Figure BDA00029227475400000918
And deleted from local storage
Figure BDA00029227475400000919
If VjFail to receive in time
Figure BDA00029227475400000920
Or if the verification fails, VjWill be provided with
Figure BDA00029227475400000921
And re-sent to TA in V2I or V2A or V2S.
Further, the updating of the reputation information specifically includes:
for each time interval and each vehicle, the TA derives a current timestamp
Figure BDA00029227475400000922
And selecting V within a predefined time range from the databaseiAll reputation feedback reported by the emergency message;
Figure BDA00029227475400000923
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400000924
for predefining time range parameters, use
Figure BDA00029227475400000925
Is shown as ViThe set of all reputation feedbacks reported by the emergency message of (1);
TA calculation of ViNew reputation score of
Figure BDA00029227475400000926
As shown in equation (21):
Figure BDA0002922747540000101
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000102
and
Figure BDA0002922747540000103
respectively, V in TA databaseiAnd VjIs equal to [0,1 ] the current reputation score of]Is an attenuation factor;
i.e. if the formula (22) holds,
Figure BDA0002922747540000104
Figure BDA0002922747540000105
is calculated as
Figure BDA0002922747540000106
A weighted average sum of; if not, then,
Figure BDA0002922747540000107
are calculated as attenuation factors delta and ViThe product of the current reputation scores;
finally, TA will be ViReputation score in the database is updated to
Figure BDA0002922747540000108
The invention also provides an emergency message dissemination system with trust management and privacy protection in SAGEVNs, and the system uses the emergency message dissemination method provided by the invention, and comprises a space part, a sky part and a ground part;
the space part comprises a plurality of satellites and corresponding ground base stations;
the sky part consists of a plurality of sky components, and the sky components specifically comprise unmanned planes, balloons and airships;
the ground part comprises a credible institution TA, a plurality of road side units RSUs, a plurality of cellular base stations BS and a plurality of vehicles, and the vehicles are provided with an on-board unit OBU and a plurality of on-board sensors; the trusted authority TA is used for registering vehicles, storing and regularly updating reputation information of the vehicles, generating and distributing reputation certificates, temporary private keys and secret threshold level sets for the vehicles;
the road side unit RSU and the cellular base station BS are used as ground infrastructure, are connected to the TA in a wired mode and are used as an interface for communication between the TA and the vehicle;
the satellites are communicated with each other in a satellite-to-satellite S2S mode, the satellites and the ground base stations are communicated with each other in a ground-to-satellite G2S mode, and the ground base stations are connected to a trusted authority in a wired mode;
the multiple sky components form one or more flying ad hoc networks FANETs, the sky components in the FANETs are communicated with each other in a sky component-to-sky component A2A mode, the sky components and the cellular base station are communicated with each other in a ground-to-sky G2A mode, and the sky components and the satellites are communicated with each other in a sky-to-space A2S mode;
emergency information is disseminated among the vehicles in a V2V wireless communication mode, the vehicles are connected with the RSU or the BS in a V2I wireless communication mode, the vehicles are connected with the sky assembly in a vehicle-to-sky assembly V2A communication mode, and the vehicles are connected with the satellites in a vehicle-to-satellite V2S communication mode.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
1. based on 0-1 coding and FNV hash algorithm, the invention can give good consideration to trust management and privacy protection; by adopting the SAGIN architecture, each vehicle can be connected to a trusted authority in a reputation certificate request stage and a reputation feedback report stage through various optional modes, and compared with the existing method, the method has stronger applicability; the invention can provide strong fault tolerance and provide strong fault tolerance for temporary faults of the trusted mechanism.
2. The invention supports the multiplexing of the pseudonym, the temporary public key and the temporary private key in different time intervals, and compared with the prior method, the pseudonym, the temporary public key and the temporary private key in the invention are shorter, thereby saving the storage space and the network bandwidth.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the system of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to examples and drawings, but the present invention is not limited thereto.
Examples
As shown in fig. 2, the emergency message dissemination system for both trust management and privacy protection in SAGIVNs of the present invention includes a space portion, a sky portion, and a ground portion;
the space part comprises a plurality of satellites and corresponding ground base stations, the satellites form one or more Satellite hosts, and the satellites in each Satellite host can communicate with each other in a Satellite-to-Satellite (S2S) mode. Meanwhile, the Satellite and the corresponding Ground base station can communicate with each other through a Ground-to-Satellite (G2S) manner, and the Ground base station is connected to a Trusted Authority (TA) through a wired manner.
The sky part comprises a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles, balloon, airship etc. (all called sky subassembly). The sky components form one or more self-organizing Networks (FANETs), and the sky components can communicate with each other in a sky-to-sky-component (A2A) mode through the sky components in each FANET. In addition, the sky component supports multiple communication modes, such as cellular communication, satellite communication, and the like. Therefore, sky components and cellular Base Stations (BSs) within a certain range can communicate with each other in a Ground-to-Air (G2A) manner, and sky components and satellites can communicate with each other in a sky-to-Space (A2S) manner.
The ground part comprises a centralized Authority (TA) and a large number of Road Side Units (RSUs), cellular Base Stations (BSs) and vehicles (vehicles). The TA is responsible for vehicle registration, storing and periodically updating the reputation information of the vehicle, generating and distributing a reputation certificate/ephemeral private key/secret threshold level set for the vehicle. The RSU and BS act as two types of ground infrastructure, are wired to the TA, and act as an interface for communication between the TA and the vehicle. Each vehicle is equipped with a plurality of On-Board sensors and an On-Board Unit (OBU), which supports a plurality of Communication modes, such as Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), cellular Communication, satellite Communication, and the like. Thus, vehicles can sense an emergency (e.g., an obstacle) within a certain range and communicate with each other in a wireless Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) manner to disseminate emergency information in the SAGIVNs. In addition, each Vehicle can connect a range of RSUs or BSs wirelessly from Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) depending on the current network status and its own needs; connecting a range of sky components (in the sky part) in a Vehicle-to-sky component (V2A) mode; or connecting the satellites (in space) in a Vehicle-to-Satellite (V2S) manner, wherein the V2A and V2S manners can be regarded as special forms of the G2A and G2S manners, respectively.
In this embodiment, the emergency message dissemination system deploys an emergency message dissemination method that gives consideration to both trust management and privacy protection in SAGIVNs, so as to give consideration to both trust management and privacy protection, as shown in fig. 1, the method specifically includes the following steps:
s1, initializing the system, including initializing a trusted authority TA and initializing other entities in the system;
s11, TA initialization, specifically:
TA sets its clock and generates public key Pk for itselfTAnd private key SkT；
Wherein, SkTAlways stored by the TA secret.
TA divides time into a series of equal-length time intervals T1,T2,., and defining n (n is Z)+) Selectable reputation level and threshold level L1＜L2＜...＜Ln。
Where the length of each time interval is denoted as θ.
For each Tα∈{T1,T2,., TA from [0, λ n-1 ]]Within the interval (lambda belongs to Z+) Randomly selecting n and L1,L2,...,LnOrdered integers in one-to-one correspondence
Figure BDA0002922747540000131
And for each
Figure BDA0002922747540000132
Respectively calculating 0 codes
Figure BDA0002922747540000133
And 1 encoding
Figure BDA0002922747540000134
To obtain
Figure BDA0002922747540000135
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000136
all have at most
Figure BDA0002922747540000137
And (4) each element.
TA random Generation of secret values
Figure BDA0002922747540000138
The secret value is kept secret by the TA and is
Figure BDA0002922747540000139
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001310
each element c in (1) is calculated
Figure BDA00029227475400001311
Get the corresponding set
Figure BDA00029227475400001312
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001313
if a hash collision occurs, another random one is generated
Figure BDA00029227475400001314
And regenerate
Figure BDA00029227475400001315
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001316
this detection is referred to as "collision detection-i";
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000141
represents the pair c and
Figure BDA0002922747540000142
performing character string splicing, and performing FNV hash on a spliced result;
binary coding r of TA with random rho bits1,r2,.. fill as a new element
Figure BDA0002922747540000143
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000144
to obtain
Figure BDA0002922747540000145
Corresponding set of individual elements
Figure BDA0002922747540000146
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000147
for each rτ∈{r1,r2,., if a certain one is available
Figure BDA0002922747540000148
If true, another random value r is usedτThis detection is called "collision detection-II";
where ρ is equal to
Figure BDA0002922747540000149
The output length of (d);
TA random rearrangement
Figure BDA00029227475400001410
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001411
i.e. randomly disordering the element sequence in each set to obtain the corresponding set
Figure BDA00029227475400001412
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001413
and storing it in a database;
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400001414
and
Figure BDA00029227475400001415
are respectively called and Lβ∈{L1,L2,...,LnAt TαInner secret 0 encoding and secret 1 encoding.
S12, initializing other entities, specifically:
configuring a satellite and corresponding ground base stations, and establishing wired connection between each ground base station and a TA (timing advance);
configuring an unmanned aerial vehicle, a balloon and an airship to suspend above a road and supplement BS;
RSUs are installed beside a road, and wired connection is established between each RSU and a TA;
BSs are installed near the road, and a wired connection is established between each BS and the TA.
S2, vehicle registration, specifically:
when the vehicle ViUpon registration with the TA, the TA distributes a unique identifier i for it, and the TA generates ViMaster public key of
Figure BDA00029227475400001416
And a master private key
Figure BDA00029227475400001419
And is taken as V in an off-line manneriInstalling Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for storage
Figure BDA00029227475400001417
PkTClocks synchronized with the TA, parameters shared with the TA, cryptography and digital signature algorithms, and protection reputation certificates, ephemeral private keys, and secret threshold level sets to ensure that they are not stolen, manipulated, or shared.
TA is V according to equation (1)iSetting initial reputation score
Figure BDA00029227475400001418
And will ViIs stored in the database, the formula is as follows:
Figure BDA0002922747540000151
s3, request for reputation certificate, at the beginning of each time interval, vehicle ViRequesting a new reputation certificate, a temporary private key and a secret threshold level set from the TA, specifically:
S31、Vigenerating random values
Figure BDA0002922747540000152
And selecting a threshold level
Figure BDA0002922747540000153
Then generates the request information
Figure BDA0002922747540000154
As shown in equation (2):
Figure BDA0002922747540000155
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000156
indicating the use of PkTThe asymmetric encryption is carried out and,
Figure BDA0002922747540000157
indicating use of
Figure BDA0002922747540000158
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (3):
Figure BDA0002922747540000159
vehicle ViBy means of V2I or V2A or V2S
Figure BDA00029227475400001510
Sending the data to the TA;
receive from
Figure BDA00029227475400001511
Then, TA utilizes SkTDecryption
Figure BDA00029227475400001512
To obtain i,
Figure BDA00029227475400001513
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001514
and based on
Figure BDA00029227475400001515
Authentication
Figure BDA00029227475400001516
The validity of (2);
TA obtains the Current TαAnd attempts to retrieve V from the databaseiAt TαK groups of reputation certificates, ephemeral private keys, and a secret threshold level set:
if the search result is null, TA searches V in the data baseiCurrent reputation score of
Figure BDA00029227475400001517
And convert it to the current reputation level
Figure BDA00029227475400001518
The conversion is shown in equation (4):
Figure BDA00029227475400001519
suppose that
Figure BDA00029227475400001520
Wherein L isβi∈{L1,L2,...,Ln}；
TA retrieves from the database at TαInner correspond to
Figure BDA0002922747540000161
Secret 0 encoding of
Figure BDA0002922747540000162
And is ViGenerating k sets of pseudonyms, ephemeral public keys, ephemeral private keys, and random values to form
Figure BDA0002922747540000163
Wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000164
are each ViAt TαThe k-th pseudonym, the k-th temporary public key, the k-th temporary private key and the k-th random key in the blockA machine value;
for each kappa, TA is
Figure BDA0002922747540000165
Each element c in (1) calculates
Figure BDA0002922747540000166
Filling and randomly rearranging the set (including collision detection-I and collision detection-II) to obtain V according to the method mentioned in TA initializationiAt TαInner kth random reputation level
Figure BDA00029227475400001622
TA is ViIs generated at TαInner kth reputation certificate
Figure BDA0002922747540000167
As shown in equation (5):
Figure BDA0002922747540000168
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000169
indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (6):
Figure BDA00029227475400001610
suppose that
Figure BDA00029227475400001623
Wherein
Figure BDA00029227475400001611
TA retrieves from the database at TαInner correspond to
Figure BDA00029227475400001612
Secret 1 encoding of
Figure BDA00029227475400001613
And using it as ViAt TαInner secret threshold level set
Figure BDA00029227475400001614
Then will be
Figure BDA00029227475400001615
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001616
stored in a database.
Secondly, if the retrieval result is not null, the TA adopted result is concentrated on the existing one
Figure BDA00029227475400001617
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001618
without generating new ones
Figure BDA00029227475400001619
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001620
the above strategy can ensure that even ViRequest TA multiple times, at each TαOnly k groups of reputation certificates, temporary private keys and a secret threshold level set can be obtained, which greatly enhances the privacy protection capability of the method.
S32, TA is ViGenerating a response message
Figure BDA00029227475400001621
As shown in equation (7):
Figure BDA0002922747540000171
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000172
indicating use of
Figure BDA0002922747540000173
The asymmetric encryption is carried out and,
Figure BDA0002922747540000174
indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (8):
Figure BDA0002922747540000175
TA will be
Figure BDA0002922747540000176
Is returned to Vi；
Receive from
Figure BDA0002922747540000177
Then, ViUse of
Figure BDA0002922747540000178
Decryption
Figure BDA0002922747540000179
To obtain
Figure BDA00029227475400001710
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001711
and based on
Figure BDA00029227475400001712
Authentication
Figure BDA00029227475400001728
The validity of (2);
Vistore in its local storage
Figure BDA00029227475400001713
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001714
if ViFail to receive in time
Figure BDA00029227475400001715
It can adopt other alternative ways (i.e. V2I or V2A or V2S) to send a new request message (containing a new random
Figure BDA00029227475400001716
To avoid its request message being linked by an adversary) to request the TA again.
S4, spreading the urgent message, wherein when an urgent event epsilon occurs, the urgent message about epsilon can be spread in nearby vehicles by a V2V method, specifically:
s41, if a certain vehicle ViSensing the presence of epsilon and intentionally reporting to surrounding vehicles by on-board sensors, ViFirst, the current T is derivedαRandomly selecting one kappa from {1, 2.. multidot.k }, and then searching in a local storage
Figure BDA00029227475400001717
ViGenerating an emergency message about an event epsilon
Figure BDA00029227475400001718
As shown in formula (9):
Figure BDA00029227475400001719
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400001720
a description is shown with respect to the event epsilon,
Figure BDA00029227475400001721
to represent
Figure BDA00029227475400001722
The time stamp of the time when it was generated,
Figure BDA00029227475400001723
indicating use of
Figure BDA00029227475400001724
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (10):
Figure BDA00029227475400001725
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400001726
is comprised in
Figure BDA00029227475400001729
Middle ViThe kth pseudonym of (1);
Viin the mode of V2V
Figure BDA00029227475400001727
Broadcast to surrounding vehicles.
S42, when another vehicle VjReceive from
Figure BDA0002922747540000181
VjBased on
Figure BDA0002922747540000182
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000183
separately verify
Figure BDA0002922747540000184
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000185
effectiveness of：
VjDeriving a current time interval
Figure BDA0002922747540000186
And a current time stamp
Figure BDA0002922747540000187
Respectively verified by detecting formula (11) and formula (12)
Figure BDA0002922747540000188
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000189
has not expired wherein
Figure BDA00029227475400001810
And psi are two predefined parameters.
Figure BDA00029227475400001833
Figure BDA00029227475400001811
Vehicle VjRetrieve at T in local storeαInner secret threshold level set
Figure BDA00029227475400001812
And from
Figure BDA00029227475400001813
Is prepared by
Figure BDA00029227475400001814
And
Figure BDA00029227475400001815
then is that
Figure BDA00029227475400001816
Each element c in (1) calculates
Figure BDA00029227475400001817
To obtain a corresponding set
Figure BDA00029227475400001818
(it is called VjIs corresponding to
Figure BDA00029227475400001819
Random threshold level set) and detect
Figure BDA00029227475400001820
Whether or not this is true.
If true, then
Figure BDA00029227475400001821
I.e. ViAt VjIt appears to be authentic, therefore VjIs based on immediately
Figure BDA00029227475400001822
Making a decision; at the same time, VjCan also be based on
Figure BDA00029227475400001823
Generating and broadcasting an urgent message to surrounding vehicles;
if not, then
Figure BDA00029227475400001824
I.e. ViAt VjIt appears to be untrusted, therefore VjCan not be aligned with
Figure BDA00029227475400001825
Making any decision; whether or not
Figure BDA00029227475400001826
Whether or not it is true, as long as
Figure BDA00029227475400001827
Is effective and does notExpiration date, VjAll store
Figure BDA00029227475400001828
To facilitate subsequent reputation feedback reporting. This strategy can greatly facilitate the reputation evolution of newly registered vehicles with low initial reputation scores.
In the above process, each message receiver can accurately judge whether a message broadcaster is trusted or not in a non-interactive and privacy-protecting manner.
S5, the reputation feedback report specifically includes:
when a certain vehicle VjWhen the vehicle enters a preset range of the occurrence of the emergency event epsilon, the actual state of the epsilon (namely whether the vehicle exists or not, marked as
Figure BDA00029227475400001829
) And judge
Figure BDA00029227475400001830
The correctness of the operation. VjIs composed of
Figure BDA00029227475400001831
Calculating a feedback score
Figure BDA00029227475400001832
As shown in equation (13):
Figure BDA0002922747540000191
Vjis composed of
Figure BDA0002922747540000192
Generating prestige feedback
Figure BDA0002922747540000193
As shown in equation (14):
Figure BDA0002922747540000194
wherein, alpha,
Figure BDA0002922747540000195
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000196
are all extracted from
Figure BDA0002922747540000197
Indicating use of
Figure BDA0002922747540000198
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (15):
Figure BDA0002922747540000199
Vjstoring
Figure BDA00029227475400001910
And sends it to TA by way of V2I or V2A or V2S;
receive from
Figure BDA00029227475400001911
After that, TA is verified by the detection equation (16)
Figure BDA00029227475400001912
Validating and deriving the current timestamp TnT。
Figure BDA00029227475400001913
TA verification by detection equation (17)
Figure BDA00029227475400001914
Where ω is a predefined parameter;
Figure BDA00029227475400001915
TA will be
Figure BDA00029227475400001916
And a unique identifier i (corresponding to T) of the message broadcasterαInside of
Figure BDA00029227475400001917
) Stored in a database. If VjIs composed of
Figure BDA00029227475400001918
Multiple reputation feedbacks are reported and the TA stores only the latest one.
TA is
Figure BDA00029227475400001919
Generating acknowledgement messages
Figure BDA00029227475400001920
As shown in equation (18):
Figure BDA00029227475400001921
wherein,
Figure BDA0002922747540000201
is extracted from
Figure BDA0002922747540000202
Indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (19):
Figure BDA0002922747540000203
TA will be
Figure BDA0002922747540000204
Is returned to Vj；
Receive from
Figure BDA0002922747540000205
Rear, VjUse of
Figure BDA0002922747540000206
Decryption
Figure BDA0002922747540000207
And verify
Figure BDA0002922747540000208
Whether or not it is consistent with formula (19), decrypted
Figure BDA0002922747540000209
And is stored
Figure BDA00029227475400002010
In (1)
Figure BDA00029227475400002011
Whether they are equal; if the verification passes, VjConfirm TA has received
Figure BDA00029227475400002012
And deleted from local storage
Figure BDA00029227475400002013
If VjFail to receive in time
Figure BDA00029227475400002014
Or if the verification fails, VjWill be provided with
Figure BDA00029227475400002015
And sent to the TA again in the other alternative (i.e., V2I or V2A or V2S).
And S6, updating the reputation information, and updating the reputation information of the vehicle by the TA according to the reputation feedback in the database when each time interval is ended, wherein the updating specifically comprises the following steps:
for each time interval (e.g. T)α) And each vehicle (e.g. V)i)，
TA derived current timestamp
Figure BDA00029227475400002016
And selects from the database that it is within the predefined time range (i.e., satisfies equation (20) where
Figure BDA00029227475400002017
Is a predefined parameter) is ViAll reputation feedback reported by the urgent message (the set of which is denoted as
Figure BDA00029227475400002018
)
Figure BDA00029227475400002019
TA calculation of ViNew reputation score of
Figure BDA00029227475400002020
As shown in equation (21):
Figure BDA00029227475400002021
wherein,
Figure BDA00029227475400002022
and
Figure BDA00029227475400002023
respectively, V in TA databaseiAnd VjIs equal to [0,1 ] the current reputation score of]Is an attenuation factor.
I.e. if the formula (22) holds,
Figure BDA0002922747540000211
Figure BDA0002922747540000212
is calculated as
Figure BDA0002922747540000213
Wherein the current reputation score of each message recipient is taken as an important weight; if not, then,
Figure BDA0002922747540000214
are calculated as attenuation factors delta and ViThe product of the current prestige scores.
TA will be ViReputation score in the database is updated to
Figure BDA0002922747540000217
Is obtained by the formula (1) and the formula (21)
Figure BDA0002922747540000215
And
Figure BDA0002922747540000216
all belong to the interval [0,1]。
It should also be noted that in this specification, terms such as "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising an … …" does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises the element.
The previous description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims (9)

1. An emergency message spreading method considering trust management and privacy protection in SAGAVINS is characterized by comprising a trusted authority TA, a road side unit RSU, a cellular base station BS, a vehicle-mounted sensor and a vehicle-mounted unit OBU of the vehicle, a sky component, a satellite and a ground base station corresponding to the satellite, and comprises the following steps:
initializing a system, initializing a trusted authority TA and initializing other entities in the system; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
setting TA self-clock and generating public key Pk for TA selfTAnd private key SkTWherein SkTAlways stored secretly by the TA;
TA divides time into a series of equal-length time intervals T1,T2…, and defining n selectable reputation levels and a threshold level L1＜L2＜…＜LnWherein the length of each time interval is represented as theta, n ∈ Z+；
For each Tα∈{T1,T2…, TA from [0, λ n-1 ]]Randomly selecting n and L in interval1,L2,...,LnOrdered integers in one-to-one correspondence
Figure FDA0003487118140000011
And for each
Figure FDA0003487118140000012
Respectively calculating 0 codes
Figure FDA0003487118140000013
And 1 encoding
Figure FDA0003487118140000014
To obtain
Figure FDA0003487118140000015
And
Figure FDA0003487118140000016
all have at most
Figure FDA0003487118140000017
An element; wherein λ ∈ Z+；
TA random Generation of secret values
Figure FDA0003487118140000018
The secret value is kept secret by the TA and is
Figure FDA0003487118140000019
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000110
each element c in (1) is calculated
Figure FDA00034871181400000111
Get the corresponding set
Figure FDA00034871181400000112
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000113
if a hash collision occurs, another random one is generated
Figure FDA00034871181400000114
And regenerate
Figure FDA00034871181400000115
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000116
referred to as "collision detection-i";
wherein,
Figure FDA00034871181400000117
represents the pair c and
Figure FDA00034871181400000118
performing character string splicing, and performing FNV hash on a spliced result;
binary coding r of TA with random rho bits1,r2… filling as a new element
Figure FDA00034871181400000119
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000120
to obtain
Figure FDA00034871181400000121
Corresponding set of individual elements
Figure FDA00034871181400000122
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000123
for each rτ∈{r1,r2… }, if a certain one is present
Figure FDA00034871181400000124
If true, another random value r is usedτReferred to as "collision detection-II";
where ρ is equal to
Figure FDA00034871181400000125
The output length of (d);
TA random rearrangement
Figure FDA0003487118140000021
And
Figure FDA0003487118140000022
i.e. randomly disordering the element sequence in each set to obtain the corresponding set
Figure FDA0003487118140000023
And
Figure FDA0003487118140000024
and storing it in a database;
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000025
and
Figure FDA0003487118140000026
are respectively called and Lβ∈{L1,L2,…,LnAt TαInner secret 0 encoding and secret 1 encoding;
vehicle registration, when a new vehicle is accessed into the SAGAVINS, a trusted authority TA distributes a unique identifier for the new vehicle, generates a master public key and a master private key, installs a trusted platform module and sets an initial reputation score for the vehicle;
the method comprises the steps that a prestige certificate request is carried out, and a vehicle requests a new prestige certificate, a temporary private key and a secret threshold level set from a TA;
spreading emergency messages, wherein when a certain vehicle senses the occurrence of an emergency through a vehicle-mounted sensor, the emergency messages are spread to other vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle V2V mode;
the method comprises the following steps that a prestige feedback report is carried out, when other vehicles drive into a preset range of emergency occurrence, the actual state of the emergency is sensed through a vehicle-mounted sensor, and the correctness of the emergency message is judged;
and (4) updating the prestige information, and updating the prestige information of the vehicle by the TA according to the prestige feedback in the database.
2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the initialization of other entities in the system is specifically:
configuring a satellite and corresponding ground base stations, and establishing wired connection between each ground base station and a TA (timing advance);
configuring a sky assembly to be suspended above a roadway and to supplement a BS, wherein the sky assembly includes a drone, a balloon, and an airship;
RSUs are installed beside a road, and wired connection is established between each RSU and a TA;
BSs are installed near the road, and a wired connection is established between each BS and the TA.
3. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the vehicle registration is specifically as follows:
when the vehicle ViUpon registration with the TA, the TA distributes a unique identifier i for it, and the TA generates ViMaster public key of
Figure FDA0003487118140000027
And a master private key
Figure FDA0003487118140000028
And is taken as V in an off-line manneriInstalling a trusted platform module;
the trusted platform module is used for storing
Figure FDA0003487118140000029
PkTA clock synchronized with the TA, parameters shared with the TA, and cryptography and digital signature algorithms to protect the reputation certificate, the temporary private key, and the secret threshold level set from theft, manipulation, or sharing;
TA is V according to equation (1)iSetting initial reputation score
Figure FDA0003487118140000031
And will ViIs stored in the database, the formula is as follows:
Figure FDA0003487118140000032
4. the method of claim 3, wherein said request for reputation certificates comprises the steps of:
Vigenerating random values
Figure FDA0003487118140000033
And selecting a threshold level
Figure FDA0003487118140000034
Then generates the request information
Figure FDA0003487118140000035
As shown in equation (2):
Figure FDA0003487118140000036
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000037
indicating the use of PkTThe asymmetric encryption is carried out and,
Figure FDA0003487118140000038
indicating use of
Figure FDA0003487118140000039
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (3):
Figure FDA00034871181400000310
vehicle ViWill be connected by means of vehicle-to-infrastructure V2I or vehicle-to-sky assembly V2A or vehicle-to-satellite V2S
Figure FDA00034871181400000311
Sending the data to the TA;
receive from
Figure FDA00034871181400000312
Then, TA utilizes SkTDecryption
Figure FDA00034871181400000313
To obtain i,
Figure FDA00034871181400000314
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000315
and based on
Figure FDA00034871181400000316
Authentication
Figure FDA00034871181400000317
The validity of (2).
5. The method of claim 4, wherein said request for reputation certificates further comprises the steps of:
TA obtains the Current TαAnd attempts to retrieve V from the databaseiAt TαK groups of reputation certificates, ephemeral private keys, and a secret threshold level set:
if the search result is null, TA searches V in the databaseiCurrent reputation score of
Figure FDA00034871181400000318
And convert it to the current reputation level
Figure FDA00034871181400000319
The conversion is shown in equation (4):
Figure FDA0003487118140000041
suppose that
Figure FDA0003487118140000042
Wherein L isβi∈{L1,L2,…,Ln}；
TA retrieves from the database at TαInner correspond to
Figure FDA0003487118140000043
Secret 0 encoding of
Figure FDA0003487118140000044
And is ViGenerating k sets of pseudonyms, ephemeral public keys, ephemeral private keys, and random values to form
Figure FDA0003487118140000045
Wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000046
are each ViAt TαA kth pseudonym, a kth temporary public key, a kth temporary private key, and a kth random value within;
for each kappa, TA is
Figure FDA0003487118140000047
Each element c in (1) calculates
Figure FDA0003487118140000048
Filling and randomly rearranging the set to obtain V according to the method mentioned in TA initializationiAt TαInner kth random prestigeGrade
Figure FDA0003487118140000049
TA is ViIs generated at TαInner kth reputation certificate
Figure FDA00034871181400000410
As shown in equation (5):
Figure FDA00034871181400000411
wherein,
Figure FDA00034871181400000412
indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (6):
Figure FDA00034871181400000413
suppose that
Figure FDA00034871181400000414
Wherein
Figure FDA00034871181400000415
TA retrieves from the database at TαInner correspond to
Figure FDA00034871181400000416
Secret 1 encoding of
Figure FDA00034871181400000417
And using it as ViAt TαInner secret threshold level set
Figure FDA00034871181400000418
Then will be
Figure FDA00034871181400000419
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000420
storing in a database;
if the search result is not null, TA adopts the existing result set
Figure FDA0003487118140000051
And
Figure FDA0003487118140000052
without generating new ones
Figure FDA0003487118140000053
And
Figure FDA0003487118140000054
after executing corresponding operation according to the retrieval result, TA is ViGenerating a response message
Figure FDA0003487118140000055
As shown in equation (7):
Figure FDA0003487118140000056
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000057
indicating use of
Figure FDA0003487118140000058
The asymmetric encryption is carried out and,
Figure FDA0003487118140000059
indicating the use of SkTGenerated digital signatures, e.g. officialFormula (8):
Figure FDA00034871181400000510
TA will be
Figure FDA00034871181400000511
Is returned to Vi；
Receive from
Figure FDA00034871181400000512
Then, ViUse of
Figure FDA00034871181400000513
Decryption
Figure FDA00034871181400000514
To obtain
Figure FDA00034871181400000515
Figure FDA00034871181400000516
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000517
and based on
Figure FDA00034871181400000518
Authentication
Figure FDA00034871181400000519
The validity of (2);
Vistore in its local storage
Figure FDA00034871181400000520
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000521
if ViFail to receive in time
Figure FDA00034871181400000522
The TA will be requested again with a new request message in the form of V2I or V2A or V2S.
6. The method as claimed in claim 5, wherein the emergency message dissemination method for both trust management and privacy protection in SAGEVNs is specifically as follows:
when a certain vehicle ViV when the presence of an emergency event epsilon is sensed by an on-board sensor and intentionally reported to a surrounding vehicleiFirst, the current T is derivedαRandomly selecting a kappa from {1,2, …, k }, and then searching in the local storage
Figure FDA00034871181400000523
ViGenerating an emergency message about an event epsilon
Figure FDA00034871181400000524
As shown in formula (9):
Figure FDA00034871181400000525
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000061
a description is shown with respect to the event epsilon,
Figure FDA0003487118140000062
to represent
Figure FDA0003487118140000063
The time stamp of the time when it was generated,
Figure FDA0003487118140000064
indicating use of
Figure FDA0003487118140000065
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (10):
Figure FDA0003487118140000066
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000067
is comprised in
Figure FDA0003487118140000068
Middle ViThe kth pseudonym of (1);
Viin the mode of V2V
Figure FDA0003487118140000069
Broadcast to other vehicles;
when another vehicle VjReceive from
Figure FDA00034871181400000610
VjBased on
Figure FDA00034871181400000611
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000612
separately verify
Figure FDA00034871181400000613
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000614
the effectiveness of (a) is specifically:
Vjderiving a current time interval
Figure FDA00034871181400000615
And a current time stamp
Figure FDA00034871181400000616
Respectively verified by detecting formula (11) and formula (12)
Figure FDA00034871181400000617
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000618
has not expired wherein
Figure FDA00034871181400000619
And ψ is two predefined parameters;
Figure FDA00034871181400000620
Figure FDA00034871181400000621
vehicle VjRetrieve at T in local storeαInner secret threshold level set
Figure FDA00034871181400000622
And from
Figure FDA00034871181400000623
Is prepared by
Figure FDA00034871181400000624
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000625
then is that
Figure FDA00034871181400000626
Each element c in (1) calculates
Figure FDA00034871181400000627
To obtain a corresponding set
Figure FDA00034871181400000628
And detecting
Figure FDA00034871181400000629
Whether the result is true or not;
if it is not
Figure FDA00034871181400000630
Is established, then
Figure FDA00034871181400000631
I.e. ViAt VjIt appears to be authentic, therefore VjIs based on immediately
Figure FDA00034871181400000632
Making a decision; at the same time, VjCan also be based on
Figure FDA00034871181400000633
Generating and broadcasting an emergency message to other vehicles;
if it is not
Figure FDA00034871181400000634
If not, then
Figure FDA00034871181400000635
I.e. ViAt VjIt appears to be untrusted, therefore VjCan not be aligned with
Figure FDA0003487118140000071
Making any decision;
therein, no matter whether
Figure FDA0003487118140000072
Whether or not it is true, as long as
Figure FDA0003487118140000073
Effective and unexpired, VjAll store
Figure FDA0003487118140000074
To facilitate subsequent reputation feedback reporting.
7. The method as claimed in claim 6, wherein the reputation feedback report is specifically:
when a certain vehicle VjWhen the vehicle enters a preset range of the occurrence of the emergency event epsilon, the actual state of the emergency event epsilon is sensed and judged through the vehicle-mounted sensor
Figure FDA0003487118140000075
The correctness of the test;
Vjis composed of
Figure FDA0003487118140000076
Calculating a feedback score
Figure FDA0003487118140000077
As shown in equation (13):
Figure FDA0003487118140000078
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000079
the actual state of the emergency event epsilon;
Vjis composed of
Figure FDA00034871181400000710
Generating prestige feedback
Figure FDA00034871181400000711
As shown in equation (14):
Figure FDA00034871181400000712
wherein, alpha,
Figure FDA00034871181400000713
And
Figure FDA00034871181400000714
are all extracted from
Figure FDA00034871181400000715
Indicating use of
Figure FDA00034871181400000716
The generated digital signature is shown in formula (15):
Figure FDA00034871181400000717
Vjstoring
Figure FDA00034871181400000718
And sends it to TA by way of V2I or V2A or V2S;
receive from
Figure FDA00034871181400000719
After that, TA is verified by the detection equation (16)
Figure FDA00034871181400000720
Efficient and exportCurrent time stamp TnT；
Figure FDA0003487118140000081
TA verification by detection equation (17)
Figure FDA0003487118140000082
Where ω is a predefined parameter;
Figure FDA0003487118140000083
TA will be
Figure FDA0003487118140000084
And the unique identifier i of the emergency message broadcaster is stored in the database, and if VjIs composed of
Figure FDA0003487118140000085
Reporting a plurality of prestige feedbacks, the TA storing only the latest one;
TA is
Figure FDA0003487118140000086
Generating acknowledgement messages
Figure FDA0003487118140000087
As shown in equation (18):
Figure FDA0003487118140000088
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000089
is extracted from
Figure FDA00034871181400000810
Figure FDA00034871181400000811
Indicating the use of SkTThe generated digital signature is shown in formula (19):
Figure FDA00034871181400000812
TA will be
Figure FDA00034871181400000813
Is returned to Vj；
Receive from
Figure FDA00034871181400000814
Rear, VjUse of
Figure FDA00034871181400000815
Decryption
Figure FDA00034871181400000816
And verify
Figure FDA00034871181400000817
Whether or not it is consistent with formula (19), decrypted
Figure FDA00034871181400000818
And is stored
Figure FDA00034871181400000819
In (1)
Figure FDA00034871181400000820
Whether they are equal; if the verification passes, VjConfirm TA has received
Figure FDA00034871181400000821
And deleted from local storage
Figure FDA00034871181400000822
If VjFail to receive in time
Figure FDA00034871181400000823
Or if the verification fails, VjWill be provided with
Figure FDA00034871181400000824
And re-sent to TA in V2I or V2A or V2S.
8. The method as claimed in claim 7, wherein the updating of reputation information is specifically as follows:
for each time interval and each vehicle, the TA derives a current timestamp
Figure FDA0003487118140000091
And selecting V within a predefined time range from the databaseiAll reputation feedback reported by the emergency message;
Figure FDA0003487118140000092
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000093
for predefining time range parameters, use
Figure FDA0003487118140000094
Is shown as ViThe set of all reputation feedbacks reported by the emergency message of (1);
TA calculation of ViNew reputation score of
Figure FDA0003487118140000095
As shown in equation (21):
Figure FDA0003487118140000096
wherein,
Figure FDA0003487118140000097
and
Figure FDA0003487118140000098
respectively, V in TA databaseiAnd VjIs equal to [0,1 ] the current reputation score of]Is an attenuation factor;
i.e. if the formula (22) holds,
Figure FDA0003487118140000099
Figure FDA00034871181400000910
is calculated as
Figure FDA00034871181400000911
A weighted average sum of; if not, then,
Figure FDA00034871181400000912
are calculated as attenuation factors delta and ViThe product of the current reputation scores;
finally, TA will be ViReputation score in the database is updated to
Figure FDA00034871181400000913
An emergency message dissemination system for both trust management and privacy protection in SAGAVINs, characterized in that the emergency message dissemination method of any of claims 1-8 is applied, comprising a space section, a sky section and a ground section;
the space part comprises a plurality of satellites and corresponding ground base stations;
the sky part consists of a plurality of sky components, and the sky components specifically comprise unmanned planes, balloons and airships;
the ground part comprises a credible institution TA, a plurality of road side units RSUs, a plurality of cellular base stations BS and a plurality of vehicles, and the vehicles are provided with an on-board unit OBU and a plurality of on-board sensors; the trusted authority TA is used for registering vehicles, storing and regularly updating reputation information of the vehicles, generating and distributing reputation certificates, temporary private keys and secret threshold level sets for the vehicles;
the road side unit RSU and the cellular base station BS are used as ground infrastructure, are connected to the TA in a wired mode and are used as an interface for communication between the TA and the vehicle;
the satellites are communicated with each other in a satellite-to-satellite S2S mode, the satellites and the ground base stations are communicated with each other in a ground-to-satellite G2S mode, and the ground base stations are connected to a trusted authority in a wired mode;
the multiple sky components form one or more flying ad hoc networks FANETs, the sky components in the FANETs are communicated with each other in a sky component-to-sky component A2A mode, the sky components and the cellular base station are communicated with each other in a ground-to-sky G2A mode, and the sky components and the satellites are communicated with each other in a sky-to-space A2S mode;
emergency information is disseminated among the vehicles in a V2V wireless communication mode, the vehicles are connected with the RSU or the BS in a V2I wireless communication mode, the vehicles are connected with the sky assembly in a vehicle-to-sky assembly V2A communication mode, and the vehicles are connected with the satellites in a vehicle-to-satellite V2S communication mode.
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