CN112187459B - Credible authentication method and system among modules in intelligent network networking - Google Patents
Credible authentication method and system among modules in intelligent network networking Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN112187459B CN112187459B CN202011072995.4A CN202011072995A CN112187459B CN 112187459 B CN112187459 B CN 112187459B CN 202011072995 A CN202011072995 A CN 202011072995A CN 112187459 B CN112187459 B CN 112187459B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- module
- vehicle
- vcu
- certificate
- tpm
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Medical Informatics (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a security authentication method between modules in an intelligent networked vehicle based on trusted computing, which comprises the processes of system initialization, certificate generation and verification, mutual authentication and key agreement between the modules, rapid message authentication, revocation of a change module and the like. The invention uses the trusted computing technology to ensure the safety and the credibility of the module, uses the remote certification to verify the safety state of the module, and adopts the high-efficiency message authentication. The intelligent internet vehicle communication model can realize module authentication and quick message authentication. Whether the module is safe or not only needs to be verified regularly, and the quick message authentication of the module can meet the verification of a large amount of real-time data in the intelligent internet vehicle.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the intelligent internet vehicle communication safety technology, and particularly relates to a credible authentication method and system among modules in an intelligent internet vehicle.
Background
With the development of computer control technology, intelligent internet vehicles are also gradually a research focus. The intelligent internet vehicle mainly depends on an in-vehicle computer system to realize unmanned driving. The intelligent internet vehicle mainly comprises three parts of data sensing, data processing and control execution. Various sensors equipped in the vehicle are responsible for acquiring real-time data, and a vehicle-mounted computing and communication unit (VCU) is responsible for processing data received from the sensors, making timely decisions and finally sending the decisions to an actuator. The actuators are responsible for receiving commands collected from the VCU to perform further operations, including controlling steering and acceleration and deceleration of the vehicle. All actions are completed by the vehicle, and no human participation is needed.
Although the internet vehicle has great potential, the safety problem of the internet vehicle still needs to be solved. The secure data transmission between the internal modules is short of an effective mechanism for guaranteeing, and an attacker can modify, delete and replay messages in the transmission process. If the receiver acquires wrong data, wrong actions may be generated, for example, the vehicle-mounted computing and communication unit acquires modified camera data, and a front obstacle is not detected, so that a traffic accident is caused. Message authentication is therefore required to secure the secure data transfer of the internal modules. Meanwhile, the safety inside the intelligent internet vehicle cannot be guaranteed only by message authentication. The internal module may be malicious or attacked, and if the malicious internal module continuously issues wrong information, even if the message authentication guarantee message is not tampered in the transmission process, wrong data wastes vehicle computing resources and can cause a decision without errors.
In summary, the main purpose of the security certification protocol research based on the trusted execution environment in the intelligent internet vehicle is to realize the mutual certification and the rapid message certification among the modules in the intelligent internet vehicle. Considering that an attacker may initiate attacks on the intelligent network online module and attacks on messages in the transmission process, currently, the related authentication of the module is lack of credibility, but the security protection of the module is particularly critical. Therefore, module safety and data safety protection are achieved based on the research of the intelligent internet vehicle system safety certification protocol of the trusted execution environment.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to: the invention aims to solve the problem of safe communication in the existing intelligent networked car, provides a method for realizing authentication between modules and quick message authentication, combines the module authentication and the message authentication, and provides an authentication method in the intelligent networked car based on a trusted computing technology, namely, a trusted execution environment is constructed based on a TPM in trusted computing, so that the safe credibility of the modules is realized, and the quick authentication of the messages is realized on the basis.
The technical scheme is as follows: the invention discloses a credible authentication method among modules in an intelligent online vehicle, which comprises the following steps of:
s1, initialization of trusted authority TA: trusted authority TA Generation Master Key sk TA And a corresponding public key P pub ；
S2, module initialization: module i in the vehicle is based on corresponding trusted platform module TPM i The endorsement key AIK generates its own public and private key sk i And pk i And broadcasts its own public key pk i (ii) a The vehicle-mounted computing processing unit VCU generates a self private key sk by using the endorsement key AIK v Generating public and private keys pk v ；
S3, the in-vehicle module i safely sends the state information to a trusted authority TA, the TA verifies the state information, and if the state information passes the verification, a certificate is generated for the TA; after receiving the certificate sent by the TA, the in-vehicle module i firstly verifies the certificate;
and S4, mutual authentication is carried out among the in-vehicle module i and the vehicle calculation processing unit VCU, and a signature is generated and sent to the opposite side based on the certificate processed by the private key and the TA method. After the signature verification of the two parties passes, generating a session and key, and storing the session and key in a TPM module;
s5, when data are transmitted between the in-vehicle module i and the vehicle calculation processing unit VCU, a message verification code HMAC is generated by utilizing the generated session key to realize message verification;
and S6, if the TA detects that a certain in-vehicle module is changed section, the TA cancels the in-vehicle module.
Further, the trusted authority TA selects
As master key sk TA And calculates the corresponding public key P pub ，P pub ＝(X，Y，Z)，X＝g x ，Y＝g y ，Z＝g z Wherein G is the generator of group G; TA selects two safe collision-free one-way hash functions: h: {0,1} * →Z q ，H：{0，1} * →Z q TA selects two q-th order groups: g 1 ＝＜g 1 ＞，G T ＝＜g T >, bilinear mapping as e: g 1 *G 1 ＝G T Wherein q is a prime number; the TA then broadcasts the common parameter g 1 ，g T ，G 1 ，G T ，P pub ，h，H}。
Further, the specific process of generating the certificate and the in-vehicle module verification certificate by the trusted authority TA in step S3 is as follows:
S3.1、TPM i collecting status information cs of in-vehicle module i i And sending the information to an in-vehicle module i, and then the in-vehicle module calculates and sends the identity, configuration information and a public key of the in-vehicle module
Sending the certificate to a trusted authority TA to acquire the certificate; likewise, the VCU calls the TPM v To collect status information cs v Finally, the ID of the user is sent v Configuration information (attribute cs) v ) And the public key pk v By passing
Feeding TA;
s3.2, the trusted authority TA utilizes the master key sk TA Decryption obtains (ID) respectively i ，cs i ||pk i And (ID) v ，cs v ||pk v ) The TA judges whether the state of the in-vehicle module i is normal or not according to the state standard ps; if the result is normal, the TA generates a corresponding certificate and sends the corresponding certificate to a response in-vehicle module i;
TA selection a i ∈G 1 And calculate A i ＝a i z ，b i ＝a i y ，B i ＝A i y ，
And sends a certificate sigma i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) Giving module i in vehicle, TA selects a v E G1, and calculating A v ＝a z z ，b v ＝a v y ，B v ＝A v y ，
Thereby generating a certificate sigma v ＝(a v ，A v ，b v ，B v ，c v ) And sending to the VCU; wherein
A private key that is TA;
s3.3, certificate verification
When the module i in the vehicle receives the certificate sigma sent by the TA i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) Then, the certificate sigma is first checked i Verification is performed by determining whether the following equation holds:
e(a i ，Z)＝e(g，A i )，
e(A，Y i )＝e(g，B i )；
likewise, the VCU receives the certificate σ sent by the TA v ＝(a v ，A v ，b v ，B v ，c v ) Then, the certificate sigma is first checked v Verification is performed by determining whether the following equation holds:
e(a v ，Z)＝e(g，A v )，
e(A，Y v )＝e(g，B v )；
if both the verification succeeds, executing the step S3.4;
s3.4, pair of in-vehicle module i and VCU
Certificate sigma i And σ v Carrying out treatment;
TPMi is first selected
Calculating r i1 -1 And send r i1 -1 ，r i2 For in-vehicle module i, in-vehicle module i calculates
σ i ＝(a′ i ，A′ i ，b′ i ，B′ i ，c′ i ) As a certificate for the final in-vehicle module i;
likewise, TPM in a VCU i Selecting
Calculating r v1 -1 And send r v1 -1 ，r v2 To the VCU; VCU calculation
Further, the detailed method of step S4 is as follows:
s4.1, TPM in VCU v Selecting
Calculate g n Sending N v ，g n To the VCU; VCU transmitting N v ，g n Giving the in-vehicle module i to communicate with the in-vehicle module i;
s4.2, signature generation
First, TPM i Upon receiving N v ，g n Then sign it
And sending the PBA signature to an in-vehicle module i to further generate a PBA signature; the in-vehicle module i performs the following operations:
selecting
Calculating u ix ＝e(X，a′ i )，u ixy ＝e(X，b′ i )，u is ＝e(g，c′ i )，u ixyz ＝e(X，B′ i )，
s i1 ＝w i1 -c Hi cs i modq，s i2 ＝w i2 -c Hi r i1 modq, wherein c Hi ＝H(σ′ i ，u ix ，u ixy ，u ixyz ，u is ，T i ，N v ，g n ) Simultaneous TPM i Selecting
Calculate g m Sending N via in-vehicle module i i ，g m To the VCU; the final in-vehicle module i generates a final PBA signature sigma PBAi ＝(σ′ i ，c Hi ，δ i ，s i1 ，s i2 ，T i ，N i )；
The VCU generates a signature;
when receiving N sent by the in-vehicle module i i ，g m First, TPM v Generate a signature thereon
And send delta v To the VCU; the VCU generates the PBA signature by:
u vx ＝e(X，a″ v )，u vxy ＝e(X，b′ v )，u vs ＝e(g，c′ v )，u vxyz ＝e(X，B′ v )，
selecting
c Hv ＝H(σ′ v ，u vx ，u vxy ，u vxyz ，u vs ，T v ，N i ，g m )，
And calculate s v1 ＝w v1 -c Hv cs v modq，s v2 ＝w v2 -c Hv r v1 modq；
Finally generating the PBA signature sigma PBAv ＝(σ′ v ，c Hv ，δ v ，s v1 ，s v2 ，T v ，N v )；
S4.3, signature verification stage
When the in-vehicle module i receives the signature sigma of the PBA PBAv First, the in-vehicle module i verifies the equation
If the result is true, continuing to obtain the result if the result is verified;
in-vehicle module i verifies certificate σ 'by verifying whether the following equation stands' v ：
e(a″ v ，Z)＝e(g，A′ v )，
e(a′ v ，Y)＝e(g，b′ v )，
e(A′ i ，Y)＝e(g，B′ v )
Then by calculating and verifying the followingC 'is judged by equation' Hv ＝c Hv Whether or not:
u′ vx ＝e(X，a′ v )，
u′ vxy ＝e(X，b′ v )，
u′ vs ＝e(g，c′ v )，
u′ vxyz ＝e(X，B′ v )，
c′ Hv ＝H(σ′ v ，u′ vx ，u′ vxy ，u′ vxy z，u′ vs ，T′ v ，N i ，g m )；
if the above equation is established, the VCU passes the verification of the in-vehicle module i;
the VCU verifies the signature of the in-vehicle module i in the same way;
s4.4, generating root key based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
TPM i Using its own secret value m and received g n To calculate k iv ＝g nnm (ii) a At the same time, TPM v Using its own secret value n and received g m To calculate k vi ＝g mn (ii) a Then the root key is stored in TPM i And TPM v Performing the following steps; the session key in the t times of communication is subjected to hash operation on the root key: k is a radical of i+1 ＝h(k i )。
Further, the detailed method of the inter-vehicle module message authentication in S5 is as follows:
the TPM in the in-vehicle module generates the message at the same time i Generating a responsive key k d ，k d-1 ，k d-2 ，...，k d And successively sent to an in-vehicle module i which calculates
And transmit
To the VCU;
VCU calls TPM v Generating a secret key k' d ，k′ d-1 ，k′ d-2 ，...，k′ d (ii) a VCU calculation
Finally, the VCU passes the judgment
Whether to stand for full message authentication.
Further, the detailed method of revoking management in step S6 is as follows:
when the VCU finds that the module i in the vehicle sends an error message, the VCU locally stores the error message record, and when the record value of the error message reaches the threshold value, the VCU sends the error message record
Feeding TA; TA verification Using private Key sk TA Obtaining ID v M, and finding out the certificate of the related in-vehicle module i;
the TA then sends a revocation command to the TPM in the in-vehicle module i i ；TPM i Verifying the received command, and deleting the certificate sigma after the verification is passed i ＝(a i ,A i ,b i ,B i ,c i ) And cs i (ii) a Verification of the in-vehicle module i requires generation of a PBA signature based on the certificate σ i The absence of a certificate does not allow the generation of a correct signature;
in the above process, in order to ensure that the TPM in the in-vehicle module i correctly receives the message sent by the TA, a "heartbeat" mechanism is adopted, that is, the TA periodically sends a random message to the TPM, and determines whether the TPM correctly receives the message according to feedback received by the TA. The invention also discloses a system for realizing the credible authentication method among the modules in the intelligent internet vehicle, which comprises a credible institution TA, a vehicle processing unit VCU equipped with a credible platform module TPM and an in-vehicle module i equipped with the credible platform module TPM; in the participation of the trusted authority TA, the in-vehicle module i and the vehicle processing unit VCU perform mutual authentication and secure communication, and the in-vehicle VCU and the module are both equipped with TPMs to implement trusted authentication and save private keys.
Has the advantages that: compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and disadvantages:
(1) the invention uses the trusted platform module TPM of trusted computing to ensure the module state safety, the TPM can provide protection for sensitive data and can judge whether the module state is safe;
(2) aiming at the interior of the intelligent networked vehicle, the invention not only considers the safety in the module data transmission process, but also adopts the remote certification technology to realize the mutual authentication between the modules, thereby avoiding the attack to the modules and further improving the interior safety of the intelligent networked vehicle;
(3) the invention combines module authentication and message authentication, wherein the mutual authentication of the module authentication only needs to be verified at regular intervals, and the message authentication is realized by using HMAC, so that the calculation and transmission costs are lower, and the overall message authentication efficiency is improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the system of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a block flow diagram of the system of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a specific flowchart of mutual module authentication according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary process for performing module revocation in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a comparison between the time when the TA issues the certificate and the time when the in-vehicle module verifies the certificate in the embodiment;
FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating the time overhead of PBA signatures in an embodiment;
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating message authentication time in an embodiment.
Detailed Description
The technical solution of the present invention is described in detail below, but the scope of the present invention is not limited to the embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1, the system of the present invention includes the following participants: a trusted authority TA, a vehicle computing processing unit VCU, an in-vehicle module i (e.g. sensors and actuators, etc.) equipped with a trusted platform module TPM. By means of the safety storage capacity provided by the TPM, the module can safely store data such as a private key.
As shown in fig. 2, the method for authenticating trust between modules in an intelligent internet vehicle of the present invention includes the following steps:
(1) a preparation process, namely initializing the TA and generating a public and private key of the in-vehicle module i;
(2) and in the communication process, mutual authentication, message authentication and revocation of malicious modules among modules in the intelligent internet vehicle (CAV).
The specific steps of the step (1) are as follows:
initialization of TA: TA selection
As master key and calculates the corresponding public key X ═ g x ,Y＝g y ,Z＝g z ,P pub TA selects two safe collision-free one-way hash functions: h: {0,1} * →Z q ，H:{0,1} * →Z q TA selects two q-th order groups G 1 ＝＜g 1 ＞,G T ＝＜g T G is a bilinear mapping of e 1 *G 1 ＝G T Wherein q is a prime number. TA broadcast common parameter g 1 ,g T ,G 1 ，G T ，P pub ，h，H}；
Module initialization: module i in vehicle is based on TPM i The endorsement key AIK generates its own public and private key sk i ,pk i And broadcasts its own public key pk i . The vehicle-mounted computing unit VCU executes the same operation to generate a public key and a private key;
the process of the step (2) comprises the following steps: the module requests a certificate, the TA verifies the state of the module and signs the certificate, the module verifies the certificate and signs in combination with a private key and attributes, and mutual authentication, key agreement and message authentication among the modules are carried out. If a variant module exists, the TA queries and deactivates the module.
The specific processes of requesting and generating certificates are described as follows:
1)TPM i collecting status information cs of in-vehicle module i i And transmits cs i Sending the data to an in-vehicle module i, and then calculating and sending the data to the in-vehicle module i
Sent to the TA to obtain the certificate. Likewise, the VCU performs the same operations, ultimately transmitting
Feeding TA;
2) TA decryption obtains (ID) i ,cs i ||pk i And (ID) v ,cs v ||pk v ). And the TA judges whether the state of the in-vehicle module i is normal or not according to the state standard ps. And if the response is normal, the TA generates a corresponding certificate and sends the corresponding certificate to the response in-vehicle module i. TA selection a i E.g. G, and calculate A i ＝a i z ,b i ＝a i y ,B i ＝A i y ,
And sends a certificate sigma i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) Giving the in-vehicle module i, and meanwhile, generating the certificate sigma by the TA in the same way v ＝(a v ，A v ，b v ，B v ，c v ) And sent to the VCU.
3) A certificate verification phase. When the module i in the vehicle receives sigma i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) Then, the certificate is first required to be verified to pass judgment e (a) i ，Z)＝e(g，A i )，
e(A，Y i )＝e(g，B i ) Whether or not this is true. Likewise, the VCU verifies the received certificate in the same manner.
Subsequently, the in-vehicle module i and the VCU need to process the received certificate. TPM i First, selecting
Calculating r i1 -1 And send r i1 -1 ，r i2 And (5) giving an in-vehicle module i. In-vehicle module i calculation
σ′ i ＝(a′ i ，A′ i ，b′ i ，B′ i ，c′ i ) As a certificate for the final in-vehicle module i. Likewise, TPM in a VCU i Selecting
Calculating r v1 -1 And send r v1 -1 ，r v2 To the VCU. VCU calculation
As shown in fig. 3, the specific steps of the mutual authentication and fast message authentication process between the modules are as follows:
1) TPM in VCU v Selecting
Calculate g n Sending N v ，g n To the VCU. VCU transmitting N v ，g n Giving the in-vehicle module ii to communicate with it.
2) And a signature generation stage. First, TPM i Upon receiving N v ，g n Then sign it
And sent to the in-vehicle module i for further generation of PBA signatures. The in-vehicle module i needs to perform the following operations: selecting
Calculating u ix ＝e(X，a′ i )，u ixy ＝e(X，b′ i )，u is ＝e(g，c′ i )，u ixyz ＝e(X，B′ i )，
s i1 ＝w i1 -c Hi cs i modq，s i2 ＝w i2 -c Hi r i1 modq。
Wherein c is Hi ＝H(σ′ i ，u ix ，u ixy ，u ixyz ，u is ，T i ，N v ，g n ) Simultaneous TPM i Selecting
Calculate g m Sending N via module i i ，g m To the VCU. The final in-vehicle module i generates a final PBA signature sigma PBAi ＝(σ′ i ，c Hi ，δ i ，s i1 ，s i2 ，T i ，N i )；
The VCU generates a signature. When receiving N sent by the in-vehicle module i i ，g m First, TPM v Generate a signature thereon
And send delta v To the VCU. The VCU generates the PBA signature by: u. of vx ＝e(X，a′ v )，u vxy ＝e(X，b′ v )，u vs ＝e(g，c′ v )，u vxyz ＝e(X，B′ v ) Selecting
And calculate s v1 ＝w v1 -c Hv cs v modq，s v2 ＝w v2 -c Hv r v1 modq，
3) And (5) signature verification stage. When the in-vehicle module i receives the signature of the PBA, firstly, the in-vehicle module i verifies
If the verification is passed, the process continues.
In-vehicle Module i verifies σ' v By: e '(a' v ，Z)＝e(g，A′ v )，e(a′ v ，Y)＝e(g，b′ v )，e(A′ i ，Y)＝e(g，B′ v ) And the module i in the module vehicle verifies that the signature passes: u' vx ＝e(X，a′ v )，u′ vxy ＝e(X，b′ v )，u′ vs ＝e(g，c′ v )，u′ vxyz ＝e(X，B′ v )，
And calculates and verifies c' Hv ＝H(σ′ v ，u′ vx ，u′ vxy ，u′ vxy z，u′ vs ，T′ v ，N i ，g m )，c′ Hv ＝c Hv And if the determination result is positive, the VCU passes the verification of the in-vehicle module i. The VCU verifies the signature of the in-vehicle module i in the same way.
The root key is generated based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. TPM i Using its own secret value m and received g n Calculating k iv ＝g nm . At the same time, TPM v Using its own secret value n and received g m Calculating k vi ＝g mn 。
Root Key preservation in TPM i And TPM v In (1). the session key in the t times of communication is subjected to hash operation on the root key: k is a radical of i+1 ＝h(k i )。
4) And a message authentication phase. The module i in the vehicle generates a message and the TPM in the module i Generating a responsive key k d ，k d-1 ，k d-2 ，...，k d And successively sent to module i. In-vehicle module i calculation
And transmit
To the VCU. VCU calls TPM v Generating a secret key k' d ，k′ d-1 ，k′ d-2 ，...，k′ d . VCU calculation
VCU authentication message passing computation
Whether or not this is true.
As shown in fig. 4, the specific process of module revocation is as follows:
when the VCU finds that the module i in the vehicle sends an error message, the VCU locally stores the record, and when the record value reaches the threshold value, the VCU sends the record value
To TA. TA verification Using private Key to obtain ID v M and finds the certificate of the relevant module i. Finally, TA sends cancel command to TPM in module i in vehicle i 。TPM i Verifying the received revocation command, and deleting the certificate sigma after the verification is passed i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) And cs i . Verification of a module requires generation of a PBA signature, which is based on a certificate σ i The absence of a certificate does not allow the generation of a correct signature. Meanwhile, in order to ensure that the TPM in the module correctly receives the message sent by the TA, a 'heartbeat' mechanism is adopted, namely the TA regularly sends a random message to the TPM, and whether the TPM correctly receives the message is judged according to feedback received by the TA.
Example (b):
the embodiment performs related experiments in linux system, wherein the calculation related to trusted platform module TPM is implemented in Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions). Fig. 5 shows the time at which the TA issues the certificate and the in-vehicle module verifies the certificate. In fig. 6, the present embodiment illustrates the time overhead of the relevant PBA signatures. The message authentication time for messages of different lengths, with message lengths from 1KB-2MB, is shown in fig. 7.
Claims (7)
1. A credible authentication method between modules in an intelligent internet vehicle is characterized by comprising the following steps: the method comprises the following steps:
s1, initialization of trusted authority TA: trusted authority TA generates master key sk TA And a corresponding public key P pub ；
S2, module initialization: module i in the vehicle is based on corresponding trusted platform module TPM i The endorsement key AIK generates its own private key sk i And the public key pk i And broadcasts its own public key pk i (ii) a The vehicle-mounted computing processing unit VCU generates a self private key sk by using the endorsement key AIK v Generating public and private keys pk v (ii) a i represents the ith in-vehicle module;
s3, the in-vehicle module i sends the state information to the trusted authority TA safely, the TA verifies the state information, and if the state information passes the verification, a certificate is generated for the TA; after receiving the certificate sent by the TA, the in-vehicle module i firstly verifies the certificate and processes the certificate;
s4, mutual authentication is carried out among the in-vehicle module i and the vehicle calculation processing unit VCU, a signature is generated and sent to the opposite side based on a certificate processed by a private key of the user and a TA method, and a session key is generated and stored in each TPM module after the signature verification of the user and the TA method is passed;
s5, when data are transmitted between the in-vehicle module i and the vehicle calculation processing unit VCU, generating a message authentication code HMAC by using the session key generated in the step S4 to realize the authentication of the message;
and S6, if the TA detects that a certain in-vehicle module is changed section, the TA cancels the in-vehicle module.
2. The method for credible authentication among modules in the intelligent internet vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps:
the trusted authority TA selects the x, y,
as the master key sk TA And calculates the corresponding public key P pub ，P pub ＝(X，Y，Z)，X＝g x ，Y＝g y ，Z＝g z Wherein G is the generator in G; TA selects two safe collision-free one-way hash functions: h: {0,1} * →Z q ，H：{0，1} * →Z q TA selects two q-th order groups: g 1 ＝＜g 1 ＞，G T ＝＜g T >, bilinear mapping as e: g 1 *G 1 ＝G T Wherein q is a prime number; the TA then broadcasts the common parameter g 1 ，g T ，G 1 ，G T ，P pub ，h，H}。
3. The inter-module credible authentication method in the intelligent internet vehicle as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the specific process of generating the certificate and the in-vehicle module verification certificate by the trusted authority TA in step S3 is as follows:
S3.1、TPM i collecting status information cs of in-vehicle module i i And sent to the in-vehicle module i, and then the in-vehicle module i calculates
Sending the certificate to a trusted authority TA to acquire the certificate; likewise, the VCU calls TPM v Performing the same operation as above and finally sending the ID v Attribute cs v And the public key pk v By passing
Feeding TA;
s3.2, the trusted authority TA utilizes the master key sk TA Decryption obtains (ID) respectively i ，cs i ||pk i And (ID) v ，cs v ||pk v ) The TA judges whether the state of the in-vehicle module i is normal or not according to the state standard ps; if the result is normal, the TA generates a corresponding certificate and sends the corresponding certificate to a response in-vehicle module i;
TA selection a i E G1, and calculating A i ＝a i z ，b i ＝a i y ，B i ＝A i y ，
And sends a certificate sigma i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) Giving module i in vehicle, TA selects a v E G1, and calculating A v ＝a v z ，b v ＝a v y ，B v ＝A v y ，
Thereby generating a certificate sigma v ＝(a v ，A v ，b v ，B v ，c v ) And sending to the VCU;
s3.3, certificate verification
When the module i in the vehicle receives the certificate sigma sent by the TA i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) Then, the certificate sigma is first checked i Verification is performed by determining whether the following equation holds:
e(a i ，Z)＝e(g，A i )，
e(A，Y i )＝e(g，B i )
likewise, the VCU receives the certificate σ sent by the TA v ＝(a v ，A v ，b v ，B v ，c v ) Then, the certificate sigma is first checked v Verification is performed by determining whether the following equation holds:
e(a v ，Z)＝e(g，A v )，
e(A，Y v )＝e(g，B v )；
if both the verification succeeds, executing the step S3.4;
s3.4, pair of in-vehicle module i and VCU
Certificate sigma i And σ v Carrying out treatment;
TPM i firstly, select r i1 ，
Calculating r i1 -1 And send r i1 -1 ，r i2 For in-vehicle module i, in-vehicle module i calculates
σ′ i ＝(a′ i ，A′ i ，b′ i ，B′ i ，c′ i ) As a certificate for the final in-vehicle module i;
likewise, TPM in a VCU v Selection of r v1 ，
Calculating r v1 -1 And send r v1 -1 ，r v2 To the VCU; VCU calculation
4. The method for credible authentication among modules in the intelligent internet vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the detailed method of the step S4 is as follows:
s4.1, TPM in VCU v Selection of N v ，
Calculate g n Sending N v ，g n To the VCU; VCU transmitting N v ，g n Giving the in-vehicle module i to communicate with the in-vehicle module i;
s4.2, signature generation
First, TPM i Upon receiving N v ，g n Then, sign it
And sending the PBA signature to an in-vehicle module i for further generating a PBA signature; the in-vehicle module i performs the following operations:
selection of w i1 ，
Calculating u ix ＝e(X，a′ i )，u ixy ＝e(X，b′ i )，u is ＝e(g，c′ i )，u ixyz ＝e(X，B′ i )，
s i1 ＝w i1 -c Hi cs i modq，s i2 ＝w i2 -C Hi r i1 modq, wherein c Hi ＝H(σ′ i ，u ix ，u ixy ，u ixyz ，u is ，T i ，N v ，g n ) Simultaneous TPM i Selection of N i ，
Calculate g m ViaIn-vehicle module i sends N i ，g m To the VCU; the final in-vehicle module i generates a final PBA signature sigma PBAi ＝(σ′ i ，c Hi ，δ i ，s i1 ，s i2 ，T i ，N i )；
The VCU generates a signature;
when receiving N sent by the in-vehicle module i i ，g m First, TPM v Generate a signature thereon
And send delta v To the VCU; the VCU generates the PBA signature by:
u vx ＝e(X，a″ v )，u vxy ＝e(X，b′ v )，u vs ＝e(g，c′ v )，u vxyz ＝e(X，B′ v )，
selection of w v1 ，
c Hv ＝H(σ′ v ，u vx ，u vxy ，u vxyz ，u vs ，T v ，N i ，g m )，
And calculate s v1 ＝w v1 -c Hv cs v modq，s v2 ＝w v2 -C Hv r v1 modq；
Finally generating PBA signature sigma PBAv ＝(σ′ v ，c Hv ，δ v ，s v1 ，s v2 ，T v ，N v )；
S4.3, signature verification stage
When the in-vehicle module i receives the signature sigma of the PBA PBAv First, the in-vehicle module i verifies the equation
g m If the result is true, continuing to obtain the result if the result is verified;
in-vehicle module i verifies certificate σ 'by verifying whether the following equation stands' v ：
e(a″ v ，Z)＝e(g，A′ v )，
e(a′ v ，Y)＝e(g，b′ v )，
e(A′ i ，Y)＝e(g，B′ v )
C 'is then judged by calculating and verifying the following equation' Hv ＝c Hv Whether or not:
u′ vx ＝e(X，a′ v )，
u′ vxy ＝e(X，b′ v )，
u′ vs ＝e(g，c′ v )，
u′ vxyz ＝e(X，B′ v )，
c′ Hv ＝H(σ′ v ，u′ vx ，u′ vxy ，u′ vxyz ，u′ vs ，T′ v ，N i ，g m )；
if the above equation is established, the VCU passes the verification of the in-vehicle module i;
the VCU verifies the signature of the in-vehicle module i in the same way;
s4.4, generating root key based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
TPM i Using its own secret value m and received g n To calculate k iv ＝g nm (ii) a At the same time, TPM v Using its own secret value n and the received g m To calculate k vi ＝g mn (ii) a Then respectively storing the root keys in the TPM i And TPM v Performing the following steps; the session key in the mu-time communication is obtained by carrying out hash operation on the root key: k is a radical of μ+1 ＝h(k μ )。
5. The inter-module credible authentication method in the intelligent internet vehicle as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the detailed method for message authentication between the vehicle interior modules in the S5 is as follows:
the TPM in the in-vehicle module generates the message at the same time i Generating a responsive key k d ，k d-1 ，k d-2 ，...，k d And successively sending the data to an in-vehicle module i which calculates
And sends m μ ，μ，
To the VCU;
VCU calls TPM v Generating a secret key k' d ，k′ d-1 ，k′ d-2 ，...，k′ d (ii) a VCU calculation
Finally, the VCU passes the judgment
Whether to stand for full message authentication.
6. The inter-module credible authentication method in the intelligent internet vehicle as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the detailed method of revocation management in step S6 is as follows:
when VCU findsThe module i in the vehicle sends an error message, the error message record is stored locally, and when the record value of the error message reaches the threshold value, the VCU sends the error message
Feeding TA; TA verification Using Master Key sk TA Obtaining ID v M, and finding out the certificate of the related in-vehicle module i;
then TA sends cancel command to TPM in module i in vehicle i ；TPM i Verifying the received command, and deleting the certificate sigma after the verification is passed i ＝(a i ，A i ，b i ，B i ，c i ) And cs i (ii) a Verification of the in-vehicle module i requires generation of a PBA signature based on the certificate σ i The absence of a certificate does not allow the generation of a correct signature;
in the above process, in order to ensure that the TPM in the in-vehicle module i correctly receives the message sent by the TA, a "heartbeat" mechanism is adopted, that is, the TA periodically sends a random message to the TPM, and determines whether the TPM correctly receives the message according to feedback received by the TA.
7. A system for realizing the credible authentication method between the modules in the intelligent internet vehicle as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: the system comprises a trusted authority TA, a vehicle processing unit VCU equipped with a trusted platform module TPM and an in-vehicle module i equipped with the trusted platform module TPM; in the participation of the trusted authority TA, mutual authentication and secure communication between the in-vehicle module i and the vehicle processing unit VCU are performed, and the vehicle processing unit VCU and the in-vehicle module i are both equipped with a trusted platform module to realize trusted authentication and save a private key.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011072995.4A CN112187459B (en) | 2020-10-09 | 2020-10-09 | Credible authentication method and system among modules in intelligent network networking |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011072995.4A CN112187459B (en) | 2020-10-09 | 2020-10-09 | Credible authentication method and system among modules in intelligent network networking |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN112187459A CN112187459A (en) | 2021-01-05 |
| CN112187459B true CN112187459B (en) | 2022-08-16 |
Family
ID=73947861
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011072995.4A Active CN112187459B (en) | 2020-10-09 | 2020-10-09 | Credible authentication method and system among modules in intelligent network networking |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN112187459B (en) |
Families Citing this family (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN113115317A (en) * | 2021-03-05 | 2021-07-13 | 暨南大学 | Privacy protection method for vehicle trust score in Internet of vehicles |
Citations (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105847235A (en) * | 2016-03-14 | 2016-08-10 | 安徽大学 | Identity based efficient anonymous batch authentication method in IOV (Internet of Vehicles) environment |
| CN106713326A (en) * | 2016-12-28 | 2017-05-24 | 上海电机学院 | Vehicle-mounted network message authentication protocol |
| CN108259465A (en) * | 2017-12-08 | 2018-07-06 | 清华大学 | A kind of authentication encryption method of intelligent automobile internal network |
| CN109067525A (en) * | 2018-08-01 | 2018-12-21 | 安徽大学 | Message authentication method based on half credible administrative center in car networking |
| CN109391631A (en) * | 2018-11-28 | 2019-02-26 | 重庆邮电大学 | It is a kind of with the car networking anonymous authentication system and method controllably linked |
| CN109891416A (en) * | 2016-10-27 | 2019-06-14 | 株式会社电装 | For authenticating and the system and method for authorization device |
Family Cites Families (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP6173411B2 (en) * | 2014-12-12 | 2017-08-02 | Kddi株式会社 | Management device, vehicle, management system, management method, and computer program |
| CN107437993A (en) * | 2016-05-26 | 2017-12-05 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | One kind is based on without the side's authentication key agreement method of certificate two and device |
| CN109788482B (en) * | 2019-02-26 | 2021-09-03 | 武汉大学 | Method and system for anonymous authentication of messages between vehicles in Internet of vehicles environment |
-
2020
- 2020-10-09 CN CN202011072995.4A patent/CN112187459B/en active Active
Patent Citations (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105847235A (en) * | 2016-03-14 | 2016-08-10 | 安徽大学 | Identity based efficient anonymous batch authentication method in IOV (Internet of Vehicles) environment |
| CN109891416A (en) * | 2016-10-27 | 2019-06-14 | 株式会社电装 | For authenticating and the system and method for authorization device |
| CN106713326A (en) * | 2016-12-28 | 2017-05-24 | 上海电机学院 | Vehicle-mounted network message authentication protocol |
| CN108259465A (en) * | 2017-12-08 | 2018-07-06 | 清华大学 | A kind of authentication encryption method of intelligent automobile internal network |
| CN109067525A (en) * | 2018-08-01 | 2018-12-21 | 安徽大学 | Message authentication method based on half credible administrative center in car networking |
| CN109391631A (en) * | 2018-11-28 | 2019-02-26 | 重庆邮电大学 | It is a kind of with the car networking anonymous authentication system and method controllably linked |
Non-Patent Citations (5)
| Title |
|---|
| An Extensible and Effective Anonymous Batch Authentication Scheme for Smart Vehicular Networks;Jing Zhang，etc;《IEEE》;20200203;全文 * |
| Anonymous Key-Agreement Protocol for V2G Environment Within Social Internet of Vehicles;Shafiq Ahmed，etc;《IEEE》;20200618;全文 * |
| Full Session Key Agreement Scheme Based on Chaotic Map in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks;Jie Cui，etc;《IEEE》;20200526;全文 * |
| 基于分布式密钥共享的UWSN安全分簇方案;仲红等;《通信学报》;20150525;全文 * |
| 基于可信计算的车载网认证方案;文松等;《湖北文理学院学报》;20170815(第08期);全文 * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN112187459A (en) | 2021-01-05 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN105847235B (en) | The efficient anonymous batch of authentication method of identity-based under a kind of car networking environment | |
| CN106330910A (en) | Strong privacy protection dual authentication method based on node identities and reputations in Internet of vehicles | |
| CN111371744B (en) | Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus method based on distributed key | |
| CN108270573B (en) | Privacy protection method for unmanned automobile | |
| CN109076078A (en) | Method to establish and update the key of the In-vehicle networking communication for safety | |
| CN108964919A (en) | The lightweight anonymous authentication method with secret protection based on car networking | |
| CN114205091B (en) | Network authentication and key negotiation method for automatic driving vehicle based on chaotic mapping | |
| EP3462747A1 (en) | Security device for providing security function for image, camera device including the same, and system on chip for controlling the camera device | |
| CN105763558A (en) | Distributed aggregation authentication method having privacy protection function for vehicle-mounted self-organizing network | |
| CN110086622A (en) | In-vehicle network security architecture designs under a kind of intelligent network connection environment | |
| CN104394000A (en) | Batched certification method based on pseudonym verification public key in vehicle-mounted network | |
| CN108401243B (en) | Vehicular ad hoc network message authentication method and system | |
| US9286485B2 (en) | Using trust points to provide services | |
| CN113852632B (en) | SM9 algorithm-based vehicle identity authentication method, system, device and storage medium | |
| WO2017008829A1 (en) | A method and a system for reliable computation of a program | |
| CN111885545B (en) | Method for tracking selfish node based on V2V cooperative transmission authentication | |
| CN113268542A (en) | Block chain rewriting method and system based on multi-party authorization | |
| CN111147594A (en) | Internet of things data transmission system, key generation method and data transmission method thereof | |
| CN114286332A (en) | Dynamic and efficient vehicle-mounted cloud management method with privacy protection function | |
| CN112187459B (en) | Credible authentication method and system among modules in intelligent network networking | |
| CN112733179A (en) | Lightweight non-interactive privacy protection data aggregation method | |
| JP2022552554A (en) | Issuing Offline PKI Certificates in Decentralized V2X Networks | |
| Jiang et al. | An anonymous communication scheme based on ring signature in VANETs | |
| CN116321154A (en) | Efficient message authentication method based on zero knowledge proof in Internet of vehicles environment | |
| CN116707854A (en) | Robust cloud storage access control method based on attribute encryption |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |