CN112069515A - Safe EFUSE burning method and system - Google Patents
Safe EFUSE burning method and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN112069515A CN112069515A CN202010842720.8A CN202010842720A CN112069515A CN 112069515 A CN112069515 A CN 112069515A CN 202010842720 A CN202010842720 A CN 202010842720A CN 112069515 A CN112069515 A CN 112069515A
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- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
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Abstract
The invention discloses a safe EFUSE burning method and a safe EFUSE burning system, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, and calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1; after receiving the shared key of the burning software end, the chip end randomly generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, and signs the signature of S2, wherein the signature is Q; the burning software calculates to obtain a first communication encryption key E according to the own D1 and the S2 of the chip end, and the chip end calculates to obtain a second communication encryption key E' according to the own D2 and the first shared key S1 of the burning software end; if E is true, the first communication encryption key E can be regarded as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link; the burning software uses the first communication encryption key E to encrypt the data to be burned into the EFUSE. The safe EFUSE burning method and the safe EFUSE burning system can effectively protect the data safety in the EFUSE burning process and ensure that the data is obtained by a real burning chip.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of chip burning, relates to a burning method, and particularly relates to a safe EFUSE burning method and system.
Background
EFUSE (one time programmable memory) or OTP plays an important role as a medium for chip data storage. As is known, the encryption key of the chip application is usually burned in the built-in EFUSE of the chip. Moreover, in the IOT era, the communication encryption key, authentication data, etc. of the terminal product and the cloud service are also burned in the EFUSE built in the chip; therefore, it is important to ensure the data security of the EFUSE.
The built-in EFUSE of the chip can ensure the safety of the data after burning by setting read-write protection, but cannot ensure the data safety of the EFUSE in the burning process. At present, the mode of burning EFUSE is basically based on serial port communication, and the communicated data is plaintext, so that the mode is easy to be monitored by a third party, and the monitoring cost is low; moreover, the method is also easy to be disguised as a chip by a disguiser to acquire the EFUSE data to be burned, so that the EFUSE data burning process has a great risk of being stolen, and great hidden danger is brought to intellectual property protection of products.
A common EFUSE burning scenario is shown in fig. 1; the EFUSE burning is generally carried out in a common electronic factory with extremely low security level, a listener can easily steal data on a communication link in the burning process by using the existing mature eavesdropping technology, and a communication protocol or a communication mode is always open. Under the burning scene, a listener can easily analyze the data burned into the EFUSE according to the protocol.
In addition, even if the data of the communication link is added with monitoring security protection, due to the fact that the communication protocol or the communication mode is disclosed, a disguiser can disguise the data into a chip to be burned according to the communication protocol, and therefore the previous security protection mechanism is cracked.
In view of the above, there is a need to design a new EFUSE recording method to overcome at least some of the above-mentioned defects of the existing EFUSE recording method.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a safe EFUSE burning method and a safe EFUSE burning system, which can effectively protect the data security in the EFUSE burning process, ensure that the data is obtained by a real burning chip, prevent the data from being stolen by monitoring in the burning process and prevent a masquerader from disguising as the chip to be burned to steal the EFUSE data to be burned.
In order to solve the technical problem, according to one aspect of the present invention, the following technical solutions are adopted:
a secure EFUSE burning method, the method comprising:
the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning software end, the chip end randomly generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signs the second shared key S2, and sends a second shared key S2 and a signature Q to the burning software through a communication interface;
after the chip burning software receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, the validity of the second shared secret key S2 is verified according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning software calculates a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning software and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning software end; if E is true, the first communication encryption key E can be regarded as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning software encrypts data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
and the chip end decrypts the data to be burnt into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', performs integrity check, can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and then returns the burning result to the burning software.
According to another aspect of the invention, the following technical scheme is adopted: a secure EFUSE burning method, the method comprising:
the burning module generates a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip generates a second private key D2 of the chip, calculates a second shared key S2 and signs a second shared key S2 with the signature being Q, and then sends the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface;
after the burning module receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, the legality of the second shared secret key S2 is verified according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module calculates a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key E is satisfied as the second communication encryption key E', the first communication encryption key E is considered as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module encrypts data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
and the chip end decrypts the data to be burnt into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', performs integrity check, can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and then returns the burning result to the burning module.
As an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module randomly generates its own first private key D1.
As an embodiment of the present invention, after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip randomly generates its own second private key D2.
As an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module is burning software.
According to another aspect of the invention, the following technical scheme is adopted: a safe EFUSE burning system comprises a burning module and at least one chip terminal; the burning module can be connected with the chip end;
the burning module is used for generating a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculating a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sending the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
the chip end is used for generating a second private key D2 of the chip end after receiving the shared key of the burning module, calculating a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signing the second shared key S2 to obtain a signature Q, and then sending the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface;
the burning module is used for verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q after receiving the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module is used for calculating a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of a chip end;
the chip end is used for calculating to obtain a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key E is satisfied as the second communication encryption key E', the first communication encryption key E is considered as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module is used for encrypting data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E and then sending the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
the chip end is used for decrypting data to be burned into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', and performing integrity check, the data can be burned into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and then the burning result is returned to the burning module.
As an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module randomly generates its own first private key D1.
As an embodiment of the present invention, after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip randomly generates its own second private key D2.
As an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module is burning software.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the safe EFUSE burning method and the safe EFUSE burning system can effectively protect the data safety in the EFUSE burning process, ensure that the data is obtained by a real burning chip, avoid the data from being stolen by monitoring in the burning process and prevent a masquerader from disguising as the chip to be burned to steal the EFUSE data to be burned.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a conventional EFUSE burning scene.
Fig. 2 is a flowchart of a secure EFUSE burning method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
For a further understanding of the invention, reference will now be made to the preferred embodiments of the invention by way of example, and it is to be understood that the description is intended to further illustrate features and advantages of the invention, and not to limit the scope of the claims.
The description in this section is for several exemplary embodiments only, and the present invention is not limited only to the scope of the embodiments described. It is within the scope of the present disclosure and protection that the same or similar prior art means and some features of the embodiments may be interchanged.
The invention discloses a safe EFUSE burning method, and FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the safe EFUSE burning method in one embodiment of the invention; referring to fig. 2, the method includes:
step 1, the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through a communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning software end, the chip end randomly generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signs the second shared key S2, and sends the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning software through a communication interface;
step 3, after the chip burning software receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
step 4, the burning software calculates a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning software and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
step 5, the chip end calculates a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning software end; if the first communication encryption key E is the second communication encryption key E', the E can be regarded as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
step 6, encrypting data to be burnt to the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E by burning software, and then sending the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
and (7) decrypting the data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a second communication encryption key E' at the chip end, verifying the completeness, burning the data into the EFUSE after the verification is passed, and returning the burning result to burning software.
The invention also discloses a safe EFUSE burning system, which comprises a burning module and at least one chip end; the burning module can be connected with the chip end.
The burning module is used for generating a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculating a first shared key S1, and sending the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface. In an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module randomly generates its own first private key D1. In one embodiment, the burning module is burning software.
The chip end is used for generating a second private key D2 of the chip end after receiving the shared key of the burning module, calculating a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signing the second shared key S2 to obtain a signature Q, and then sending the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface. In an embodiment of the present invention, after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip randomly generates its own second private key D2.
The burning module is used for verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q after receiving the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip, and the burning process continues.
The burning module is used for calculating a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end.
The chip end is used for calculating to obtain a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key E is the second communication encryption key E', the first communication encryption key E is considered to be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link.
The burning module is used for encrypting data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E and then sending the encrypted data to the chip end through a communication link.
The chip end is used for decrypting data to be burned into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', and performing integrity check, the data can be burned into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and then the burning result is returned to the burning module.
In summary, the secure EFUSE burning method and system provided by the invention can effectively protect the data security in the EFUSE burning process, can ensure that the data is obtained by the real burning chip, avoids the data being monitored and stolen in the burning process, and prevents a pretend from pretending to be a chip to be burned to steal the EFUSE data to be burned.
The technical features of the embodiments described above may be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the embodiments described above are not described, but should be considered as being within the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The description and applications of the invention herein are illustrative and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention to the embodiments described above. Effects or advantages referred to in the embodiments may not be reflected in the embodiments due to interference of various factors, and the description of the effects or advantages is not intended to limit the embodiments. Variations and modifications of the embodiments disclosed herein are possible, and alternative and equivalent various components of the embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art. It will be clear to those skilled in the art that the present invention may be embodied in other forms, structures, arrangements, proportions, and with other components, materials, and parts, without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics thereof. Other variations and modifications of the embodiments disclosed herein may be made without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention.
Claims (9)
1. A safe EFUSE burning method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning software end, the chip end randomly generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signs the second shared key S2, and sends a second shared key S2 and a signature Q to the burning software through a communication interface;
after the chip burning software receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, the validity of the second shared secret key S2 is verified according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning software calculates a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning software and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning software end; if the first communication encryption key E is satisfied as the second communication encryption key E', the first communication encryption key E is considered as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning software encrypts data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
and the chip end decrypts the data to be burnt into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', performs integrity check, can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and then returns the burning result to the burning software.
2. A safe EFUSE burning method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the burning module generates a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip generates a second private key D2 of the chip, calculates a second shared key S2 and signs a second shared key S2 with the signature being Q, and then sends the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface;
after the burning module receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, the legality of the second shared secret key S2 is verified according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module calculates a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key E is satisfied as the second communication encryption key E', the first communication encryption key E is considered as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module encrypts data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
and the chip end decrypts the data to be burnt into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', performs integrity check, can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and then returns the burning result to the burning module.
3. The secure EFUSE burning method of claim 2, wherein:
the burning module randomly generates a first private key D1.
4. The secure EFUSE burning method of claim 2, wherein:
and after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip randomly generates a second private key D2.
5. The secure EFUSE burning method of claim 2, wherein:
the burning module is burning software.
6. A safe EFUSE burning system is characterized by comprising a burning module and at least one chip end; the burning module can be connected with the chip end;
the burning module is used for generating a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculating a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sending the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
the chip end is used for generating a second private key D2 of the chip end after receiving the shared key of the burning module, calculating a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signing the second shared key S2 to obtain a signature Q, and then sending the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface;
the burning module is used for verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q after receiving the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q; if the second shared key S2 is illegal, the burning process stops; if the second shared key S2 is legal, the second shared key S2 is considered to be the shared key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module is used for calculating a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of a chip end;
the chip end is used for calculating to obtain a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key E is satisfied as the second communication encryption key E', the first communication encryption key E is considered as a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module is used for encrypting data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E and then sending the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
the chip end is used for decrypting data to be burned into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', and performing integrity check, the data can be burned into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and then the burning result is returned to the burning module.
7. The secure EFUSE burning system of claim 6, wherein:
the burning module randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning module.
8. The secure EFUSE burning system of claim 6, wherein:
and after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip randomly generates a second private key D2.
9. The secure EFUSE burning system of claim 6, wherein:
the burning module is burning software.
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| CN112069515B (en) | 2023-10-13 |
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