CN112350823B - CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers - Google Patents
CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers Download PDFInfo
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- CN112350823B CN112350823B CN201910730350.6A CN201910730350A CN112350823B CN 112350823 B CN112350823 B CN 112350823B CN 201910730350 A CN201910730350 A CN 201910730350A CN 112350823 B CN112350823 B CN 112350823B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02P—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING OF GOODS
- Y02P90/00—Enabling technologies with a potential contribution to greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions mitigation
- Y02P90/02—Total factory control, e.g. smart factories, flexible manufacturing systems [FMS] or integrated manufacturing systems [IMS]
Abstract
The invention provides a CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers, after receiving a notice that a sender needs to send a message, the receiver generates a random number so that the sender utilizes the random number to encrypt the message and then transmits the message to the receiver; after completing the transmission of the preset number of messages each time, if the message transmission request sent by the sender is received, the receiver generates a new random number so that the sender can transmit the message by using the new random number; the method has the advantages that the method can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks because new random numbers are generated after the transmission of the preset number of messages is finished each time, meanwhile, the messages are encrypted, malicious tampering can be prevented, confidentiality and integrity of the messages are guaranteed, in addition, the random numbers are generated once when the messages are powered on each time, even if one party is abnormally powered off, the process is only needed to be carried out again, and the communication process is relatively simple.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of vehicle-mounted controller communication, in particular to a CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers.
Background
Since the release of national network security regulations, the use of vehicle-mounted encryption chips has begun in automobiles, and at the same time, communication protocols between vehicle-mounted controllers have also become an important research direction. As the data volume of bus communication increases, the conventional CAN communication protocol is getting worse in terms of transmission rate and bandwidth. Thus, CAN FD communication protocols arose.
Compared with CAN, CAN FD has the following improvements:
CAN FD employs two approaches to improve the efficiency of communication: one approach is to shorten bit time and increase bit rate; another approach is to lengthen the data field, reduce the number of messages, and reduce the bus load rate. Three polynomials are used in the CRC check section to ensure the data reliability under high-speed communication.
Although CAN FD is partially optimized compared with CAN, the problems of replay prevention, message authentication and the like of information security are not solved, so that a secondary design of a protocol is needed, and the vulnerability of the vehicle-mounted controller in the aspect of information security is avoided in the process of CAN FD communication.
For the secure communication scheme of CAN FD, the VECTOR company proposes the following solution:
to prevent replay attacks, at the beginning of a communication, the recipient generates a series of random numbers through the ID key and sends them to the sending node. The transmitting node increases the random number by 1 each time and appends to the end of the message. When the receiving node receives the message, the receiver checks whether the message is equal to the message sent by the receiver, and if so, the receiver continues to process; if it is different, the message is rejected. To accommodate a certain packet loss, the receiving node is allowed to receive a slightly higher value. This means that in the transmitted message the counter is constantly changing and the signal content is kept unchanged in time. And secure transmission is realized by using an AES128 algorithm, and keys among ECUs are realized by using a key negotiation algorithm, so that playback prevention, message authentication and message integrity are realized.
For the secure communication scheme of CAN FD, GM corporation proposes the following solution:
the GM company adds a counter field in the CAN FD data section according to AutoSAR standard specification, and the counter is increased by 1 change per communication.
The above two communication schemes, although solving replay attacks, have the following problems:
(1) The two schemes are that the receiving end sends the random number to the sender, the sender can self-increment 1 method every time the message is sent, the receiver is informed of the state of the message sent by the sender currently, the method prevents replay attack, but adds the risk of man-in-the-middle attack, because only 1 is increment each time, the random number or counter value can be guessed for the next session, and man-in-the-middle attack is easy to introduce;
(2) Because the number of times that the data can be repeatedly stored in the EEP is limited due to the changing characteristic of the random number or counter value, typically about one hundred thousand times, the random number or counter value is typically stored in the RAM due to such characteristic, but for controllers such as Tbox and vehicle-mounted controllers, there is an abnormal power failure condition, and the case of increasing 1 is present in the whole life cycle of the vehicle, that is, the random number or counter value is always increasing in the whole life cycle of the vehicle, if such a condition occurs, the value is emptied, so that both communicating parties need to renegotiate how much the current random number or counter value is, which results in a communication signal to assist in completion of the negotiation process, which also results in abnormal complexity of the whole process due to the problem of value synchronization, and for the vehicle-mounted controller, the more complex communication process represents unstable and lower communication efficiency, and even causes potential safety hazards in the vehicle with very high real-time requirements.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers, which aims to solve the problems that the prior CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers CAN prevent malicious message tampering and replay attack, CAN not prevent man-in-the-middle attack, and needs to negotiate again after abnormal power failure, so that the communication process is complex.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers, which comprises the following steps:
after receiving a notice that a sender needs to send a message, the receiver generates a random number, generates a temporary session key by using the random number and sends the temporary session key to the sender, and the sender decrypts the temporary session key to obtain the random number, encrypts the message by using the random number and then transmits the encrypted message to the receiver;
after completing the transmission of the preset number of messages each time, if the message transmission request sent by the sender is received, the receiver generates a new random number, generates a new temporary session key by using the new random number and sends the new temporary session key to the sender, and the sender decrypts the new temporary session key to obtain the new random number, encrypts the message by using the new random number and then transmits the message to the receiver.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers, when the receiving party generates the new random number at least twice, the preset number is the same value or different values each time.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers, the notification includes the number of messages to be transmitted, and the preset number does not exceed the total number of the messages to be transmitted.
Optionally, in the method for inter-vehicle controller CAN FD communication, the method for inter-vehicle controller CAN FD communication further includes:
presetting an encryption key at the receiver and a decryption key at the sender before communication begins;
the encryption key is used for encrypting the random number to generate the temporary session key, and the decryption key is used for decrypting the temporary session key.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers, the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers further includes: presetting a first algorithm and a second algorithm at the sender and the receiver before communication begins;
the first algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm or an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and the second algorithm is a hash algorithm.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers, when the encryption key and the decryption key are the same key, the first algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm, and when the encryption key and the decryption key are the same key, the first algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers, the temporary session key is generated by using a first rule, where the first rule is:
encrypting the random number using a first algorithm and the encryption key to form first data; the method comprises the steps of,
encrypting the random number using a second algorithm and the encryption key to form second data;
wherein the first data and the second data constitute the temporary session key.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle controllers, a second rule is used to encrypt the message, where the second rule is:
encrypting the message to be sent currently by using the second algorithm and the random number generated during the transmission of the message currently so as to form third data;
and adding the third data to the message to be sent currently.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle controllers, the symmetric encryption algorithm is an AES128 algorithm, the asymmetric encryption algorithm is an ECC algorithm, and the hash algorithm is SHA1, MD4, MD5, MD6 or SHA2.
Optionally, in the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers, the method for performing CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers further includes: and each time communication is established, the receiver generates at least one random number for generating a temporary session key of the current communication, and further for sending a message of the current communication.
In the CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers, random numbers are added to the back of message data to prevent replay attack, after receiving a notification that a sender is to send a message, the receiver generates a random number, generates a temporary session key by using the random number and sends the temporary session key to the sender, and the sender decrypts the temporary session key to obtain the random number, encrypts the message by using the random number and then transmits the encrypted message to the receiver; after completing the transmission of the preset number of messages each time, if the message transmission request sent by the sender is received, the receiver generates a new random number, generates a new temporary session key by using the new random number and sends the new temporary session key to the sender, and the sender decrypts the new temporary session key to obtain the new random number, encrypts the message by using the new random number and then transmits the message to the receiver. Since the new random number is generated after the transmission of the preset number of messages is finished each time, the attack of people in the middle can be prevented, meanwhile, the messages are prevented from being tampered maliciously by utilizing the random number in the transmission process, and the confidentiality and the integrity of the messages are guaranteed.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of a CAN FD communication method between vehicle-mounted controllers according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating the data structure of a temporary session key according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating the data structure of a message after encryption processing in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed description of the preferred embodiments
The CAN FD communication method between the vehicle-mounted controllers provided by the invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and the specific embodiments. It should be noted that the drawings are in a very simplified form and are all to a non-precise scale, merely for convenience and clarity in aiding in the description of embodiments of the invention. Furthermore, the structures shown in the drawings are often part of actual structures. In particular, the drawings are shown with different emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the various embodiments.
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of a method for CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 1, where the method for CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:
s11, after receiving a notice that a sender needs to send a message, the receiver generates a random number, and generates a temporary session key by using the random number to send the temporary session key to the sender; the sender decrypts the temporary session key to obtain the random number, encrypts a message by using the random number and transmits the message to the receiver;
and S12, after the transmission of the preset number of messages is completed each time, if a message transmission request sent by the sender is received, the receiver generates a new random number, generates a new temporary session key by using the new random number and sends the new temporary session key to the sender, and the sender decrypts the new temporary session key to obtain the new random number, encrypts the message by using the new random number and then transmits the message to the receiver.
In the method for CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers provided by the embodiment of the invention, since new random numbers are generated after the transmission of the preset number of messages is completed each time, replay attack CAN be prevented, meanwhile, since the messages are encrypted by the random numbers in the transmission process, malicious tampering of the messages CAN be prevented, confidentiality and integrity of the messages are ensured, in addition, since the generation of the random numbers is carried out once before the communication is started each time, even if one party has abnormal power failure, the counter value does not need to be renegotiated, and the process only needs to be carried out again, namely, compared with the prior art, the communication process is not complicated because of abnormal power failure.
In the communication method provided by the embodiment of the invention, each time communication is established, namely, each time the vehicle-mounted controller (comprising the sender and the receiver) is powered on, the receiver generates at least one random number for generating a temporary session key of the current communication and further for sending a message of the current communication.
In each communication process, only a random number can be generated, or a random number can be generated at intervals of a certain number of messages, the more frequent and the safer, the frequency of generating the random number depends on the requirement of communication speed; and, when the receiving side generates a new random number at least twice, each time the preset number is the same value or is different values, for example, the first time generates a new random number, which may be when 5 messages have been transmitted, and the second time generates a new random number, which may be when 8 messages have been retransmitted. The switching of the frequency of generating the random number also increases the security to some extent, helping to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
In addition, preferably, the notification includes the number of messages to be transmitted, so that the preset number is set so that the preset number does not exceed the total number of messages to be transmitted. For example, if the number of messages to be transmitted is 10, the preset number may be set to 5, 6, 10, etc. after the notification is received by the receiving side, and if the number of messages to be transmitted is 50, the preset number may be set to 20, 30, 40, etc. after the notification is received by the receiving side. That is, when the notification includes the number of messages to be transmitted, the receiving side is given a basis for setting a node for generating a random number, so as to avoid the situation that the preset number is set too large, and the receiving side cannot always generate a new random number, but when the total number of messages to be transmitted is relatively large, the preset number can be increased appropriately for the purpose of communication rate.
Table 1 shows an exemplary setting of the preset number each time a random number is to be generated when the number of messages to be transmitted is 50. After the first message is transmitted, if 5 messages are transmitted again, generating a new random number 1; then, if 10 messages are transmitted again, generating a new random number 2; then, if 8 messages are transmitted again, generating a new random number 3; finally, if 12 messages are transmitted again, a new random number 4 is generated, and the rest messages are encrypted by the random number 4 to finish transmission.
TABLE 1
| Preset number of messages | New random number |
| 5 strips | Random number 1 |
| 10 strips | Random number 2 |
| 8 strips | Random number 3 |
| 12 strips | Random number 4 |
Furthermore, in the embodiment of the present invention, the random number may be encrypted by using an encryption key to generate the temporary session key; the temporary session key may be paired with a decryption key to obtain the random number. Therefore, the inter-vehicle controller CAN FD communication method may further include: presetting an encryption key at the receiver and a decryption key at the sender before communication begins; the method comprises the steps of,
presetting a first algorithm and a second algorithm on the sender and the receiver; the first algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm or an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and the second algorithm is a hash algorithm. When the encryption key and the decryption key are the same key, the first algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm, and when the encryption key and the decryption key are the same key, the first algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
The symmetric encryption algorithm can be an AES128 algorithm, the asymmetric encryption algorithm can be an ECC algorithm, and encryption and decryption operations can be performed; the second algorithm may be a hash algorithm, such as SHA1, MD4, MD5, MD6 or SHA2, and may only perform encryption operation, but not perform decryption operation, so as to ensure the integrity of the data.
Further, the temporary session key is preferably generated by adopting a first rule, where the first rule is: encrypting the random number using a first algorithm and an encryption key to form first data Cipher; and encrypting the random number using a second algorithm and an encryption key to form second data HMAC1; wherein, as shown in fig. 2, the first data Cipher and the second data HMAC1 form the temporary session key; in step S14, the encrypted messages are generated by using a second rule, where the second rule is: encrypting the message to be sent currently by using the second algorithm and the random number generated during the transmission of the message currently so as to form third data Cipher; and adding the third Data Cipher to the message Data to be sent currently, so that the Data structure of the encrypted message is shown in fig. 3.
The CAN FD communication method between the vehicle-mounted controllers provided by the embodiment of the invention mainly comprises two processes: a temporary session key generation process and a secure communication process.
(1) Temporary session key generation process
After the power-on is started, after the receiving party is notified of the transmission message by the sending party, the receiving party generates a random number, and because at least one random number is generated by the receiving party and a temporary session key of the current communication is generated based on the generated random number, even if any party has abnormal drop, negotiation is not needed, and the process is only needed to be carried out again, namely, compared with the prior art, the communication process is not complicated because of abnormal power-off.
(2) Secure communication process
After receiving the temporary session key sent by the receiver, the sender decrypts the received temporary session key, thereby obtaining a random number used for generating the temporary session key, and encrypts the message by using the random number. Moreover, since a new random number is generated after the transmission of the preset number of messages is completed each time, man-in-the-middle attacks can be prevented.
In summary, the method for CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers solves the problems that the prior method for CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers CAN prevent falsification of messages and replay attack, CAN not prevent man-in-the-middle attack, and needs to negotiate again after abnormal power failure, so that the communication process is complex.
The above description is only illustrative of the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any alterations and modifications made by those skilled in the art based on the above disclosure shall fall within the scope of the appended claims.
Claims (8)
1. The CAN FD communication method between the vehicle-mounted controllers is characterized by comprising the following steps:
after receiving a notice that a sender needs to send a message, a receiver generates a random number, generates a temporary session key by using the random number and sends the temporary session key to the sender, and the sender decrypts the temporary session key to obtain the random number, encrypts the message by using the random number and then transmits the encrypted message to the receiver;
after completing the transmission of a preset number of messages each time, if a message transmission request sent by the sender is received, the receiver generates a new random number, generates a new temporary session key by using the new random number and sends the new temporary session key to the sender, and the sender decrypts the new temporary session key to obtain the new random number, encrypts the message by using the new random number and then transmits the message to the receiver;
when the receiving party generates a new random number at least twice, the preset number is the same value or different values each time, so that the frequency of generating the new random number is changed; the notification comprises the number of messages to be transmitted, the receiver adjusts the preset number according to the number of the messages to be transmitted, and the preset number does not exceed the total number of the messages to be transmitted.
2. The inter-vehicle controller CAN FD communication method according to claim 1, further comprising:
presetting an encryption key at the receiving side and a decryption key at the transmitting side before communication starts;
the encryption key is used for encrypting the random number to generate the temporary session key, and the decryption key is used for decrypting the temporary session key.
3. The inter-vehicle controller CAN FD communication method according to claim 2, further comprising: presetting a first algorithm and a second algorithm at the sender and the receiver before communication begins;
the first algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm or an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and the second algorithm is a hash algorithm.
4. The method for CAN FD communication between vehicle controllers according to claim 3 wherein,
when the encryption key and the decryption key are the same key, the first algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm, and when the encryption key and the decryption key are the same key, the first algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
5. The method for CAN FD communication between vehicle-mounted controllers according to claim 3, wherein the temporary session key is generated using a first rule:
encrypting the random number using a first algorithm and the encryption key to form first data; the method comprises the steps of,
encrypting the random number using a second algorithm and the encryption key to form second data;
wherein the first data and the second data constitute the temporary session key.
6. The method for CAN FD communication between vehicle controllers according to claim 3, wherein the message is encrypted by using a second rule:
encrypting the message to be sent currently by using the second algorithm and the random number generated during the transmission of the current message to form third data;
and adding the third data to the message to be sent currently.
7. The method for CAN FD communication between vehicle controllers according to claim 3, wherein said symmetric encryption algorithm is AES128 algorithm, said asymmetric encryption algorithm is ECC algorithm, and said hash algorithm is SHA1, MD4, MD5, MD6 or SHA2.
8. The inter-vehicle-controller CAN FD communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, further comprising: and each time communication is established, the receiver generates at least one random number for generating a temporary session key of the current communication, and further for sending a message of the current communication.
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