CN112285658A - Recursive computation based method for rapidly generating satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal - Google Patents

Recursive computation based method for rapidly generating satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal Download PDF

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CN112285658A
CN112285658A CN202011112214.XA CN202011112214A CN112285658A CN 112285658 A CN112285658 A CN 112285658A CN 202011112214 A CN202011112214 A CN 202011112214A CN 112285658 A CN112285658 A CN 112285658A
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马方方
杨伟铭
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Institute Of Logistics Science And Technology Institute Of Systems Engineering Academy Of Military Sciences
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S7/00Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
    • G01S7/02Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
    • G01S7/38Jamming means, e.g. producing false echoes
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S7/00Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
    • G01S7/02Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
    • G01S7/021Auxiliary means for detecting or identifying radar signals or the like, e.g. radar jamming signals
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/88Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications
    • G01S13/89Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications for mapping or imaging
    • G01S13/90Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications for mapping or imaging using synthetic aperture techniques, e.g. synthetic aperture radar [SAR] techniques

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Abstract

The invention discloses a method for quickly generating satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signals based on recursive computation, which specifically comprises the following steps: before interference is implemented, acquiring motion parameters and SAR signal parameters of an interference object SAR platform, and after receiving a radio-frequency signal of an interference object, performing anti-aliasing filtering, down-conversion, analog-to-digital conversion and fast Fourier transform processing on the radio-frequency signal to obtain an SAR baseband digital signal; the interference machine calculates an interference system function at the current moment, modulates the received signal by using the interference system function to generate a radio frequency interference signal, and transmits the radio frequency interference signal through the antenna. Different from other methods for independently calculating the interference system function of each pulse arrival time, the method provided by the invention focuses on the relation between the interference system functions of adjacent pulse arrival times, realizes the rapid calculation of the interference system function in a recursion mode, improves the operation efficiency and reduces the calculation cost.

Description

Recursive computation based method for rapidly generating satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of electronic countermeasure, and particularly relates to a deception jamming method for a synthetic aperture radar.
Background
SAR is an acronym of Synthetic Aperture Radar, refers to Synthetic Aperture Radar, is an active microwave remote sensing imaging Radar capable of working all day long and all weather, and has wide and important application in the fields of information reconnaissance, resource exploration, natural disaster assessment, key area monitoring and the like. The satellite-borne SAR is carried on an artificial satellite, has a larger mapping range compared with an airborne SAR, is not limited by conditions such as national boundaries, geographical climates and the like, and can complete global observation in a short time. Therefore, electronic countermeasure techniques for SAR, particularly on-board SAR, have received great attention and development for the purpose of protecting the sensitive targets and areas of the own.
The active electronic interference of the current SAR mainly comprises two types of suppression interference and deception interference. The deception jamming signal is completely coherent with the original signal, compared with suppression jamming, the needed jamming power is very small, the deception jamming signal has extremely strong concealment, even if discovered by an enemy, the deception jamming signal is difficult to eliminate through anti-jamming measures, the jamming image can be adjusted according to actual requirements, and the flexibility is very strong. Based on the above advantages, the spoofing interference is more attractive and is also a hot area of current research.
The deception jamming requires that the jamming machine modulates and forwards the intercepted SAR pulse by combining a jamming template and obtaining a system function through calculation according to the motion parameters (platform position, speed and the like), signal parameters (carrier frequency, pulse width and the like), antenna parameters (beam mode, antenna pointing direction and the like) and the like of a jamming object in each pulse repetition period to generate a jamming signal, and the jamming object generates a false target after imaging the jamming object. How to solve the system function of the jammer (hereinafter referred to as the interference system function) is a main problem of SAR deception interference research, the most direct method is to calculate the signal two-way propagation delay difference between each scattering unit on an interference template and the jammer, but the calculated amount of the method is very large, and the pulse repetition period of the SAR is in millisecond level, so that the instantaneity is difficult to guarantee. Subsequent studies are all developed around reducing the real-time computation amount, and a series of achievements are obtained, but the contradiction between the computation complexity and the real-time processing requirement is still not completely solved, and especially for large-scale scenes or high-resolution targets, the large amount of real-time computation requirements are still a great bottleneck for the practical implementation of deception jamming.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a method for quickly generating a satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal based on recursive computation, which aims at the problems of high operation complexity and difficult practicability existing in system function computation in satellite-borne SAR deception jamming, and specifically comprises the following steps:
obtaining the stem before applying the interferenceThe method comprises the steps of disturbing the motion parameters of an SAR platform and SAR signal parameters, wherein the SAR platform motion parameters comprise a motion track, a motion speed v and the like, and the SAR signal parameters comprise a carrier frequency f0Bandwidth B, pulse repetition period PRI, etc.
S1, after receiving the radio frequency signal of the interference object, the jammer performs processing such as anti-aliasing filtering, down-conversion, analog-to-digital conversion and fast Fourier transform on the radio frequency signal to obtain an SAR baseband digital signal;
s2, the interference machine calculates the interference system function at the current moment according to the motion parameters and the signal parameters of the interference object and by combining the interference template;
s3, modulating the received signal by using the interference system function, namely multiplying the interference system function by the generated SAR baseband digital signal to obtain a baseband interference signal in a digital form;
and S4, performing fast Fourier transform, digital-to-analog conversion, up-conversion, gain control and other processing on the generated baseband interference signal, generating a radio frequency interference signal, and transmitting the radio frequency interference signal through an antenna.
And repeating the processing of the steps S1 to S4 on each received pulse to generate the satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal.
In step S2, the jammer calculates the interference system function at the current time according to the motion parameters and the signal parameters of the interfering object and by combining the interference template, and the initialization stage specifically includes two stages of initialization and real-time calculation, where the initialization stage includes the following steps:
s21, according to the SAR platform motion trail and the jammer position, on a two-dimensional slant range plane, establishing a deception jamming coordinate system by taking the jammer position as an origin, wherein the x axis is vertical to the SAR platform motion trail, the y axis is parallel to the SAR motion trail, when the SAR zero Doppler plane passes through the jammer, the slant range of the SAR platform and the jammer is shortest, and the shortest slant range R between the jammer and the SAR platform is determinedJ0
S22, taking the time when the SAR zero Doppler surface passes through the jammer as the time reference, enabling the SAR platform to move at a constant speed along a straight line, wherein the speed is v, the SAR transmits pulse signals at a certain pulse repetition interval PRI, and the time when the SAR zero Doppler surface passes through the jammer is taken as the time referenceAnd (5) recording the time when the interference machine receives the SAR pulse signal for the first time as t [ 0)]The time when the subsequent pulse is received is sequentially marked as t [ 1]],t[2],…t[n]At the corresponding moment, the instantaneous slope distance between the SAR platform and the jammer is RJ[0],RJ[1],RJ[2],…,RJ[n]And the instantaneous slope from the scattering unit P (x, y) is Rx,y[0],Rx,y[1],Rx,y[2],…,Rx,y[n]Instantaneous slope distance Rx,y[n]And RJ[n]The difference (n-0, 1, 2, …) is denoted as Δ Rx,y[n]Calculating the initial time slope distance R between the jammer and the SAR platformJ[0]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000031
S23, the interference template is a scattering unit set describing the electromagnetic characteristics of the false scene, the scattering coefficient corresponding to each scattering unit coordinate is recorded, the initial slope distance difference between each scattering unit and the interference machine in the interference template is calculated, and for the scattering unit with the coordinate of (x, y), the initial slope distance difference delta R isx,y[0]Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002728963690000032
s24, calculating a recursion variable Hy[0]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000033
Wherein σx,yThe scattering coefficient of the scattering unit P (x, y) with the coordinate (x, y) in the interference template,
Figure BDA0002728963690000034
Figure BDA0002728963690000035
is an imaginary unit, frThe signal range frequency, c is the speed of light.
After the initialization is completed, the real-time computing phase may be entered, in which steps S25 and S26 are repeatedly performed:
s25, reaching time t [ n ] according to the nth (n is 0, 1, 2, …) pulse]Is a recursion variable Hy[n]Calculating the interference system function H [ n ] at the moment]:
H[n]=∑JHy[n],
Modulating the received SAR pulse with H [ n ] to generate satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal.
S26, if the interference is not finished, according to the slope distance R between the interference machine and the SAR platform at the nth pulse arrival timeJ[n]And a recurrence variable Hy[n]Calculating the recursion variable H of the arrival time of the next pulsey[n+1]And a pitch RJ[n+1]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000041
Figure BDA0002728963690000042
Let n be n +1, continue to step S25, calculate the interference system function at the next pulse arrival time, and loop until the interference ends.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
(1) according to the invention, an interference system function of each pulse arrival time is obtained by a recursion method, and a corresponding interference signal can be generated after the received SAR signal is modulated. The method has relatively large calculation amount in the initialization stage, can be initialized in advance when the side lobe signal is received, and implements interference on the main lobe, thereby reducing the calculation complexity and improving the real-time performance of deceptive interference.
(2) The method is different from other methods for independently calculating the interference system function of each pulse arrival time, and by focusing on the relation between the interference system functions of adjacent pulse arrival times, the method realizes the quick calculation of the interference system function in a recursion mode, improves the operation efficiency and reduces the calculation cost.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a model of a SAR spoofing interference method;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of modulation-forwarding based SAR spoofing interference;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a function recursive calculation of a satellite-borne SAR deception jamming machine system;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of scattering point locations of an interference template;
FIG. 5 is a false target imaging result obtained by a recursive computation-based spaceborne SAR deception jamming signal generation method;
fig. 6 shows the result of imaging the echo of a real target at the same position.
Detailed Description
For a better understanding of the present disclosure, an example is given here.
The embodiment provides a method for rapidly generating a satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal based on recursive computation, and fig. 1 is a SAR deception jamming model, which is described in detail below.
The SAR spoofing interference model is first described as follows:
1. on a two-dimensional slant range plane, establishing an interference coordinate system by taking the position of an interference machine as an origin, wherein the x axis is a distance direction and is vertical to the SAR motion trail, and the y axis is an azimuth direction and is parallel to the SAR motion trail;
2. in the interference process, considering that the SAR platform moves at a constant speed v along a straight line;
3. when the SAR zero Doppler surface passes through the jammer, the slant distance between the SAR zero Doppler surface and the jammer is shortest, and the SAR zero Doppler surface is marked as RJ0
4. The interference template is a scattering unit set for describing electromagnetic characteristics of a false scene, the scattering coefficient of each coordinate is recorded, and the scattering coefficient of a scattering unit P (x, y) with the coordinate of (x, y) in the interference template is recorded as sigmax,y
5, the SAR transmits pulse signals at a certain pulse repetition interval PRI, the time when the SAR zero Doppler surface passes through the interference machine is taken as a time reference, and the interference machine receives the SAR pulses for the first timeThe time of the impulse signal is denoted t [0 ]]The time when the subsequent pulse is received is sequentially marked as t [ 1]],t[2]…, the SAR and jammer instantaneous slope at the corresponding instant is RJ[0],RJ[1],RJ[2]…, has an instantaneous slope distance R from the scattering element P (x, y)x,y[0],Rx,y[1],Rx,y[2]…, instantaneous slope distance Rx,y[n]And RJ[n]The difference (n is 0, 1, 2, …) is represented as Δ Rx,y[n]。
Fig. 2 is a modulation-forwarding-based SAR spoofing interference schematic diagram, and the method for rapidly generating a satellite-borne SAR spoofing interference signal based on recursive computation specifically includes:
before interference is implemented, relevant parameters of an interference object need to be acquired in advance, and the method specifically includes: 1) platform motion parameters including motion trail, motion speed v and the like; 2) SAR signal parameters, including carrier frequency f0Bandwidth B, pulse repetition period PRI, etc.
S1, after receiving the radio frequency signal of the interference object, the jammer performs a series of processing such as anti-aliasing filtering, down-conversion, analog-to-digital conversion and fast Fourier transform to the radio frequency signal to obtain an SAR baseband digital signal;
s2, at the same time, the interference machine calculates the interference system function of the current time according to the motion parameters and signal parameters of the interference object and the interference template;
s3, modulating the received signal by using the interference system function, namely multiplying the interference system function by the generated SAR baseband digital signal to obtain a baseband interference signal in a digital form;
and S4, performing a series of processing such as fast Fourier transform, digital-to-analog conversion, up-conversion, gain control and the like on the generated baseband interference signal, generating a radio frequency interference signal, and transmitting the radio frequency interference signal through an antenna.
And repeating the processing on each received pulse to generate a satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal.
In the whole interference signal generation process, the calculation of the interference system function is the most complex and time-consuming part, and how to quickly calculate the interference system function is a key problem to be solved in the SAR deception interference field.
Fig. 3 shows a flowchart of recursive computation of a system function of a space-borne SAR spoofing jammer, where the recursive computation of the system function of the SAR spoofing jammer is described as follows:
the whole interference process is divided into two stages of initialization and real-time calculation, wherein the initialization stage comprises the following steps:
s21, according to the SAR platform motion trail and the jammer position, on a two-dimensional slant range plane, establishing a deception jamming coordinate system by taking the jammer position as an origin, taking an x axis as a distance direction and a y axis as an orientation direction, and determining the shortest slant range R between the jammer and the SARJ0
S22, using the time when the SAR zero Doppler surface passes through the jammer as the time reference, and at the first pulse arrival time t [0 ]]Calculating the initial slope distance R between the jammer and the SARJ[0]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000061
S23, calculating the initial slope distance difference delta R between each scattering unit and the jammer in the interference templatex,y[0]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000062
S24, calculating a recursion variable Hy[0]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000071
Wherein σx,yThe scattering coefficient of the scattering unit with the coordinate (x, y) in the interference template,
Figure BDA0002728963690000072
is an imaginary unit, frThe signal range frequency, c is the speed of light.
After the initialization is completed, a real-time computing stage can be entered, and the following steps are repeatedly executed in the stage:
s25, reaching time t [ n ] according to the nth (n is 0, 1, 2, …) pulse]Is a recursion variable Hy[n]Calculating the interference system function H [ n ] at the moment]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000073
The interference signal can be generated by modulating the received SAR signal with H [ n ].
S26, if the interference is not finished, according to the slope distance R between the interference machine and the SAR at the nth pulse arrival timeJ[n]And a recurrence variable Hy[n]Calculating the recursion variable H of the next pulse arrival time by the following recursion formulay[n+1]And a pitch RJ[n+1]:
Figure BDA0002728963690000074
Figure BDA0002728963690000075
Let n be n +1, continue to execute S25, calculate the interference system function H [ n +1] of the next pulse arrival time, and so on, until the interference ends.
With reference to fig. 4, by using a recursive computation-based method for rapidly generating a satellite-borne SAR spoofing interference signal, a spoofing interference simulation result on a false point target is as follows:
the main parameters of the interfering object are as follows: the carrier frequency is 11GHz, the signal modulation frequency is 50 MHz/mus, the pulse repetition period is 0.14ms, the pulse width is 3 mus, the movement speed is 7.1km/s, and the shortest slant distance between the interference machine and the SAR is 900 km.
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the positions of scattering points of an interference template, the interference template is a 3 × 3 scattering point array, the distance and the azimuth interval between adjacent points are both 0.3km, and an interference machine is located at the center of the template;
FIG. 5 is a false target imaging result obtained by a recursive computation-based spaceborne SAR deception jamming signal generation method;
fig. 6 shows the result of imaging the echo of a real target at the same position.
The above description is only an example of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application. Various modifications and changes may occur to those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present application should be included in the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims (2)

1. A method for quickly generating satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signals based on recursive computation is characterized by specifically comprising the following steps:
before interference is implemented, obtaining the motion parameters and SAR signal parameters of an interference object SAR platform, wherein the SAR platform motion parameters comprise a motion track and a motion speed v, and the SAR signal parameters comprise a carrier frequency f0Bandwidth B, pulse repetition period PRI;
s1, after receiving the radio frequency signal of the interference object, the jammer performs anti-aliasing filtering, down-conversion, analog-to-digital conversion and fast Fourier transform processing on the radio frequency signal to obtain an SAR baseband digital signal;
s2, the interference machine calculates the interference system function at the current moment according to the motion parameters and the signal parameters of the interference object and by combining the interference template;
s3, modulating the received signal by using the interference system function, namely multiplying the interference system function by the generated SAR baseband digital signal to obtain a baseband interference signal in a digital form;
s4, after the generated baseband interference signal is subjected to fast Fourier transform, digital-to-analog conversion, up-conversion and gain control processing, a radio frequency interference signal is generated and transmitted through an antenna;
and repeating the processing of the steps S1 to S4 on each received pulse to generate the satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal.
2. The method for rapidly generating spaceborne SAR deception jamming signal based on recursion calculation as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step S2, the jammer calculates the jamming system function at the current moment according to the motion parameter and the signal parameter of the jamming object and by combining the jamming template, and the method is specifically divided into two stages of initialization and real-time calculation, wherein the initialization stage includes the following steps:
s21, according to the SAR platform motion trail and the jammer position, on a two-dimensional slant range plane, establishing a deception jamming coordinate system by taking the jammer position as an origin, wherein the x axis is vertical to the SAR platform motion trail, the y axis is parallel to the SAR motion trail, when the SAR zero Doppler plane passes through the jammer, the slant range of the SAR platform and the jammer is shortest, and the shortest slant range R between the jammer and the SAR platform is determinedJ0
S22, taking the time when the SAR zero Doppler surface passes through the jammer as a time reference, enabling the SAR platform to move at a constant speed along a straight line, taking the speed as v, enabling the SAR to transmit pulse signals at a certain pulse repetition interval PRI, taking the time when the SAR zero Doppler surface passes through the jammer as a time reference, and marking the time when the jammer receives the SAR pulse signals for the first time as t [0 ]]The time when the subsequent pulse is received is sequentially marked as t [ 1]],t[2],…t[n]At the corresponding moment, the instantaneous slope distance between the SAR platform and the jammer is RJ[0],RJ[1],RJ[2],…,RJ[n]And the instantaneous slope from the scattering unit P (x, y) is Rx,y[0],Rx,y[1],Rx,y[2],…,Rx,y[n]Instantaneous slope distance Rx,y[n]And RJ[n]The difference (n-0, 1, 2, …) is denoted as Δ Rx,y[n]Calculating the initial time slope distance R between the jammer and the SAR platformJ[0]:
Figure FDA0002728963680000021
S23, the interference template is a scattering unit set describing the electromagnetic characteristics of the false scene, the scattering coefficient corresponding to each scattering unit coordinate is recorded, the initial slope distance difference between each scattering unit and the interference machine in the interference template is calculated, and for the scattering unit with the coordinate of (x, y), the initial slope distance difference delta R isx,y[0]Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002728963680000022
s24, calculating a recursion variable Hy[0]:
Figure FDA0002728963680000023
Wherein σx,yThe scattering coefficient of the scattering unit P (x, y) with the coordinate (x, y) in the interference template,
Figure FDA0002728963680000024
Figure FDA0002728963680000025
is an imaginary unit, frIs the signal range frequency, c is the speed of light;
after the initialization is completed, the real-time computing phase may be entered, in which steps S25 and S26 are repeatedly performed:
s25, reaching time t [ n ] according to the nth (n is 0, 1, 2, …) pulse]Is a recursion variable Hy[n]Calculating the interference system function H [ n ] at the moment]:
H[n]=∑yHy[n],
Modulating the received SAR pulse by using H [ n ] to generate a satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal;
s26, if the interference is not finished, according to the slope distance R between the interference machine and the SAR platform at the nth pulse arrival timeJ[n]And a recurrence variable Hy[n]Calculating the recursion variable H of the arrival time of the next pulsey[n+1]And a pitch RJ[n+1]:
Figure FDA0002728963680000031
Figure FDA0002728963680000032
Let n be n +1, continue to step S25, calculate the interference system function at the next pulse arrival time, and loop until the interference ends.
CN202011112214.XA 2020-10-16 2020-10-16 Recursive computation based method for rapidly generating satellite-borne SAR deception jamming signal Pending CN112285658A (en)

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