CN112498664A - Flight control system and flight control method - Google Patents
Flight control system and flight control method Download PDFInfo
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- CN112498664A CN112498664A CN202011292473.5A CN202011292473A CN112498664A CN 112498664 A CN112498664 A CN 112498664A CN 202011292473 A CN202011292473 A CN 202011292473A CN 112498664 A CN112498664 A CN 112498664A
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
- B64C—AEROPLANES; HELICOPTERS
- B64C13/00—Control systems or transmitting systems for actuating flying-control surfaces, lift-increasing flaps, air brakes, or spoilers
- B64C13/24—Transmitting means
- B64C13/38—Transmitting means with power amplification
- B64C13/50—Transmitting means with power amplification using electrical energy
- B64C13/505—Transmitting means with power amplification using electrical energy having duplication or stand-by provisions
Abstract
The invention provides a flight control system and a flight control method. The flight control system is provided with: an operating device for providing operating instructions for the cockpit; a flight control device which receives a manipulation instruction and generates a control instruction for controlling an aircraft control surface according to the manipulation instruction; and a flight control actuation device for actuating the corresponding aircraft control surface according to the generated control command. The flight control device comprises an enhanced command control device, a basic command control device and a backup control device. When the basic instruction control equipment is effective, the backup control equipment participates in voting of the control instruction received from the control device and voting of the control instruction, and when the basic instruction control equipment fails, the backup control equipment generates the control instruction according to the control instruction and sends the generated control instruction to the flight control actuation device. Therefore, the backup control equipment can be ensured to accurately control the control surface of the airplane, and the continuous safe flight and landing of the airplane are realized.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of airplane flight control, in particular to a flight control system and a flight control method.
Background
Flight control systems are complex and critical systems on modern civil aircraft, and are critical to aircraft safety. At present, some form of backup device is used in the flight control system of a single-channel or double-channel civil passenger plane which is put into operation in the world. To prevent the prevention of maintaining a certain steering capability of the aircraft after the loss of all control electronics.
For example, a320 aircraft manufactured by airbus provides a certain yaw and pitch control capability for the aircraft by using a mechanical backup to keep the attitude of the aircraft stable for a short period of time after the fly-by-wire flight control system is completely lost until one of the 1 flight control computers in the fly-by-wire flight control system is restarted, by controlling the rudder and horizontal stabilizer of the aircraft by the pilot operating the pedals and hand wheel in the cockpit. The boeing B777 aircraft also employs a mechanical back-up similar to a320, with a pair of spoilers (4# and 11#) and a horizontal stabilizer controlled after loss of the fly-by-wire flight control system.
However, this form of backup for mechanical manipulation by the pilot is not very precise and is very challenging for the pilot's own ability to manipulate. For this reason, an electrical backup form is used in place of the mechanical backup form in the airbus series aircraft and the boeing series aircraft thereafter to provide a more accurate steering signal.
Since the above-described backup devices can only provide a low quality level of manoeuvring capability for manoeuvring a portion of the aircraft control surfaces, it is difficult to achieve the minimum acceptable control requirements of the flight control system. Therefore, the electric backup mode adopted in A380 and A350 released by the airbus company can provide the higher-quality-level control capability of controlling the control surfaces of the airplane in a mode of meeting the minimum acceptable control requirement, and even controlling all the control surfaces of the airplane, thereby realizing the continuous safe flight and landing of the airplane and greatly improving the safety margin.
However, such existing backup devices in the form of an electrical backup and meeting the minimum acceptable controlled configuration are basically started or allowed to enter the operating state after the fly-by-wire flight control system is completely lost, i.e. after all flight control computers have failed, so that there is a problem that it takes some time for the backup device to actually enter the operating state from the start, and therefore some valuable time for maintaining the stable attitude of the aircraft may be lost. In addition, such backup devices are not known as to the availability and correctness of instructions after being activated, and thus there is a problem that the accuracy of the control of the aircraft control surfaces by means of the backup device cannot be ensured.
Disclosure of Invention
The present invention has been made in view of the above problems, and an object thereof is to provide a flight control system and a flight control method that enable a backup control device to adopt a hot backup state and ensure availability and correctness of instructions for the backup control device.
In order to achieve the object, the present invention provides a flight control system including: the control device is used for providing control instructions of the cab; a flight control device that receives a steering command from the steering device and generates a control command for controlling an aircraft control surface based on the received steering command; and a flight control actuator that receives the control command generated by the flight control device and actuates the corresponding control surface of the aircraft according to the received control command, the flight control device including: the flight control system comprises an enhanced instruction control device capable of executing a normal mode control law, a basic instruction control device connected with the enhanced instruction control device and capable of executing a direct mode control law, and a backup control device connected with the basic instruction control device and capable of executing a backup mode control law, wherein when the basic instruction control device is effective, the backup control device participates in voting on the manipulation instruction received from the manipulation device and participates in voting on the control instruction, and when the basic instruction control device fails, the backup control device generates a control instruction according to the manipulation instruction received from the manipulation device and sends the generated control instruction to the flight control actuation device.
According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when the basic command control device is valid, the received manipulation command is voted by both the basic command control device and the backup control device, so as to vote a valid manipulation command.
According to a preferred mode of the present invention, in a case where the enhanced instruction control device is effective, the effective manipulation instruction is transmitted to the enhanced instruction control device by the basic instruction control device, a control instruction is generated from the received effective manipulation instruction by the enhanced instruction control device, and the generated control instruction is transmitted to the basic instruction control device and the backup control device, the received control instruction is resolved by the basic instruction control device and the backup control device respectively, and the control instructions resolved by the respective control instructions are voted together so as to vote out an effective control instruction, and/or in a case where the enhanced instruction control device fails, the control instruction is generated from the effective manipulation instruction by the basic instruction control device and the backup control device respectively, and votes on the generated control commands together to find out the effective control command.
According to a preferred mode of the invention, the flight control system further comprises a cross-linked system sensor for detecting flight state information including airspeed and angle of attack, the cross-linked system sensor being connected to the augmentation command control device, the augmentation command control device generating control commands based on active steering commands and flight state information received from the cross-linked system sensor in the event that the augmentation command control device is active.
According to a preferred mode of the invention, the flight control system further comprises a direct mode sensor for detecting flight status information including pitch angle rate, yaw angle rate, roll angle rate, and in case of failure of the augmentation command control device, the basic command control device generates control commands based on active steering commands and flight status information received from the direct mode sensor. In addition, in the case where the basic command control device fails, the backup control device generates a control command based on a manipulation command received from the manipulation device and flight state information received from a direct mode sensor.
According to a preferred aspect of the present invention, the augmentation instruction control apparatus includes a plurality of augmentation instruction computers connected to each other, each augmentation instruction computer being capable of generating a control instruction for all the aircraft control surfaces, the augmentation instruction control apparatus controls the operation of the aircraft control surfaces when both the augmentation instruction control apparatus and the basic instruction control apparatus are active, the augmentation instruction control apparatus continues to generate control instructions for all the aircraft control surfaces when one of the augmentation instruction computers fails, and the basic instruction control apparatus controls the operation of the aircraft control surfaces when all of the augmentation instruction computers fails.
According to a preferred aspect of the present invention, the basic command control device includes a plurality of basic command computers, each of the basic command computers generates a control command for only a part of the control surfaces of the aircraft, and all of the basic command computers are capable of generating a control command for all of the control surfaces of the aircraft, and when the augmentation command control device fails and the basic command control device is effective, the basic command control device controls the operation of the control surfaces of the aircraft, and when any 1 of the plurality of basic command computers fails, the other basic command computers continue to generate a control command for the part of the control surfaces of the aircraft so as to satisfy a minimum acceptable control configuration, and when all of the plurality of basic command computers fail, the backup control device controls the operation of the control surfaces of the aircraft.
According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the plurality of basic command computers are divided into a direct control command computer connected to a remote control device on any one aircraft control surface and directly controlling the remote control device, and an indirect control command computer not connected to the remote control device, and for any one of 1 set of the remote control devices, a control command is generated by the direct control command computer, and the generated control command is voted by the indirect control command computer.
According to a preferred aspect of the present invention, the backup control device comprises 1 backup computer connected to a portion of the aircraft control surfaces on the flight actuation device that satisfy the minimum acceptable control configuration, and capable of generating control commands for these aircraft control surfaces.
According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, an odd number of operating element sensors for detecting an operation of an operating element are provided on the operating device, and the operating element sensors are connected to the basic command control device and the backup control device, respectively. The steering device sensor may be a position signal sensor
According to a preferred aspect of the present invention, the flight control actuator device includes a plurality of actuators in a control surface of the aircraft and a plurality of remote control devices each controlling each of the actuators.
The remote control devices which are arranged aiming at the same airplane control surface are remote control devices with different models and non-similar designs.
According to a preferred mode of the invention, the flight control system further comprises energy means for powering said manoeuvring means, said augmentation command control device, said basic command control device and the flight control actuation means.
According to a preferred mode of the present invention, in a case where the basic instruction control device is active, when the number of times of manipulation instructions for participating in voting or control instructions that are erroneous instructions from the backup control device exceeds a prescribed threshold, the backup control device is restarted.
The invention also provides a flight control method, which is a method for performing flight control by using the flight control system.
According to the flight control system and the flight control method of the embodiment, the backup control device is always in the starting state in the flight process of the airplane, so that the airplane can immediately enter the backup mode executed by the backup control device when other flight control devices fail, and the time of the airplane in the uncontrollable state is greatly shortened. In addition, the backup control equipment always participates in voting on the control command from the control device and voting on the control command for controlling the control surface of the airplane, so that the usability and the correctness of the control command received by the backup control equipment and the generated control command can be verified, and therefore when other flight control equipment fails, the accuracy of controlling the control surface of the airplane by using the backup control equipment can be ensured, and the continuous safe flight and landing of the airplane can be realized.
Drawings
For a better understanding of the above and other objects, features, advantages and functions of the present invention, reference should be made to the preferred embodiments illustrated in the accompanying drawings. Like reference numerals in the drawings refer to like parts. It will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that the drawings are intended to illustrate preferred embodiments of the invention without any limiting effect on the scope of the invention, and that the various components in the drawings are not drawn to scale.
FIG. 1 is an architectural diagram schematically illustrating a flight control system of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram schematically showing a correspondence relationship between different control type computers and a flight control actuator in the basic command control apparatus of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a diagram schematically illustrating an aircraft control surface layout when the flight control system of the present invention is applied to a single-channel aircraft.
Wherein the reference numerals are as follows:
110 cockpit controls, 111 control device sensors, 120 flight controls,
121 enhanced instruction control device, 122 basic instruction control device, 123 backup control device,
130 flight control actuation devices, 131, 301 ailerons, 132, 302 elevators, 133, 303 rudders, 304 horizontal stabilizer, 140 energy control modules (energy devices), 150 other aircraft systems/sensors, 160 direct mode sensors, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224BCC, 2311L _ AIL _ REU1, 2312L _ AIL _ REU2, 2313R _ AIL _ REU1, 2314R _ AIL _ REU2, 2321 left aileron outer actuator, 2322 left aileron inner actuator, 2323 right aileron outer actuator, 2324 right aileron outer actuator.
Detailed Description
The inventive concept of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. What has been described herein is merely a preferred embodiment in accordance with the present invention and other ways of practicing the invention will occur to those skilled in the art and are within the scope of the invention.
(System architecture, flight control mode)
FIG. 1 is an architectural diagram schematically illustrating a flight control system of the present invention. The flight control system of the present invention includes: a cockpit manipulator 110 on which a plurality of manipulating devices are mounted and which provides corresponding manipulation commands via a plurality of manipulating device sensors 111 that detect manipulations of the manipulating devices, respectively; a flight control device 120 including an augmentation instruction control apparatus 121, a basic instruction control apparatus 122 connected to the augmentation instruction control apparatus 121, and a backup control apparatus 123 connected to the basic instruction control apparatus 122, the flight control device 120 receiving a manipulation instruction from the cockpit from the manipulation device sensor 111, and calculating and outputting a control instruction for controlling the control surface of the aircraft in conjunction with the aircraft state information; a flight control actuator 130 for receiving a control command from the flight control device 120 and operating a corresponding aircraft control surface including an aileron 131, an elevator 132, and a rudder 133; and an energy control module 140 for powering the flight control system.
In the present embodiment, the manipulation device sensor 111 is connected to the basic instruction control apparatus 122 and the backup control apparatus 123, respectively. When a pilot in the cockpit manipulates one of the above-described manipulating devices, for example, a steering wheel, a positional change of the steering wheel is detected via the manipulating device sensor 111, and a manipulation command based on the positional change is transmitted to the basic command control device 122 and the backup control device 123 in the flight control apparatus 120.
In the case where the basic instruction control device 122 is valid (i.e., no failure occurs), the basic instruction control device 122 and the backup control device 123 vote on the received manipulation instruction together, thereby voting out a valid manipulation instruction, which is sent to the enhanced instruction control device 121 via the basic instruction control device 122.
The augmentation command control device 121 is coupled to other aircraft systems/sensors 150 and is capable of obtaining interface signals (e.g., airspeed, angle of attack, etc.) from the other aircraft systems/sensors 150 that are associated with complex aircraft conditions. When the enhanced command control device 121 is enabled, a high-precision control command for controlling the control surface of the aircraft can be generated and output to the basic command control device 122 by performing the calculation of the complex and high-level normal mode control law on the basis of the acquired interface signal and the enabled steering command. The enhanced instruction control device 121 also outputs the generated control instruction to the backup control device 123 via a digital communication bus, not shown.
Then, the basic command control device 122 and the backup control device 123 respectively resolve the control commands from the augmentation command control device 121, and vote on the resolved control commands together, thereby voting out an effective control command, and then transmit the effective control command to the flight control actuation device 130 to control the operation of the corresponding aircraft control surface.
The above is a normal flight control mode executed by the flight control system in a case where both the augmentation command control apparatus 121 and the basic command control apparatus 122 in the flight control device 120 are effective.
In the event that the augmentation command control apparatus 121 fails (i.e., fails to operate), the flight control system enters the direct flight control mode if the basic command control apparatus 122 is active.
In this direct flight control mode, the primary command control device 122 and the backup control device 123 acquire primary aircraft state signals of pitch angle rate, yaw angle rate, roll angle rate, and the like, respectively, from the direct mode sensors 160 connected thereto. The basic command control device 122 performs calculation based on the direct mode control law according to the determined effective maneuvering commands and the acquired basic aircraft state signals and generates control commands for controlling the aircraft control surfaces, and the backup control device 123 also performs calculation based on the most basic backup mode control law according to the determined effective maneuvering commands and the acquired basic aircraft state signals and generates control commands for controlling the aircraft control surfaces. Thereafter, the basic command control device 122 and the backup control device 123 vote on the respective calculated control commands together to vote out an effective control command, and send the effective control command to the flight control actuation device 130 to control the action of the corresponding aircraft control surface.
In the event of a failure of the basic command control device 122, the flight control system enters a backup mode, regardless of whether the augmentation command control device 121 is active or not.
In this backup mode, the backup control device 123 performs a backup mode control law calculation in combination with the basic aircraft state signals from the direct mode sensor 160 for the steering commands from the cockpit controls 110 without performing any voting, and then generates and sends valid control commands to the flight control actuators 130 for controlling the aircraft control surfaces that meet the minimum acceptable control configuration.
(Components of the System)
Next, each component of the flight control system of the present invention is specifically described.
< flight control device >
The enhanced Command control device 121 includes X (X is an integer of 3 or more) enhanced Command control computers (ACC) and is 3 in the present embodiment. The ACCs are capable of bi-directionally transmitting and receiving data between each other via a digital communication bus, such as ARINC429, 1553B and CAN, etc., which preferably uses ARINC 429. Since all flight control surfaces can be controlled by 1 ACC to realize the normal flight control mode function of the flight control system, the ACCs can select any one working mode of a master-master (Active-Active), a master-Standby (Active-Standby) or a master-Standby (Active-Standby). In this embodiment, these ACCs preferably operate in a master-slave mode.
In addition, to eliminate the problem of common mode faults in conventional flight control systems, the ACC has a control channel and a supervisory channel that are not of similar design. The two channels can adopt two different microprocessor combinations, two different types of DSP combinations and two different types of PLD combinations. The two chips share one interface FPGA. The channels are physically separated from each other. The ACC executes calculation of the control instruction in the normal flight control mode through the control channel, and verifies the correctness of the instruction of the control channel through the monitoring channel.
When the flight control system is in a normal flight control mode, when the main control ACC detects an internal fault (such as a central processing unit and RAM fault), the main control ACC notifies the other two ACCs through a digital communication bus, and then the connection between the main control ACC and peripheral equipment is cut off, so that the main control ACC enters a failure state from a working state. Meanwhile, 1 standby ACC enters the working state from the standby state, but the other 1 remaining standby ACC remains in the standby state.
When the 2 nd working ACC detects the internal fault, the 1 st spare ACC is informed through the digital communication bus, and then the 2 nd working ACC is disconnected from the peripheral equipment to enter the failure state. And meanwhile, the last 1 standby ACC is switched into a working state from a standby state.
The control command transmitted from the enhancement command control device 121 to the basic command control device 122 includes command information indicating whether the control command is valid, for example, the control command transmitted from one of 1 valid ACCs in the enhancement command control device 121 to the basic command control device 122 includes command information "command valid", and the control command transmitted from one of 1 invalid ACC to the basic command control device 122 includes command information "command invalid". However, the present invention is not limited to this, and it may be configured such that when one ACC fails, the control command is not transmitted to the basic command control device 122.
When all of the 3 ACCs have a failure, the instruction information sent from any 1 ACC of the augmentation instruction control device 121 to the basic instruction control device 122 is "instruction invalid", that is, the control instruction is invalid, or the basic instruction control device 122 detects that the control instruction is not received from the augmentation instruction control device 121 after a prescribed time period has elapsed, at this time, the basic instruction control device 122 determines that the augmentation instruction control device 121 is invalid, causes the flight control system to enter the direct mode, and isolates all ACCs from the entire flight control system.
The Basic Command control device 122 includes Y Basic Command control computers (BCC) each having 4 or more Basic Command controllers (Y is an integer of 4 or more), and is 4 in the present embodiment. These BCCs control Remote control units (REU) provided on the control surface of the airplane, which will be described later, and are included in the different flight control actuators 130, respectively, and all REUs are controlled by 4 BCCs. Therefore, 4BCC must adopt a master-Active working mode.
The control structure of BCC is the same as ACC, and non-similarly designed control and supervisory channels are also used. Only a small number of signals used for verifying the truth of instructions are transmitted between a control channel and a monitoring channel in BCC in a crossed mode, physical isolation is carried out among branches, and each channel is powered by an independent power supply, so that the independence of the two channels is guaranteed, and therefore, the verification can be failed only when two independent faults occur simultaneously. The BCC performs a calculation of a control instruction from the enhanced instruction control device 121 in the normal flight control mode or a calculation of a control instruction directly in the direct flight control mode through the control channel and verifies the correctness of the instruction of the control channel through the monitoring channel.
Different BCCs are connected to different steering device sensors within the cockpit steering device 110. Therefore, since each BCC is associated with a different steering device sensor and a REU on the control surface of the aircraft corresponding to the steering command, when one of 1 of the 4 BCCs fails, the REU connected to the BCC and the actuator to be described later controlled by the REU become uncontrollable. However, in order to meet the minimum acceptable control of the aircraft, the system availability is increased by optimizing the configuration to ensure that a continuous safe flight and landing of the aircraft can still be achieved without partial loss of control of the BCC.
Each BCC provides discrete signals to the backup control device 123 via a digital communication bus (preferably using a CAN bus), a high level discrete signal of 28V is provided to the backup control device 123 when 1 BCC is operating normally, and a low level discrete signal of 0V is provided to the backup control device 123 when 1 BCC is failed, whereby the operational state of the basic command control device 122 is monitored by the backup control device 123, and when discrete signals received by the backup control device 123 from all BCCs are low, it is determined that all BCCs are failed, thereby putting the flight control system into backup mode.
In the present embodiment, the structure of all BCCs is exactly the same as the logic operation performed internally, and the mounting position and control object of each BCC are identified according to the pins of the BCC. The 4 BCCs are classified into direct control type BCCs connected to and directly controlling a REU on any one aircraft control surface and indirect control BCCs not connected to the REU. For one of 1 REU, the control instruction is generated by the direct control BCC connected to it, and the rest indirect control BCCs not connected to this REU are only used to vote on the generated control instruction. Details regarding the connection of different types of BCCs to the REU are explained later.
The Backup Control device 123 in the present embodiment includes 1 Backup Computer (BC) for short. The BC is provided with a control channel and a power module independent of the energy control module 140. The control channel is formed, for example, by an FPGA, via which control commands are acquired from a control device sensor connected to the BC.
The BC is connected to a respective one of the REUs provided by the flight actuation device 130 for controlling the actuators on each of all aircraft control surfaces that meet the minimum acceptable control configuration. Therefore, in case all BCCs of the basic command control device 122 fail, the pilot can still operate all control surfaces through the backup control device 123, i.e. through BC, to ensure continuous flight safety and landing of the aircraft.
< cockpit manipulating device >
The plurality of control devices mounted on the cab control device 110 include, for example, a steering column, a steering wheel, a foot rest, a horizontal stabilizer trim switch, a side lever, and the like. The plurality of manipulation device sensors 111 are, for example, sensors mounted inside the manipulation devices, but may be provided separately from the manipulation devices. An odd number of, for example, 5 or 7, manipulation device sensors are preferably installed for each manipulation device, and in the present embodiment, 5 manipulation device sensors are installed for each manipulation device, corresponding to 4 BCCs and 1 BC. These manipulation device sensors may be position signal sensors for detecting position signals, potentiometers, or photoelectric encoders, and in the present embodiment, the position signal sensors are selected as the manipulation device sensors.
In the present embodiment, 5 position signal sensors are attached to 4 BCCs and 1 BC as follows.
For example, in case the steering device is a steering wheel, 1 BCC is connected to the 1 st position signal sensor of the left steering wheel and also to the 1 st position signal sensor of the right steering wheel; 1 BCC is connected with a 2 nd position signal sensor of a left steering wheel and is also connected with a 2 nd position signal sensor of a right steering wheel; 1 BCC is connected with a3 rd position signal sensor of a left steering wheel and is also connected with a3 rd position signal sensor of a right steering wheel; 1 BCC is connected with a 4 th position signal sensor of a left steering wheel and is also connected with a 4 th position signal sensor of a right steering wheel; BC is connected with the 5 th position signal sensor of the left steering wheel and is also connected with the 5 th position signal sensor of the right steering wheel.
In the case that the manipulation device is a steering column, 1 BCC is connected with a 1 st position signal sensor of a left steering column and is also connected with a 1 st position signal sensor of a right steering column; 1 BCC is connected with a 2 nd position signal sensor of a left steering column and is also connected with a 2 nd position signal sensor of a right steering column; 1 BCC is connected with a3 rd position signal sensor of a left steering column and is also connected with a3 rd position signal sensor of a right steering column; 1 BCC is connected with a 4 th position signal sensor of a left steering column and also connected with a 4 th position signal sensor of a right steering column; BC is connected with the 5 th position signal sensor of the left steering column and is also connected with the 5 th position signal sensor of the right steering column.
Under the condition that the control device is a pedal, 1 BCC is connected with a 1 st position signal sensor of a left pedal and also connected with a 1 st position signal sensor of a right pedal; 1 BCC is connected with a 2 nd position signal sensor of a left pedal and is also connected with a 2 nd position signal sensor of a right pedal; 1 BCC is connected with a3 rd position signal sensor of a left pedal and is also connected with a3 rd position signal sensor of a right pedal; 1 BCC is connected with a 4 th position signal sensor of a left pedal and is also connected with a 4 th position signal sensor of a right pedal; BC connects the 5 th position signal sensor of the left foot support, and also connects the 5 th position signal sensor of the right foot support.
< flight control actuator >
The flight control actuation device 130 includes a plurality of REUs for each aircraft control surface such as the ailerons 131, the elevators 132, and the rudders 133, and a plurality of actuators controlled by each REU. Each REU receives control commands, including actuator position commands, velocity commands, from the BCC or BC via a digital communication bus (preferably using a CAN bus). The type of the actuator controlled by each REU is judged by identifying the installation position, so that corresponding control parameters are set.
In the present embodiment, as shown in fig. 2, the installation and connection of the REU will be described by taking the aileron control surface as an example. For example, when the flight control system according to the present embodiment is applied to a single-aisle aircraft, 4 REUs (2 REUs for each aileron) and their corresponding actuators are mounted on the control surfaces of the left and right ailerons, the 4 REUs being L _ AIL _ REU 12311, L _ AIL _ REU 22312, R _ AIL _ REU 12313, and R _ AIL _ REU 22314, respectively, and the actuators controlled by the 4 REUs being the left aileron outer actuator 2321, the left aileron inner actuator 2322, the right aileron inner actuator 2323, and the right ailer outer actuator 2324, respectively. For example, 1 BCC 2221 is connected to and controls L _ AIL _ REU 12311, 1 BCC 2222 is connected to and controls L _ AIL _ REU 22312, 1 BCC 2223 is connected to and controls R _ AIL _ REU 12313, and 1 BCC 2224 is connected to and controls R _ AIL _ REU 22314. As described above, BCCs are classified into a direct control class and an indirect control class, and in fig. 2, for the left flap, BCC 2221 and BCC 2222 are configured as direct control classes BCC, BCC 2223 and BCC 2224 directly connected to the left flap as indirect control classes BCC, while for the right flap, BCC 2223 and BCC 2224 are configured as direct control classes BCC directly connected to the right flap, and BCC 2221 and 2223 are configured as indirect control classes BCC.
Similarly, 4 REUs (2 REUs are mounted on each elevator on each side) and their corresponding actuators (not shown) are mounted on the left and right elevator control surfaces, and for the left elevator, the BCC 2221 and BCC 2222 are configured as direct control type BCCs, and the BCC 2223 and BCC 2224 are configured as indirect control type BCCs. For the right elevator, the BCC 2223 and BCC 2224 are configured as direct control type BCCs, and the BCC 2221 and BCC 2222 are called indirect control type BCCs.
As for the rudder, 3 REUs are attached to each of the three rudders, and thus, for any one rudder, for example, BCC 2221, BCC 2222, and BCC 2223 can be configured as a direct control type BCC, and BCC 2224 can be configured as an indirect control type BCC.
As described above, by classifying BCC into a direct control class and an indirect control class for each aircraft control surface, it is possible to sufficiently ensure the accuracy of the BCC in calculating control commands and the reliability of voting on effective control commands.
In addition, to support critical availability requirements, the flight control system in this embodiment employs two types of REUs, a type I REU and a type II REU, which are made up of complex electronics using dissimilar designs. Similarly, for the aileron control surface, the L _ AIL _ REU 12311 and the L _ AIL _ REU 22312 mounted on the left aileron use the type I REU and the type II REU, respectively, and the R _ AIL _ REU 12313 and the R _ AIL _ REU 22314 mounted on the right aileron use the type I REU and the type II REU, respectively. Because the plurality of actuators on each aircraft control surface receive control commands from different BCCs and are controlled by different types of REUs, the controllability of the aircraft can be improved, and the flight safety of the aircraft can be further ensured.
In addition, as described above, 1 of the REUs on each aircraft control surface is connected to the BC, thereby ensuring that all aircraft control surfaces are controlled by the BC in a minimum acceptable control configuration after failure of all BCCs.
< energy control Module >
The energy control module 140 is used to provide power to the cockpit controls 110, flight controls 120, and flight controls 130, control the voltage of all output loads, and provide circuit breaker protection for each output load. But the backup control device 123 is not powered by the energy control module 140. In the present embodiment, the number of energy control modules 140 is set to be the same as the BCC number, but the present invention is not limited thereto, and the number may be different. In addition, the flight control system may not be additionally provided with an energy control module, and the power distribution system inherent to the aircraft may be used for supplying power to the above devices.
(System logic)
The system logic of the flight control system according to the present embodiment will be described below.
In case the aircraft is in normal flight control mode or direct flight control mode, i.e. in case at least part of the BCCs in the primary command control device 122 is active, the BC of the backup control device 123 participates in the voting of all the steering commands received from the cockpit manipulating means 110 and in the voting of the actuator position/velocity commands as control commands and monitors and backs up the voted command results, but in this case the control commands generated by the BC itself are not allowed to be used for controlling the aircraft control surfaces.
In case the aircraft is in the backup mode, i.e. in case all BCCs in the primary command control device 122 fail, the BC of the backup control device 123 does not perform any voting, but directly solves the steering commands from the cockpit controls 110 and generates actuator position/velocity commands as control commands for controlling the aircraft control surfaces that meet the minimum acceptable control configuration, and outputs the generated actuator position/velocity commands to the flight control actuation means 130 for controlling the REU and actuators that the flight control actuation means 130 has. The operation mode conversion relationship of BC is as follows.
TABLE 1
Command data is exchanged between each BCC of the primary command control device 122 and the BC of the backup control device 123 via a digital communication bus, preferably using the ARIC429 bus. In addition, as described above, the BC also determines whether the operating states of the BCCs are valid by the discrete signals received from each BCC. When a BC indicates failure of the corresponding BCC from the discrete signals of all BCCs, the control instruction validity flag indicating that the BC is allowed to control the aircraft control surfaces is set, for example, from "0" to "1".
As described above, at least 1 REU on each aircraft control surface is connected to one of the 1 BCCs and BC, and receives control commands from the BCCs and BC. The REU determines which device or computer to execute the control command transmitted from the BC, and executes the control command from the BC only when the REU determines that all the control commands from the BCC are invalid and the validity flag bit of the control command from the BC is '1'.
< voting and processing of manipulation instruction >
The BCC of the basic command control device 122 and BC of the backup control device 123 solve the travel command of the steering device from the position signal sensor provided in the steering device and vote together with the received forming command, and the final valid steering command is selected. As described above, in the case where the enhanced instruction control device 121 is active (i.e., 1 ACC is operating), the BCC of the basic instruction control device 122 sends the active manipulation instruction to the ACC that is in an operating state.
In the present embodiment, the flow of the voting and processing of the steering command described above is as follows.
First, one of 1 BCC or BC receives position signals from left and right steering devices, determines validity and correctness of the signals, and solves a steering command.
Then, the BCC or BC compares the position signal of the same side manipulating device with the position signal received last time, if the absolute value of the difference between the two is larger than a preset threshold value, the side position signal is judged to be unavailable, and the available position signal of the other side is directly used; if the position signals on the two sides are unavailable, directly quitting voting on the current operation instruction; if the position signals on the two sides are available, judging whether the difference between the two signals is larger than a preset threshold value, directly quitting voting on the current control instruction when the absolute value of the difference is larger than the preset threshold value, otherwise, selecting an effective position signal according to a certain rule, and calculating the stroke of the control device. The certain rule may be to determine the greater value, the lesser value, or any value between the two position signals.
When the direct control BCC exits the vote, the number of times the BCC has exited the vote is checked, and when the number of times exceeds a predetermined number of times (for example, 3 times), the direct control BCC is hot-started in the air. And after the hot start, if the BCC exits voting again, judging that the BCC is invalid, and closing the BCC by a flight control system.
When an indirect control BCC exits the current vote, the number of times that BCC has exited the current vote is similarly checked, and when the number of times exceeds a predetermined number of times (e.g., 3 times), the BCC is prohibited from participating in subsequent command votes.
When the BC of the backup control device 123 exits the vote of this time, the BC is checked similarly up to the number of times of voting exits continuously, and when the number of times exceeds a predetermined number of times (for example, 3 times), the BC is hot-started in the air, thereby ensuring that the manipulation command can be accurately processed and the control command can be accurately calculated as long as the BC can be operated. In addition, to ensure the most basic operation of the flight control system, even if the subsequent BC exits voting again, it is still restarted, allowing it to continue participating in subsequent votes.
The 4 BCCs and BC pass the calculated steering commands to each other for voting. And searching the number of channels with consistent position signals of the manipulating device in the non-failed computers participating in voting, and selecting the position signal corresponding to the channel with the highest number of consistent position signals in the searching result as a final effective manipulating instruction. As described above, when the emphasis instruction control device 121 is active, the active manipulation instruction is sent to the emphasis instruction control device 121. If the enhanced command control device 121 fails, the valid steering commands are internally processed by the BCC in its active state.
In addition, if the number of non-failed computers participating in voting, including BCC and BC, is even and the result of the search for the number of channels whose position signals of the manipulating device are consistent is leveled (e.g., 2:2), BC is not allowed to participate in this voting and the search is performed again.
< voting and processing of control instruction >
As described above, when the aircraft is in the normal flight control mode, the BCC of the basic command control device 122 and the BC of the backup control device 123 resolve the control commands from the enhanced command control device 121, and vote on the respective resolved control commands together to vote out the valid control commands. When the aircraft is in the direct flight control mode, the BCC of the primary command control device 122 and the BC of the backup control device 123 each internally process the effective control commands, calculate actuator position commands/velocity commands including the control commands, and vote the calculated control commands together to vote out the effective control commands.
In the present embodiment, the flow of the voting and processing for the control command described above is as follows.
The 4 BCCs and BC pass the actuator position commands/velocity commands, which are respectively calculated or computed, to each other for voting. And searching the number of channels with consistent control instructions in the non-failed computers participating in voting, and selecting the control instruction corresponding to the channel with the largest number of channels with consistent control instructions as a final effective control instruction in the search result. Thereafter, the BCC in the active state sends the active control command to the REU in the flight control actuation device 130.
In addition, if the number of non-failed computers participating in the voting including BCC and BC is even and the search result for the number of channels with the same control signal is equal (for example, 2:2), BC is not allowed to participate in the voting and the search is performed again.
(Driving the aircraft control surface)
The flight control system of the invention can be applied to single-channel airplanes. FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of an aircraft control surface layout for a typical single-aisle aircraft having two ailerons, two elevators, a rudder, and a horizontal stabilizer, illustrating the application of the flight control system of the present invention to the single-aisle aircraft. In order to ensure a continuous safe flight and landing of the aircraft, the BC of the backup control device 123 is configured to be able to control at least two ailerons, two elevators and one rudder in the above-mentioned control plane of a single-channel aircraft, so as to meet minimum acceptable control requirements.
In addition, a typical single-channel aircraft typically employs three independent sets of hydraulic power systems at 1300psi to drive actuators on the aircraft control surfaces. Each set of hydraulic energy system respectively drives different actuators. For example, in the case where each aileron is driven by two actuators, each elevator is driven by two actuators, and the rudder is driven by three actuators, the 1 st hydraulic energy system drives the right aileron outer actuator, the left elevator outer actuator, and the rudder down actuator, the 2 nd hydraulic energy system drives the right aileron outer actuator, the right elevator outer actuator, and the rudder inner actuator, and the third hydraulic energy system drives the left aileron inner actuator, the right aileron inner actuator, the left elevator inner actuator, the right elevator inner actuator, and the rudder up actuator.
The electric pump of the third hydraulic energy system is driven by the ram air turbine as an emergency turbo generator set in the event of a shutdown of all the engines of the aircraft. Therefore, in order to ensure control of the control surfaces of the aircraft, the actuators controlled by the REU connected to the BC, which is the control target of the backup control device 123 in the flight control system according to the present embodiment, are all powered by the third hydraulic energy source system.
In all engine off conditions, the 115V critical emergency ac bus is powered by the ram air turbine while BC and its connected direct mode sensors are also powered via the 28V critical emergency dc bus.
The flight control system of the invention can also be applied to a two-channel aircraft, a typical two-channel aircraft has four ailerons, four elevators, two rudders and a full-motion horizontal stabilizer. Similarly, when the flight control system is applied to a two-lane aircraft, the BC of the backup control device 123 is configured to be able to control at least the left inner aileron, the right inner aileron, the left inner elevator, the right inner elevator, and the rudder of the above-described control surfaces of the two-lane aircraft in order to ensure continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft.
In the flight control actuation device 130 of the two-channel aircraft, a plurality of REUs and a plurality of actuators controlled by the REUs are associated, corresponding to the number of aircraft control surfaces. A typical dual channel aircraft typically employs three independent sets of hydraulic power systems at 1300psi or 1500psi to drive actuators on the aircraft control surfaces. Compared with a single-channel airplane, actuators driven by each set of hydraulic energy system in the double-channel airplane are correspondingly increased, but the working principle is the same as that of the single-channel airplane, and therefore the description is omitted.
According to the flight control system of the embodiment, under the condition that the aircraft is in the normal flight control mode or the direct flight control mode, the backup control device in the flight control system is always in the starting state, so that the aircraft can immediately enter the backup mode when other flight control devices fail, and the time that the aircraft is in the uncontrollable state is greatly shortened. And under the condition that the airplane is in a normal flight control mode or a direct flight control mode, the backup control equipment always participates in voting on the control instruction from the cockpit control device and in voting on the control instruction for controlling the control surface of the airplane, so that the usability and the correctness of the control instruction received by the backup control equipment and the generated control instruction can be checked, and therefore when other flight control equipment fails, the backup control equipment can be ensured to generate an effective control instruction, the accuracy of controlling the control surface of the airplane based on the effective control instruction is ensured, and the continuous safe flight and landing of the airplane are realized.
The scope of the invention is limited only by the claims. Persons of ordinary skill in the art, having benefit of the teachings of the present invention, will readily appreciate that alternative structures to the structures disclosed herein are possible alternative embodiments, and that combinations of the disclosed embodiments may be made to create new embodiments, which also fall within the scope of the appended claims.
Claims (17)
1. A flight control system is characterized by comprising:
the control device is used for providing control instructions of the cab;
a flight control device that receives a steering command from the steering device and generates a control command for controlling an aircraft control surface based on the received steering command; and
a flight control actuation device which receives the control instruction generated by the flight control device and actuates the corresponding aircraft control surface according to the received control instruction,
the flight control device includes: an enhanced command control device capable of executing a normal mode control law, a basic command control device connected to the enhanced command control device and capable of executing a direct mode control law, and a backup control device connected to the basic command control device and capable of executing a backup mode control law,
in the event that the primary command control device is active, the backup control device participates in voting on the manipulation commands received from the manipulation means and in voting on the control commands,
and under the condition that the basic instruction control equipment fails, the backup control equipment generates a control instruction according to the control instruction received from the control device and sends the generated control instruction to the flight control actuating device.
2. The flight control system of claim 1,
and under the condition that the basic instruction control equipment is effective, voting is carried out on the received manipulation instruction by the basic instruction control equipment and the backup control equipment together, so as to vote out an effective manipulation instruction.
3. The flight control system of claim 2,
when the enhanced instruction control device is effective, the effective manipulation instruction is sent to the enhanced instruction control device through the basic instruction control device, a control instruction is generated according to the received effective manipulation instruction through the enhanced instruction control device, the generated control instruction is sent to the basic instruction control device and the backup control device, the received control instruction is resolved through the basic instruction control device and the backup control device respectively, and the control instructions resolved by the basic instruction control device and the backup control device are voted together to vote out an effective control instruction, and/or
And under the condition that the enhanced instruction control equipment fails, respectively generating control instructions according to the effective control instructions through the basic instruction control equipment and the backup control equipment, and voting the generated control instructions together so as to determine the effective control instructions.
4. Flight control system according to claim 2 or 3,
and a cross-linking system sensor for detecting flight state information including airspeed and angle of attack, the cross-linking system sensor being connected with the augmentation instruction control device,
in the event that the augmentation-instruction control device is active, the augmentation-instruction control device generates control instructions based on active steering instructions and flight-state information received from the cross-linked-system sensors.
5. Flight control system according to claim 2 or 3,
also included are direct mode sensors for detecting flight status information including pitch angle rate, yaw rate, and roll rate,
in the event of failure of the augmentation command control device, the basic command control device generates control commands based on active steering commands and flight status information received from direct mode sensors.
6. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
also included are direct mode sensors for detecting flight status information including pitch angle rate, yaw rate, and roll rate,
in the case where the basic command control device fails, the backup control device generates a control command based on a manipulation command received from the manipulation device and flight status information received from a direct mode sensor.
7. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
the augmentation instruction control apparatus is provided with a plurality of augmentation instruction computers connected to each other, each augmentation instruction computer being capable of generating control instructions for all aircraft control surfaces,
and under the condition that the enhancement instruction control equipment and the basic instruction control equipment are both effective, the enhancement instruction control equipment controls the action of the control surfaces of the airplane, when one 1 of the enhancement instruction computers fails, other enhancement instruction computers continue to generate control instructions for all the control surfaces of the airplane, and when all the enhancement instruction computers fail, the basic instruction control equipment controls the action of the control surfaces of the airplane.
8. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
the basic instruction control device is provided with a plurality of basic instruction computers, each basic instruction computer only generates control instructions for part of airplane control surfaces, all the basic instruction computers can generate control instructions for all the airplane control surfaces,
when the enhanced instruction control device fails and the basic instruction control device is effective, the basic instruction control device controls the action of the control surface of the airplane, when one 1 of the basic instruction computers fails, other basic instruction computers continue to generate control instructions aiming at part of the control surface of the airplane in a mode of meeting the minimum acceptable control configuration, and when all the basic instruction computers fail, the backup control device controls the action of the control surface of the airplane.
9. The flight control system of claim 8,
the plurality of basic instruction computers are divided into a direct control instruction computer which is connected with the remote control equipment on any airplane control surface and directly controls the remote control equipment and an indirect control instruction computer which is not connected with the remote control equipment, aiming at 1 certain remote control equipment, the direct control instruction computer generates a control instruction, and the indirect control instruction computer votes the generated control instruction.
10. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
the backup control device is provided with 1 backup computer, the backup computer is connected with part of airplane control surfaces on the flight actuating device, which meet the minimum acceptable controlled configuration, and can generate control instructions aiming at the airplane control surfaces.
11. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
an odd number of operating element sensors for detecting an operation of an operating element are provided on the operating device, which operating element sensors are connected to the basic command control device and the backup control device, respectively.
12. The flight control system of claim 11,
the manipulation device sensor is a position signal sensor.
13. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
the flight control actuation device is provided with a plurality of actuators in the control surface of the airplane and a plurality of remote control devices for respectively controlling each actuator.
14. The flight control system of claim 13,
the remote control devices which are arranged aiming at the same airplane control surface are remote control devices with different models and non-similar designs.
15. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
the flight control system also comprises an energy device for supplying power to the operating device, the enhanced command control device, the basic command control device and the flight control actuating device.
16. A flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
and under the condition that the basic instruction control device is effective, restarting the backup control device when the times of the manipulation instructions or the control instructions from the backup control device for participating in voting are wrong instructions exceed a specified threshold value.
17. A flight control method for performing flight control using the flight control system according to any one of claims 1 to 17,
in the event that the primary command control device is active, engaging the backup control device in voting on the manipulation commands received from the manipulation device and in voting on the control commands,
and in the case that the basic command control device fails, causing the backup control device to generate a control command according to the manipulation command received from the manipulation device, and transmitting the generated control command to the flight control actuation device.
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