CN112615670A - Method for judging terahertz communication eavesdropping - Google Patents
Method for judging terahertz communication eavesdropping Download PDFInfo
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- CN112615670A CN112615670A CN202011461909.9A CN202011461909A CN112615670A CN 112615670 A CN112615670 A CN 112615670A CN 202011461909 A CN202011461909 A CN 202011461909A CN 112615670 A CN112615670 A CN 112615670A
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- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 32
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 12
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 7
- 230000000903 blocking effect Effects 0.000 description 5
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011835 investigation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000035945 sensitivity Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000002834 transmittance Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003313 weakening effect Effects 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/50—Transmitters
- H04B10/516—Details of coding or modulation
- H04B10/54—Intensity modulation
- H04B10/541—Digital intensity or amplitude modulation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/07—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems
- H04B10/075—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems using an in-service signal
- H04B10/079—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems using an in-service signal using measurements of the data signal
- H04B10/0795—Performance monitoring; Measurement of transmission parameters
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/07—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems
- H04B10/075—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems using an in-service signal
- H04B10/079—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems using an in-service signal using measurements of the data signal
- H04B10/0795—Performance monitoring; Measurement of transmission parameters
- H04B10/07953—Monitoring or measuring OSNR, BER or Q
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/50—Transmitters
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/50—Transmitters
- H04B10/516—Details of coding or modulation
- H04B10/54—Intensity modulation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/60—Receivers
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/90—Non-optical transmission systems, e.g. transmission systems employing non-photonic corpuscular radiation
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- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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- Optics & Photonics (AREA)
- Optical Communication System (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a method for judging that terahertz communication is intercepted, which comprises the following steps: the method is used in a terahertz communication system and utilizes backscattering parameters to judge whether eavesdropping exists or not; first a backscattering parameter S is defined180To quantify the magnitude of the change, S, when there are no small objects in the line-of-sight transmitted beam180The channel is considered secure at 0. When there is a small object in the line-of-sight transmitted beam, S180>And 0, presetting a threshold value according to the specific condition of the communication system, and regarding that the communication system has wiretapping once the backscattering parameter is higher than the threshold value. The invention has the advantages that: the method is used as an index for judging whether the terahertz communication environment is safe. Greatly improving terahertz communicationThe security of the system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of terahertz communication eavesdropping prevention, in particular to a method for judging terahertz communication eavesdropping.
Background
The openness of the wireless channel easily causes the key to be easily intercepted in the distribution and exchange processes of the key, so that the method for maintaining the information security by adopting the key encryption technology faces a great challenge.
Terahertz communication is one of the key technologies of 6G mobile communication, and has important national strategic significance. It is expected that in the near future, data such as personal privacy, financial data, business information and even data related to national security can be transmitted through the terahertz communication system, which makes the confidentiality thereof one of the key problems to be solved urgently in future wireless communication. Few research works for the safety of the terahertz communication physical layer at home and abroad are carried out, and no related prior art is provided yet.
The millimeter-wave band with narrow beams and high directivity characteristics is generally considered to be more secure and less vulnerable to eavesdropping than the conventional band used for communication. However, international team research led by professor Edward Knightly at rice university in the united states showed that: if a small object capable of reflecting signals exists in the transmission beam, the physical layer security of the millimeter wave communication link is seriously threatened, and a eavesdropping receiver outside the beam can successfully decode the transmitted information through the part of the signals reflected by the object.
In the face of potential security threats, the team proposes to use the signal blocking rate of the receiving end to detect whether there is eavesdropping, which is defined as follows:
wherein S isreceiverIs the actual received signal strength, S, of the receiveroptimalIs the received signal strength in an ideal case. According to the expression of the signal shielding rate, when no shielding object exists in the transmission beam, the signal shielding rate is 0; when the shielding object exists, the signal shielding rate is greater than zero; when the signal is completely occluded, the signal occlusion ratio will be 1. According to actual needs, an occlusion rate threshold value (which should be within the (0,1) interval) may be artificially preset, and once the detected signal occlusion rate is greater than the threshold value, the link may be considered unsafe, i.e. there is eavesdropping.
In the face of a complex communication link environment, it is not enough to simply utilize the signal blocking rate detected by the receiving end to perform eavesdropping investigation, because the signal blocking rate is only related to the signal strength of the receiving end, under many circumstances, such as: the effective shielding area of the small object is far smaller than the transmission area of the wave beam, the transmittance of the small object to the electromagnetic wave of the transmission frequency band is high, the small object generates diffraction phenomenon at the edge due to the shape of the small object, and the like.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention provides a method for judging the eavesdropping of the terahertz communication, and solves the defects in the prior art.
In order to realize the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a method for judging that terahertz communication is intercepted comprises the following steps: judging whether eavesdropping exists or not by utilizing backscattering parameters in a terahertz communication system;
first a backscattering parameter S is defined180To quantify the magnitude of the change, the backscattering parameter (S)180) The expression of (a) is as follows:
wherein,
is the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received at the transmitter in the absence of a small object,
is the signal-to-noise ratio at the transmitter in the presence of small objects.
When there is no small object in the line-of-sight transmitted beam, S180The channel is considered secure at 0.
When there is a small object in the line-of-sight transmitted beam, S180>0, presetting a threshold value according to the specific condition of the communication system, wherein the threshold value range is 0-1, and once the backscattering parameter is detectedAbove the threshold, the communication system is deemed to be eavesdropping.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that:
the backscattering parameter is influenced by the scattering phenomenon of a small object and can be used as an index for judging whether the terahertz communication environment is safe or not. Because the principle of the terahertz wave shielding device is different from the signal shielding rate, the backscattering parameter can be simultaneously applied with the signal shielding rate, the defect of the signal shielding rate is made up, and the safety of the terahertz wave communication system is improved to a great extent.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a terahertz communication link diagram according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings by way of examples.
Fig. 1 shows a terahertz communication link with eavesdropping, which consists of a transmitter, two receivers and a small object, wherein the transmitter and the receivers transmit information through a line-of-sight link, and a small object capable of reflecting or flashing part of the signal to the eavesdropping receiver exists in a transmission beam, so that a non-line-of-sight eavesdropping channel is generated, and the eavesdropping receiver can acquire the transmitted information through the channel.
The transmitter section consisted of a waveguide coupled horn antenna and a dielectric lens (5 cm diameter, 7.5cm focal length), the transmitter carrier frequency was 200GHz, the measured far field beam pattern directivity was 34dBi, and the transmitter corresponded to a divergence angle of approximately 4 °. The transmitter signal is modulated using an Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) pulse generator at a transmission rate of 1 Gbit/s. The technical scheme requires that the transmitting terminal equipment is a terahertz signal source with transmitting and receiving functions. The legitimate receiving and eavesdropping receivers use the exact same horn antenna and dielectric lens and therefore their sensitivity is the same. The signal detected by the receiver is amplified and analyzed in real time using a bit error rate tester.
According to the communication model, small objects in the transmission beam can block part of signals, which can cause the weakening of the signal strength at the receiver end, however, the signal blocking rate at the receiving end is not well suitable for various eavesdropping scenes. In the terahertz frequency band (0.1-10 THz), the scattering phenomenon plays a leading role, and the important characteristic is that terahertz waves scattered by a small object can be transmitted to all directions in the space. Once the eavesdropper adopts the periscopic eavesdropping method, part of the signal is necessarily scattered by a small object to the direction of the transmitter. Meanwhile, part of signals are reflected back to the direction of the receiver along a line-of-sight link by the surface of the horn antenna of the receiver, and if small objects which work in cooperation with the eavesdropping receiver exist in the wave beam, the reflected part of signals are shielded to a certain degree. In view of the above two factors, the existence of eavesdropping will cause the received signal strength at the transmitter to change, and when the scattered signal is strong, the received signal strength at the transmitter will increase, and conversely when the blocking signal is more, the signal strength at that location will decrease.
Based on the change in signal strength at the transmitter, we define a backscattering parameter (S)180) To quantify the magnitude of the change as an effective indicator for eavesdropping detection. Scattering parameter (S)180) The expression of (a) is as follows:
wherein,
is the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received at the transmitter in the absence of a small object,
is the signal-to-noise ratio at the transmitter in the presence of small objects. When there is no small object in the line-of-sight transmitted beam, S180The channel may be considered secure at 0. When there is a small object in the line-of-sight transmitted beam, S180>0, we can preset a threshold value according to the specific situation of the communication system(e.g., S)180>0.5) that we would consider the communication system to be eavesdropping once the backscattering parameter is above the threshold.
The scattering phenomenon of the terahertz frequency band is fully considered, and the back scattering parameter is an effective index for detecting eavesdropping.
It will be appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that the examples described herein are intended to assist the reader in understanding the manner in which the invention is practiced, and it is to be understood that the scope of the invention is not limited to such specifically recited statements and examples. Those skilled in the art can make various other specific changes and combinations based on the teachings of the present invention without departing from the spirit of the invention, and these changes and combinations are within the scope of the invention.
Claims (1)
1. A method for judging that terahertz communication is intercepted comprises the following steps: judging whether eavesdropping exists or not by utilizing backscattering parameters in a terahertz communication system;
first a backscattering parameter S is defined180To quantify the magnitude of the change, the backscattering parameter (S)180) The expression of (a) is as follows:
wherein,
is the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received at the transmitter in the absence of a small object,
is the signal-to-noise ratio at the transmitter with a small object;
when there is no small object in the line-of-sight transmitted beam, S180When the channel is equal to 0, the channel is considered to be safe;
when there is a small object in the line-of-sight transmitted beam, S180>And 0, presetting a threshold value according to the specific condition of the communication system, wherein the threshold value range is 0-1, and once the backscattering parameter is higher than the threshold value, the communication system is determined to have wiretapping.
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Citations (4)
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20140198973A1 (en) * | 2013-01-15 | 2014-07-17 | Capital Normal University | Terahertz temporal and spatial resolution imaging system, imaging method and application thereof |
| US20170155496A1 (en) * | 2012-05-13 | 2017-06-01 | Amir Keyvan Khandani | Full duplex wireless transmission with channel phase-based encryption |
| CN110662219A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-07 | 上海交通大学 | DA-APH modulation-based secret communication method and system |
| CN110855373A (en) * | 2019-10-09 | 2020-02-28 | 广东工业大学 | Anti-eavesdropping device and method for optical fiber communication system |
-
2020
- 2020-12-10 CN CN202011461909.9A patent/CN112615670A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20170155496A1 (en) * | 2012-05-13 | 2017-06-01 | Amir Keyvan Khandani | Full duplex wireless transmission with channel phase-based encryption |
| US20140198973A1 (en) * | 2013-01-15 | 2014-07-17 | Capital Normal University | Terahertz temporal and spatial resolution imaging system, imaging method and application thereof |
| CN110662219A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-07 | 上海交通大学 | DA-APH modulation-based secret communication method and system |
| CN110855373A (en) * | 2019-10-09 | 2020-02-28 | 广东工业大学 | Anti-eavesdropping device and method for optical fiber communication system |
Non-Patent Citations (4)
| Title |
|---|
| CHIA-YI YEH ET AL: "Feasibility of Passive Eavesdropping in Massive MIMO:An Experimental Approach", 《IEEE》 * |
| DANIEL STEINMETZER ET AL: "Eavesdropping with Periscopes:Experimental Security Analysis of Highly Directional Millimeter Waves", 《IEEE》 * |
| WEIJUN GAO ET AL: "Distance-Adaptive Absorption-Peak Hopping (DA-APH) Modulation for Terahertz Covert Communications", 《IEEE》 * |
| 达里宇舒·萨义德齐亚: "《太赫兹成像 传感及通信技术手册》", 30 May 2016 * |
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Application publication date: 20210406 |