CN112380269B - Identity card information inquiry and evidence fixing and obtaining method based on block chain - Google Patents
Identity card information inquiry and evidence fixing and obtaining method based on block chain Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of identity information security, and particularly relates to a block chain-based identity card information inquiry and evidence fixing and evidence obtaining method. Firstly, constructing a query center and query parties as a block chain network of a alliance, and generating a public key and a private key for a center node and each query node by adopting an elliptic curve algorithm; then, the inquiry node encrypts the inquiry request and chains the hash value of the inquiry request, returns an inquiry result when the central node receives the inquiry request, encrypts an inquiry record and chains an inquiry log to finish information inquiry and certification; and when the records of the query node are inconsistent with the records of the central node, querying whether the block chain has a corresponding query request and query records or not, and completing query evidence collection. The invention defines the data reliability of the identity card information inquiry system, solves the problem of inconsistent inquiry records caused by the cache of the user identity card information by an inquirer, and has important application value in the aspects of inquiry track tracing, business data storage and the like of the information system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of identity information security, and particularly relates to a method for inquiring, fixing and obtaining area identity card information.
Background
When the public identity card inquiry center provides the identity card information inquiry verification service, the problem that the data of the inquiry center is inconsistent with the data of an inquirer exists. The conventional method for solving the problem is to perform backtracking verification on the historical query records, however, the query record data is often stored in a single-point system and is easily damaged or tampered, so that the credibility of the query records is affected. In order to solve the security problem of query records, the existing data protection scheme usually performs incremental storage on log data according to a timestamp to form a log chain, and compresses or recalculates and arranges the log chain to reduce the storage space and recovery time overhead. And performing one-way hash on log record data, only storing an initial key of the log record data, and performing real-time integrity detection on the log by using the USBKey. Also, a log protection scheme based on a trusted cryptographic module solves the key management problem. However, existing solutions all perform protection from the production source of the log in a single point, and do not form integrity protection.
According to the log data secure storage network, the inquiry record ciphertext and the inquiry record hash value are linked through an alliance block chain technology, a hash algorithm and an elliptic curve encryption algorithm, and a log data secure storage network with a distributed chain data structure is constructed. When the query information is inconsistent with the central node, the root cause of the problem can be effectively and quickly positioned based on safe and credible log data.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a block chain-based identity card information query evidence fixing and obtaining method aiming at the problem of low credibility of query records in the traditional identity card information query network, so as to ensure the data safety and consistency of an identity card information query system, efficiently locate information query problems and improve the working efficiency of the identity card query network.
The invention provides a block chain-based identity card information inquiry and evidence fixing and obtaining method, which comprises the steps of firstly, constructing an inquiry center and inquiry parties into a block chain network of a alliance, and generating a public key and a private key for a center node and each inquiry node by adopting an elliptic curve algorithm; then, the inquiry node encrypts the inquiry request and chains the inquiry request hash value, returns an inquiry result when the central node receives the inquiry request, encrypts the inquiry record and chains the inquiry log to complete information inquiry and certification; when the records of the query node are inconsistent with the records of the central node, querying whether the block chain has a corresponding query request and query records or not, and completing query and evidence obtaining; the method comprises the following specific steps.
(1) The identity card information inquiry and fixing method specifically comprises the following substeps;
(1.1) based on the alliance blockchain network, generating a pair of public key and private key for the inquiry party node A and the inquiry center node C by adopting an elliptic curve algorithmP，S) As a unique identity on a chain, the process is as follows:
(1.1.1) selecting an elliptic curve from the nodesE(x, y)And get togetherE(x, y) Any base point ofG(x', y') CalculatingG(x', y')
Order of (1)n；
(1.1.2) selection of integersk（k < n，nIs a base pointG(x', y') Order of) as a private key of a node, a public key of the node is calculated according to an elliptic curve addition operation ruleK=kG；
(1.2) inquiring request certificate; the inquiring party node A initiates an identity card inquiring request to the inquiring center node CReqThe processing steps are as follows:
(1.2.1) Inquiry side node A sends inquiry requestReqApplying a Hash AlgorithmSHA256Get the digital fingerprint of the query request, notehashReq；
(1.2.2) the inquiring party node A adopts an elliptic curve algorithm and a private key Sa of the inquiring party node A to carry out pairinghashReqSigning, i.e.sig(hashReq)；
(1.2.3) the identification card (ID),Req、sig(hashReq) For uplink storage in transactional form;
(1.3) fixing the ID card inquiry result; after the query center node C receives the query request of the query party node A, the processing steps are as follows:
(1.3.1) the query center node C returns a query result to the node A;
(1.3.2) the query center node C adopts a Hash algorithmSHA256For query logsRlogPerforming a hash operationObtaining the digital fingerprint of the query log, and recording the digital fingerprinthashRlog；
(1.3.3) inquiring the central node C by adopting an elliptic curve signature algorithm and a private key Sc of the inquiring central node ChashRlogSigning, i.e.sig(hashRlog)；
(1.3.4) the identification card (ID),Rlog、sig(hashRlog) In a transaction form, uplink storage.
(2) The method specifically comprises the following substeps of inquiring and recording identity cards to obtain evidence:
(2.1) sending a query request according to the ID and the time range of the identity card needing to be proved, and searching a matching result on the chain based on the data sets in the step (1.2.3) and the step (1.3.4);
(2.2) inquiring and returning the inquiry request and the inquiry log data of the ID card corresponding to the block chain;
(2.3) the inquiring party A provides the ID card and local inquiry request log data corresponding to the ID card ID and the time;
(2.4) bySHA256Calculating the hash value of the query request log data returned in the step (2.3);
and (2.5) comparing the hash value of the step (2.4) with the hash value of the query request obtained in the step (2.2).
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. the block chain type data structure and the distributed storage method of the block chain technology effectively overcome the defects of the single-point log storage method of the traditional identity card inquiry system and ensure the data security and consistency of the inquiry records;
2. the query request and the query record are signed and linked by adopting an asymmetric encryption algorithm, a signature algorithm and a Hash algorithm, so that the source of the query message can be quickly verified, and the data integrity of the query result can be ensured;
3. when the data of the query center is inconsistent with the data of the query party, a block chain data storage mode based on multi-party consensus provides powerful self-certification guarantee for the two parties, and the efficiency of problem location and solution is greatly improved.
The invention links up the ID card information query request, the query record ciphertext and the hash value, ensures the data reliability of the ID card information query system, can effectively solve the problem of inconsistent query records caused by the cache of the user ID card information by a query party, and has important application value in the aspects of query track tracing, business data storage and the like of the information system.
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Fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a block chain-based identity card information query evidence fixing and evidence obtaining method.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the identity card information query and evidence collection method based on the blockchain of the present invention includes the following steps.
(1) The identity card information inquiry and fixing method specifically comprises the following steps.
(1.1) based on the alliance block chain network, generating a pair of inquiry party nodes and inquiry center nodes by adopting an elliptic curve algorithm
Public and private keys: (P，S) As a unique identity on the chain; the method comprises the following steps:
(1.1.1) selecting an elliptic curve E (1x, y) And take E: (E)x, y) Any one of the base points G (x', y') Calculating G: (x', y') Order of (1)n；
(1.1.2) selection of integersk（k < n，nIs a base point G(x', y') Order of) as a private key of a node, a public key of the node is calculated according to an elliptic curve addition operation ruleK=kG。
(1.2) query node A employsSHA256Hash algorithm to query requestReqPerforming Hash operation to obtain query request
Hash value ofhashReqThe specific process comprises the following steps:
(1.2.1) respectively taking the first 32 bits of the decimal part of the square root of the first 8 prime numbers in the natural number to generate 8 hash initial values H0={h 00, h 01, …, h 07And on the first 64 prime numbers in the natural numberTakes the first 32 bits of the radix of the cube root to generate 64 constants C = ∑ tonek 0, k 1, …, k 63}；
(1.2.2) inReqThen continuously supplementing the bit value 0 until the length satisfies the remainder 448 after modulo 512, and obtaining the intermediate message M1Then the length value of M is expressed by 64-bit data, and is added to M1At the end of (3), an intermediate message M is generated2；
(1.2.3) adding M2Is divided inton512-bit message blocks { M }0, M1, …, M n Sequentially carrying out logic calculation on each block to obtain 8 32-bit word portsw n0, w n1, …, w n7Concatenating the message digest to generate a 256-bit message digest as the hash value of the message MhashReqThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
(1.2.3.1) information Block M i Character divided into 16 32 bitsw i0, w i1, …, w i15And continuously generating 48 character ports according to the formulas (2) - (4)w i16, w i17, …, w i63}, # denotes a bitwise exclusive-or operation,S λ indicating cyclic right shiftλThe number of the bits is one,R λ indicating a shift to the rightλA bit;
w it = σ 1(w i t(−2)) + w i t(−7) + σ 0(w i t(−15)) + w i t(−16) （2）
σ 0(x)=S 7(x)⊕S 18(x)⊕R 3(x) （3）
σ 1(x)= S 17(x)⊕S 19(x)⊕R 10(x) （4）
(1.2.3.2) initializing the hash value H i ={h i(-1)0, h i(-1)1, …, h i(-1)7H for i Make 64 assignment operations, i.e.h i(-1)0=T1 +T2，h i(-1)1= h i(-1)0，h i(-1)2= h i(-1)1，h i(-1)3= h i(-1)2，h i(-1)4= h i(-1)3+T1，h i(-1)5=h i(-1)4，h i(-1)6= h i(-1)5，h i(-1)7= h i(-1)6Wherein T is1And T2Calculated according to the formulas (5) - (10),k t represents the second generation in step (1.2.1)tConstant, Λ represents bitwise and operation, and is represented by bitwise complement operation;
T1 = h i(-1)7+ Σ1(h i(-1)4) + Ch(h i(-1)4, h i(-1)5, h i(-1)6) + k t + w it （5）
T2= Σ0(h i(-1)0) +Ma(h i(-1)0, h i(-1)1, h i(-1)2) （6）
Ch(x, y, z) = (x∧y)⊕(¬x∧z) （7）
Ma(x, y, z) = (x∧y)⊕(x∧z)⊕(y∧z) （8）
Σ0(x) = S 2(x)⊕S 13(x)⊕S 22(x) （9）
Σ1(x) = S 6(x)⊕S 11(x)⊕S 25(x) （10）。
(1.3) node A adopts elliptic curve signature algorithm pairhashReqCarry out digital signatures, i.e.sig(hashReq)。
(1.4) node A will (ID),Req、sig(hashReq) In the form of a transaction to the on-chain storage.
(1.5) node C adopts Hash algorithmSHA256For query logsRlogPerforming Hash operation to obtain digital fingerprint of query loghashRlog，The specific process is as follows:
(1.5.1) respectively taking the first 32 bits of the decimal part of the square root of the first 8 prime numbers in the natural number to generate 8 hash initial values H0={h 00, h 01, …, h 07And the first 32 bits are taken for the decimal part of the cubic root of the first 64 prime numbers in the natural number to generate 64 constants C = &k 0, k 1, …, k 63}；
(1.5.2) complementing the 1 st bit value 1 at the end of M, and then continuously complementing the bit value 0 until the length meets the remainder 448 after modulus 512, so as to obtain the intermediate message M1Then the length value of M is expressed by 64-bit data, and is added to M1At the end of (3), an intermediate message M is generated2；
(1.5.3) adding M2Is divided inton512-bit message blocks { M }0, M1, …, M n Sequentially carrying out logic calculation on each block to obtain 8 32-bit word portsw n0, w n1, …, w n7Concatenating the message digest to generate a 256-bit message digest as the hash value of the message MhashRlogThe method specifically comprises the following steps:
(1.5.3.1) information block M i Character divided into 16 32 bitsw i0, w i1, …, w i15And continuously generating 48 character ports according to the formulas (2) - (4)w i16, w i17, …, w i63}, # denotes a bitwise exclusive-or operation,S λ indicating cyclic right shiftλThe number of the bits is one,R λ indicating a shift to the rightλA bit;
w it = σ 1(w i t(−2)) + w i t(−7) + σ 0(w i t(−15)) + w i t(−16) （2）
σ 0(x)=S 7(x)⊕S 18(x)⊕R 3(x) （3）
σ 1(x)= S 17(x)⊕S 19(x)⊕R 10(x) （4）
(1.5.3.2) initializing the hash value H i ={h i(-1)0, h i(-1)1, …, h i(-1)7H for i Make 64 assignment operations, i.e.h i(-1)0=T1 +T2，h i(-1)1= h i(-1)0，h i(-1)2= h i(-1)1，h i(-1)3= h i(-1)2，h i(-1)4= h i(-1)3+T1，h i(-1)5=h i(-1)4，h i(-1)6= h i(-1)5，h i(-1)7= h i(-1)6Wherein T is1And T2Calculated according to the formulas (5) - (10),k t represents the second generation in step (1.5.1)tConstant, Λ represents bitwise and operation, and is represented by bitwise complement operation;
T1 = h i(-1)7+ Σ1(h i(-1)4) + Ch(h i(-1)4, h i(-1)5, h i(-1)6) + k t + w it （5）
T2= Σ0(h i(-1)0) +Ma(h i(-1)0, h i(-1)1, h i(-1)2) （6）
Ch(x, y, z) = (x∧y)⊕(¬x∧z) （7）
Ma(x, y, z) = (x∧y)⊕(x∧z)⊕(y∧z) （8）
Σ0(x) = S 2(x)⊕S 13(x)⊕S 22(x) （9）
Σ1(x) = S 6(x)⊕S 11(x)⊕S 25(x) （10）。
(1.6) node C adopts elliptic curve signature algorithm and private key pair of ChashRlogCarry out digital signatures, i.e.sig(hashRlog)。
(1.7) node C will (ID),Rlog、sig(hashRlog) In the form of a transaction to the on-chain storage.
(2) Identity card inquiry record evidence obtaining
When the complaint of the identity card inquiry related service occurs, the inquiry party node and the inquiry center node verify whether the inquiry history records of the inquiry party and the inquiry center are consistent through the block chain platform, and the condition that the inquiry party does not submit the inquiry request to the inquiry center is eliminated. The specific steps of inquiring the record and obtaining evidence are as follows:
(2.1) sending a query request according to the ID and the time of the identity card, and performing on-chain query;
(2.2) inquiring and returning the inquiry request and the inquiry log data of the ID card corresponding to the block chain;
(2.3) the inquiring party A provides the ID card and local inquiry request log data corresponding to the ID card ID and the time;
(2.4) use of Hash AlgorithmSHA256Calculating the hash value of the query request log data returned in the step (2.3);
and (2.5) comparing the hash value of the step (2.4) with the hash value of the query request obtained in the step (2.2).
Aiming at the problem of low credibility of query records in the traditional identity card information query network, the invention constructs a decentralized trust network based on the block chain technology, and effectively solves the problems of data safety and consistency of the traditional identity card information query system. When the query node logs of cases 1 and 2 in table 1 are not authentic, it can be quickly verified whether the query node sends the query request data to the central node by verifying the data with the digital signature on the block chain. Therefore, the operation efficiency of the identity card inquiry network is improved.
Table 1 query for presence of log data
Claims (4)
1. A block chain-based identity card information inquiry and evidence collection method is characterized in that firstly, an inquiry center node and each inquiry party node are constructed into a block chain network of a alliance, and an elliptic curve algorithm is adopted to generate a public key and a private key for the inquiry center node and each inquiry party node; then, the inquiring party node encrypts the inquiry request and links up the hash value of the inquiry request, and when the inquiry center node receives the inquiry request, the inquiry center node returns the inquiry result, encrypts the inquiry record and links up the inquiry log to complete information inquiry and authentication; when the records of the inquiring party node and the inquiring center node are inconsistent, inquiring whether the block chain of the alliance has corresponding inquiring requests and inquiring records or not, and finishing inquiring and evidence obtaining; the method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) the identity card information inquiry solid card specifically comprises the following substeps:
(1.1) based on a block chain network of the alliance, generating a pair of public keys and private keys (P, S) for a query party node and a query center node by adopting an elliptic curve algorithm as a unique identity on a chain, wherein the process comprises the following steps:
(1.1.1) selecting an elliptic curve E (x, y), taking any base point G (x ', y') on the E (x, y), and calculating the order n of G (x ', y');
(1.1.2) selecting an integer k as a private key of a node, wherein k < n and n are the order of a base point G (x ', y'); calculating a public key K of the node as kG according to an elliptic curve algorithm operation rule;
(1.2) inquiring request certificate; the inquiring party node A initiates an identity card inquiring request Req to an inquiring center node C, and the processing steps are as follows:
(1.2.1) the inquiring party node A sends an inquiring request Req, and a hash algorithm SHA256 is applied to obtain a digital fingerprint of the inquiring request, and the digital fingerprint is marked as a hashReq;
(1.2.2) the inquiring party node A digitally signs the hashReq, namely sig (hashReq), by adopting an elliptic curve algorithm and a private key Sa of the inquiring party node A;
(1.2.3) storing the ID card (ID, Req, sig (hashReq)) in a trade form and in a chain;
(1.3) fixing the ID card inquiry result; after the query center node C receives the query request of the query party node A, the processing steps are as follows:
(1.3.1) the query center node C returns a query result to the querier node A;
(1.3.2) the query center node C performs hash operation on the query log Rlog by adopting a hash algorithm SHA256 to obtain a digital fingerprint of the query log, and the digital fingerprint is recorded as hashRlog;
(1.3.3) inquiring the central node C, and digitally signing the hashRlog by adopting an elliptic curve algorithm and a private key Sc of the inquiring central node C, namely sig (hashRlog);
(1.3.4) storing the ID card (ID, Rlog, hashRlog) in a trade form and in a chain;
(2) the method specifically comprises the following substeps of inquiring and recording identity cards to obtain evidence:
(2.1) sending a query request according to the ID and the time range of the identity card needing to be proved, and searching a matching result on the chain based on the data sets in the step (1.2.3) and the step (1.3.4);
(2.2) inquiring and returning the inquiry request and the inquiry log data of the ID card corresponding to the block chain;
(2.3) the inquiring party node A provides the ID card and local inquiry request log data corresponding to the ID card ID and time;
(2.4) calculating the hash value of the query request log data returned in the step (2.3) by using SHA 256;
(2.5) comparing the hash value of the step (2.4) with the hash value of the query request obtained in the step (2.2);
in the step (1.2.1), the node a of the inquiring party performs hash operation on the query request Req by using a SHA256 hash algorithm to obtain a hash value hashReq of the query request, and the specific flow is as follows:
(1.2.1.1) respectively taking the first 32 bits of the decimal part of the square root of the first 8 prime numbers in the natural number to generate 8 hash initial values H0＝{h00,h01,…,h07And the first 32 bits are taken from the decimal part of the cubic root of the first 64 prime numbers in the natural number to generate 64 constants C ═ k0,k1,…,k63}；
(1.2.1.2) complementing the 1 st bit value 1 at the end of the Req, and then continuously complementing the bit value 0 until the length meets the remainder 448 after modulo 512, so as to obtain the intermediate message M1Then the length value of M is expressed by 64-bit data, and is added to M1At the end of (3), an intermediate message M is generated2；
(1.2.1.3) adding M2Divided into n message blocks of 512 bits size M0,M1,…,MnAnd sequentially carrying out logic calculation on each block to obtain 8 32-bit words wn0,wn1,…,wn7And concatenating the messages to generate a 256-bit message digest as the hash value hashReq of the message M.
2. The identity card information query evidence fixing and evidence obtaining method based on the blockchain according to claim 1, wherein the specific processing flow of the step (1.2.1.3) is as follows:
(1.2.1.3.1) information block MiDivided into 16 words of 32 bits wi0,wi1,…,wi15And continuing to generate 48 words { w } according to formulas (2) - (4)i16,wi17,…,wi63},. indicate a bitwise exclusive-or operation, SλIndicating a cyclic right shift of a number of bits, RλRepresents a right shift of λ bits;
wit＝σ1(wi(t-2))+wi(t-7)+σ0(wi(t-15))+wi(t-16) (2)
σ0(x)＝S7(x)⊕S18(x)⊕R3(x) (3)
σ1(x)＝S17(x)⊕S19(x)⊕R10(x) (4)
(1.2.1.3.2) initializing the hash value Hi＝{h(i-1)0,h(i-1)1,…,h(i-1)7H foriCarry out 64 assignment operations, i.e. h(i-1)0＝T1+T2，h(i-1)1＝h(i-1)0，h(i-1)2＝h(i-1)1，h(i-1)3＝h(i-1)2，h(i-1)4＝h(i-1)3+T1，h(i-1)5＝h(i-1)4，h(i-1)6＝h(i-1)5，h(i-1)7＝h(i-1)6Wherein T is1And T2K is calculated according to the formulae (5) to (10)tRepresents the tth constant generated in step (1.2.1.1), represents a bitwise and operation,
representing a bitwise complement operation;
T1＝h(i-1)7+Σ1(h(i-1)4)+Ch(h(i-1)4,h(i-1)5,h(i-1)6)+kt+wit (5)
T2＝Σ0(h(i-1)0)+Ma(h(i-1)0,h(i-1)1,h(i-1)2) (6)
Ma(x,y,z)＝(x∧y)⊕(x∧z)⊕(y∧z) (8)
Σ0(x)＝S2(x)⊕S13(x)⊕S22(x) (9)
Σ1(x)＝S6(x)⊕S11(x)⊕S25(x) (10)。
3. the identity card information inquiry and evidence obtaining method based on the blockchain as claimed in claim 2, wherein in the step (1.3.2), the inquiry center node C performs hash operation on the inquiry log Rlog by using a hash algorithm SHA256 to obtain the digital fingerprint hashRlog of the inquiry log, and the specific flow is as follows:
(1.3.2.1) respectively taking the first 32 bits of the decimal part of the square root of the first 8 prime numbers in the natural number to generate 8 hash initial values H0＝{h00,h01,…,h07And the first 32 bits are taken from the decimal part of the cubic root of the first 64 prime numbers in the natural number to generate 64 constants C ═ k0,k1,…,k63}；
(1.3.2.2) complementing the 1 st bit value 1 at the end of M, and then continuing to complement the bit value 0 until the length meets the remainder 448 after modulo 512, so as to obtain the intermediate message M1Then the length value of M is expressed by 64-bit data, and is added to M1At the end of (3), an intermediate message M is generated2；
(1.3.2.3) adding M2Divided into n message blocks of 512 bits size M0,M1,…,MnAnd sequentially carrying out logic calculation on each block to obtain 8 32-bit words wn0,wn1,…,wn7And concatenating the messages to generate a 256-bit message digest as the hash value hashRlog of the message M.
4. The identity card information query evidence fixing and evidence obtaining method based on the blockchain according to claim 3, wherein the specific process of the step (1.3.2.3) is as follows:
(1.3.2.3.1) information block MiDivided into 16 words of 32 bits wi0,wi1,…,wi15And continuing to generate 48 words { w } according to formulas (2) - (4)i16,wi17,…,wi63},. indicate a bitwise exclusive-or operation, SλIndicating a cyclic right shift of a number of bits, RλRepresents a right shift of λ bits;
wit＝σ1(wi(t-2))+wi(t-7)+σ0(wi(t-15))+wi(t-16) (2)
σ0(x)＝S7(x)⊕S18(x)⊕R3(x) (3)
σ1(x)＝S17(x)⊕S19(x)⊕R10(x) (4)
(1.3.2.3.2) initializing the hash value Hi＝{h(i-1)0,h(i-1)1,…,h(i-1)7H foriCarry out 64 assignment operations, i.e. h(i-1)0＝T1+T2，h(i-1)1＝h(i-1)0，h(i-1)2＝h(i-1)1，h(i-1)3＝h(i-1)2，h(i-1)4＝h(i-1)3+T1，h(i-1)5＝h(i-1)4，h(i-1)6＝h(i-1)5，h(i-1)7＝h(i-1)6Wherein T is1And T2K is calculated according to the formulae (5) to (10)tRepresents the tth constant generated in step (1.3.2.1), Λ represents a bitwise and operation,
representing a bitwise complement operation;
T1＝h(i-1)7+Σ1(h(i-1)4)+Ch(h(i-1)4,h(i-1)5,h(i-1)6)+kt+wit (5)
T2＝Σ0(h(i-1)0)+Ma(h(i-1)0,h(i-1)1,h(i-1)2) (6)
Ma(x,y,z)＝(x∧y)⊕(x∧z)⊕(y∧z) (8)
Σ0(x)＝S2(x)⊕S13(x)⊕S22(x) (9)
Σ1(x)＝S6(x)⊕S11(x)⊕S25(x) (10)。
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