CN112804272A - Conflict calculation method of chameleon hash function and cuttable block chain account book structure - Google Patents
Conflict calculation method of chameleon hash function and cuttable block chain account book structure Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of network security, and particularly relates to a collision calculation method of a chameleon hash function and a cuttable block chain account book structure. The collision calculation method of the chameleon hash function is characterized by comprising the following steps of: the method comprises the following steps: and (3) generating a hash key: calculating to obtain a system public key and n private shares based on a public parameter, a secret key generation algorithm and a verifiable secret sharing algorithm, and calculating at least t private shares in the n private shares to obtain a trapdoor private key; and (3) Hash calculation: calculating to obtain a hash value according to the system public key, the message and the chameleon random number corresponding to the message; and (3) collision calculation: and calculating Hash collision based on the obtained trap door private key, the message, the random number, the Hash value and the new message to obtain a new chameleon random number meeting the collision. Based on the algorithm, the chameleon Hash trapdoor authority is not mastered by a certain node independently to cause the risk of malicious utilization, and the influence on efficiency caused by the fact that all nodes participate in trapdoor synthesis is avoided.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of network security, and particularly relates to a collision calculation method of a chameleon hash function, a cuttable block chain account book structure and a cutting method.
Background
The blockchain is an innovative application mode of computer technologies such as distributed data storage, point-to-point transmission, a consensus mechanism and an encryption algorithm in the internet era. Blockchain technology is considered as a subversive innovation of computing models behind mainframes, personal computers, the internet. In a narrow sense, the blockchain is a distributed account book which is a chain data structure formed by combining data blocks in a sequential connection mode according to a time sequence and is guaranteed in a cryptographic mode and cannot be tampered and forged. Broadly speaking, the blockchain technique is a completely new distributed infrastructure and computing paradigm that utilizes blockchain data structures to verify and store data, utilizes distributed node consensus algorithms to generate and update data, cryptographically secure data transmission and access, and utilizes intelligent contracts composed of automated script code to program and manipulate data.
The block chain account book plays an important role in the working process of the block chain, all data of the distributed block chain account book are transparent and shared, can be updated in real time, and can be widely adopted by industries such as medical treatment, finance and transportation, so that the purposes of saving application cost, simplicity, rapidness, avoiding manual errors, effectively preventing cheating and the like can be achieved. However, as the application data is continuously increased, the blockchain account book is increasingly large, which inevitably results in increased storage and calculation costs. For example, in Bizhou, the amount of data from the current created tile to the current tile reaches 243.6GB and continues to increase.
A tailorable block chain technique based on chameleon hash functions is proposed in renewable Block-or-rewriting history in bitcoin and friends, introduced by Atenise et al in 2016, to allow blocks to be re-edited while keeping hash values unchanged. However, there is no specific mention in this scheme of how to implement editing of tile content in a fully decentralized environment.
Chinese patent CN11061850A and chinese patent disclose a collision calculation method for chameleon hash function and an editable block chain construction method. However, although the above scheme adopts a non-centralized distribution trapdoor method, all nodes are required to participate, so the following problems are easily caused: firstly, the sharers can not be well prevented from cheating, namely some sharers can provide false shares when restoring the trapdoor, and some members can not restore the correct secret; the second is the inability to effectively prevent distributor spoofing, i.e., a distributor may distribute false shares to some sharers when distributing secret shares.
Therefore, in view of the above disadvantages, the present invention is urgently needed to provide a collision calculation method for chameleon hash function, and a tailorable block chain ledger structure and a tailoring method.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a collision calculation method of a chameleon hash function, a cuttable block chain account book structure and a cutting method, and aims to solve the problem that cutting of a block chain needs participation of all nodes in the prior art.
The invention provides a collision calculation method of a chameleon hash function, which comprises the following steps: and (3) generating a hash key: calculating based on a public parameter, a secret key generation algorithm and a verifiable secret sharing algorithm to obtain a system public key and n private shares, wherein at least t private shares in the n private shares can be calculated based on a secret reconstruction algorithm to obtain a trapdoor private key; and (3) Hash calculation: calculating to obtain a hash value according to the system public key, the message and the chameleon random number corresponding to the message, and verifying whether the hash value and the chameleon random number are effective hash pairs for the message book; and (3) collision calculation: and calculating Hash collision based on the obtained trap door private key, the message, the random number, the Hash value and the new message, and deducing a new chameleon random number meeting the collision through a collision calculation result.
In the collision calculation method of chameleon hash function, it is further preferable that the public parameter generating step specifically includes: firstly, selecting a safety parameter, selecting a prime number q according to the safety parameter, and selecting a GDH group G with a generation element G with the order of q, wherein a system public parameter is paramtch = { G, q, G }.
In the collision calculation method of chameleon hash function, it is further preferable that in the key generation step, each secret share is calculated based on the following formula:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
and satisfy
(ii) a tk is the trapdoor private key, tkjThe secret share of the jth node, j being the jth node, n being the total number of nodes in the blockchain network, j =1,2,3, … n; p is a big prime number, and q is a big prime factor of p-1; mod is a mod function.
In the collision calculation method of chameleon hash function, it is further preferable that in the key generation step, whether the private share used for synthesizing the trapdoor private key is correct is verified, and the trapdoor private key is calculated based on the correct private share and a secret reconstruction algorithm; verifying the secret share for synthesizing the trapdoor private key based on the following formula:
wherein g is a q-order element, p is a large prime number, tkjIs a private share of the jth node;
，aidisclosing functions for polynomials
I =0,1,2 … t-1; mod is a mod function.
The invention also discloses a cuttable block chain account book structure which is realized based on the collision calculation method of the chameleon hash function and comprises a plurality of blocks, wherein each block comprises a block head and a block body which are in one-to-one correspondence; the block body stores transaction information of the block; the block header comprises a hash value, a message, a nonce value and a random number; the hash value is a chameleon hash value of a previous block, and is used for forming a chain structure with the previous block, and so on until the hash value is linked to the initial block; the message is calculated by the transaction information; the random number and the hash value are hash pairs based on a chameleon hash function.
The invention also discloses a cutting method of the cuttable block chain account book, which is realized based on the collision calculation method of the chameleon hash function and comprises the following steps: step 1: the system management node initiates trapdoor verification and synthesis based on the chameleon hash function, and obtains a system public key and a trapdoor private key under the cooperation of at least t nodes; step 2: the system management node performs cutting operation on the block of the area to be cut, and calculates to obtain a new message of the block after the cutting operation; and step 3: and the system management node modifies the block head of the cuttable block chain cutting operation area in the step 2 based on the system public key and the trapdoor private key obtained in the step 1, so that blocks before and after the operation area can form a chain structure through the hash value.
As described above, in the method for cutting a block chain ledger, preferably, the step 1 specifically includes: step 1.1: the system management node outputs a public key and a trapdoor private key based on a chameleon hash function, wherein the trapdoor private key is a plurality of private shares obtained based on a verifiable secret sharing algorithm; step 1.2: the system management node distributes the plurality of private shares obtained in the step 1.1 to a plurality of nodes one by one; step 1.3: the node receives the private shares distributed in the step 1.2, verifies whether the private shares are valid or not, and returns the private shares to the system management node when the private shares are verified to be valid; step 1.4: and the system management node receives and verifies the returned private shares, and calculates a Laval difference value calculation formula based on at least t private shares passing the verification to obtain the trapdoor private key.
As described above, in the method for cutting a block chain ledger, preferably, the step 2 specifically includes: step 2.11: the block chain capable of being cut positions a block of the operation area to be cut, and deletes the transaction to be deleted in the block body of the block to obtain an updated block; step 2.12: the new message for updating the block obtained in step 2.11 is calculated.
As described above, in the method for cutting a block chain ledger, preferably, step 3 specifically includes: step 3.11: the system management node calculates to obtain a hash value according to the system public key and the information and the random number of the cutting block head in the step 2; step 3.12: the system management node verifies whether the hash value and the random number are effective hash pairs of the message according to the message of the cutting block head, the random number and the hash value calculated in the step 3.11; step 3.13: if the verification in the step 3.12 is passed, the system management node takes the trapdoor private key obtained in the step 1, the hash value obtained in the step 3.11, the new message obtained in the step 2.12, the message of the cutting block head and the random number as input to obtain a new random number; step 3.14: and the system management node updates the new message obtained in the step 2.12 and the new random number obtained in the step 3.13 to the head of the cutting block.
Alternatively, in the method for cutting a block chain ledger book that can be cut as described above, it is further preferable that step 2 specifically includes: step 2.21: the block chain capable of being cut positions and deletes the blocks of the operation area to be cut; step 2.22: the tailorable block chain locates the previous and next blocks of the deleted block.
In the above method for clipping a clipable block chain ledger, it is further preferable that the chameleon hash function model includes: the secret key generation module: the system is used for outputting a public key and a trap door private key according to the security parameters; a hash calculation module: the hash value is output according to the public key, the message and the random number; a verification calculation module: the message, the hash value and the random number are used as input to verify whether the hash value and the random number are effective hash pairs for the message; and the collision calculation module is used for taking the trap door private key, the message, the random number, the hash value and the new message as input when the verification is passed, and outputting the new random number.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
the method solves the problem of block chain capacity cutting by introducing the chameleon hash function, so that specific personnel with chameleon hash trapdoor authority can delete the account book record of the block chain, and meanwhile, the integrity verification of the forward and backward block chains of the corresponding block chain account book is not influenced. By the mode, the capacity of the block chain ledger book can be deleted, garbage transactions and error transactions can also be deleted, error check and timely loss stopping of block chain intelligent contracts are facilitated, and healthy development of block chain application is facilitated.
The verification secret sharing algorithm is introduced to solve the safety problem in block chain capacity cutting, so that the chameleon Hash trapdoor authority is not only not mastered by a certain node to cause the risk of malicious utilization, but also the influence on efficiency caused by the participation of all nodes in trapdoor synthesis is avoided, meanwhile, the hidden danger caused by malicious trapdoor private key distribution and malicious participant is solved, the verification of multi-person shared trapdoor information is realized, and the safety of centralized block chain ledger cutting is ensured.
Detailed Description
Example 1:
the embodiment discloses a block chain account book structure capable of being cut, which comprises a plurality of blocks, wherein each block comprises a block head and a block body which are in one-to-one correspondence; the block body stores transaction information of the block; the block header comprises a hash value, a message, a nonce value and a random number; the hash value is a chameleon hash value of a previous block, and is used for forming a chain structure with the previous block, and so on until the hash value is linked to the initial block; the message is calculated by the transaction information; the random number and the hash value are hash pairs based on a chameleon hash function.
One chameleon Hash function scheme consists of four functions, Key Generation HG, Hash H, Verification HV and Collision HC [10 ]:
（1）
: a key generation algorithm for inputting a security parameter
And outputting the public key hk and the trap door private key tk.
（2）
: generating hash value, inputting user's public key
Any one message
And random number
Outputting the hash value
。
（3）
: by messages
Hash value
And random number
As an input, if
To pair
Is a valid hash pair, thenD is 1, otherwise 0.
（4）
: calculated by H function by trap door private key tk, original message m, m
And new message
As input, new random number is output
And satisfy
。
Specifically, based on the tailorable block chain book structure of the chameleon hash function, the block head can be represented by one tuple
Wherein
The hash value, i.e. the hash value of the last chunk,
for a message, the Merkle tree root representing all transactions in the block corresponding to the block header,
and (h, z) is a random number, namely a hash pair output by the chameleon hash function. Function G is defined as a chameleon hash function
When the block B satisfies
Then the block is valid.
This time zone block chain
Chain head
Expanding a blockchain may be accomplished by adding valid blocks to the chain header
Wherein
。
Due to the fact that
Can be derived from other data in the block header by a chameleon hash function, so that a modifiable block can be obtained
The method is simplified as follows:
wherein
The random number is required for calculating the chameleon hash function. At this time, the blocks are aligned
To satisfy
Is effective.
Simplified block chain
The chain head is
By adding valid blocks after the chain head
Wherein
And the purpose of expanding the block chain is achieved.
Compare ordinary block chain, the tailorable block chain account book structure disclosed in this embodiment mainly has following two changes:
(1) changing a block hash value generation function G from a common hash function such as an SHA-256 function to a chameleon hash function;
(2) the block header is incremented by a random value r. The random value r also needs to be updated when the blockchain is modified (i.e., the collision value found using the chameleon hash function).
Example 2:
the embodiment discloses a method for cutting a cuttable block chain account book, which is used for realizing the cutting of the cuttable block chain account book structure in the embodiment 1, and comprises the following steps:
step 1: the system management node initiates trapdoor verification and synthesis based on the chameleon hash function, and obtains a system public key and a trapdoor private key under the cooperation of at least t nodes;
step 2: the system management node performs cutting operation on the block of the area to be cut, and calculates to obtain a new message of the block after the cutting operation;
and step 3: and the system management node modifies the block head of the cuttable block chain cutting operation area in the step 2 based on the system public key and the trapdoor private key obtained in the step 1, so that blocks before and after the operation area can form a chain structure through the hash value.
Further, in the above-mentioned case,
the step 1 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1.1: the system management node outputs a public key and a trapdoor private key based on a chameleon hash function, wherein the trapdoor private key is a plurality of private shares obtained based on a verifiable secret sharing algorithm;
step 1.2: the system management node distributes the plurality of private shares obtained in the step 1.1 to a plurality of nodes one by one;
step 1.3: the node receives the private shares distributed in the step 1.2, verifies whether the private shares are valid or not, and returns the private shares to the system management node when the private shares are verified to be valid;
step 1.4: and the system management node receives and verifies the returned private shares, and calculates a Laval difference value calculation formula based on at least t private shares passing the verification to obtain the trapdoor private key.
Further, step 2 specifically includes:
step 2.11: the block chain capable of being cut positions a block of the operation area to be cut, and deletes the transaction to be deleted in the block body of the block to obtain an updated block;
step 2.12: the new message for updating the block obtained in step 2.11 is calculated.
The embodiment is mainly used for deleting the transaction of the block in the block, namely, realizing the clipping of the transaction in the block.
For blocks to delete transactionsB i Deleting the transaction to be deleted, regenerating a Merkle tree, and calculating to obtain the message value of the block body after deleting the transactionx i '。
In particular, for blocks
Wherein
Is updated to
To maintain
Does not change, does not affect the normal link of the subsequent blocks, and needs to be updated
The value is obtained. By chameleon hash functions
The function being updated, i.e.
New block after modification
Reuse the new block
Substitution
The position in the blockchain.
Further, in the above-mentioned case,
the step 3 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 3.11: the system management node calculates to obtain a hash value according to the system public key and the information and the random number of the cutting block head in the step 2;
step 3.12: the system management node verifies whether the hash value and the random number are effective hash pairs of the message according to the message of the cutting block head, the random number and the hash value calculated in the step 3.11;
step 3.13: if the verification in the step 3.12 is passed, the system management node takes the trapdoor private key obtained in the step 1, the hash value obtained in the step 3.11, the new message obtained in the step 2.12, the message of the cutting block head and the random number as input to obtain a new random number;
step 3.14: and the system management node updates the new message obtained in the step 2.12 and the new random number obtained in the step 3.13 to the head of the cutting block.
Further, the chameleon hash function model includes:
the secret key generation module: the system is used for outputting a public key and a trap door private key according to the security parameters;
a hash calculation module: the hash value is output according to the public key, the message and the random number;
a verification calculation module: the message, the hash value and the random number are used as input to verify whether the hash value and the random number are effective hash pairs for the message;
and the collision calculation module is used for taking the trap door private key, the message, the random number, the hash value and the new message as input when the verification is passed, and outputting the new random number.
Further, in step 2.1, the calculation formula of the private share in the trapdoor private key is as follows:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is a t-1 degree polynomial on the finite field GF (p) and satisfies
(ii) a tk is a trap door private key, j is the jth node, n is the total number of nodes in the blockchain network, j =1,2,3, … n; p is a large prime number, q is a large prime factor of p-1, mod refers to the mod function. Simultaneously disclosing functions
Promise of coefficients of
Wherein a isi= parameters of the polynomial equation,
。
further, in step 2.3 and step 2.4, it is verified whether the secret share is correct by the following formula:
wherein g is a q-order element and p is a large prime number，tkjIs a private share of the jth node.
Specifically, the number of nodes in the blockchain network is n, and the threshold value of the synthesizable trapdoor is t, where t is less than or equal to n and can be set by the system management node. In step 2.1, the calculated trapdoor private key is divided into a plurality of private shares based on a verifiable secret sharing algorithm, and the trapdoor private key can be synthesized from the plurality of shares, and simultaneously the following two requirements are met:
(1) verifiability: after receiving a secret share, the user can test whether it is a valid share. If a share is valid, there is a unique secret as the output of the secret reconstruction algorithm, which acts on any t valid shares.
(2) Unpredictability: for the polynomial time algorithm, t-1 secret shares are input, and no information about the secret can be obtained.
The verifiable secret sharing model is mainly composed of four parts: system parameters, secret distribution, authentication algorithms, and secret reconstruction.
(1) System parameters: p is a large prime number, q is a large prime factor of p-1, g is a q-order element, the triplet (p, q, g) is public, t is a threshold value, n is the number of participants, s is the secret to be shared, and the secret space and the share space are both finite fields gf (p). Firstly selecting safety parameters, selecting prime number q according to the safety parameters, and selecting a GDH group G with generation element G of order q, wherein the system public parameters are paramtch = { G, q, G }.
(2) Secret distribution: randomly select one
On
Polynomial of degree
Satisfy the following requirements
Then calculate the secret shares
And sent to the participants in secret, wherein
Simultaneously disclosing functions
Promise of coefficients of
，aiDisclosing functions for polynomials
I =0,1,2 … t-1; wherein
Mod is a mod function.
(3) And (3) verification algorithm: each participant verifies after receiving the secret share
And if the secret share is not correct, the share is valid, otherwise, the received secret share is incorrect.
(4) Secret reconstruction: when in use
A participant
Each participant when collaborating to recover secrets
Disclose his share
To other collaborators, each collaboratorThe validity of the secret shares is judged by executing a verification algorithm. Polynomial function calculated by Lagrange difference formula
Finally, calculating the function value
I.e. secret
。
In this embodiment, the trapdoor private key is the secret to be shared.
Example 3:
the present embodiment discloses a method for cutting a cuttable block chain ledger, which is used to implement cutting of the cuttable block chain ledger structure described in embodiment 1, wherein the main steps are the same as those in embodiment 2, and the difference is as follows:
1）
the step 2 specifically comprises the following steps:
step 2.21: the block chain capable of being cut positions and deletes the blocks of the operation area to be cut;
step 2.22: the tailorable block chain locates the previous and next blocks of the deleted block.
This embodiment is mainly used to delete the whole block in a large block chain. Instead of deleting a particular transaction, to delete a block
Requiring modification of the block
So that it can be associated with the block
And (5) normal linking.
When a block is to be deleted
For block
Need to be provided with
Is modified into
To maintain
Does not change, does not affect the normal link of the subsequent blocks, and needs to be updated
The value: by chameleon hash functions
The function being updated, i.e.
New block after modification
Deleting block
Then, the new block is reused
Substitution
The position in the blockchain.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention, and not to limit the same; while the invention has been described in detail and with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that: the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments may still be modified, or some or all of the technical features may be equivalently replaced; and the modifications or the substitutions do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions depart from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims (11)
1. A collision calculation method of chameleon hash function is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
and (3) generating a hash key: calculating based on a public parameter, a secret key generation algorithm and a verifiable secret sharing algorithm to obtain a system public key and n private shares, wherein at least t private shares in the n private shares can be calculated based on a secret reconstruction algorithm to obtain a trapdoor private key;
and (3) Hash calculation: calculating to obtain a chameleon hash value according to the system public key, the message and the chameleon random number corresponding to the message, and verifying whether the hash value and the chameleon random number are effective hash pairs for the message book;
and (3) collision calculation: and calculating Hash collision based on the obtained trap door private key, the message, the random number, the Hash value and the new message, and deducing a new chameleon random number meeting the collision through a collision calculation result.
2. The chameleon hash function collision calculation method according to claim 1, wherein the public parameter generation step specifically includes: firstly, selecting a safety parameter, selecting a prime number q according to the safety parameter, and selecting a GDH group G with a generation element G with the order of q, wherein a system public parameter is paramtch = { G, q, G }.
3. The method for calculating collision of chameleon hash function according to claim 2, wherein in the key generating step, each private share is calculated based on the following formula:
wherein tk is the trap door private key, tkjSection jA secret share of a point, j being the jth node, n being the total number of nodes in the blockchain network, j =1,2,3, … n;
and satisfy
(ii) a p is a big prime number, and q is a big prime factor of p-1; mod is a mod function.
4. The chameleon hash function collision calculation method according to claim 3,
in the key generation step, whether the private share for synthesizing the trapdoor private key is correct is verified, and the trapdoor private key is obtained by calculation based on the correct private share and a secret reconstruction algorithm; verifying the secret share for synthesizing the trapdoor private key based on the following formula:
wherein g is a q-order element, p is a large prime number, tkjIs a private share of the jth node;
，aidisclosing functions for polynomials
I =0,1,2 … t-1; mod is a mod function.
5. A tailorable block chain ledger structure is characterized in that the collision calculation method based on the chameleon hash function of any one of claims 1 to 4 is realized, and comprises a plurality of blocks, wherein each block comprises a block head and a block body which are in one-to-one correspondence; the block body stores transaction information of the block; the block header comprises a hash value, a message, a nonce value and a random number; the hash value is a chameleon hash value of a previous block, and is used for forming a chain structure with the previous block, and so on until the hash value is linked to the initial block; the message is calculated by the transaction information; the random number and the hash value are hash pairs based on a chameleon hash function.
6. A clipping method of a cuttable block chain ledger book is characterized by being realized based on the chameleon hash function collision calculation method of any one of claims 1 to 4, and comprising the following steps:
step 1: the system management node initiates trapdoor verification and synthesis based on the chameleon hash function, and obtains a system public key and a trapdoor private key under the cooperation of at least t nodes;
step 2: the system management node performs cutting operation on the block of the area to be cut, and calculates to obtain a new message of the block after the cutting operation;
and step 3: and the system management node modifies the block head of the cuttable block chain cutting operation area in the step 2 based on the system public key and the trapdoor private key obtained in the step 1, so that blocks before and after the operation area can form a chain structure through the hash value.
7. The method for clipping the block chain ledger of claim 6, wherein the step 1 specifically comprises:
step 1.1: the system management node outputs a public key and a trapdoor private key based on a chameleon hash function, wherein the trapdoor private key is a plurality of private shares obtained based on a verifiable secret sharing algorithm;
step 1.2: the system management node distributes the plurality of private shares obtained in the step 1.1 to a plurality of nodes one by one;
step 1.3: the node receives the private shares distributed in the step 1.2, verifies whether the private shares are valid or not, and returns the private shares to the system management node when the private shares are verified to be valid;
step 1.4: and the system management node receives and verifies the returned private shares, and calculates a Laval difference value calculation formula based on at least t private shares passing the verification to obtain the trapdoor private key.
8. The method for clipping the block chain ledger of claim 7, wherein the step 2 specifically includes:
step 2.11: the block chain capable of being cut positions a block of the operation area to be cut, and deletes the transaction to be deleted in the block body of the block to obtain an updated block;
step 2.12: the new message for updating the block obtained in step 2.11 is calculated.
9. The method for clipping the block chain ledger of claim 8, wherein step 3 specifically includes:
step 3.11: the system management node calculates to obtain a hash value according to the system public key and the information and the random number of the cutting block head in the step 2;
step 3.12: the system management node verifies whether the hash value and the random number are effective hash pairs of the message according to the message of the cutting block head, the random number and the hash value calculated in the step 3.11;
step 3.13: if the verification in the step 3.12 is passed, the system management node takes the trapdoor private key obtained in the step 1, the hash value obtained in the step 3.11, the new message obtained in the step 2.12, the message of the cutting block head and the random number as input to obtain a new random number;
step 3.14: and the system management node updates the new message obtained in the step 2.12 and the new random number obtained in the step 3.13 to the head of the cutting block.
10. The method for clipping the block chain ledger of claim 6, wherein the step 2 specifically includes:
step 2.21: the block chain capable of being cut positions and deletes the blocks of the operation area to be cut;
step 2.22: the tailorable block chain locates the previous and next blocks of the deleted block.
11. The method for clipping a clipable blockchain ledger according to any one of claims 6 to 10, wherein the chameleon hash function model includes:
the secret key generation module: the system is used for outputting a public key and a trap door private key according to the security parameters;
a hash calculation module: the hash value is output according to the public key, the message and the random number;
a verification calculation module: the message, the hash value and the random number are used as input to verify whether the hash value and the random number are effective hash pairs for the message;
and the collision calculation module is used for taking the trap door private key, the message, the random number, the hash value and the new message as input when the verification is passed, and outputting the new random number.
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