CN112491538A - Measuring equipment independent quantum key distribution method and system based on continuous variables - Google Patents

Measuring equipment independent quantum key distribution method and system based on continuous variables Download PDF

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CN112491538A
CN112491538A CN202011261851.3A CN202011261851A CN112491538A CN 112491538 A CN112491538 A CN 112491538A CN 202011261851 A CN202011261851 A CN 202011261851A CN 112491538 A CN112491538 A CN 112491538A
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quantum
receiving end
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quantum signals
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黄鹏
曾贵华
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Shanghai Xuntai Information Technology Co ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/60—Receivers
    • H04B10/61—Coherent receivers
    • H04B10/616—Details of the electronic signal processing in coherent optical receivers
    • H04B10/6164—Estimation or correction of the frequency offset between the received optical signal and the optical local oscillator
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/60—Receivers
    • H04B10/61—Coherent receivers
    • H04B10/616—Details of the electronic signal processing in coherent optical receivers
    • H04B10/6165—Estimation of the phase of the received optical signal, phase error estimation or phase error correction
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Optical Communication System (AREA)

Abstract

The invention provides a measuring equipment irrelevant quantum key distribution method and system based on continuous variables, which comprises the following steps: step S1: quantum signal preparation and encoding are respectively carried out on a transmitting end and a receiving end to obtain quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end; step S2: respectively transmitting the quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end to the measuring end, and carrying out interference and detection on the quantum signals to obtain a measured value; step S3: decoding the measured quantum signals; step S4: performing parameter evaluation according to the quantum signals and the measured values of the transmitting end and the receiving end; step S5: and performing data negotiation according to the decoded quantum signals, and performing security enhancement according to the parameter evaluation result. The invention carries out negotiation and privacy enhancement processing by means of the existing post-processing algorithm method based on the discrete variable technology, reduces the realization complexity of the existing CVQKD system, simultaneously improves the channel capacity, and improves the system performance from the aspects of post-processing and coding.

Description

Measuring equipment independent quantum key distribution method and system based on continuous variables
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of quantum secret communication, in particular to a measuring equipment irrelevant quantum key distribution method and system based on continuous variables. In particular, the invention relates to a measuring device independent quantum key distribution method based on continuous variable coherent state, which adopts a phase matching method based on discrete modulation dense coding to distribute quantum keys.
Background
The continuous variable quantum key distribution technology can utilize a coherent detection method to ensure that two communication parties far away from each other realize key distribution with information theory safety. As the continuous variable quantum key distribution technology inherits many advantages of classical coherent optical communication, has higher channel capacity and convergence with the classical optical communication, and is widely concerned by a plurality of mainstream quantum cryptography research organizations in the world. Various protocols have been proposed by researchers in various countries for continuous variable quantum key distribution so far, and the most widely applied protocol is gaussian modulation coherent state continuous variable quantum key distribution protocol, which has been proved to be unconditionally safe in theory. At present, the continuous variable quantum key distribution technology becomes an important branch of the whole quantum secret communication technology, and commercial products appear in the market, and the market is advanced towards industrialization.
However, although gaussian modulation coherent state continuous variable quantum key distribution has theoretically proven the security, the non-idealities of various actual devices of the system may introduce actual security holes and related attacks, such as local oscillation attack, calibration attack, wavelength attack, and the like, so that the system operation may no longer have unconditional integrity described in theory. In order to remove the actual security hole, researchers provide a continuous variable measurement device independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) scheme, so that the actual security problem caused by factors such as an imperfect measuring party can be removed. However, when such schemes are actually operated, if an effective security key is generated, the efficiency of the coherent detection of the continuous variable quantum used is required to reach an almost ideal condition, which greatly limits the practical application and popularization of the CV-MDI-QKD. In fact, to date, there has been little report of a truly practical CV-MDI-QKD experiment.
Patent document CN111404681A (application No.: 202010176435.7) discloses a continuous variable measurement device-independent quantum key distribution method, system, and medium, including: step A: according to the frequency offset estimation technology, estimating the frequency offset between the two parties of the method and the intermediate party by means of a pilot signal, and realizing frequency offset compensation; and B: according to the phase estimation technology and the data disclosed by both legal parties, the correlation coefficient between the received data and the intermediate party is calculated, the phase drift introduced by each channel is estimated, and the phase compensation of the quantum signals is realized.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention aims to provide a measuring device independent quantum key distribution method and system based on continuous variables.
The measurement equipment irrelevant quantum key distribution method based on the continuous variables comprises the following steps:
step S1: respectively carrying out quantum signal preparation and coding at a transmitting end and a receiving end to obtain quantum signals (X) of the transmitting end and the receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB)；
Step S2: respectively transmitting the quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end to the measuring end, interfering the quantum signals, and detecting the interfered quantum signals to obtain a measured value XCAnd PD；
Step S3: decoding the measured quantum signals;
step S4: according to quantum signals (X) of transmitting end and receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And the measured value X obtained by measurementCAnd PDPerforming parameter evaluation;
step S5: and performing data negotiation according to the decoded quantum signals, and performing security enhancement according to the parameter evaluation result.
Preferably, the step S1 includes:
step S1.1: respectively obtaining two bit true random number strings R1 and R2 according to binary true random number generators of a sending end and a receiving end;
step S1.2: selecting a coded coherent state quantum signal according to two-bit true random numbers R1 and R2;
step S1.3: and adjusting the strength of the coherent quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end through the adjustable attenuator, and optimizing to obtain the safe key rate.
Preferably, step S1.2 includes:
when the two-bit true random number string is 00, selecting a coherent state | alpha > to be defined as an X ground state;
when the string of two-bit true random numbers is 01, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi/2>Defined as the P ground state;
when the string of two-bit true random numbers is 10, then the coherent state | α e is selected3πi/2>Defined as the P ground state;
when the string of two-bit true random numbers is 11, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi>Defined as the X ground state;
where α is the amplitude of the coherent quantum signal and i represents the imaginary unit.
Preferably, the step S2 includes:
step S2.1: the quantum signals which are coded are simultaneously sent to a measuring end by a quantum channel at a sending end and a receiving end;
step S2.2: interfering the quantum signal at the measuring end through the optical beam splitter;
step S2.3: coherent detection is carried out on the interfered quantum signals to respectively obtain measured values XCAnd PD。
Preferably, the sending end and the receiving end encode the key information on discrete phases of continuous variable signals matched with each other, and the quantum homodyne detector with low efficiency is preset to distribute the quantum key irrelevant to the measuring equipment.
Preferably, the step S3 includes:
step S3.1: the transmitting end and the receiving end respectively store the measured value XCAnd PDTwo-bit true random number strings R1 and R2 satisfying a preset condition when an X ground state is selected by itself or when a P ground state is selected by itself, respectively, and the two-bit true random number strings R1 and R2 satisfying the preset decision condition are recorded as KAAnd KB；
Step S3.2: when the two bit true random number strings R1 of the transmitting end and the receiving end are correspondingly selected asWhen P ground state is present, the receiving end turns over KBBit, the sending end and the receiving end form consistent key bits K and K';
step S3.3: the sending end and the receiving end respectively reserve the unsatisfied KAAnd KBAnd transmitting end does not satisfy KAIs marked as (X) in the coherent state quantum signal of different ground statesA,PA) Will receive end not satisfy KBIs marked as (X) in the coherent state quantum signal of different ground statesB,PB)。
Preferably, the measured value XCAnd PDThe preset conditions respectively met are as follows:
{XC∈R:-δC≤XC≤δC}
{PD∈R:-δD≤PD≤δD}
wherein R represents a real number; xCAn X component representing a quantum signal detected by the measurement terminal through the quantum homodyne detector; deltaCThe sending end and the receiving end respectively judge whether the currently prepared and coded quantum signals meet the condition of generating an effective key or not by judging whether the result published by the measuring end meets the judgment threshold range or not; subscript C represents the quantum signal modulus C detected by the quantum homodyne measurer; pDA P component representing a quantum signal detected by the measurement terminal through the quantum homodyne detector; deltaDRepresenting the decision threshold of the detected P component.
Preferably, the step S5 includes:
step S5.1: negotiating the generated key bits K and K' by the transmitting end and the receiving end through a classical channel to obtain a consistent bit string;
step S5.2: and calculating a compression factor according to the parameters obtained by parameter evaluation, and performing privacy enhancement operation on the obtained bit string to finally obtain a string of shared security keys.
Preferably, the parameter evaluation comprises: evaluating channel over-noise and channel transmittance in the communication process, and evaluating the leaked information quantity and the mutual information quantity of a legal party; and judging whether the secret key rate is greater than zero or not according to the parameter evaluation, namely whether a legal party can obtain the safety secret key or not, and giving up communication and restarting when the secret key rate is less than zero.
The invention provides a measuring equipment independent quantum key distribution system based on continuous variables, which comprises:
module M1: respectively carrying out quantum signal preparation and coding at a transmitting end and a receiving end to obtain quantum signals (X) of the transmitting end and the receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB)；
Module M2: respectively transmitting the quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end to the measuring end, interfering the quantum signals, and detecting the interfered quantum signals to obtain a measured value XCAnd PD；
Module M3: decoding the measured quantum signals;
module M4: according to quantum signals (X) of transmitting end and receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And the measured value X obtained by measurementCAnd PDPerforming parameter evaluation;
module M5: and performing data negotiation according to the decoded quantum signals, and performing security enhancement according to the parameter evaluation result.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the invention is different from the previous CV-MDI-QKD protocol, because the invention adopts a phase matching coding method based on discrete modulation, the invention can directly generate a discretized binary original key, and therefore, the invention can directly carry out negotiation and confidentiality enhancement processing by the existing post-processing algorithm method based on the discrete variable technology, thereby reducing the realization complexity of the existing CVQKD system and improving the system performance from the post-processing angle;
2. the invention adopts a discrete phase matching method, has lower necessary detection efficiency (the necessary detection efficiency refers to the minimum quantum homodyne detector efficiency required by obtaining the safe key rate under a specific transmission distance), so the protocol can still obtain the safe key under the condition of actually lower detector efficiency, such as the detection efficiency of 0.6, but the traditional Gaussian modulation coherent CV-MDI-QKD can not obtain the safe key;
3. the invention relates to a phase matching continuous variable measuring equipment irrelevant quantum key distribution method based on dense coding, namely unfair base selection information is used as bit key information, and the method has higher channel capacity, simpler implementation steps and higher safe key rate compared with the existing phase matching continuous variable measuring equipment irrelevant quantum key distribution method.
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Other features, objects and advantages of the invention will become more apparent upon reading of the detailed description of non-limiting embodiments with reference to the following drawings:
fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a phase matching-based independent quantum key distribution method for a continuous variable measurement device.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in detail with reference to specific examples. The following examples will assist those skilled in the art in further understanding the invention, but are not intended to limit the invention in any way. It should be noted that it would be obvious to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit of the invention. All falling within the scope of the present invention.
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention aims to provide a phase matching-based independent quantum key distribution method for continuous variable measurement equipment, which is used for solving the problem that the practical realization is seriously limited due to the high requirement of the existing Gaussian modulation coherent CV-MDI-QKD on the efficiency of a quantum balance homodyne detector.
Example (b):
referring to fig. 1, the measurement device independent quantum key distribution method based on continuous variables according to the present invention includes:
step M1: the sending terminal and the receiving terminal carry out quantum signal preparation and coding to obtain quantum signals (X) of the sending terminal and the receiving terminalA,PA) And (X)B,PB)；
Step M2: the sending end and the receiving end transmit the quantum signals to the measuring end, the measuring end interferes the quantum signals, and the interfered quantum signals are detected to obtain a measured value XCAnd PD；
Step M3: carrying out information decoding on the detected quantum signals;
step M4: preparing quantum signals (X) according to the preserved preparation of a transmitting terminal and a receiving terminalA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And corresponding measured values X disclosed by the measuring partyCAnd PDPerforming parameter evaluation;
step M5: and carrying out data negotiation according to the decoded quantum signals and carrying out privacy enhancement according to parameter evaluation.
Specifically, the step M1 includes:
step M1.1: respectively obtaining two bit true random number strings R1 and R2 according to binary true random number generators of a sending end and a receiving end;
step M1.2: the transmitting end and the receiving end select and encode coherent state quantum signals according to two-bit true random numbers R1 and R2 respectively;
step M1.3: the sending end and the receiving end respectively adjust the strength of respective coherent state quantum signals through the adjustable attenuators, and the finally generated safe secret key rate is optimized.
Preferably, said step M1.2 comprises: the transmitting end (receiving end) selects the encoding quantum state according to the random number in the two-bit true random number R1 (R2). When the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 00, then the coherent state | α is selected>(defined as the X ground state); when the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 01, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi/2>(defined as the P ground state); when the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 10, then the coherent state | α e is selected3πi/2>(defined as the P ground state); when the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 11, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi>(defined as the X ground state), where α is the amplitude of the coherent quantum signal and i represents the imaginary unit.
Specifically, the step M2 includes:
step M2.1: the sending end and the receiving end simultaneously send the encoded quantum signals to the measuring end through a quantum channel;
step M2.2: the measuring end interferes the quantum signal through the optical beam splitter;
step M2.3: coherent detection is carried out on the interfered quantum signals to respectively obtain measured values XCAnd PD。
Preferably, said step M2.3 comprises: the sending end and the receiving end encode the key information on discrete phases of continuous variable signals which are matched with each other, the key information cannot be revealed by publishing the information of the measuring end, the irrelevant quantum key distribution of the measuring equipment is realized by utilizing a quantum homodyne detector with low preset efficiency, and measured values X are respectively obtainedCAnd PD。
In particular, said step M2.3 comprises: the sending end and the receiving end encode the key information on the discrete phases of the continuous variable signals which are matched with each other, the key information cannot be revealed by publishing the information of the measuring end, the irrelevant quantum key distribution of the measuring equipment is realized by utilizing the actually available low-efficiency quantum homodyne detector, and the measured values X are respectively obtainedCAnd PD. Obtaining X with a detectorCAnd PDBut XCAnd PDInstead of the key, the detecting party publishes the result, which is needed to help the sending and receiving ends to establish the associated shared key.
Specifically, the step M3 includes:
step M3.1: the transmitting end and the receiving end respectively store the measured value XCAnd PDSatisfy { X when X ground state is selected for itself, respectivelyC∈R:-δC≤XC≤δCOr { P when P base is selected for itselfD∈R:-δD≤PD≤δDR1 and R2 of the device respectively mark as K random number strings R1 and R2 of the sending end and the receiving end which meet the judgment conditionAAnd KB；
Wherein R represents a real number, XCRepresenting the X component, delta, of a quantum signal detected by a Hom quantum homodyne detector on the measurement sideCDecision thresholds representing detected X components, i.e. published by the decision measurerWhether the result meets the judgment threshold range or not, a sender and a receiver respectively judge whether the signals currently prepared and coded by the sender and the receiver can generate effective keys or not, and subscript C represents that the quantum signal modulus detected by a Hom quantum homodyne measurer is C, PDRepresenting the P component, delta, of the quantum signal detected by the Hom quantum homodyne detector on the measurement sideDA decision threshold representing the detected P component;
step M3.2: when the random number strings R1 of the sending end and the receiving end are correspondingly selected to be P ground states, the receiving end overturns KBBit, the sending end and the receiving end form consistent key bits K and K';
step M3.3: the sending end and the receiving end respectively reserve the unsatisfied KAAnd KBThe transmitting end does not satisfy KAThe coherent state quantum signal of different bases is denoted as (X)A,PA) Will receive end not satisfy KBThe coherent state quantum signal of different bases is denoted as (X)B,PB)。
Specifically, the step M4 includes: the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal prepare the quantum signal (X) according to the storedA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And corresponding measured values X disclosed by the measuring partyCAnd PDAnd evaluating the channel over-noise and transmittance parameters.
Specifically, the step M5 includes:
step M5.1: negotiating the generated key bits K and K' by the transmitting end and the receiving end through a classical channel to obtain a consistent bit string;
step M5.2: and calculating a compression factor according to the parameters obtained by parameter evaluation, and performing privacy enhancement operation on the obtained bit string to finally obtain a string of shared security keys.
Specifically, the parameter evaluation includes: evaluating channel over-noise and channel transmittance in the communication process, and evaluating the leaked information quantity and the mutual information quantity of a legal party; and judging whether the secret key rate is greater than zero or not according to the parameter evaluation, namely whether a legal party can obtain the safety secret key or not, and giving up communication and restarting when the secret key rate is less than zero.
The invention provides a device-independent quantum key distribution system based on continuous variable measurement, which comprises:
module M1: the sending terminal and the receiving terminal carry out quantum signal preparation and coding to obtain quantum signals (X) of the sending terminal and the receiving terminalA,PA) And (X)B,PB)；
Module M2: the sending end and the receiving end transmit the quantum signals to the measuring end, the measuring end interferes the quantum signals, and the interfered quantum signals are detected to obtain a measured value XCAnd PD；
Module M3: carrying out information decoding on the detected quantum signals;
module M4: preparing quantum signals (X) according to the preserved preparation of a transmitting terminal and a receiving terminalA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And corresponding measured values X disclosed by the measuring partyCAnd PDPerforming parameter evaluation;
module M5: and carrying out data negotiation according to the decoded quantum signals and carrying out privacy enhancement according to parameter evaluation.
Specifically, the module M1 includes:
module M1.1: respectively obtaining two bit true random number strings R1 and R2 according to binary true random number generators of a sending end and a receiving end;
module M1.2: the transmitting end and the receiving end select and encode coherent state quantum signals according to two-bit true random numbers R1 and R2 respectively;
module M1.3: the sending end and the receiving end respectively adjust the strength of respective coherent state quantum signals through the adjustable attenuators, and the finally generated safe secret key rate is optimized.
Preferably, said module M1.2 comprises: the transmitting end (receiving end) selects the encoding quantum state according to the random number in the two-bit true random number R1 (R2). When the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 00, then the coherent state | α is selected>(defined as the X ground state); when the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 01, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi/2>(defined as the P ground state); when the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 10, then the coherent state | α e is selected3πi/2>(Ding)Defined as the P ground state); when the two-bit true random number R1(R2) is 11, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi>(defined as the X ground state), where α is the amplitude of the coherent quantum signal and i represents the imaginary unit.
Specifically, the module M2 includes:
module M2.1: the sending end and the receiving end simultaneously send the encoded quantum signals to the measuring end through a quantum channel;
module M2.2: the measuring end interferes the quantum signal through the optical beam splitter;
module M2.3: coherent detection is carried out on the interfered quantum signals to respectively obtain measured values XCAnd PD。
Preferably, said module M2.3 comprises: the sending end and the receiving end encode the key information on discrete phases of continuous variable signals which are matched with each other, the key information cannot be revealed by publishing the information of the measuring end, the irrelevant quantum key distribution of the measuring equipment is realized by utilizing a quantum homodyne detector with low preset efficiency, and measured values X are respectively obtainedCAnd PD。
In particular, said module M2.3 comprises: the sending end and the receiving end encode the key information on the discrete phases of the continuous variable signals which are matched with each other, the key information cannot be revealed by publishing the information of the measuring end, the irrelevant quantum key distribution of the measuring equipment is realized by utilizing the actually available low-efficiency quantum homodyne detector, and the measured values X are respectively obtainedCAnd PD. Obtaining X with a detectorCAnd PDBut XCAnd PDInstead of the key, the detecting party publishes the result, which is needed to help the sending and receiving ends to establish the associated shared key.
Specifically, the module M3 includes:
module M3.1: the transmitting end and the receiving end respectively store the measured value XCAnd PDSatisfy { X when X ground state is selected for itself, respectivelyC∈R:-δC≤XC≤δCOr { P when P base is selected for itselfD∈R:-δD≤PD≤δDR1 ofAnd R2, recording the random number strings R1 and R2 of the transmitting end and the receiving end which meet the above-mentioned decision condition as KAAnd KB；
Wherein R represents a real number, XCRepresenting the X component, delta, of a quantum signal detected by a Hom quantum homodyne detector on the measurement sideCThe judgment threshold of the detected X component is represented, namely, whether the result published by a measuring party meets the judgment threshold range is judged, a sending party and a receiving party respectively judge whether the currently prepared and coded signals can generate effective keys, subscript C represents the quantum signal modulus C detected by a Hom quantum homodyne measurer, and subscript P represents that the quantum signal modulus C and the P are respectively CDRepresenting the P component, delta, of the quantum signal detected by the Hom quantum homodyne detector on the measurement sideDA decision threshold representing the detected P component;
module M3.2: when the random number strings R1 of the sending end and the receiving end are correspondingly selected to be P ground states, the receiving end overturns KBBit, the sending end and the receiving end form consistent key bits K and K';
module M3.3: the sending end and the receiving end respectively reserve the unsatisfied KAAnd KBThe transmitting end does not satisfy KAThe coherent state quantum signal of different bases is denoted as (X)A,PA) Will receive end not satisfy KBThe coherent state quantum signal of different bases is denoted as (X)B,PB)。
Specifically, the module M4 includes: the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal prepare the quantum signal (X) according to the storedA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And corresponding measured values X disclosed by the measuring partyCAnd PDAnd evaluating the channel over-noise and transmittance parameters.
Specifically, the module M5 includes:
module M5.1: negotiating the generated key bits K and K' by the transmitting end and the receiving end through a classical channel to obtain a consistent bit string;
module M5.2: and calculating a compression factor according to the parameters obtained by parameter evaluation, and performing privacy enhancement operation on the obtained bit string to finally obtain a string of shared security keys.
Specifically, the parameter evaluation includes: evaluating channel over-noise and channel transmittance in the communication process, and evaluating the leaked information quantity and the mutual information quantity of a legal party; and judging whether the secret key rate is greater than zero or not according to the parameter evaluation, namely whether a legal party can obtain the safety secret key or not, and giving up communication and restarting when the secret key rate is less than zero.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that, in addition to implementing the systems, apparatus, and various modules thereof provided by the present invention in purely computer readable program code, the same procedures can be implemented entirely by logically programming method steps such that the systems, apparatus, and various modules thereof are provided in the form of logic gates, switches, application specific integrated circuits, programmable logic controllers, embedded microcontrollers and the like. Therefore, the system, the device and the modules thereof provided by the present invention can be considered as a hardware component, and the modules included in the system, the device and the modules thereof for implementing various programs can also be considered as structures in the hardware component; modules for performing various functions may also be considered to be both software programs for performing the methods and structures within hardware components.
The foregoing description of specific embodiments of the present invention has been presented. It is to be understood that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above, and that various changes or modifications may be made by one skilled in the art within the scope of the appended claims without departing from the spirit of the invention. The embodiments and features of the embodiments of the present application may be combined with each other arbitrarily without conflict.

Claims (10)

1. A measurement device independent quantum key distribution method based on continuous variables is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step S1: respectively carrying out quantum signal preparation and coding at a transmitting end and a receiving end to obtain quantum signals (X) of the transmitting end and the receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB)；
Step S2: respectively transmitting the quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end to the measuring end, interfering the quantum signals, and transmitting the interfered quantum signals to the measuring endDetecting the quantum signal to obtain a measured value XCAnd PD；
Step S3: decoding the measured quantum signals;
step S4: according to quantum signals (X) of transmitting end and receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And the measured value X obtained by measurementCAnd PDPerforming parameter evaluation;
step S5: and performing data negotiation according to the decoded quantum signals, and performing security enhancement according to the parameter evaluation result.
2. The continuous variable-based measuring device-independent quantum key distribution method according to claim 1, wherein the step S1 comprises:
step S1.1: respectively obtaining two bit true random number strings R1 and R2 according to binary true random number generators of a sending end and a receiving end;
step S1.2: selecting a coded coherent state quantum signal according to two-bit true random numbers R1 and R2;
step S1.3: and adjusting the strength of the coherent quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end through the adjustable attenuator, and optimizing to obtain the safe key rate.
3. The continuous variable-based measuring device-independent quantum key distribution method according to claim 2, wherein the step S1.2 comprises:
when the two-bit true random number string is 00, selecting a coherent state | alpha > to be defined as an X ground state;
when the string of two-bit true random numbers is 01, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi/2>Defined as the P ground state;
when the string of two-bit true random numbers is 10, then the coherent state | α e is selected3πi/2>Defined as the P ground state;
when the string of two-bit true random numbers is 11, then the coherent state | α e is selectedπi>Defined as the X ground state;
where α is the amplitude of the coherent quantum signal and i represents the imaginary unit.
4. The continuous variable-based measuring device-independent quantum key distribution method according to claim 1, wherein the step S2 comprises:
step S2.1: the quantum signals which are coded are simultaneously sent to a measuring end by a quantum channel at a sending end and a receiving end;
step S2.2: interfering the quantum signal at the measuring end through the optical beam splitter;
step S2.3: coherent detection is carried out on the interfered quantum signals to respectively obtain measured values XCAnd PD。
5. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the sending end and the receiving end encode the key information on the discrete phases of the continuous variable signals that match each other, and the quantum homodyne detector with low efficiency is preset to distribute the independent quantum key of the measuring device.
6. The continuous variable-based measuring device-independent quantum key distribution method according to claim 3, wherein the step S3 comprises:
step S3.1: the transmitting end and the receiving end respectively store the measured value XCAnd PDTwo-bit true random number strings R1 and R2 satisfying a preset condition when an X ground state is selected by itself or when a P ground state is selected by itself, respectively, and the two-bit true random number strings R1 and R2 satisfying the preset decision condition are recorded as KAAnd KB；
Step S3.2: when the two-bit true random number strings R1 of the sending end and the receiving end are correspondingly selected to be P ground states, the receiving end turns over KBBit, the sending end and the receiving end form consistent key bits K and K';
step S3.3: the sending end and the receiving end respectively reserve the unsatisfied KAAnd KBAnd transmitting end does not satisfy KACoherent state quantum signal of different ground statesIs (X)A,PA) Will receive end not satisfy KBIs marked as (X) in the coherent state quantum signal of different ground statesB,PB)。
7. The continuous variable-based measurement device-independent quantum key distribution method of claim 6, wherein the measurement value X isCAnd PDThe preset conditions respectively met are as follows:
{XC∈R:-δC≤XC≤δC}
{PD∈R:-δD≤PD≤δD}
wherein R represents a real number; xCAn X component representing a quantum signal detected by the measurement terminal through the quantum homodyne detector; deltaCThe sending end and the receiving end respectively judge whether the currently prepared and coded quantum signals meet the condition of generating an effective key or not by judging whether the result published by the measuring end meets the judgment threshold range or not; subscript C represents the quantum signal modulus C detected by the quantum homodyne measurer; pDA P component representing a quantum signal detected by the measurement terminal through the quantum homodyne detector; deltaDRepresenting the decision threshold of the detected P component.
8. The continuous variable-based measuring device-independent quantum key distribution method according to claim 6, wherein the step S5 comprises:
step S5.1: negotiating the generated key bits K and K' by the transmitting end and the receiving end through a classical channel to obtain a consistent bit string;
step S5.2: and calculating a compression factor according to the parameters obtained by parameter evaluation, and performing privacy enhancement operation on the obtained bit string to finally obtain a string of shared security keys.
9. The continuous variable-based measuring device-independent quantum key distribution method of claim 1, wherein the parameter evaluation comprises: evaluating channel over-noise and channel transmittance in the communication process, and evaluating the leaked information quantity and the mutual information quantity of a legal party; and judging whether the secret key rate is greater than zero or not according to the parameter evaluation, namely whether a legal party can obtain the safety secret key or not, and giving up communication and restarting when the secret key rate is less than zero.
10. A continuous variable based measurement device independent quantum key distribution system, comprising:
module M1: respectively carrying out quantum signal preparation and coding at a transmitting end and a receiving end to obtain quantum signals (X) of the transmitting end and the receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB)；
Module M2: respectively transmitting the quantum signals of the transmitting end and the receiving end to the measuring end, interfering the quantum signals, and detecting the interfered quantum signals to obtain a measured value XCAnd PD；
Module M3: decoding the measured quantum signals;
module M4: according to quantum signals (X) of transmitting end and receiving endA,PA) And (X)B,PB) And the measured value X obtained by measurementCAnd PDPerforming parameter evaluation;
module M5: and performing data negotiation according to the decoded quantum signals, and performing security enhancement according to the parameter evaluation result.
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CN114301586A (en) * 2021-12-01 2022-04-08 西北大学 Noise-free linear amplifier-based independent quantum key distribution method for continuous variable measurement equipment

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CN112073189A (en) * 2020-09-01 2020-12-11 上海循态信息科技有限公司 Independent quantum key distribution method and system for continuous variable measurement equipment

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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