CN112286550A - Security signature algorithm for system upgrade of embedded equipment - Google Patents
Security signature algorithm for system upgrade of embedded equipment Download PDFInfo
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- CN112286550A CN112286550A CN202011138496.0A CN202011138496A CN112286550A CN 112286550 A CN112286550 A CN 112286550A CN 202011138496 A CN202011138496 A CN 202011138496A CN 112286550 A CN112286550 A CN 112286550A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
- G06F8/60—Software deployment
- G06F8/65—Updates
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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Abstract
The invention discloses a security signature algorithm for system upgrade of an embedded device, which belongs to the technical field of embedded operating system upgrade and data security encryption and comprises the following steps: reading a binary data packet to be differentiated; step two, partitioning the data packet; respectively signing the data blocks by using a preset signature algorithm, and recording signature algorithm mark values; step four, checking the signature data of the corresponding block, judging whether the signature data conflict, and if the signature conflict does not occur, performing step seven; and step five, if the signature data conflicts, adjusting the size of the blocks, repeating the step two to the step four until the signature of the data block is unique, and performing the step seven. The method of the invention completely avoids the hidden trouble of upgrading failure caused by data block label conflict theoretically and practically, and improves the safety of system upgrading.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of embedded operating system upgrading and data security encryption, in particular to a security signature algorithm for embedded equipment system upgrading.
Background
Embedded operating systems are widely used in various fields, and update of terminal systems is also a routine iteration in order to adapt to service updates. In order to improve the reliability and the safety of system upgrading and eliminate the hidden trouble of upgrading failure under the condition of upgrading power failure, the invention develops a safety signature algorithm aiming at the upgrading of an embedded device system based on the invention patents ' differential upgrading algorithm aiming at the binary system file of IOT equipment ', self-adaptive bidirectional differential algorithm based on block write-back ' and ' mixed packing compression technology of integer arrays ' which are self-developed by the company.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a security signature algorithm for upgrading an embedded device system, so as to solve the problems in the background technology.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme: a security signature algorithm for system upgrade of an embedded device comprises the following steps:
reading a binary data packet to be differentiated;
step two, partitioning the data packet;
respectively signing the data blocks by using a preset signature algorithm, and recording signature algorithm mark values;
step four, checking the signature data of the corresponding block, judging whether the signature data conflict, and if the signature conflict does not occur, performing step seven;
step five, if the signature data conflicts, adjusting the size of the blocks, repeating the step two to the step four until the signature of the data block is unique, and performing the step seven;
step six, if the signature algorithm is used, and the signature conflict occurs in the block size adjusted each time, the signature algorithm needs to be replaced, and the steps two to five are repeated until the signature of the data block is unique;
recording the size of the blocks, the signature data and the mark value of the signature algorithm;
step eight, differentiating and packaging the successfully partitioned data;
and step nine, compressing the packed data, and writing the difference packet into the difference packet.
Preferably, the signature algorithm replaced in the sixth step is murmurr 3, CRC32, xxHash or lookup3, and the sequence of replacing the signature algorithm is murmurr 3, CRC32, xxHash and lookup 3.
Preferably, the data obtained by the difference in the step eight is packed into an integer array by using a basic storage bit number smaller than the integer storage length.
Preferably, the difference in the step eight is divided into a forward direction and a reverse direction, and the forward direction and the reverse direction are performed simultaneously.
Preferably, the binary data packet includes an old version and a new version.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
according to the invention, data is blocked and signature check is carried out before difference, so that the uniqueness of signature and the reliability of power failure upgrade are ensured; the method of the invention completely avoids hidden trouble of upgrading failure caused by data block label conflict theoretically and practically, and improves the safety of system upgrading.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an algorithm for generating unique signature data in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating uniqueness of signatures according to the present invention, wherein (a) is a diagram illustrating a case where a power failure occurs during upgrade, (b) is a diagram illustrating a situation where all signatures of data blocks conflict, and (c) is a diagram illustrating a situation where no signatures of data blocks conflict;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating signature algorithm tag values according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, the present invention provides a technical solution: a security signature algorithm for system upgrade of an embedded device comprises the following steps:
And 102, respectively blocking the data packets of the new and old versions.
103, respectively signing the data blocks by using a preset signature algorithm so as to generate power failure during upgrading and accurately position the power failure position to continue upgrading; the failure of upgrading under the condition of power failure is avoided.
And 104, verifying the signature data, judging whether the signatures of the blocks corresponding to the new version and the old version are the same, and if the signature data of the corresponding blocks are different, executing the step 107.
If the signatures are the same, step 105 further determines whether the corresponding data contents are the same, and if the data contents are the same and there is no data signature conflict, step 107 is performed.
And 106, if the data contents are different and the data signature conflict occurs in the block, adjusting the size of the data block, and repeating the steps 102 to 105 to ensure the uniqueness of the signature data and avoid the data signature conflict.
And step 107, recording the size of the block, the signature data of the new version and the old version and the mark value of the used algorithm, and writing the difference packet.
And 108, differentiating the data with the unique signature, and packaging the differential result.
In the embodiment, the differential data are packed by using the basic storage bit number smaller than the integer storage length, so that the effective utilization of the integer storage space is improved; and compressing the packed data.
When the system of the embedded device is upgraded in a power failure mode, firstly, the data signature of the first block is verified and compared with the signature data of the new version and the old version stored in the differential packet, and if the signature data of the new version and the old version are the same, the upgrading is started from the block; if the signature data is different from the signature data of the old version, comparing signatures of the corresponding new version data blocks, if the signature data is the same as the signature data of the new version data block, indicating that the block is upgraded, and sequentially comparing the signatures of the next block; if the signatures of the data blocks are different from those of the old and new versions, the data blocks are partially upgraded, and if the power failure occurs in the data blocks, the backup (copied old version data of the data blocks) should be overwritten to the data blocks, and then the data blocks are upgraded from the data blocks.
If the process is normally carried out, the signature of the block corresponding to the new version and the old version is required to be unique; if the signatures of the corresponding blocks conflict, the power-down upgrade may fail. For example, as shown in fig. 2, 2(a) is the case of power failure during upgrade, and it is necessary to check the signatures of the data blocks of the old and new versions (a1, a2, B1, B2, C1, and C2) and determine at which block the power failure occurred.
When data block signatures a1, a2, B1 and B2 all conflict 2(B), not only the corresponding blocks conflict, but also adjacent blocks conflict, the signatures of a1, B1 and C1 blocks are sequentially compared, the signatures of a1 and a2 blocks are found to be the same, the signatures of B1 and B2 blocks are found to be the same, the signatures of C1 blocks are judged to be old versions through signatures, and the signatures of backups are all the same as a1, a2, B1 and B2. This makes it impossible to determine, via the signature, whether a1 or B1 has been upgraded, and whether a power loss occurred in upgrading the a1 block or the B1 block.
When the signatures of the data blocks A1 and A2 are unique, and the signatures of the data blocks B1 and B2 are unique, no matter whether the adjacent blocks A1 and B1 have collision 2(c), the power-down position can be determined; assuming that power failure occurs in the block B1, the block A1 is upgraded to the block A2, the signature of the block A1 is equal to the signature of the block A2, the signature data of backup is not equal to the block A1, the signature of the block B1 is not equal to the signature of the block B2, power failure is uniquely determined to occur in the block B1, and backup is covered to the block B1; assuming that a power loss occurs at the a1 block, the signature of the a1 block is not equal to the signature of the a2 block, uniquely determining that a power loss occurred at the B1 block, overwriting the backup to the a1 block. Therefore, the failure of power failure upgrading can be avoided only by ensuring the uniqueness of the signatures of the data blocks corresponding to the new version and the old version.
In the algorithm, a murmurur 3 hash algorithm is used as a preferred signature algorithm (the signature algorithm is found to have the best quality through investigation), and if in an extreme case, the signature is carried out through self-adaptive block division, and the signature conflict exists in the size of each block, an alternative signature algorithm needs to be replaced for signature verification, and the size of one block is found out to enable the signature to be unique. We investigated 4 signature algorithms in total, as shown in fig. 3, each corresponding to a 2-bit flag value. And writing the corresponding mark value into the head of the differential packet, and determining the signature algorithm in sequence during upgrading to completely avoid the failure of power failure upgrading.
According to one aspect of the present invention, an algorithm for solving signature conflicts during system upgrade of an embedded device is provided, the technical solution is as follows:
reading an old version and a new version of a binary data packet to be differentiated, when an embedded device system is upgraded, firstly, partitioning the data packet, and then differentiating, wherein the differentiating process is divided into forward and reverse;
and respectively signing the data blocks by using a preset signature algorithm, so that the process of completing the upgrade is judged when the power failure upgrade is carried out, and the upgrade failure of the equipment due to the power failure is prevented. This requires that the signature data be guaranteed to be unique so that the final upgrade is successful.
Verifying the signature data of the blocks corresponding to the new version and the old version, judging whether the signature data is unique, and if the signature is unique, recording the size of each block; if the signatures of the corresponding blocks are the same and the data contents are different, the signature data conflict, the size of the sub-blocks needs to be adjusted in a self-adaptive mode, and the signature data needs to be verified again until the signatures of the data blocks are unique. And recording the signature data of each block in the new version and the old version and the used signature algorithm, and writing the differential packet.
And differentiating the successfully partitioned data, and packing the integer array by using a basic storage bit number smaller than the integer storage length of the obtained differential data, so that the storage capacity of a smaller number with the high-order storage of 0 is reduced, and the effective utilization of the integer storage space is improved.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (5)
1. A security signature algorithm for upgrading an embedded device system is characterized by comprising the following steps:
reading a binary data packet to be differentiated;
step two, partitioning the data packet;
respectively signing the data blocks by using a preset signature algorithm, and recording signature algorithm mark values;
step four, checking the signature data of the corresponding block, judging whether the signature data conflict, and if the signature conflict does not occur, performing step seven;
step five, if the signature data conflicts, adjusting the size of the blocks, repeating the step two to the step four until the signature of the data block is unique, and performing the step seven;
step six, if the signature algorithm is used, and the signature conflict occurs in the block size adjusted each time, the signature algorithm needs to be replaced, and the steps two to five are repeated until the signature of the data block is unique;
recording the size of the blocks, the signature data and the mark value of the signature algorithm;
step eight, differentiating and packaging the successfully partitioned data;
and step nine, compressing the packed data, and writing the difference packet into the difference packet.
2. The security signature algorithm for the system upgrade of the embedded device according to claim 1, wherein: the signature algorithm replaced in the sixth step is Murmur3, CRC32, xxHash or lookup3, and the sequence of replacing the signature algorithm is Murmur3, CRC32, xxHash and lookup 3.
3. The security signature algorithm for the system upgrade of the embedded device according to claim 1, wherein: and step eight, packing the integer array by using the basic storage bit number smaller than the integer storage length for the data obtained by the difference in the step eight.
4. The security signature algorithm for the system upgrade of the embedded device according to claim 1, wherein: and the difference in the step eight is divided into a forward direction and a reverse direction, and the forward direction and the reverse direction are carried out simultaneously.
5. The security signature algorithm for the system upgrade of the embedded device according to claim 1, wherein: the binary data packet includes an old version and a new version.
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116302030A (en) * | 2023-03-09 | 2023-06-23 | 上海对外经贸大学 | Safe embedded system firmware block differential upgrading method and system |
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116302030A (en) * | 2023-03-09 | 2023-06-23 | 上海对外经贸大学 | Safe embedded system firmware block differential upgrading method and system |
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