CN112364344B - Voltage phase angle virtual false data injection attack method for alternating current-direct current hybrid system - Google Patents

Voltage phase angle virtual false data injection attack method for alternating current-direct current hybrid system Download PDF

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CN112364344B
CN112364344B CN202011050022.0A CN202011050022A CN112364344B CN 112364344 B CN112364344 B CN 112364344B CN 202011050022 A CN202011050022 A CN 202011050022A CN 112364344 B CN112364344 B CN 112364344B
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direct current
alternating current
hybrid system
power
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CN112364344A (en
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李丰
桑梓
袁晓舒
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Super High Transmission Co of China South Electric Net Co Ltd
Dongfang Electric Group Research Institute of Science and Technology Co Ltd
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Dongfang Electric Group Research Institute of Science and Technology Co Ltd
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/554—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures involving event detection and direct action
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
    • G06F30/10—Geometric CAD
    • G06F30/18—Network design, e.g. design based on topological or interconnect aspects of utility systems, piping, heating ventilation air conditioning [HVAC] or cabling
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q50/00—Systems or methods specially adapted for specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
    • G06Q50/06—Electricity, gas or water supply
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2113/00—Details relating to the application field
    • G06F2113/04—Power grid distribution networks
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
    • Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of power supply system network security protection, and particularly relates to a voltage phase angle false data injection attack method for an alternating current-direct current hybrid system.

Description

Voltage phase angle virtual false data injection attack method for alternating current-direct current hybrid system
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of power supply system network security protection, and particularly relates to a voltage phase angle virtual false data injection attack method for an alternating current-direct current hybrid system.
Background
With the development of information communication technology, modern power systems become information physical fusion systems. However, since the information communication system inevitably has a bug, the possibility that the power system is attacked by the information is increasing. The false data injection attack is a common network attack, which utilizes a detection vulnerability of power system state estimation to maliciously tamper with measurement data. Since many applications of the power system, such as economic dispatch, emergency analysis, etc., depend on the results of the state estimation, erroneous state estimation results may mislead the operation and control functions of the control center. The attack is extremely hidden and is not easy to be detected, but the attack has great harm to the safe and stable operation of a power system, and a blackout accident can be caused in serious cases.
To build a successful spurious data injection attack, an attacker needs to tamper with a subset of the measurement data and bypass the residual-based bad data detection algorithm. In the existing research, in order to simplify the problem, a linear state estimation model based on direct current power flow is mostly adopted. However, when an attacker uses a false data injection attack for linear state estimation and the actual state estimation is nonlinear state estimation, the attack can be easily detected, so that many scholars specially design an attack strategy for nonlinear state estimation. One has proposed a graph theory based algorithm to determine the subset of the measurement data that needs to be tampered with to achieve an attack when the system employs a non-linear state estimation. It has also been shown by researchers that spurious data injection attacks against nonlinear state estimates require the attacker to know the voltage magnitude and phase angle of some nodes in order to compute a deterministic attack vector.
The existing research on constructing the false data injection attack methods is directed at an alternating current system, however, the attack methods are not completely applicable to an alternating current-direct current hybrid system. On one hand, a state estimation model of an alternating current part of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system is based on nonlinear alternating current power flow, so that an attack method aiming at linear state estimation is not applicable; on the other hand, when the attack involves measurement and state variables of the converter bus node, not only the influence of active and reactive power changes of the direct current part on the alternating current part but also the influence of voltage amplitude changes of the alternating current part on the direct current part are considered.
Because the high-voltage direct-current transmission has the advantages of large transmission capacity, long transmission distance, low cost of transmission lines and the like, the high-voltage direct-current transmission is widely applied to national networking and west-east transmission projects, and the current power system becomes an alternating-current and direct-current hybrid system along with the increasing proportion of the high-voltage direct-current transmission in the power system. The research on the false data injection attack method taking the alternating current-direct current hybrid system as the scene is beneficial to formulating a corresponding detection and defense method and improving the safety of the system.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method for aiming at false data injection attack of a voltage phase angle of an alternating current-direct current hybrid system for formulating a corresponding detection and defense method aiming at the problems in the prior art.
The voltage phase angle virtual false data injection attack method aiming at the alternating current-direct current hybrid system is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
establishing a state estimation model of the AC/DC hybrid system, namely respectively determining the measurement of an AC part and a DC part in the AC/DC hybrid system, a measurement equation and a state variable equation, then determining the measurement equation of an AC/DC coupling part (a converter bus node) in the AC/DC hybrid system, establishing the state estimation model of the AC/DC hybrid system according to the measurement, the measurement equation and the state variable equation, and detecting bad data;
in the step of establishing the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system, an alternating current part adopts an alternating current power flow model, the quantity of the alternating current part is measured by the alternating current power flow model and comprises node active/reactive injection power, branch active/reactive power flow and node voltage amplitude, and a state variable comprises a voltage phase angle and amplitude of each node;
specifically, the active power flow P of the line between the node i and the node j ij ＝V i 2 g ij -V i V j (g ij cosθ ij +b ij sinθ ij ) Reactive power flow Q ij ＝-V i 2 b ij -V i V j (g ij sinθ ij -b ij cosθ ij ) (ii) a And the active injection power of the node i
Figure BDA0002709266890000021
Reactive injection power
Figure BDA0002709266890000022
In the formula, V i Is the voltage amplitude of node i, g ij Is the admittance between node i and node j, θ ij Is the phase angle difference between node i and node j, S i Is the set of all nodes directly connected to node i.
In the step of establishing the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system, the measurement of the DC component includes the active power on the DC side
Figure BDA0002709266890000023
Active power at AC side
Figure BDA0002709266890000024
Reactive power at AC side
Figure BDA0002709266890000025
DC voltage V m r(i) And a direct current I m d (ii) a The state variable of the DC part comprises a DC voltage V r(i) D.c. current I d ＝I ord +η 14 AC side current I acr ＝k 3 B r T r I d +η 6 A commutation side trigger delay angle alpha, an inversion side extinction angle gamma = gamma ord +η 15 And power factor angle phi r(i) The superscript m is expressed as a quantity measurement, the subscript r is expressed as a rectification side variable, and the subscript i is expressed as an inversion side variable;
wherein, V dr ＝V di +RI d +η 3 ，V dr ＝k 1 B r T r E acr cosΦ r +η 4 I.e. V dr ＝k 1 B r T r E acr cosα-k 2 B r X cr I d +η 1 ；
Specifically, the active power of the direct current side of the node i
Figure BDA0002709266890000031
Exchange of electricitySide active power
Figure BDA0002709266890000032
Reactive power at AC side
Figure BDA0002709266890000033
Direct current active voltage V di ＝k 1 B i T i E aci cosγ+k 2 B i X ci I d +η 2 DC reactive voltage V di ＝k 1 B i T i E aci cosΦ i +η 5 And a direct current I aci ＝k 3 B i T i I d +η 7 ；
In the formula, k in the formula 1 、k 2 、k 3 Are all constants respectively
Figure BDA0002709266890000034
3/pi and
Figure BDA0002709266890000035
B r(i) the number of bridges in series; t is the transformation ratio of the converter transformer; e acr(i) Is the AC side commutation bus voltage; x cr(i) Is equivalent commutation reactance; r is a direct current line resistor; I.C. A ord And gamma ord The arc extinguishing angle of the inversion side and the direct current are manually set respectively; eta 1 -η 15 Is a measurement error.
In the step of establishing the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system, a measurement equation of an alternating current-direct current coupling part (a converter bus node) in the alternating current-direct current hybrid system is determined, specifically:
the active tide flow measurement equation of the AC-DC coupling part is as follows
Figure BDA0002709266890000036
In which the AC-DC coupling part is on the rectifying side p i And p ac Taking-and taking + on the inversion side;
reactive power flow
Figure BDA0002709266890000037
In the step of establishing the state estimation model of the AC-DC hybrid system, the state estimation model of the AC-DC hybrid system is established
Figure BDA0002709266890000038
In the formula, z p 、z q 、z d Measuring vectors for alternating current active power, alternating current reactive power and direct current respectively; h is p 、h q 、h d Measuring function vectors for alternating current active power, alternating current reactive power and direct current respectively; eta p 、η q 、η d Measuring error vectors for alternating current active power, alternating current reactive power and direct current respectively; theta is an alternating-current node voltage phase angle vector; v is an alternating current node voltage amplitude vector; x is the number of dc Is a direct current state variable;
given a certain amount of measurement, state estimation is performed by using an alternating iterative algorithm, so that each state variable can be estimated, meanwhile, in order to prevent bad data in measured data from interfering with a state estimation result, bad data detection is required to be performed to eliminate the bad data, so that the state estimation accuracy is improved, the bad data is detected by using the maximum standardized residual error test, which is expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0002709266890000041
in the formula L NR Measuring residual errors; τ is threshold value for bad data detection, L NR <And tau time indicates that the state estimation result is reliable.
A step of establishing a false data injection attack model, which is to inject false data into the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model established in the step of establishing the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model to obtain a measurement residual error which can bypass the detection of bad data of the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model and establish the false data injection attack model;
specifically, when the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system is injected with false data, the maximum standardized residual error test is used for detecting bad data, and the measured residual error after the bad data detection
Figure BDA0002709266890000042
Wherein z is a Is the measurement of the system after being attacked;
Figure BDA0002709266890000043
is the estimated value of the state variable after the system is attacked;
when attacking vector
Figure BDA0002709266890000044
When there is L NRbad ＝L NR The attack vector a can be expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0002709266890000045
in the formula, the subscript a represents the measured state variable after the attack.
And an attack vector determination step, namely determining the type of the quantity measurement needing to be tampered and the size needing to be tampered according to the false data injection attack model, and generating false data which can bypass the detection of bad data of the AC-DC hybrid system state estimation model and change the commutation bus voltage phase angle estimation value and serve as an attack vector.
Specifically, in the attack vector determination step, the amount of measurement to be tampered is determined, according to the measurement equation of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system in the alternating current-direct current hybrid system state estimation model establishment step, when the estimated value of the voltage phase angle of a current conversion bus node (node i) changes, active and reactive injection power measurement of a node j directly connected with the node and active and reactive tide flow measurement of an alternating current part of a branch circuit connected with the node i need to be tampered, and measurement of a direct current part does not need to be tampered, wherein j belongs to S i ，S i Is a collection of nodes directly connected to node i.
In the attack vector determining step, the magnitude of the measurement that the active power flow and the reactive power flow of the alternating current part between the node i and the node j need to be modified is determined, specifically:
active power flow size needing to be tampered
Figure BDA0002709266890000051
Size of reactive power flow to be tampered with
Figure BDA0002709266890000052
In the formula, theta ia Is the magnitude of the change in commutation bus voltage angle;
active injection power size of node i needing to be tampered
Figure BDA0002709266890000053
Reactive injection power size of node i needing to be tampered
Figure BDA0002709266890000054
Active injection power size of node j needing to be tampered
Figure BDA0002709266890000055
Reactive injection power size of node j needing to be tampered
Figure BDA0002709266890000056
The other measurements are kept constant, thus determining the attack vector a. The attack vectors determined by the above model can successfully bypass the bad data detection mechanism.
Compared with the prior art, the technical scheme of the invention considers the influence of the high-voltage direct-current transmission line on the state estimation of the power system, carries out state estimation on the alternating-current and direct-current hybrid system by using the alternating iteration algorithm, and constructs the false data injection attack aiming at changing the voltage phase angle estimation value of the commutation bus on the basis, so that the attack can bypass the bad data detection algorithm. The false data injection attack method obtained by the method can successfully bypass a bad data detection algorithm, interfere the subsequent operation scheduling of the power system, and has certain theoretical value.
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The foregoing and following detailed description of the invention will be apparent when read in conjunction with the following drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 is a schematic structural view of a basic embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an improved IEEE14 node system in a specific embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a state estimation result according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions for achieving the objects of the present invention are further illustrated by the following specific examples, and it should be noted that the technical solutions claimed in the present invention include, but are not limited to, the following examples.
As a specific implementation scheme of the present invention, the embodiment discloses a voltage phase angle false data injection attack method for an ac/dc hybrid system, which includes an ac/dc hybrid system state estimation model establishment step, a false data injection attack model establishment step, and an attack vector determination step.
And establishing a state estimation model of the AC-DC hybrid system, namely respectively determining the quantity measurement, the measurement equation and the state variable equation of the AC part and the DC part in the AC-DC hybrid system, then determining the measurement equation of the AC-DC coupling part in the AC-DC hybrid system, establishing a state estimation model of the AC-DC hybrid system according to the quantity measurement, the measurement equation and the state variable equation, and detecting bad data.
Specifically, step 1-1, determining an alternating current component quantity measurement, a state variable and a measurement equation:
the alternating current part adopts an alternating current power flow model, and the quantity measurement comprises the following steps: active and reactive injection power of the node; branch active and reactive power flows; the node voltage magnitude. The state variables include: the phase angle and magnitude of the voltage at each node.
Flow P for a line between node i and node j ij 、Q ij The measurement equation can be determined by the following equation:
P ij ＝V i 2 g ij -V i V j (g ij cosθ ij +b ij sinθ ij )
Q ij ＝-V i 2 b ij -V i V j (g ij sinθ ij -b ij cosθ ij )
active and reactive injection power P for node i i 、Q i The measurement equation can be determined by the following equation:
Figure BDA0002709266890000061
Figure BDA0002709266890000062
in the formula V i -the voltage amplitude of node i;
V j -the voltage amplitude of node j;
g ij admittance between node i and node j;
θ ij -phase angle difference between node i and node j;
S i set of all nodes directly connected to node i.
Step 1-2, determining a direct current partial quantity measurement, a state variable and a measurement equation;
for a double ended direct current transmission system, the quantity measurement comprises: active power P at DC side m dcr(i) Active power P on AC side m acr(i) AC side reactive power Q m acr(i) D.c. voltage V m r(i) D.c. current I m d . The state quantities include: DC voltage V r(i) D.c. current I d AC side current I acr(i) Commutation side trigger delay angle alpha, inversion side extinction angle gamma and power factor angle phi r(i) 。
Where the superscript m denotes the quantity measured, the subscript r denotes the rectifier side variable, and the subscript i denotes the inverter side variable.
The measurement equation is expressed as follows:
V dr ＝k 1 B r T r E acr cosα-k 2 B r X cr I d +η 1
V di ＝k 1 B i T i E aci cosγ+k 2 B i X ci I d +η 2
V dr ＝V di +RI d +η 3
V dr ＝k 1 B r T r E acr cosΦ r +η 4
V di ＝k 1 B i T i E aci cosΦ i +η 5
I acr ＝k 3 B r T r I d +η 6
I aci ＝k 3 B i T i I d +η 7
Figure BDA0002709266890000071
Figure BDA0002709266890000072
Figure BDA0002709266890000073
Figure BDA0002709266890000074
Figure BDA0002709266890000075
Figure BDA0002709266890000076
I d ＝I ord +η 14
γ＝γ ord +η 15
in the formula k 1 -constant, size of
Figure BDA0002709266890000077
k 2 -a constant, size 3/pi;
k 3 -constant, size of
Figure BDA0002709266890000078
B r(i) -number of bridges in series;
t-converter transformer transformation ratio;
E acr(i) -the ac side converter bus voltage;
X cr(i) -an equivalent commutation reactance;
r is direct current line resistance;
I ord -an artificially set direct current;
γ ord -an artificially set inversion side extinction angle;
eta-measurement error.
Step 1-3, determining a measurement equation of an alternating current-direct current coupling part (a converter bus node):
Figure BDA0002709266890000079
Figure BDA00027092668900000710
wherein the value is taken on the rectification side and the value is taken on the inversion side.
Step 1-4, establishing an AC-DC hybrid system state estimation model according to the measurement equation of the step 1-3, and expressing as follows:
Figure BDA0002709266890000081
in the formula z p The alternating current active power measurement vector comprises branch active power flow and node active power injection power;
z q -alternating current reactive power measurement vector comprising branch reactive power flow, node reactive injection power;
z d -a direct current measurement vector;
h p -alternating current active power measurement function vector;
h q -alternating reactive measurement function vector;
h d -direct current measurement of the function vector;
θ — alternating node voltage phase angle vector;
v-alternating node voltage magnitude vector;
x dc -a direct current state variable;
η p -alternating current active power measurement error vector;
η q -alternating current active power measurement error vector;
η d -measuring the error vector in direct current.
Given a certain amount of measurement, state estimation is performed by using an alternating iterative algorithm, and each state variable can be estimated. Meanwhile, in order to prevent the measured data from having bad data to interfere with the state estimation result, the bad data detection is required to eliminate the bad data, so as to improve the state estimation accuracy. The maximum normalized residual test is commonly used to detect bad data and is expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0002709266890000082
in the formula L NR -measuring the residual error;
τ — bad data detection threshold.
L NR <And tau time indicates that the state estimation result is reliable.
And the step of establishing the false data injection attack model, namely injecting false data into the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model established in the step of establishing the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model to obtain a measurement residual error which can bypass the detection of bad data of the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model and establish the false data injection attack model.
The method comprises the following specific steps:
after the system is attacked by the injection of the false data, the measurement residual error is expressed as:
Figure BDA0002709266890000091
in the formula L NRbad -measurement residuals after the system is attacked;
z a -measurement of the amount of the system after an attack;
Figure BDA0002709266890000092
-an estimate of the state variable after the system has been attacked.
When attacking vector
Figure BDA0002709266890000093
When there is L NRbad ＝L NR Specifically, the attack vector a can be expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0002709266890000094
in the formula, the subscript a represents the measured state variable after the attack.
And in the attack vector determination step, the type of the quantity measurement needing to be tampered and the size needing to be tampered are determined according to the false data injection attack model, and false data which can bypass the detection of bad data of the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system and change the voltage phase angle estimation value of the commutation bus is generated to serve as an attack vector.
The method comprises the following specific steps:
and 3-1, determining the quantity measurement needing to be tampered. According to the measurement equation of the AC-DC hybrid system, when the estimated value of the voltage phase angle of a node (node i) of a current conversion bus changes, the active and reactive injection power measurement of a node j directly connected with the node and the active and reactive tidal current measurement of a branch connected with the node i need to be tampered. The measurement of the dc component does not require tampering. Wherein j ∈ S i ，S i Is a collection of nodes directly connected to node i.
And 3-2, determining the size of the quantity to be measured by the tampering amount. For active and reactive power flows between the node i and the node j, the tampering size is determined by the following formula:
Figure BDA0002709266890000095
Figure BDA0002709266890000096
in the formula
Figure BDA0002709266890000101
-the active power flow size to be tampered with;
θ ia -the magnitude of the commutation bus voltage phase angle change;
Figure BDA0002709266890000102
-the size of the reactive power flow to be tampered with.
For the active and reactive injected power of the node i, the size of the tampering is determined by the following formula:
Figure BDA0002709266890000103
Figure BDA0002709266890000104
in the formula
Figure BDA0002709266890000105
The active injection power of the node i to be tampered with;
Figure BDA0002709266890000106
node i needs the amount of reactive injection power that is tampered with.
For the active and reactive injected power of the node j, the size of the tampering is determined by the following formula:
Figure BDA0002709266890000107
Figure BDA0002709266890000108
in the formula
Figure BDA0002709266890000109
The active injection power of the node j to be tampered with;
Figure BDA00027092668900001010
node j needs the amount of reactive injection power that is tampered with.
The other measurements are kept constant, thus determining the attack vector a. The attack vectors determined by the above model can successfully bypass the bad data detection mechanism.
The method is an alternating attack scene of the direct current parallel-serial system, and is closer to an actual system. The attack strategy can bypass bad data detection, has strong concealment and convenient attack vector calculation, and can provide an idea for subsequent system defense.
To explain the effects of the technical solution of the present application more specifically, a double-ended dc/ac hybrid system is constructed based on an IEEE14 node system.
An alternating current line between an alternating current node 4 and a node 5 of an original system is replaced by a double-end direct current transmission system, and the fact that the constructed alternating current-direct current hybrid system has the same power flow condition as the original alternating current system is guaranteed. Wherein the converter station connected to node 5 is the rectifying side and the converter station connected to node 4 is the inverting side, the improved IEEE14 node system is shown in fig. 2.
Assume that the goal of the attacker is to change the voltage phase angle of node 5 by 0.5 °. First, an attacker needs to know the voltage amplitude and phase angle of the nodes 1, 2, 5, and 6 in advance, and obtain the measurement value to be changed through calculation. The measurement values that an attacker needs to tamper with in order to achieve the attack are shown in table 1. For convenience, the active power, reactive power and voltage amplitude of the alternating current part are all expressed by per unit values, and the direct current part adopts named values.
TABLE 1 measurement of the amount of tampering required to make an attack
Figure BDA0002709266890000111
After modifying these measurement values, the state estimation was performed, and the results are shown in table 2, table 3, and fig. 3.
TABLE 2 results of partial state estimation by communication
Figure BDA0002709266890000112
TABLE 3 DC partial state estimation results
Figure BDA0002709266890000113
Figure BDA0002709266890000121
From the simulation results, when an attacker tampers with the relevant quantity measurement strictly according to the calculation results, the bad data detection can be bypassed, and the voltage phase angle variation of the node 5 can reach the expected result. Meanwhile, the estimated values of other state variables hardly change before and after the attack.

Claims (6)

1. The voltage phase angle false data injection attack method for the alternating current-direct current hybrid system is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
establishing a state estimation model of the AC/DC hybrid system, namely respectively determining the measurement quantity of an AC part and a DC part in the AC/DC hybrid system, a measurement equation and a state variable equation, then determining the measurement equation of an AC/DC coupling part in the AC/DC hybrid system, establishing a state estimation model of the AC/DC hybrid system according to the measurement quantity, the measurement equation and the state variable equation, and detecting bad data;
a step of establishing a false data injection attack model, which is to inject false data into the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model established in the step of establishing the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model to obtain a measurement residual error which can bypass the detection of bad data of the AC/DC hybrid system state estimation model and establish the false data injection attack model;
an attack vector determining step, namely determining the type of the quantity to be tampered and the size to be tampered according to a false data injection attack model, generating false data which can bypass the detection of bad data of a state estimation model of an alternating current-direct current hybrid system and change a voltage phase angle estimation value of a converter bus as an attack vector, specifically, establishing a measurement equation of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system in the step according to the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system, when the estimation value of the voltage phase angle of a node i of the converter bus is changed, measuring active and reactive injection power of an alternating current part of a node j directly connected with the node j and measuring active and reactive tide flows of a branch connected with the node i need to be tampered, and measuring the direct current part does not need to be tampered, wherein j belongs to S i ，S i Is a set of nodes directly connected to node i; determining active power between node i and node jThe size of the measurement of the reactive power flow needing to be tampered is as follows:
active power flow size needing to be tampered
Figure FDA0002709266880000011
Size of reactive power flow to be tampered with
Figure FDA0002709266880000012
In the formula, theta ia Is the magnitude of the change in commutation bus voltage angle;
active injection power size of node i needing to be tampered
Figure FDA0002709266880000013
Reactive injection power size of node i needing to be tampered
Figure FDA0002709266880000014
Active injection power size of node j needing to be tampered
Figure FDA0002709266880000015
Reactive injection power size of node j needing to be tampered
Figure FDA0002709266880000021
The other measurements are kept constant, thus determining the attack vector a.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the step of establishing the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system, an alternating current part adopts an alternating current power flow model, the quantity of the alternating current part is measured by the alternating current power flow model and comprises node active/reactive injection power, branch active/reactive power flow and node voltage amplitude, and a state variable comprises a voltage phase angle and amplitude of each node;
specifically, the node i and the node bActive power flow P of line between points j ij ＝V i 2 g ij -V i V j (g ij cosθ ij +b ij sinθ ij ) Reactive power flow Q ij ＝-V i 2 b ij -V i V j (g ij sinθ ij -b ij cosθ ij ) (ii) a And the active injection power of the node i
Figure FDA0002709266880000022
Reactive injection power
Figure FDA0002709266880000023
In the formula, V i Is the voltage amplitude of node i, g ij Is the admittance between node i and node j, θ ij Is the phase angle difference between node i and node j, S i Is the set of all nodes directly connected to node i.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the method comprises: in the step of establishing the state estimation model of the alternating current-direct current hybrid system, the measurement of the direct current part comprises the active power of the direct current side
Figure FDA0002709266880000024
Active power at AC side
Figure FDA0002709266880000025
Reactive power at AC side
Figure FDA0002709266880000026
DC voltage V m r(i) And a direct current I m d (ii) a The state variable of the DC part comprises a DC voltage V r(i) Direct current I d ＝I ord +η 14 AC side current I acr ＝k 3 B r T r I d +η 6 A commutation side trigger delay angle alpha, an inversion side extinction angle gamma = gamma ord +η 15 And power factor angle phi r(i) The superscript m is expressed as a quantity measurement, the subscript r is expressed as a rectification side variable, and the subscript i is expressed as an inversion side variable;
wherein, V dr ＝V di +RI d +η 3 ，V dr ＝k 1 B r T r E acr cosΦ r +η 4 I.e. V dr ＝k 1 B r T r E acr cosα-k 2 B r X cr I d +η 1 ；
Specifically, the active power of the direct current side of the node i
Figure FDA0002709266880000027
Active power at AC side
Figure FDA0002709266880000028
Reactive power at AC side
Figure FDA0002709266880000029
Dc active voltage V di ＝k 1 B i T i E aci cosγ+k 2 B i X ci I d +η 2 D.c. reactive voltage V di ＝k 1 B i T i E aci cosΦ i +η 5 And a direct current I aci ＝k 3 B i T i I d +η 7 ；
In the formula, k in the formula 1 、k 2 、k 3 Are all constants respectively
Figure FDA0002709266880000031
3/pi and
Figure FDA0002709266880000032
B r(i) the number of bridges in series; t is the transformation ratio of the converter transformer; e acr(i) Is a crossA current side converter bus voltage; x cr(i) Is equivalent commutation reactance; r is a direct current line resistor; I.C. A ord And gamma ord The arc extinguishing angle of the inversion side and the direct current are manually set respectively; eta 1 -η 15 Is a measurement error.
4. The method for injecting the voltage angle false data aiming at the alternating current-direct current hybrid system according to claim 2 or 3, wherein in the alternating current-direct current hybrid system state estimation model establishing step, a measurement equation of an alternating current-direct current coupling part (a converter bus node) in the alternating current-direct current hybrid system is determined, specifically:
the active tide flow measurement equation of the AC-DC coupling part is as follows
Figure FDA0002709266880000033
In which the AC-DC coupling part is on the rectifying side p i And p ac Taking-and taking + on the inversion side;
reactive power flow
Figure FDA0002709266880000034
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the method comprises: in the step of establishing the state estimation model of the AC-DC hybrid system, the state estimation model of the AC-DC hybrid system is established
Figure FDA0002709266880000035
In the formula, z p 、z q 、z d Measuring vectors for alternating current active power, alternating current reactive power and direct current respectively; h is p 、h q 、h d Measuring function vectors for alternating current active power, alternating current reactive power and direct current respectively; eta p 、η q 、η d Measuring error vectors for alternating current active power, alternating current reactive power and direct current respectively; theta is an alternating-current node voltage phase angle vector; v is an alternating current node voltage amplitude vector; x is the number of dc Is a direct current state variable;
then using maximum normalized residual test
Figure FDA0002709266880000036
To detect bad data, wherein L NR Measuring residual errors; τ is threshold value for bad data detection, L NR <And tau time indicates that the state estimation result is reliable.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the step of establishing the false data injection attack model, when false data is injected into the state estimation model of the AC-DC hybrid system, the maximum standardized residual error test is used for detecting bad data, and the measured residual error after the bad data detection
Figure FDA0002709266880000041
Wherein z is a Is the measurement of the system after being attacked;
Figure FDA0002709266880000042
is the estimated value of the state variable after the system is attacked;
when attacking vector
Figure FDA0002709266880000043
When there is L NRbad ＝L NR The attack vector a can be expressed as follows:
Figure FDA0002709266880000044
in the formula, the subscript a represents the measured state variable after the attack.
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