CN112636911A - Non-networking equipment tap value variable function sequence password generation mode - Google Patents
Non-networking equipment tap value variable function sequence password generation mode Download PDFInfo
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- CN112636911A CN112636911A CN202110006002.1A CN202110006002A CN112636911A CN 112636911 A CN112636911 A CN 112636911A CN 202110006002 A CN202110006002 A CN 202110006002A CN 112636911 A CN112636911 A CN 112636911A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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Abstract
The invention discloses a generation mode of a tap value variable function sequence password of non-networking equipment, which comprises the following steps: the non-networked devices preset or initialize a plurality of groups of multi-bit random arrays, a plurality of groups of bit value formulas, the method comprises the steps of selecting numerical values of a plurality of groups of random array positions corresponding to each numerical value according to a receiving storage position, selecting an arithmetic operation according to a receiving storage position jump position, operating a unit numerical value according to an execution sequence numerical value receiving storage position, and intercepting a new password by the jump position.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a generation mode of a tap value variable function sequence password of non-networking equipment, belonging to the field of data processing.
Background
However, small devices which are low in cost and convenient to move cannot meet the more and more sharing use requirements under the condition of not being provided with the networking, or fixed passwords or fixed personnel use.
Disclosure of Invention
Based on this, the invention provides a method for generating a tap value variable function sequence password by checking password authentication and sharing for equipment without networking conditions, which comprises the following steps:
presetting or user initializing multiple groups of random arrays by the equipment storage chip, presetting multiple groups of bit value arithmetic expressions and equipment ID, presetting extension storage bits and presetting ordinal storage bits;
the first time, the first array is used, and the back 3-bit attached value of the first array is taken to connect the storage bits;
taking values according to corresponding positions of multiple groups of random arrays corresponding to each corresponding numerical value of each connecting storage bit;
selecting an equation according to the value of the connecting storage bit;
substituting a dynamic formula selected based on the connected storage bits into the selected dynamic numerical value, and generating long-string numbers after operation;
according to the bit value of the product of the connecting storage bit and the execution times, the long string of adjacent 6 bits of the number are intercepted by the skip bit to be used as a new password;
and if the equipment comparison is correct, the connecting storage bit is updated to the last 3 bits of the long string of numbers generated after operation, the ordinal number is added with 1, a confirmation check code is returned, and if the equipment comparison is incorrect, check code information containing the connecting storage bit and the ordinal number is returned.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent, the present application is further described in detail below with reference to examples. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application.
In one example, in example 1, a simple 4-array 4-algorithm single-channel tap value-variable function tap sequence password generation method is used, 4 multi-bit random arrays are preset, and 4-algorithm devices ID. are synchronized to a cloud host.
a1=325199034326 (random 12 bit array)
a2=013462923639
a3=812734378928
a4=457651834879
Formula S1= (a2k1 × 100+ a3k3+ i) (a3k1 × 10000+ a1k2+ a1k2) ((a 1k1+ a1k2+ a1k2) + a4k1+ a4k2+ a4k3+ i)
S2=(a2k1*100+a1k3+i)*(a2k1*10000+a2k2+a1k2)*(a1k1+a3k2+a1k2)+a4k1+a4k2+a4k3+i
S3=(a1k1*100+a1k3+i)*(a2k1*10000+a2k2+a1k3)*(a3k1+a3k2+a1k2)+a4k1+a4k2+a4k3+i
S4=(a3k1*100+a2k3+i)*(a1k1*10000+a2k1+a1k1)*(a3k1+a3k2+a1k2)+a4k1+a4k2+a4k3+i
The first array's last 3 attached values, k =326, are taken after the device is first used or reset and synchronized to the cloud host based on the device ID, k =326, then k1=3 is taken for its hundred bits, k2=2 is taken for its ten bits, k3=6 is taken for its one bit,
corresponding to the 3 rd bit a1k1=5 a1 of the array a1, the 2 nd bit a1k2=2 a1, the 6 th bit a1k3=9
Corresponding to the 3 rd bit a2k1=3 a2 of the array a2, the 2 nd bit a2k2=1 a2, the 6 th bit a2k3=2
Corresponding to the 3 rd bit a3k1=2 a3 of the array a3, the 2 nd bit a3k2=1 a3, the 6 th bit a3k3=4
Corresponding to the 3 rd bit a4k1=7 a4 of the array a4, the 2 nd bit a4k2=5 a4, the 6 th bit a4k3=1
Assuming the evaluation function is the tap bit 6, divide by 2 by exactly 3 and evaluate S3
S3=(a1k1*100+a1k3+i)*(a2k1*10000+a2k2+a1k3)*(a3k1+a3k2+a1k2)+a4k1+a4k2+a4k3+i
Assuming that the current execution ordinal i is 622
S3=(5*100+9+622)*(3*10000+1+9)*(2+1+2)+7+5+1+622
S3=169707185
The tap store bit and execution times product 622 x 326 bits is 2
S3=169707185 new cipher obtained by intercepting the 2 nd bit and the last 5 th bit
697071
If the verification is correct, 3 bits 185 after S3=169707185 are stored as a dragon-connected storage bit, an execution ordinal i is added with 1 to be equal to 623, k =185 and the ordinal 623 are returned, a1 is taken, and a2 tail number is generated into a long character string confirmation code.
If the verification is wrong, prompting to check the equipment number and returning k =326 and ordinal 622 and taking a1, a2, a3 and a4
Generating long character string check code by tail number
Example 2 factor of safety requirement, increase to 10 random arrays, and 10 equations, 10 channels (e.g., multiple cabinet doors of a receiving cabinet)
Presetting 10 12-bit array
a1=325199034710 a2=345822078180 a3=341345797422
a4=013462923639 a5=234536680122 a6=231075656354
a7=812734378928 a8=133479764542 a9=678243243658
a10=457651834631
Presetting 10 channels corresponding to 10 connecting storage bits and 10 ordinal storage bits
If the current channel 10 takes the 10 th array and then the 3 th additional value storage bit k =631, the execution ordinal i =1 is assumed
k first bit k1= 6k second bit k2= 2k third bit k3=1
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a1k1=9 a1 of the array a1, the 2 nd bit a1k2=2 a1, the 1 st bit a1k3=3
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a2k1=2 a2 of the array a2, the 2 nd bit a2k2=4 a2, the 1 st bit a2k3=3
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a3k1=5 a3 of the array a3, the 2 nd bit a3k2=4 a3, the 1 st bit a3k3=3
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a4k1=2 a4 of the array a4, the 2 nd bit a4k2=1 a4, the 1 st bit a4k3=0
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a5k1=6 a5 of the array a5, the 2 nd bit a5k2=3 a5, the 1 st bit a5k3=2
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a6k1=5 a6 of the array a6, the 2 nd bit a6k2=3 a6, the 1 st bit a6k3=2
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a7k1=4 a7 of the array a7, the 2 nd bit a7k2=1 a7, the 1 st bit a7k3=8
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a8k1=9 a8 of the array a8, the 2 nd bit a8k2=3 a8, the 1 st bit a8k3=1
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a9k1=3 a9 of the array a9, the 2 nd bit a9k2=7 a9, the 1 st bit a9k3=6
Corresponding to the 6 th bit a10k1=1 a10 of the array a10, the 2 nd bit a10k2=5 a10, the 1 st bit a10k3=4
k =631 the leading value is 6
Then the equation s6 is calculated
s1=(a1k1*10+a1k3+i)*(a2k1*10+a2k2+a1k3)*(a3k1*1000+a3k2+a1k2)*a9k1+a9k2+ank3+i
s2=(a2k2*10+a1k3+i)*(a3k1*10+a4k2+a1k3)*(a4k1*1000+a4k2+a3k2)*a9k1+a9k2+ank3+i
...s6=(a6k2*10+a1k3+i)*(a7k1*10+a4k2+a1k3)*(a8k1*1000+a4k2+a3k2)*a9k1
*a9k2*a9k3*i
s6=(3*10+3+1)*(4*10+1+3)*(9*1000+1+4)*3*7*6*1
s6=1697406480
16974064801697406480 superimposed double length s6 character string
According to the product 631 of the storage bit and the execution times of the channel 10, the 1 st bit is cut out by the 1 jump bit of the end bit value of 631 and 1, and then the continuous 6 bits are used as a new password
169740
User inputs 10#169740 comparison password
If the verification is correct, the k value 480 of the new channel 10 at the position 3 bits after s6=1697406480 is stored and the execution times of the channel is added by 1 to be 2
If the verification is wrong, prompting to check the device number and return the original k value 631 of the channel and the ordinal value and take the tail number of a1,
a2 end mantissa a3 end number generates a long string check 631+0+0+2+1000 character concatenation 1+0+0+2
163303
After the host computer obtains the check code, the correct password can be recalculated according to the user authority and the corresponding array sum formula so as to verify the phenomenon that the data which is not used by the user is asynchronous when the user obtains the password.
Claims (5)
1. A method for generating a tap change value variable function sequence password of non-networked equipment comprises the following steps:
presetting or initializing a plurality of groups of random arrays and a plurality of groups of bit value arithmetic expressions by the equipment memory chip;
the first time, the first array is used, and the back 3-bit attached value of the first array is taken to connect the storage bits;
taking values according to corresponding positions of multiple groups of random arrays corresponding to each corresponding numerical value of each connecting storage bit;
selecting an equation according to the connecting storage value;
substituting a dynamic formula selected based on the connected storage bits into the selected dynamic numerical value, and generating long-string numbers after operation;
according to the execution times and the product of the tap storage bits and the bit value, 6 adjacent bits of the long string of numbers are intercepted by bit skipping to serve as a new password;
and after the cloud host authenticates the authority, the password is acquired, if the comparison is correct, the equipment executes the operation command, updates the connecting and storing value, adds 1 to the update execution ordinal number, and if the comparison is incorrect, returns the verification information.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein values are taken for corresponding positions of the plurality of sets of random arrays according to corresponding values of each bit of the tap memory bits.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the formula is selected based on a tap bit value.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the selected dynamic formula of the tap memory location is substituted into the selected dynamic numerical value, a long string of numbers is generated after operation, and a partial long string of number segments are intercepted based on the product of the execution times and the tap memory location to generate the sequence cipher.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the verification password updates the tap storage bit if correct, and returns the confirmation code information, and if the verification password is incorrect, returns the execution times of the array value encryption and the tap storage bit composite check code information.
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