CN112414472B - Safety barrier integrity judging method, device, control equipment and storage medium - Google Patents

Safety barrier integrity judging method, device, control equipment and storage medium Download PDF

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CN112414472B
CN112414472B CN202011397056.7A CN202011397056A CN112414472B CN 112414472 B CN112414472 B CN 112414472B CN 202011397056 A CN202011397056 A CN 202011397056A CN 112414472 B CN112414472 B CN 112414472B
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safety
barrier
integrity
nuclear power
safety barrier
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CN112414472A (en
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王振营
石艳明
徐慧波
张立军
周诗情
高春燕
黄宇
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China General Nuclear Power Corp
China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
CGN Power Co Ltd
China Nuclear Power Operation Co Ltd
Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
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China General Nuclear Power Corp
China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
CGN Power Co Ltd
China Nuclear Power Operation Co Ltd
Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01D—MEASURING NOT SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR A SPECIFIC VARIABLE; ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEASURING TWO OR MORE VARIABLES NOT COVERED IN A SINGLE OTHER SUBCLASS; TARIFF METERING APPARATUS; MEASURING OR TESTING NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G01D21/00—Measuring or testing not otherwise provided for
    • G01D21/02—Measuring two or more variables by means not covered by a single other subclass
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
    • G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
    • G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
    • Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin

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  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • High Energy & Nuclear Physics (AREA)
  • Monitoring And Testing Of Nuclear Reactors (AREA)

Abstract

The safety barrier integrity judging method can determine the integrity state of a safety barrier according to a fuel function parameter, a barrier function parameter and a safety control signal from a nuclear power protection system by receiving the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter from a nuclear power safety system and the safety control signal from a sensing device. The safety barrier integrity judging method provided by the embodiment of the application can be used for autonomously determining the integrity of the current safety barrier through any equipment with a data processing function, does not need manual participation in the whole process, does not need to depend on the judging experience of workers, and is high in automation degree. The embodiment of the application solves the technical problem that the existing method for judging the integrity of the safety barrier has stronger subjectivity in the prior art, and achieves the purpose of improving the automation degree of judging the integrity of the safety barrier.

Description

Safety barrier integrity judging method, device, control equipment and storage medium
Technical Field
The application relates to the technical field of nuclear power safety, in particular to a safety barrier integrity judging method, a safety barrier integrity judging device, control equipment and a storage medium.
Background
A nuclear safety system of a nuclear power plant generally includes a fuel assembly and a safety barrier disposed outside the fuel assembly for confining radioactive materials generated by the fuel assembly. In the event of a nuclear leakage accident at a nuclear power plant, radioactive materials are susceptible to unacceptable release to the nuclear power plant and surrounding environment, causing irreparable major damage. Therefore, the integrity of the safety barrier is of great importance for the safety of the nuclear power plant and the surrounding environment.
At present, the integrity of the safety barrier is judged mainly by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating various measurement parameters in a comprehensive nuclear power plant by workers, but under the working condition of a nuclear accident, the workers mainly concentrate on controlling a unit to return and maintain a safety state, so that the workers are difficult to timely and comprehensively perform careful evaluation on the integrity of the safety barrier. Therefore, the existing method for judging the integrity of the safety barrier has strong subjectivity.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to provide a method, an apparatus, a control device and a storage medium for determining integrity of a security barrier.
In a first aspect, a method for discriminating integrity of a security barrier is provided, which includes:
receiving a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly in a nuclear power safety system, wherein the fuel function parameter is used for representing the function state of the fuel assembly, the fuel function parameter comprises the outlet temperature of the fuel assembly, and the nuclear power safety system comprises the fuel assembly and a safety barrier arranged outside the fuel assembly;
receiving a barrier function parameter of the safety barrier sent by the sensing equipment, wherein the barrier function parameter is used for representing the function state of the safety barrier;
receiving a safety control signal sent by a nuclear power protection system, wherein the safety control signal is used for regulating and controlling the nuclear power safety system when the nuclear power safety system fails;
determining the integrity state of the safety barrier according to the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal; the integrity state of the safety barrier comprises an integrity potential loss state and an integrity complete loss state, wherein the integrity potential loss state means that the safety function of the safety barrier is between normal and loss, and the integrity complete loss state means that the safety function of the safety barrier is completely lost.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the safety barrier includes a first safety barrier, a second safety barrier and a third safety barrier arranged in sequence in a direction away from the fuel assembly, and the receiving of the barrier function parameter of the safety barrier sent by the sensing device includes: receiving a first dose rate of radioactive material, a coolant temperature, a circuit water charge, and a steam generator status in the second safety barrier from the sensing device; and receiving the second dosage rate and the gas pressure of the radioactive materials in the third safety barrier sent by the sensing device.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, receiving a safety control signal sent by a nuclear power protection system includes: receiving at least one signal of a safety injection trigger signal, a shutdown start signal and an isolation trigger signal sent by a nuclear power protection system, wherein the safety injection trigger signal is used for starting spraying equipment for cooling a nuclear power safety system, the shutdown start signal is used for controlling a fuel assembly to stop working, and the isolation trigger signal is used for starting isolation equipment for isolating the nuclear power safety system.
In an alternative embodiment of the present application, determining the integrity status of the safety barrier based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal comprises: detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature or not; if the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature or the loop water charge is less than a preset water amount, determining that the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; and if the second dosage rate is greater than the second preset dosage rate or the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature, determining that the first safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an alternative embodiment of the present application, determining the integrity status of the safety barrier based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal further comprises: detecting whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates a shutdown starting signal or not; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal; if the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates a shutdown starting signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; and if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an alternative embodiment of the present application, determining the integrity status of the safety barrier based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal further comprises: detecting whether the gas pressure is higher than a preset pressure; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal; detecting whether the spraying equipment fails to start; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates an isolation trigger signal; detecting whether the isolation equipment fails to be started; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature or not; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; if the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure, the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal, the spraying equipment fails to be started, or the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature, or the second dosage rate is higher than the second preset dosage rate, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in an integrity potential loss state; and if the safety protection system generates an isolation trigger signal and the isolation equipment fails to start, determining that the third safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, further comprising: determining a safety contingency action level according to the integrity status of the safety barrier, wherein the safety contingency action level comprises: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency.
In a second aspect, there is provided a safety barrier integrity discriminating device, the device comprising: the device comprises a first receiving module, a second receiving module, a third receiving module and an integrity determining module.
The first receiving module is used for receiving a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly in a nuclear power safety system, wherein the fuel function parameter is used for representing the function state of the fuel assembly, the fuel function parameter comprises the outlet temperature of the fuel assembly, and the nuclear power safety system comprises the fuel assembly and a safety barrier arranged outside the fuel assembly;
the second receiving module is used for receiving barrier function parameters of a safety barrier in the nuclear power safety system, which are sent by the sensing equipment, wherein the barrier function parameters are used for representing the function state of the safety barrier;
the third receiving module is used for receiving a safety control signal sent by the nuclear power protection system, and the safety control signal is used for regulating and controlling the nuclear power safety system when the nuclear power safety system fails;
the integrity determination module is used for determining the integrity state of the safety barrier according to the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal; the integrity state of the safety barrier comprises an integrity potential loss state and an integrity complete loss state, wherein the integrity potential loss state means that the safety function of the safety barrier is between normal and loss, and the integrity complete loss state means that the safety function of the safety barrier is completely lost.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the second receiving module is specifically configured to: receiving a first dose rate of radioactive material, a coolant temperature, a circuit water charge, and a steam generator status in the second safety barrier from the sensing device; and receiving a second dose rate and gas pressure of the radioactive material in the third safety barrier transmitted by the sensing device.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the third receiving module is specifically configured to: receiving at least one signal of a safety injection trigger signal, a shutdown start signal and an isolation trigger signal sent by a nuclear power protection system, wherein the safety injection trigger signal is used for starting spraying equipment for cooling a nuclear power safety system, the shutdown start signal is used for controlling a fuel assembly to stop working, and the isolation trigger signal is used for starting isolation equipment for isolating the nuclear power safety system.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the integrity determination module is specifically configured to: detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; if the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature or the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, determining that the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; and if the second dosage rate is greater than the second preset dosage rate or the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature, determining that the first safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the integrity determination module is specifically configured to: detecting whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates a shutdown starting signal or not; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal; if the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates a shutdown starting signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; and if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the integrity determination module is specifically configured to: detecting whether the gas pressure is higher than a preset pressure; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal; detecting whether the spraying equipment fails to start; detecting whether a nuclear power protection system generates an isolation trigger signal; detecting whether the isolation equipment fails to be started; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; if the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure, the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal, the spraying equipment fails to start, or the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature, or the second dosage rate is higher than the second preset dosage rate, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in an integrity potential loss state; and if the safety protection system generates an isolation trigger signal and the isolation equipment fails to start, determining that the third safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, further comprising an action determination module for determining a security emergency action level according to the integrity status of the security barrier, wherein the security emergency action level comprises: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency.
In a third aspect, a control device is provided, comprising a memory storing a computer program and a processor implementing the steps of the above method when executing the computer program.
In a fourth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, having stored thereon a computer program which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method as above.
The embodiment of the application provides a safety barrier integrity judging method, wherein the integrity state of a safety barrier can be determined according to a fuel function parameter, a barrier function parameter and a safety control signal from a nuclear power protection system, wherein the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter are sent by a sensing device and the safety control signal is sent by the sensing device. The safety barrier integrity judging method provided by the embodiment of the application can be used for autonomously determining the integrity of the current safety barrier through any equipment with a data processing function, manual participation is not needed in the whole process, the judgment experience of workers is not needed, and the automation degree is high. The embodiment of the application solves the technical problem that the existing method for judging the integrity of the safety barrier has stronger subjectivity in the prior art, and achieves the purpose of improving the automation degree of judging the integrity of the safety barrier.
Meanwhile, the judgment reference adopted by the safety barrier integrity judgment method provided by the embodiment of the application is a fuel function parameter and a barrier function parameter in a nuclear power safety system and a safety control signal from a nuclear power protection system, the parameters are basic state parameters of the nuclear power safety system and the nuclear power protection system, the method is suitable for judging the integrity of the safety barrier in most nuclear power plants, and the method is wide in applicability.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment of a security barrier integrity determination method;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a method for determining integrity of a security barrier according to an embodiment;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining integrity of a security barrier according to an embodiment;
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining integrity of a security barrier according to an embodiment;
FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining integrity of a security barrier in an embodiment;
FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method for determining integrity of a security barrier in an embodiment;
FIG. 7 is a block diagram of an apparatus for security barrier integrity determination in one embodiment;
fig. 8 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a control device in one embodiment.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent, the present application is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application.
A nuclear safety system of a nuclear power plant generally includes a fuel assembly and a safety barrier disposed outside the fuel assembly for confining radioactive substances generated from the fuel assembly. In the event of a nuclear leakage accident at a nuclear power plant, radioactive materials are susceptible to unacceptable release to the nuclear power plant and surrounding environment, causing irreparable major damage. Therefore, the integrity of the safety barrier is of great importance for the safety of the nuclear power plant and the surrounding environment. At present, the integrity of the safety barrier is judged mainly by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating various measurement parameters in a comprehensive nuclear power plant by workers, but under the working condition of a nuclear accident, the workers mainly concentrate on controlling a unit to return and maintain a safety state, so that the workers are difficult to timely and comprehensively perform careful evaluation on the integrity of the safety barrier. Therefore, the existing method for judging the integrity of the safety barrier has strong subjectivity.
In view of this, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for judging integrity of a safety barrier, which is configured to receive a fuel function parameter and a barrier function parameter from a nuclear power safety system, which are sent by a sensing device, and a safety control signal from a nuclear power protection system, and determine an integrity state of the safety barrier according to the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal. The safety barrier integrity judging method provided by the embodiment of the application can be used for autonomously determining the integrity of the current safety barrier through any equipment with a data processing function, does not need manual participation in the whole process, does not need to depend on the judging experience of workers, and is high in automation degree. The embodiment of the application solves the technical problem that the existing method for judging the integrity of the safety barrier has stronger subjectivity in the prior art, and achieves the purpose of improving the automation degree of judging the integrity of the safety barrier.
Meanwhile, the judgment reference adopted by the safety barrier integrity judgment method provided by the embodiment of the application is a fuel function parameter and a barrier function parameter in a nuclear power safety system and a safety control signal from a nuclear power protection system, the parameters are basic state parameters of the nuclear power safety system and the nuclear power protection system, the method is suitable for judging the integrity of the safety barrier in most nuclear power plants, and the method is wide in applicability.
In the following, an implementation environment related to the safety barrier integrity determination method provided in the embodiments of the present application will be briefly described.
Referring to fig. 1, the safety barrier integrity judging method provided by the embodiment of the present application is applied to a nuclear power safety system 10, where the nuclear power safety system 10 includes a fuel assembly 20, a safety barrier 30, a plurality of sensing devices 40, a nuclear power protection system 50, and a control device 60. The fuel assembly 20 is a nuclear reaction component, and the safety barrier 30 includes a first safety barrier, a second safety barrier and a third safety barrier arranged along a direction away from the fuel assembly 20 for limiting radioactive substances generated by the fuel assembly 20 during nuclear reaction layer by layer, wherein the first safety barrier may be a fuel clad, the second safety barrier may be a primary circuit pressure boundary, and the third safety barrier may be a containment. The sensing devices 40 are respectively disposed in the fuel assembly 20 and the safety barrier 30, and are used for acquiring status parameters of the fuel assembly 20 and the safety barrier 30. The nuclear power protection system 50 includes a controller and a plurality of protection devices, the plurality of protection devices may include, for example, a spraying device, an isolation device, and the like, and the controller is configured to control the plurality of protection devices to respectively protect the fuel assembly 20 and the safety barrier 30 according to the state parameters of the fuel assembly 20 and the nuclear power protection system 50 collected by the plurality of sensing devices 40. The control device 60 is in signal connection with the plurality of sensing devices 40 and the nuclear power protection system 50, respectively, and the control device 60 is configured to perform analysis processing according to signals collected by the plurality of sensing devices 40 and safety control signals generated by the nuclear power protection system 50.
Referring to fig. 2, an embodiment of the present application provides a safety barrier integrity judging method, which can be applied to the nuclear power safety system 10, and the following embodiments apply the method to the nuclear power safety system 10 in fig. 1, and are described in detail by taking the control device 60 as an execution subject, where the method includes the following steps 201 to 204:
step 201, a control device receives a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly in a nuclear power safety system, wherein the fuel function parameter is sent by a sensing device, and the fuel function parameter comprises an outlet temperature of the fuel assembly.
The nuclear power safety system 10 comprises a fuel assembly 20 and a safety barrier 30 arranged outside the fuel assembly 20, wherein a sensing device 40 arranged in the fuel assembly 20 collects fuel functional parameters of the fuel assembly 20 in real time, and the fuel functional parameters are used for representing the functional state of the fuel assembly 20. The fuel function parameters may include parameters such as outlet temperature, fuel power, dose rate of radioactive substance, etc., and the sensing device 40 may include a temperature measuring instrument, a power meter, a radiation measuring instrument, etc., and the number, specific types, etc. of the fuel function parameters are not limited in any way in this embodiment, and may be selected or set according to actual situations. The sensing device 40 sends the collected fuel function parameters to the control device 60 for storage through a communication device or the like for further analysis and processing.
Step 202, the control device receives the barrier function parameter of the safety barrier sent by the sensing device.
The safety barrier 30 is closed, and has a receiving cavity inside, the fuel assembly 20, i.e. the sensing device 40, is disposed in the receiving cavity, the sensing device 40 disposed in the receiving cavity collects the barrier function parameters in the safety barrier 30 in real time, and the barrier function parameters are used for representing the current function state of the safety barrier 30. The barrier function parameters may include parameters such as temperature, loop water content, gas pressure, dose rate of radioactive substance, etc., and the sensing device 40 may include a temperature measuring instrument, a water level measuring instrument, a pressure gauge, a radiation measuring instrument, etc., and the number, types, etc. of the barrier function parameters are not limited in any way in this embodiment, and may be selected or set according to actual situations. The sensing device 40 sends the acquired barrier function parameters to the control device 60 through a communication device or the like for storage, so as to be further analyzed and processed.
And 203, the control equipment receives a safety control signal sent by the nuclear power protection system.
The nuclear power protection system 50 includes a controller in signal communication with the control device 60 and a plurality of protection devices for controlling the plurality of protection devices to operate in accordance with the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter received by the control device 60. When the nuclear power safety system 10 fails, a safety control signal is generated, and the safety control signal is used for regulating and controlling the nuclear power safety system 10 when the nuclear power safety system 10 fails, that is, the safety control signal controls the plurality of protection devices to regulate and control the nuclear power safety system 10.
Step 204, the control equipment determines the integrity state of the safety barrier according to the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal; wherein the integrity status of the security barrier includes a potential integrity loss status and a complete integrity loss status.
The control device 60 receives the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal through the communication device and the like, and compares the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal with an internal preset parameter model thereof, thereby determining whether the integrity state of the current safety barrier 30 is a potential integrity loss state or a complete integrity loss state. The state of potential loss of integrity refers to the safety function of the safety barrier 30 being between normal and loss, indicating that the current safety barrier 30 has a risk of leakage, and the state of complete loss of integrity refers to the safety function of the safety barrier 30 being completely lost, having leaked, requiring timely handling by staff.
The integrity judgment method of the safety barrier can determine the integrity state of the safety barrier 30 according to the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal by receiving the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter from the nuclear power safety system 10 and the safety control signal from the nuclear power protection system 50, which are sent by the sensing equipment 40. The safety barrier integrity judging method provided by the embodiment of the application can be used for autonomously determining the integrity of the current safety barrier 30 through any equipment with a data processing function, does not need manual participation in the whole process, does not need to depend on the judging experience of workers, and is high in automation degree. The embodiment of the application solves the technical problem that the existing method for judging the integrity of the safety barrier 30 has stronger subjectivity in the prior art, and achieves the purpose of improving the automation degree of judging the integrity of the safety barrier 30.
Meanwhile, the judgment references adopted by the safety barrier integrity judgment method provided by the embodiment of the application are the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter in the nuclear power safety system 10 and the safety control signal from the nuclear power protection system 50, the parameters are the basic state parameters of the nuclear power safety system 10 and the nuclear power protection system 50, the method is suitable for judging the integrity of the safety barrier 30 in most nuclear power plants, and the method is wide in applicability.
Referring to fig. 3, in an alternative embodiment of the present application, step 202 includes steps 301-302:
step 301, the control device receives the first dose rate of radioactive material, the coolant temperature, the circuit water charge and the steam generator status in the second safety barrier from the sensing device.
The safety barrier 30 comprises a first safety barrier, a second safety barrier and a third safety barrier arranged in sequence in a direction away from the fuel assembly 20, the second safety barrier being provided with a plurality of sensing devices 40, for example: radiation measuring instruments, temperature measuring instruments, water level detecting instruments and the like. The radiation measuring instrument is used to measure a first dose rate of radioactive material within the second safety barrier, such as: uranium 235, uranium 238, etc. The temperature measuring instrument is used for measuring the temperature of the coolant in the second safety barrier, and the temperature of the coolant is normally stably maintained in a lower temperature range. The water level detector is used for detecting the water level of the loop in the second safety barrier, and the water level of the loop can comprise: the water level of the steam generator, the water level in the pipes and other water levels within the second safety barrier. Steam generator status refers to the integrity of the generator, which can be checked by any sensing device 40, such as by the radiometer measuring the presence of radioactive materials in the steam generator, thereby determining the integrity of the steam generator by determining whether a leak has occurred in the steam generator, or by the water level detector measuring the remaining water level in the steam generator to determine the integrity of the steam generator. The plurality of sensing devices 40 transmit the collected first dose rate, coolant temperature, circuit water charge, and steam generator status to the control device 60 via a communication device or the like, and the control device 60 stores them for further analysis and processing.
Step 302, the control device receives a second dose rate and a gas pressure of the radioactive material in the third safety barrier from the sensing device.
Disposed within the third safety barrier are a plurality of sensing devices 40, such as: radiometers, pressure gauges, etc. The radiation meter is configured to measure a second dose rate of the radioactive material within the third safety barrier, such as: uranium 235, uranium 238, etc. The pressure gauge is used for measuring the gas pressure in the third safety barrier, once the integrity of the first and second safety barriers is damaged, the temperature in the third safety barrier will rise sharply, and the gas pressure in the third safety barrier should be monitored in real time because the rising temperature will cause the gas pressure in the third safety barrier to increase. The plurality of sensing devices 40 transmit the acquired second dose rate and the gas pressure to the control device 60 through a communication device or the like, and the control device 60 stores the second dose rate and the gas pressure for further analysis and processing.
In an alternative embodiment of the present application, step 203 comprises: the control equipment receives at least one signal of a safety injection trigger signal, a shutdown starting signal and an isolation trigger signal sent by the nuclear power protection system 50.
The nuclear power protection system 50 includes a controller and a plurality of protection devices, the plurality of protection devices include, for example, a spraying device, an isolation device, and the like, the controller is respectively connected to the control device 60 and the plurality of protection devices through signals, and the controller controls to output different safety control signals according to signals collected by the plurality of sensing devices 40 stored in the control device 60, so as to control the plurality of protection devices to operate, so as to protect the nuclear power safety system 10. The safety control signal generated by the controller comprises a safety injection trigger signal, a shutdown start signal, an isolation trigger signal and the like,
the safety injection trigger signal, that is, the safety injection system trigger signal, is used to start the spraying equipment, and cool the fuel assembly 20, the first safety barrier, the second safety barrier, the third safety barrier, and the like in the nuclear power safety system 10. The shutdown start signal is transmitted to a control point of the fuel assembly 20 to shut down the fuel assembly 20, and the fuel assembly 20 is controlled to stop operating. The isolation trigger signal is used to transmit to an isolation device to activate the isolation device to isolate the nuclear power safety system 10 from further leakage of radioactive material into the environment. Once triggered, the safety control signal indicates that the current safety barrier 30 already has a certain safety risk, and therefore, taking the safety control signal as one of the elements for judging the integrity of the safety barrier 30 can effectively improve the accuracy of the safety barrier integrity judgment method in the embodiment of the present application.
Referring to fig. 4, in an alternative embodiment of the present application, step 204 includes steps 401-406:
step 401, the control device detects whether the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature.
The coolant is stored in the second safety barrier, i.e., the cooling layer of the primary pressure boundary layer, and is used to dissipate heat generated by the nuclear reaction of the fuel assemblies 20 to reduce the temperature within the safety barrier 30. A temperature measuring instrument or the like is inserted in the coolant, the temperature of the coolant is detected in real time, and the coolant temperature is transmitted to the control device 60 for further processing by the control device 60. The control device 60 compares the coolant temperature with a first preset temperature preset inside thereof after receiving the coolant temperature to determine whether the current coolant temperature is higher than the first preset temperature. It should be noted that the first preset temperature may be specifically set according to actual situations, and may be, for example, 400 ℃, 500 ℃, and the like, and the embodiment is not particularly limited.
Step 402, the control device detects whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount.
The water level measuring instrument measures the water content of the loop in the second safety barrier in real time, the measured water content data of the loop are transmitted to the control device 60, the control device 60 temporarily stores the water content data of the loop, the water content of the loop is compared with the preset water amount preset inside the control device, and whether the water content of the loop is smaller than the preset water amount at the current moment or not is judged.
Step 403, the control device detects whether the second dose rate is greater than a second preset dose rate.
The radiation measuring instrument transmits the measured second dose rate of the radioactive substance in the third safety barrier to the control device 60, the control device 60 temporarily stores the second dose rate data, compares the second dose rate with a second preset dose rate preset inside the second safety barrier, and determines whether the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate at the current moment.
Step 404, the control device detects whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature.
The temperature measuring instrument measures the outlet temperature of the fuel assembly 20 in real time, transmits outlet temperature data obtained through measurement to the control device 60 through the communication device and the like, and the control device 60 temporarily stores the outlet temperature data, compares the outlet temperature data with a second preset temperature preset inside the outlet temperature data, and judges whether the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature at the current moment.
Step 405, if the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature or the loop water charge is less than a preset water amount, the control device determines that the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state.
In a first aspect, if the coolant temperature is higher than the first predetermined temperature, this indicates that the residual heat removal function is severely degraded due to overheating of the second safety barrier, and the coolant begins to overheat, and the overheating phenomenon only occurs when the fuel assembly 20 begins to be exposed, which indicates that there is a potential loss of integrity of the first safety barrier, i.e., the first safety barrier is in the potential loss of integrity state.
In a second aspect, if the return water capacity of the second safety barrier is less than the predetermined amount, which means that the pressure vessel level of the second safety barrier has begun to fall below the top of the core and the fuel assemblies 20 have begun to be exposed, then a potential loss of integrity of the first safety barrier is indicated. Or the steam generator loses heat conduction capability due to the severe reduction of the secondary side water level, the heat in the fuel assembly 20 cannot be timely conducted out, and finally the fuel assembly 20 is damaged due to overheating, and it is preset that the integrity of the first safety barrier is potentially lost, that is, the first safety barrier is in the integrity potential loss state.
Step 406, if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate or the outlet temperature is greater than the second preset temperature, the control device determines that the first safety barrier is in the complete integrity loss state.
In a first aspect, if the second dose rate of the radioactive substance in the third safety barrier is greater than the second preset dose rate, it means that the first safety barrier has been damaged in a certain proportion, and the radioactive substance, including the inert gas, in the gap of the first safety barrier is released into the third safety barrier along with the second safety barrier, which is also indicative of the integrity loss of the first safety barrier, that is, the first safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In a second aspect, if the outlet temperature, i.e. the core outlet temperature of the fuel assemblies 20, is higher than the second predetermined temperature, e.g. higher than 650 ℃, it means that most of the fuel assemblies 20 are exposed and the fuel assemblies 20 begin to melt and break, which is indicative of the loss of integrity of the first safety barrier, i.e. the first safety barrier is in a complete loss of integrity state.
Referring to fig. 5, in an alternative embodiment of the present application, step 204 further includes steps 501-508:
step 501, the control device detects whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate.
The radiation measuring instrument transmits the measured first dose rate of the radioactive substance in the second safety barrier to the control device 60, the control device 60 temporarily stores the first dose rate data, compares the first dose rate with a first preset dose rate preset inside the first safety barrier, and determines whether the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate at the current moment.
Step 502, the control device detects whether the second dose rate is greater than a second preset dose rate.
The radiation measuring instrument transmits the measured second dose rate of the radioactive substance in the third safety barrier to the control device 60, the control device 60 temporarily stores the second dose rate data, compares the second dose rate with a second preset dose rate preset inside the second safety barrier, and determines whether the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate at the current moment.
Step 503, the control device detects whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount.
The water level measuring instrument measures the water filling amount of the loop in the second safety barrier in real time, transmits the measured water filling amount data of the loop to the control device 60, and the control device 60 temporarily stores the water filling amount data of the loop, compares the water filling amount of the loop with the preset water amount preset inside the control device and judges whether the water filling amount of the loop is smaller than the preset water amount at the current moment.
Step 504, the control device detects whether the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature.
The coolant is stored in the second safety barrier, i.e., the cooling layer of the primary pressure boundary layer, and is used to dissipate heat generated by the nuclear reaction of the fuel assemblies 20 to reduce the temperature within the safety barrier 30. A temperature measuring instrument or the like is inserted in the coolant, the temperature of the coolant is detected in real time, and the coolant temperature is transmitted to the control device 60 for further processing by the control device 60. The control device 60 compares the coolant temperature with a first preset temperature preset therein after receiving the coolant temperature to determine whether the current coolant temperature is higher than the first preset temperature. It should be noted that the first preset temperature may be specifically set according to actual situations, and may be, for example, 400 ℃, 500 ℃, and the like, and the embodiment is not particularly limited.
And 505, detecting whether the nuclear power protection system generates a shutdown starting signal by the control equipment.
When the nuclear power protection system 50 determines whether the current nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal according to the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter received in the control device 60, once the nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal, a shutdown start signal is immediately generated and transmitted to the fuel assembly 20 to control the fuel assembly 20 to stop working.
Step 506, the control equipment detects whether the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal.
When the nuclear power protection system 50 judges whether the current nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal according to the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter received in the control device 60, once the nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal, a safety injection trigger signal is immediately generated and transmitted to the spraying device, and the spraying device is controlled to start working.
Step 507, if the loop water content is less than a preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates a shutdown start signal, the control device determines that the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state.
In the first aspect, once the loop water content in the second safety barrier is less than the preset water amount, this means that the cooling system such as the steam generator in the second safety barrier loses its heat conduction capability due to the severe decrease of the secondary water level, the heat generated by the nuclear reaction in the fuel assembly 20 cannot be timely dissipated, and the continuous temperature rise of the second safety barrier may cause the pressure in the second safety barrier to exceed its safety pressure or limit pressure, which indicates that there is a potential loss of the integrity of the second safety barrier, i.e., the second safety barrier is in the potential loss of the integrity state.
In a second aspect, once the coolant temperature is above the first predetermined temperature, it is predicted that the overcooling of the second safety barrier will result in a significant degradation of the residual heat removal, meaning that there is a significant pressure and thermal shock to the reactor pressure vessel, and the risk of brittle fracture of the vessel, which is predicted as a potential loss of the second safety barrier, i.e. the second safety barrier is in a state of potential loss of integrity.
In a third aspect, when the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate, it is characterized that there is a leakage in a pipe of a device such as a steam generator in the second safety barrier, and the presence of radioactive substances in the second safety barrier causes a severe degradation of the integrity of the second safety barrier.
Step 508, if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal, the control device determines that the second safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In the first aspect, when the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, it is indicated that radioactive substances exist in the third safety barrier, that is, the radioactive substances generated by nuclear reactions in the fuel assembly 20 enter the third safety barrier along with the first safety barrier and the second safety barrier, that is, the integrity of the first safety barrier and the second safety barrier is completely lost, that is, the second safety barrier is in a state where the integrity is completely lost.
In a second aspect, when the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate, for example, greater than 0.02Gy/h, it is indicated that there is a leakage in a pipe of a device such as a steam generator in the second safety barrier, and the presence of radioactive substances in the second safety barrier causes a serious degradation of the integrity of the second safety barrier, and if the nuclear power protection system 50 generates the safety injection trigger signal at the same time, it represents that the leakage of the second safety barrier has already started the safety protection system, that is, it may be determined that the integrity of the second safety barrier has been completely lost, that is, the second safety barrier is in the complete integrity loss state.
Referring to fig. 6, in an alternative embodiment of the present application, step 204 further includes steps 601-609:
step 601, the control device detects whether the gas pressure is higher than a preset pressure.
The pressure gauge measures the gas pressure in the third safety barrier in real time, transmits the measured gas pressure data to the control device 60 through the communication device and the like, and the control device 60 temporarily stores the gas pressure data and compares the gas pressure with the preset pressure preset inside the control device, so as to judge whether the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure. It should be noted that the preset pressure in this embodiment may be specifically set according to actual situations, and this embodiment is not limited in any way.
Step 602, the control device detects whether the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal.
When the nuclear power protection system 50 judges whether the current nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal according to the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter received in the control device 60, once the nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal, a safety injection trigger signal is immediately generated and transmitted to the spraying device, and the spraying device is controlled to start working.
Step 603, the control equipment detects whether the spraying equipment fails to start.
Under normal conditions, the spraying equipment receives a safety injection trigger signal sent by the nuclear power protection system 50 and starts working. But once the spraying equipment fails, the spraying equipment cannot be started normally. The pressure gauge sends the water pressure to the control device 60 by measuring the water pressure at the water outlet of the spraying device, and the control device 60 judges whether the current spraying device fails to start or not according to the water pressure.
Step 604, the control device detects whether the nuclear power protection system generates an isolation trigger signal.
When the nuclear power protection system 50 determines whether the current nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal according to the fuel function parameter and the barrier function parameter received in the control device 60, once the nuclear power protection system 50 is abnormal, an isolation trigger signal is immediately generated and transmitted to an isolation device, the isolation device is controlled to operate, and the nuclear power safety system 10 is safely isolated.
Step 605, the control device detects whether the isolation device fails to start.
Under normal conditions, the isolation device receives an isolation trigger signal sent by the nuclear power protection system 50, and starts working. But once the isolation device fails, it cannot start up normally. The control device 60 detects an action signal of the isolation device through a signal detector or the like, and transmits the detected action signal to the control device 60, and the control device 60 determines whether the isolation device fails to be started through the action signal.
Step 606, the control device detects whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature.
The temperature measuring instrument measures the outlet temperature of the fuel assembly 20 in real time, transmits outlet temperature data obtained through measurement to the control device 60 through communication equipment and the like, and the control device 60 temporarily stores the outlet temperature data, compares the outlet temperature data with a second preset temperature preset inside the outlet temperature data, and judges whether the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature at the current moment.
Step 607, the control device detects whether the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate.
The radiation measuring instrument transmits the measured second dose rate of the radioactive substance in the third safety barrier to the control device 60, the control device 60 temporarily stores the second dose rate data, compares the second dose rate with a second preset dose rate preset inside the second safety barrier, and determines whether the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate at the current moment.
Step 608, if the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure, the nuclear power protection system generates a safety injection trigger signal, the spraying device fails to start, or the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature, or the second dose rate is higher than the second preset dose rate, the control device determines that the third safety barrier is in an integrity potential loss state.
On the first hand, if the gas pressure in the third safety barrier is higher than the preset pressure, for example, higher than the limit pressure of 0.52MPa, it indicates that a large amount of mass-energy release exists in the third safety barrier, and at this time, the spraying device in the safety protection system needs to be started as soon as possible to reduce the pressure of the third safety barrier, that is, the safety protection system needs to generate a safety injection trigger signal and send the safety injection trigger signal to the spraying device. Normally, the spraying equipment receives the safety injection trigger signal and immediately starts to spray and reduce the pressure, and once the starting fails, the potential loss of the integrity of the third safety barrier is indicated, namely the third safety barrier is in the potential loss state of the integrity.
In a second aspect, if the outlet temperature is greater than a second predetermined temperature, such as greater than 650 ℃, this may indicate that the fuel assembly 20 has been exposed to a large area and that the coolant in the second safety barrier is almost completely released into the third safety barrier, indicating a potential loss of integrity of the third safety barrier, i.e., the third safety barrier is in a potential loss of integrity condition.
In a third aspect, if the second dose rate in the third safety barrier is greater than the second preset dose rate, for example, greater than 20Gy/h, this may mean that the fuel assembly 20 has been damaged by a large area, which may only occur if the fuel assembly 20 is exposed continuously, and once this occurs, this may mean that the coolant in the second safety barrier has been released into the third safety barrier in a large amount, which may indicate that there is a potential loss of integrity of the third safety barrier, i.e., that the third safety barrier is in the potential loss of integrity state.
Step 609, if the safety protection system generates an isolation trigger signal and the isolation device fails to start, the control device determines that the third safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
Generally, when the first dose rate in the second safety barrier is greater than the first preset dose rate, or the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, this means that a breach accident occurs in the third safety barrier, and a large amount of mass energy is released in the third safety barrier, it is necessary to start the isolation device as soon as possible, that is, close the isolation valve of the third safety barrier to isolate the third safety barrier. At this time, the safety protection system generates an isolation trigger signal to start the isolation device to operate, so as to isolate the third safety barrier. In case of a failed start-up of the isolation device, i.e. a failure of the safety valves of the third safety barrier to close all, this means that the third safety barrier is bypassed, i.e. the integrity of this third safety barrier has been completely lost, i.e. this third safety barrier is in a completely integrity-lost state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the method further comprises: control device 60 determines a safety emergency action level based on the integrity status of safety barrier 30, wherein the safety emergency action level comprises: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency.
The control device 60 determines the safety emergency action level of the nuclear power plant according to the integrity state of the safety barrier 30, and the safety emergency action level is divided into four types: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency. Emergency standby means that a worker needs to quickly take measures to evaluate working conditions and develop certain measures to relieve, response preparation is enhanced, and the response preparation is gradually enhanced according to conditions. Factory emergency refers to the need to take immediate action to mitigate the consequences of an accident and protect field personnel. Factory emergency refers to the need for taking protective action off-site based on taking immediate action to mitigate the consequences of an accident and to protect on-site personnel. The off-site emergency is to take action immediately to relieve the accident result, protect personnel in the factory to the maximum extent and reduce the influence on the public. In this embodiment, when only the first safety barrier is in a state of potential integrity loss or in a state of complete integrity loss, emergency standby safety emergency action is taken. When the second safety barrier is in the state of potential integrity loss or the state of complete integrity loss, the safety emergency action of factory emergency or factory area emergency can be adopted. When the third safety barrier is in a potential loss of integrity state or a complete loss of integrity state, an offsite contingency safety action must be taken.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, a display device may be further provided, where the display device is in signal connection with the control device 60, and the display device is configured to display the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal, which are stored in the control device 60 and acquired by each sensor at the current time, so as to facilitate real-time monitoring by a worker. Meanwhile, the display device may also display the integrity state of the safety barrier 30 determined by the control device 60 according to the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal, so as to facilitate the real-time monitoring of the specific state of the safety barrier 30 by the staff. The integrity status of the security barrier 30 includes six: the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state or in a complete integrity loss state, the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state or in a complete integrity loss state, and the third safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state or in a complete integrity loss state.
It should be understood that, although the steps in the flowchart are shown in order as indicated by the arrows, the steps are not necessarily performed in order as indicated by the arrows. The steps are not limited to being performed in the exact order illustrated and, unless explicitly stated herein, may be performed in other orders. Moreover, at least some of the steps in the figures may include multiple steps or multiple stages, which are not necessarily performed at the same time, but may be performed at different times, and the order of performing the steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but may be performed alternately or alternatively with other steps or at least some of the steps or stages in other steps.
Referring to fig. 7, an embodiment of the present application provides a device 70 for determining the integrity of a safety barrier 30, which includes: a first receiving module 701, a second receiving module 702, a third receiving module 703 and an integrity determining module 704.
The first receiving module 701 is used for receiving a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly 20 in the nuclear power safety system 10, which is sent by a sensing device 40, wherein the fuel function parameter is used for representing a function state of the fuel assembly 20, the fuel function parameter comprises an outlet temperature of the fuel assembly 20, and the nuclear power safety system 10 comprises the fuel assembly 20 and a safety barrier 30 arranged outside the fuel assembly 20;
second receiving module 702 is configured to receive a barrier function parameter of safety barrier 30 in nuclear power safety system 10, where the barrier function parameter is used to represent a functional state of safety barrier 30, which is sent by sensing device 40;
the third receiving module 703 is configured to receive a safety control signal sent by the nuclear power protection system 50, where the safety control signal is used to regulate and control the nuclear power safety system 10 when the nuclear power safety system 10 fails;
the integrity determination module 704 is configured to determine an integrity status of the safety barrier 30 based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal; the integrity status of the security barrier 30 includes a potential integrity loss status and a complete integrity loss status, wherein the potential integrity loss status means that the security function of the security barrier 30 is between normal and loss, and the complete integrity loss status means that the security function of the security barrier 30 is completely lost.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the second receiving module 702 is specifically configured to: receiving the first dose rate of radioactive material in the second safety barrier, the coolant temperature, the circuit water charge, and the steam generator status sent by the sensing device 40; a second dose rate and gas pressure of the radioactive material within the third safety barrier transmitted by the sensing device 40 is received.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the third receiving module 703 is specifically configured to: receiving at least one of a safety injection trigger signal, a shutdown start signal and an isolation trigger signal sent by the nuclear power protection system 50, wherein the safety injection trigger signal is used for starting spraying equipment for cooling the nuclear power safety system 10, the shutdown start signal is used for controlling the fuel assembly 20 to stop working, and the isolation trigger signal is used for starting isolation equipment for isolating the nuclear power safety system 10.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the integrity determination module 704 is specifically configured to: detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; if the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature or the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, determining that the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; and if the second dosage rate is greater than the second preset dosage rate or the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature, determining that the first safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the integrity determination module 704 is specifically configured to: detecting whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether a shutdown starting signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; detecting whether a safety injection trigger signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; if the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a shutdown start signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a safety injection trigger signal, it is determined that the second safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, the integrity determination module 704 is specifically configured to: detecting whether the gas pressure is higher than a preset pressure; detecting whether a safety injection trigger signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; detecting whether the spraying equipment fails to start; detecting whether the nuclear power protection system 50 generates an isolation trigger signal; detecting whether the isolation equipment fails to be started; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; if the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure, the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a safety injection trigger signal, the spraying equipment fails to start, or the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature, or the second dosage rate is higher than the second preset dosage rate, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in an integrity potential loss state; and if the safety protection system generates an isolation trigger signal and the isolation equipment fails to start, determining that the third safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In an optional embodiment of the present application, further comprising an action determination module for determining a safety contingency action level according to the integrity status of safety barrier 30, wherein the safety contingency action level comprises: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency.
For specific limitations of safety barrier 30 integrity determination device 70, reference may be made to the above limitations of the safety barrier integrity determination method, which are not described herein again. The above-mentioned modules in the integrity determination device 70 of the security barrier 30 can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware and a combination thereof. The modules can be embedded in a hardware form or independent from a processor in the control device, and can also be stored in a memory in the control device in a software form, so that the processor can call and execute operations corresponding to the modules.
Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram of an internal structure of a Control device in an embodiment of the present application, where the Control device may be a server or a Distributed Control System (DCS). As shown in fig. 8, the control device includes a processor, a memory, and a communication component connected by a system bus. Wherein the processor is used for providing calculation and control capability and supporting the operation of the whole control device. The memory may include a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The computer program can be executed by a processor to implement a method for determining integrity of a security barrier provided in the above embodiments. The internal memory provides a cached execution environment for the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The control device may communicate with other control devices (e.g., STAs) through the communication component.
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the configuration shown in fig. 8 is a block diagram of only a portion of the configuration associated with the present application and does not constitute a limitation on the control device to which the present application is applied, and a particular control device may include more or less components than those shown in the figures, or combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.
In one embodiment, there is provided a control apparatus including: the system comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to realize the following steps:
receiving a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly 20 in the nuclear power safety system 10 sent by a sensing device 40, wherein the fuel function parameter is used for representing a function state of the fuel assembly 20, the fuel function parameter comprises an outlet temperature of the fuel assembly 20, and the nuclear power safety system 10 comprises the fuel assembly 20 and a safety barrier 30 arranged outside the fuel assembly 20;
receiving a barrier function parameter of the security barrier 30 sent by the sensing device 40, wherein the barrier function parameter is used for representing the function state of the security barrier 30;
receiving a safety control signal sent by a nuclear power protection system 50, wherein the safety control signal is used for regulating and controlling the nuclear power safety system 10 when the nuclear power safety system 10 fails;
determining an integrity status of the safety barrier 30 based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal; the integrity status of the security barrier 30 includes a potential integrity loss status and a complete integrity loss status, wherein the potential integrity loss status means that the security function of the security barrier 30 is between normal and loss, and the complete integrity loss status means that the security function of the security barrier 30 is completely lost.
In one embodiment of the application, the processor when executing the computer program further performs the steps of: receiving the first dose rate of radioactive material in the second safety barrier, the coolant temperature, the circuit water charge, and the steam generator status sent by the sensing device 40; a second dose rate and gas pressure of the radioactive material within the third safety barrier transmitted by the sensing device 40 is received.
In one embodiment of the application, the processor when executing the computer program further performs the steps of: receiving at least one of a safety injection trigger signal, a shutdown start signal and an isolation trigger signal sent by the nuclear power protection system 50, wherein the safety injection trigger signal is used for starting spraying equipment for cooling the nuclear power safety system 10, the shutdown start signal is used for controlling the fuel assembly 20 to stop working, and the isolation trigger signal is used for starting isolation equipment for isolating the nuclear power safety system 10.
In one embodiment of the application, the processor when executing the computer program further performs the steps of: detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; if the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature or the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, determining that the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; and if the second dosage rate is greater than the second preset dosage rate or the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature, determining that the first safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In one embodiment of the application, the processor when executing the computer program further performs the steps of: detecting whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether a shutdown starting signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; detecting whether a safety injection trigger signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; if the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a shutdown start signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a safety injection trigger signal, it is determined that the second safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In one embodiment of the application, the processor when executing the computer program further performs the steps of: detecting whether the gas pressure is higher than a preset pressure; detecting whether a safety injection trigger signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; detecting whether the spraying equipment fails to start; detecting whether the nuclear power protection system 50 generates an isolation trigger signal; detecting whether the isolation equipment fails to be started; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; if the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure, the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a safety injection trigger signal, the spraying equipment fails to start, or the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature, or the second dosage rate is higher than the second preset dosage rate, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in an integrity potential loss state; if the safety protection system generates an isolation trigger signal and the isolation device fails to start, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In one embodiment of the application, the processor when executing the computer program further performs the steps of: determining a safety emergency action level based on the integrity status of safety barrier 30, wherein the safety emergency action level comprises: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency.
The implementation principle and technical effect of the control device provided in the embodiment of the present application are similar to those of the method embodiment described above, and are not described herein again.
In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, which computer program, when executed by a processor, performs the steps of:
receiving a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly 20 in the nuclear power safety system 10 sent by a sensing device 40, wherein the fuel function parameter is used for representing a function state of the fuel assembly 20, the fuel function parameter comprises an outlet temperature of the fuel assembly 20, and the nuclear power safety system 10 comprises the fuel assembly 20 and a safety barrier 30 arranged outside the fuel assembly 20;
receiving a barrier function parameter of the security barrier 30 sent by the sensing device 40, wherein the barrier function parameter is used for representing the function state of the security barrier 30;
receiving a safety control signal sent by a nuclear power protection system 50, wherein the safety control signal is used for regulating and controlling the nuclear power safety system 10 when the nuclear power safety system 10 fails;
determining an integrity status of the safety barrier 30 based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal; the integrity status of the security barrier 30 includes a potential integrity loss status and a complete integrity loss status, wherein the potential integrity loss status means that the security function of the security barrier 30 is between normal and loss, and the complete integrity loss status means that the security function of the security barrier 30 is completely lost.
In one embodiment of the application, the computer program when executed by the processor further performs the steps of: receiving the first dose rate of radioactive material, coolant temperature, circuit water charge and steam generator status in the second safety barrier from the sensing device 40; a second dose rate and gas pressure of the radioactive material within the third safety barrier transmitted by the sensing device 40 is received.
In one embodiment of the application, the computer program when executed by the processor further performs the steps of: receiving at least one of a safety injection trigger signal, a shutdown start signal and an isolation trigger signal sent by the nuclear power protection system 50, wherein the safety injection trigger signal is used for starting spraying equipment for cooling the nuclear power safety system 10, the shutdown start signal is used for controlling the fuel assembly 20 to stop working, and the isolation trigger signal is used for starting isolation equipment for isolating the nuclear power safety system 10.
In one embodiment of the application, the computer program when executed by the processor further performs the steps of: detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; if the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature or the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, determining that the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; and if the second dosage rate is greater than the second preset dosage rate or the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature, determining that the first safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In one embodiment of the application, the computer program when executed by the processor further performs the steps of: detecting whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether a shutdown starting signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; detecting whether a safety injection trigger signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; if the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than a first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a shutdown start signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state; if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a safety injection trigger signal, it is determined that the second safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In one embodiment of the application, the computer program when executed by the processor further performs the steps of: detecting whether the gas pressure is higher than a preset pressure; detecting whether a safety injection trigger signal is generated by the nuclear power protection system 50; detecting whether the spraying equipment fails to start; detecting whether the nuclear power protection system 50 generates an isolation trigger signal; detecting whether the isolation equipment fails to be started; detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; if the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure, the nuclear power protection system 50 generates a safety injection trigger signal, the spraying equipment fails to start, or the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature, or the second dosage rate is higher than the second preset dosage rate, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in an integrity potential loss state; if the safety protection system generates an isolation trigger signal and the isolation device fails to start, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in a complete integrity loss state.
In one embodiment of the application, the computer program when executed by the processor further performs the steps of: determining a safety emergency action level based on the integrity status of safety barrier 30, wherein the safety emergency action level comprises: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency.
The implementation principle and technical effect of the computer-readable storage medium provided by this embodiment are similar to those of the above-described method embodiment, and are not described herein again.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the processes of the methods of the embodiments described above can be implemented by hardware instructions of a computer program, which can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any reference to memory, storage, database or other medium used in the embodiments provided herein can include non-volatile and/or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), Electrically Programmable ROM (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in M forms, such as Static RAM (SRAM), Dynamic RAM (DRAM), Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), Double Data Rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), Enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous Link (SyMchliMk) DRAM (SLDRAM), RaMbus (RaMbus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).
All possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments may not be described for the sake of brevity, but should be considered as being within the scope of the present disclosure as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present application, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, which falls within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims (10)

1. A method for discriminating between integrity of a security barrier, the method comprising:
receiving a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly in a nuclear power safety system, wherein the fuel function parameter is used for representing the function state of the fuel assembly, the fuel function parameter comprises the outlet temperature of the fuel assembly, and the nuclear power safety system comprises the fuel assembly and a safety barrier arranged outside the fuel assembly;
receiving the barrier function parameter of the safety barrier sent by the sensing device, wherein the barrier function parameter is used for representing the functional state of the safety barrier, the safety barrier comprises a first safety barrier, a second safety barrier and a third safety barrier which are sequentially arranged along the direction far away from the fuel assembly, and the receiving the barrier function parameter of the safety barrier sent by the sensing device comprises: receiving a first dose rate of radioactive material, coolant temperature and circuit water charge in the second safety barrier from the sensing device; receiving a second dose rate of radioactive materials in the third safety barrier sent by the sensing device;
receiving a safety control signal sent by a nuclear power protection system, wherein the safety control signal is used for regulating and controlling the nuclear power safety system when the nuclear power safety system fails, and the receiving the safety control signal sent by the nuclear power protection system comprises: receiving at least one signal of a safety injection trigger signal and a shutdown start signal sent by the nuclear power protection system, wherein the safety injection trigger signal is used for starting spraying equipment for cooling the nuclear power safety system, and the shutdown start signal is used for controlling the fuel assembly to stop working;
determining an integrity status of the safety barrier as a function of the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal; wherein the integrity status of the safety barrier includes a potential loss of integrity status and a complete loss of integrity status, the potential loss of integrity status refers to the safety function of the safety barrier being between normal and lost, and the complete loss of integrity status refers to the safety function of the safety barrier being completely lost; the determining the integrity status of the safety barrier as a function of the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal comprises:
detecting whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether the nuclear power protection system generates the shutdown starting signal or not; detecting whether the nuclear power protection system generates the safety injection trigger signal;
if the water content of the loop is smaller than the preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than the first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is larger than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates the shutdown starting signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in the potential integrity loss state;
and if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates the safety injection trigger signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in the complete integrity loss state.
2. The method for determining the integrity of the security barrier according to claim 1, wherein the receiving the barrier function parameter of the security barrier sent by the sensing device further comprises:
receiving a vapor generator status of radioactive material within the second safety barrier from the sensing device;
receiving the gas pressure of the radioactive material in the third safety barrier transmitted by the sensing device.
3. The method for determining the integrity of a safety barrier according to claim 2, wherein the receiving a safety control signal sent by a nuclear power protection system further comprises:
and receiving at least one signal in an isolation trigger signal sent by the nuclear power protection system, wherein the isolation trigger signal is used for starting isolation equipment for isolating the nuclear power safety system.
4. The safety barrier integrity discrimination method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the determining the integrity status of the safety barrier from the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal comprises:
detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature;
detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not;
detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not;
detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature;
determining that the first safety barrier is in the potential loss of integrity state if the coolant temperature is above the first predetermined temperature or the circuit water charge is less than the predetermined water charge;
and if the second dosage rate is greater than the second preset dosage rate or the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature, determining that the first safety barrier is in the complete integrity loss state.
5. The safety barrier integrity discrimination method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the determining the integrity status of the safety barrier based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal further comprises:
detecting whether the gas pressure is higher than a preset pressure;
detecting whether the nuclear power protection system generates the safety injection trigger signal;
detecting whether the spraying equipment fails to start;
detecting whether the nuclear power protection system generates the isolation trigger signal;
detecting whether the isolation equipment fails to start;
detecting whether the outlet temperature is higher than a second preset temperature;
detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not;
if the gas pressure is higher than the preset pressure, the nuclear power protection system generates the safety injection trigger signal, the spraying equipment fails to start, or the outlet temperature is higher than the second preset temperature, or the second dosage rate is larger than the second preset dosage rate, it is determined that the third safety barrier is in the potential integrity loss state;
and if the nuclear power protection system generates the isolation trigger signal and the isolation equipment fails to be started, determining that the third safety barrier is in the complete integrity loss state.
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
determining a safety emergency action level according to the integrity status of the safety barrier, wherein the safety emergency action level comprises: emergency standby, factory emergency and off-site emergency.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein determining the security emergency action level based on the integrity status of the security barrier comprises:
if the first safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state or in a complete integrity loss state, the safety emergency action level is the emergency standby;
if the second safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state or a complete integrity loss state, the safety emergency action level is the plant emergency or the plant area emergency;
the emergency safety action level is the off-site emergency if the third safety barrier is in a potential integrity loss state or a complete integrity loss state.
8. A security barrier integrity discrimination apparatus, the apparatus comprising:
the nuclear power safety system comprises a first receiving module, a second receiving module and a control module, wherein the first receiving module is used for receiving a fuel function parameter of a fuel assembly in the nuclear power safety system, the fuel function parameter is used for representing the function state of the fuel assembly, the fuel function parameter comprises the outlet temperature of the fuel assembly, and the nuclear power safety system comprises the fuel assembly and a safety barrier arranged outside the fuel assembly;
the second receiving module is used for receiving barrier function parameters of a safety barrier in a nuclear power safety system, which are sent by sensing equipment, wherein the barrier function parameters are used for representing the function state of the safety barrier, the safety barrier comprises a first safety barrier, a second safety barrier and a third safety barrier which are sequentially arranged along the direction far away from the fuel assembly, and the receiving of the barrier function parameters of the safety barrier, which are sent by the sensing equipment, comprises the following steps: receiving a first dose rate of radioactive material, coolant temperature and circuit water charge in the second safety barrier from the sensing device; receiving a second dose rate of radioactive materials in the third safety barrier sent by the sensing device;
the third receiving module is configured to receive a safety control signal sent by a nuclear power protection system, where the safety control signal is used to regulate and control the nuclear power safety system when the nuclear power safety system fails, and the receiving the safety control signal sent by the nuclear power protection system includes: receiving at least one signal of a safety injection trigger signal and a shutdown start signal sent by the nuclear power protection system, wherein the safety injection trigger signal is used for starting spraying equipment for cooling the nuclear power safety system, and the shutdown start signal is used for controlling the fuel assembly to stop working;
an integrity determination module for determining an integrity status of the safety barrier based on the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter, and the safety control signal; wherein the integrity status of the safety barrier includes a potential loss of integrity status and a complete loss of integrity status, the potential loss of integrity status refers to the safety function of the safety barrier being between normal and lost, the complete loss of integrity status refers to the safety function of the safety barrier being completely lost, wherein the determining the integrity status of the safety barrier according to the fuel function parameter, the barrier function parameter and the safety control signal comprises: detecting whether the first dose rate is greater than a first preset dose rate; detecting whether the second dosage rate is greater than a second preset dosage rate or not; detecting whether the water content of the loop is less than a preset water amount or not; detecting whether the temperature of the coolant is higher than a first preset temperature; detecting whether the nuclear power protection system generates the shutdown starting signal or not; detecting whether the nuclear power protection system generates the safety injection trigger signal; if the water content of the loop is smaller than the preset water amount, or the coolant temperature is higher than the first preset temperature, or the first dose rate is larger than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates the shutdown starting signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in the potential integrity loss state; and if the second dose rate is greater than the second preset dose rate, or the first dose rate is greater than the first preset dose rate and the nuclear power protection system generates the safety injection trigger signal, determining that the second safety barrier is in the complete integrity loss state.
9. A control device comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, characterized in that the processor realizes the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 7 when executing the computer program.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 7.
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