CN112040483A - Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system - Google Patents

Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN112040483A
CN112040483A CN202010501845.4A CN202010501845A CN112040483A CN 112040483 A CN112040483 A CN 112040483A CN 202010501845 A CN202010501845 A CN 202010501845A CN 112040483 A CN112040483 A CN 112040483A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
key
authentication
authentication server
private key
identity
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
CN202010501845.4A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
赵高峰
刘锐
黄进
刘金锁
缪巍巍
张明轩
朱雪阳
樊进
张利
孟伟伟
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Nari Information and Communication Technology Co
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co Ltd
Original Assignee
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Nari Information and Communication Technology Co
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by State Grid Corp of China SGCC, Nari Information and Communication Technology Co, Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co Ltd filed Critical State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Priority to CN202010501845.4A priority Critical patent/CN112040483A/en
Publication of CN112040483A publication Critical patent/CN112040483A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method and a system, which are executed by equipment A, and the method comprises the following steps: responding to the authentication start, and sending an authentication request to a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE; generating public parameters and a master key of identity information of the associated equipment A; generating a private key associating public parameters of the device A and the master key; generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated device A and the private key of the master key; receiving a public key-private key pair of the authentication server B in response to a key agreement request of the authentication server B, and generating a broadcast chain T based on the public key-private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf not, the authentication is not successful. The invention adopts an authentication mechanism based on multi-level identity, thereby further improving the overall performance of the network; using a Hash keychain, trueNow the Hash chain length is extended as required.

Description

Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system
Technical Field
The invention relates to a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method and system, which are applied to an electric wireless private network and belong to the technical field of communication.
Background
With the wide application of the wireless private network in the power system, a convenient access means is provided for control services such as power distribution automation and source network charge storage interaction and management services such as power utilization information acquisition, mobile operation and video monitoring. The electric power wireless private network can effectively supplement a wired transmission network and efficiently solve the problem of 'last kilometer' access of electric power communication.
However, with the rapid increase of the number of access terminals of the private wireless network, under the scenario of unified access of various mixed services such as source network load storage, distribution monitoring, mobile application, etc., the currently commonly adopted centralized processing mode through the core network cannot meet the real-time requirement of the load control type electric power service, and in addition, great potential hazards are brought to the safety of the private wireless power network.
The technical scheme of the prior art I is as follows: for the problem of heterogeneous access technology and device access network, some researchers have proposed Identity-Based encryption systems and signature mechanisms (IBCs), in which a public Key of a user can be easily obtained from user Identity information, and a Private Key of the user needs to be obtained through a Private Key Generation (PKG) service application. The identity-based key authentication mechanism has the advantages of simple and convenient generation of the user public key and low calculation amount for obtaining the public key, and has obvious advantages for improving the overall performance of the network.
The second technical scheme in the prior art is as follows: aiming at an authentication key mechanism, a scholart provides an MCEPAK protocol, realizes a hierarchical authorization and authentication key negotiation mechanism for a grid system, and improves identity authentication capability and overall network performance by using a key negotiation protocol based on a public key cryptographic algorithm principle.
Disclosure of Invention
The first prior art has the following disadvantages: although the IBC security protocol provides an efficient and flexible authentication mechanism, the identity registration and private key generation services in the IBC system are independently completed by private key generation, and in the power system, a single PKG cannot afford the registration and private key generation services of the entire network, which has a certain impact on resource consumption to some extent and is difficult to meet large-scale real-time requirements.
The second prior art has the following defects: public keys in an authentication key agreement protocol such as MCEPAK are all random sequences, and a public key certificate is required to bind user identity information. The Certificate generation, update and logout processes of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system are complex, and when a communication entity cannot establish communication with a Certificate Authority (CA), an authentication Key agreement mechanism established based on the PKI system loses necessary security assurance.
The invention provides a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method and system aiming at the problems of low authentication efficiency and high resource consumption. In order to reduce the consumption of resources for storing and releasing certificates, an authentication mechanism based on multi-level identity is adopted, and the overall performance of the network is further improved; in order to reduce the calculation overhead and the communication overhead and aim at the problem of controlling multiple devices in the broadcast of the power wireless private network, a Hash key chain based on a Merkle Tree is adopted to realize the on-demand expansion of the length of the Hash chain. The protocol reduces protocol redundancy and improves the real-time performance of operation.
The invention adopts the following technical scheme: a lightweight, efficient identity authentication method, performed by a device A, the method comprising:
responding to the authentication start, and sending an authentication request to a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE;
calling an identity hierarchical registration function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate public parameters and a master key of identity information of the associated equipment A;
calling a private key grading function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key;
calling an authentication key negotiation function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, and generating a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key;
receiving a public key and private key pair of the authentication server B in response to a key agreement request of the authentication server B, and generating a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAThen "authentication fails and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information" is sent to the authentication server B.
As a preferred embodiment, the associating the public parameter and the master key of the identity information of the device a specifically includes:
when the k-th layer of the device A needs to be authenticated, the identity hierarchical registration function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE constructs the identity information thereof into
Figure BDA0002525036520000031
Wherein IkRepresenting the k-th layer identity information;
if the upper limit of the level number of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is set to be l, a generator G belongs to G and a random number alpha belongs to ZpThereby obtaining g1＝gα；
Further selecting g2，g3，h1，…，hlE G, get the common parameter p ═ G, (G, G) for device a1,g2,g3,h1,…,lh and generates a master key
Figure BDA0002525036520000032
As a preferred embodiment, the associating the public parameter of the device a and the private key of the master key specifically includes: hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE (hierarchical identity authentication protocol) is a k-th layer of equipment A
Figure BDA0002525036520000033
When k is less than l and a pairing private key is generated, r, t epsilon to Z are selected arbitrarilypAnd simultaneously generating a private key according to the master key and the public parameter:
Figure BDA0002525036520000034
Figure BDA0002525036520000041
as a preferred embodiment, the generating a public key and a private key pair based on the public parameter of the associated device a and the master key and the private key specifically includes:
when the level of the equipment A is k (k is less than l), the level of the authentication server B is m (m is less than k is less than l), and the equipment A and the authentication server B have common nodes in the ith layer 1 which is less than i and less than l, the public key and the private key pair of the equipment A are generated by the private key grading function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE
Figure BDA0002525036520000042
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002525036520000043
Figure BDA0002525036520000044
as a preferred embodiment, the method further comprises: device A random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000045
According to IDBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the device A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000046
And according to the IDAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A according to the broadcast chain TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to broadcast chain TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate session keys
skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBJudging whether the authentication is successful;
if the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAIf the authentication fails, the authentication server B does not have legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the legal private key information is sent to the authentication server B;
if the session key SK is generatedBIf so, sending the authentication success information toDevice A, if it cannot generate session key SKBThen "authentication fails and device a does not have the legal private key information matching its purported identity information" is sent to device a.
The invention also provides a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method which is executed by an authentication server B and is characterized by comprising the following steps:
responding to an authentication request of the device A, and sending an authentication request to a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE;
calling an identity hierarchical registration function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter and a master key which are related to identity information of an authentication server B;
calling a private key grading function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter of an associated authentication server B and a private key of a master key;
calling an authentication key negotiation function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, and generating a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of an associated authentication server B and a private key of a master key;
in response to device A's key agreement request, device A's public-private key pair is received and broadcast chain T is generated based on device A's public-private key pairBAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBThen, the device a is sent "the authentication fails and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the asserted identity information".
As a preferred embodiment, the associating the public parameter and the master key of the identity information of the authentication server B specifically includes:
when the m layer of the authentication server needs to be authenticated, the identity hierarchical registration function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE constructs the identity information thereof into
Figure BDA0002525036520000061
Wherein ImRepresenting the m-th layer identity information;
if the upper limit of the level number of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is set to be l, a generator G belongs to G and a random number alpha belongs to ZpThereby obtaining g1＝gα；
Further selecting g2，g3，h1，…，hlE.g., G, obtains the public parameter p ═ G (G, G) of the authentication server B1,g2,g3,h1,…,hl) And generates a master key
Figure BDA0002525036520000062
As a preferred embodiment, the associating the public parameter of the authentication server B with the private key of the master key specifically includes:
the hierarchy level realizes the private key hierarchy function of the HIBE system as the mth layer of the authentication server B
Figure BDA0002525036520000063
When generating the pairing private key, randomly selecting r, t epsilon to ZpAnd simultaneously generating a private key according to the master key and the public parameter:
Figure BDA0002525036520000064
as a preferred embodiment, the generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameter of the associated authentication server B and the private key of the master key specifically includes:
when the device A is located at the level k (k < l), the authentication server B is located at the level m (m < k < l), and the devices A and B have a common node at the ith level 1 < i < l: the public key and the private key pair of the authentication server B are generated by the private key grading function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE
Figure BDA0002525036520000065
Wherein
Figure BDA0002525036520000066
i＜m＜l，
Figure BDA0002525036520000067
As a preferred embodiment, the method further comprises: device A random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000068
According to IDBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the device A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000071
And according to the public key ID of device AAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A according to the broadcast chain TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to broadcast chain TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate session keys
skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBJudging whether the authentication is successful;
if the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAIf the authentication fails, the authentication server B does not have legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the legal private key information is sent to the authentication server B;
if the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBThen "authentication fails and device a does not have the legal private key information matching its purported identity information" is sent to device a.
The invention also provides a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method which is executed by the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE and is characterized by comprising the following steps:
receiving an authentication request of the equipment A, and generating a public parameter and a master key of the identity information of the associated equipment A through an identity hierarchical registration function; generating a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of the master key through a private key grading function according to the public parameter and the master key of the identity information of the equipment A; generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated equipment A and the private key of the master key through a certification key negotiation function according to the public parameters of the equipment A and the private key of the master key, and sending the public key and private key pair to the authentication server B;
receiving an authentication request of an authentication server B, and generating a public parameter and a master key which are related to identity information of the authentication server B through an identity hierarchical registration function; generating a public parameter of the associated authentication server B and a private key of the master key through a private key grading function according to the public parameter of the identity information of the authentication server B and the master key; generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameter of the associated authentication server B and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function according to the public parameter of the authentication server B and the private key of the master key, and sending the public key and private key pair to the equipment A;
in response to device A's key agreement request, device A's public-private key pair is received and broadcast chain T is generated based on device A's public-private key pairBAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBIf the authentication fails, the device A does not have legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the authentication fails, the device A sends the legal private key information to the device A;
receiving a public key and private key pair of the authentication server B in response to a key agreement request of the authentication server B, and generating a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving authentication server B generated based on device A's public key-private key pairBroadcasting chain TBIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAThen "authentication fails and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information" is sent to the authentication server B.
The invention also provides a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication system which is characterized by comprising a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, equipment A and an authentication server B, wherein the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is respectively in communication connection with the equipment A and the authentication server B, and the equipment A is in communication connection with the authentication server B;
the device A sends an authentication request to a hierarchy level identity authentication system HIBE; a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates public parameters and a master key of identity information of associated equipment A through an identity hierarchical registration function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key through a private key hierarchical function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated equipment A and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function;
the authentication server B sends an authentication request to a hierarchy level identity authentication system HIBE; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates public parameters and a master key related to the identity information of the authentication server B through an identity hierarchical registration function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a private key associating public parameters of an authentication server B with a master key through a private key hierarchical function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of the associated authentication server B and a private key of a master key through an authentication key negotiation function;
the device A receives a key agreement request of the authentication server B, receives a public key and private key pair of the authentication server B, and generates a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAThen the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends out the authenticationThe successful information of the certification is sent to the authentication server B, if the session key SK can not be generatedAIf the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends the authentication failure and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information to the authentication server B, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends the legal private key information to the authentication server B;
the authentication server B receives the key negotiation request of the device A, receives the public key and private key pair of the device A, and generates a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the device ABAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBThe hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends successful authentication information to the device A, and if the session key SK cannot be generatedBThen, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends "authentication failed and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the purported identity information" to the device a.
As a preferred embodiment, the lightweight and efficient identity authentication system further comprises:
device A random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000101
According to IDBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the device A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000102
And according to the IDAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A is according to TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate session keys
skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBAnd judging whether the authentication is successful.
As a preferred embodiment, the method for generating a broadcast chain specifically includes: a broadcast self-regeneration authentication model based on a short Hash chain is designed, on the basis of a Merkle Tree, a key chain self-regeneration protocol is adopted to carry out secure connection among the Hash chains on a path on a message line, and the length of the short key chain when the calculation overhead and the communication overhead reach the lowest value in the short key chain self-regeneration authentication model is obtained.
As a preferred embodiment, the broadcast chain TBThe generation method specifically comprises the following steps: a Hash chain pre-distribution step; a Hash chain using step; and a Hash chain expanding step.
As a preferred embodiment, the Hash chain pre-allocating step specifically includes: the authentication server B needs to generate a random value in advance
Figure BDA0002525036520000111
As a seed, generating a Hash chain according to the self requirement of the network:
Figure BDA0002525036520000112
before the node equipment is deployed, all the common nodes R need to be stored in advance
Figure BDA0002525036520000113
The ordinary node R thus authenticates the broadcast key according to the one-way nature of the Hash chain.
As a preferred embodiment, the Hash chain using step specifically includes: if the number of used Hash chains does not exceed the specified number n0Then, the use mode of the Hash chain is unchanged; the authentication server B needs to release broadcast data in a specified time period, then the common node R needs to receive and store the data first, and then waits for the authentication server B to follow the subsequentAnd authenticating the data in a time period by broadcasting a related key by the authentication server B.
As a preferred embodiment, the Hash chain expanding step specifically includes:
step S1: when the Hash chain is used
Figure BDA0002525036520000114
When (at this time, the common node R is stored with
Figure BDA0002525036520000115
) The authentication server B selects a new random seed according to the formula (1)
Figure BDA0002525036520000116
And generating a new Hash chain using the random value:
Figure BDA0002525036520000117
step S2: redeploying the Hash on the basis of ensuring the authenticable characteristic of the Hash chain; at this time, the authentication server B calculates first
Figure BDA0002525036520000118
And
Figure BDA0002525036520000119
Figure BDA00025250365200001110
then calculate
Figure BDA00025250365200001111
Step S3: after the common node R receives the broadcast message, if
Figure BDA00025250365200001112
Then store
Figure BDA00025250365200001113
And discard
Figure BDA00025250365200001114
Meanwhile, storing the received broadcast message for message verification of the next stage; when the Hash chain is used
Figure BDA00025250365200001115
Time, calculate
Figure BDA00025250365200001116
Step S4: after the common node R receives the message, if
Figure BDA0002525036520000121
Then store
Figure BDA0002525036520000122
And discard
Figure BDA0002525036520000123
At the same time, utilize
Figure BDA0002525036520000124
Calculating the verification code of the message at the last stage and verifying the validity of the verification code so as to verify the validity of the stored information S 'in the last time period, and simultaneously verifying the validity of S' by using S '═ h (S');
step S5: if the common node R needs to store the message of this time period, in the following multicast key authentication process, the following calculation is performed:
Figure BDA0002525036520000125
step S6: the common node R, after receiving the message (2), uses the stored
Figure BDA0002525036520000126
And received
Figure BDA0002525036520000127
To verify
Figure BDA0002525036520000128
When the validity is verified, the common node R stores the message (2) for the verification of the next message; to prevent loss of authentication packets, the method is implemented in advance
Figure BDA0002525036520000129
Authentication but to guarantee
Figure BDA00025250365200001210
In the Hash chain to
Figure BDA00025250365200001211
Can be released only when the user wants to use the system.
The invention achieves the following beneficial effects: firstly, the invention provides a distributed lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication scheme for supporting multi-service attributes facing an electric power wireless private network, and designs a hierarchical-based identity authentication system HIBE (high-level identity authentication object), so that an entity can safely negotiate a session key under the condition of not authenticating the identity of the other party, and simultaneously, a session key negotiation mechanism is provided for entities belonging to different levels; secondly, by applying the framework aiming at the physical layer authentication of the power wireless terminal, the consumption of an identity authentication protocol can be reduced by combining multiple methods aiming at the low-delay access requirement under an industrial control scene, the authentication efficiency is greatly improved, the high-real-time operation requirement is met, and the resource consumption is reduced by adopting an elliptic curve password mechanism with low resource overhead; thirdly, the trust domain in the cloud power wireless private network is hierarchically divided, so that different entities can register identity information at each level of PKG and obtain corresponding legal private keys, the operation pressure of a root PKG is relieved, the bearing capacity of the system is improved, the constituent elements of the private keys are reconstructed on the basis, a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is designed by utilizing the power finger operation characteristic in bilinear mapping on an elliptic curve multiplication circulating group, and the entities can safely negotiate a session key under the condition of not authenticating the identity of each other and also provide a session key negotiation mechanism for the entities belonging to different levels of different layers through the identity hierarchical registration function, the private key hierarchical function and the authentication key negotiation function HIBE of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE; fourthly, the entity identity information in the invention is a public key, if the entity does not have a legal private key matched with the claimed identity, a correct session key cannot be calculated, thereby realizing the implicit authentication of the protocol to the entity identity information.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic topology diagram of an application embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are only for more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereby.
Example 1: a lightweight, efficient method of identity authentication, performed by a device a, the method comprising:
responding to the authentication start, and sending an authentication request to a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE;
calling an identity hierarchical registration function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate public parameters and a master key of identity information of the associated equipment A;
calling a private key grading function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key;
calling an authentication key negotiation function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, and generating a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key;
receiving a public key and private key pair of the authentication server B in response to a key agreement request of the authentication server B, and generating a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAThen, the authentication server B sends the 'authentication failure and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information' to the authentication server BAnd (4) a certificate server B.
Optionally, the public parameter and the master key of the identity information of the associated device a specifically include:
when the k-th layer of the device A needs to be authenticated, the identity hierarchical registration function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE constructs the identity information thereof into
Figure BDA0002525036520000141
Wherein IkRepresenting the k-th layer identity information;
if the upper limit of the level number of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is set to be l, a generator G belongs to G and a random number alpha belongs to ZpThereby obtaining g1＝gα；
Further selecting g2，g3，h1，…，hlE G, get the common parameter p ═ G, (G, G) for device a1，g2，g3，h1，…，hI) And generates a master key
Figure RE-GDA0002744947650000142
Optionally, the associating the public parameter of the device a and the private key of the master key specifically includes: hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE (hierarchical identity authentication protocol) is a k-th layer of equipment A
Figure BDA0002525036520000143
When k is less than l and a pairing private key is generated, r, t epsilon to Z are selected arbitrarilypAnd simultaneously generating a private key according to the master key and the public parameter:
Figure BDA0002525036520000144
Figure BDA0002525036520000145
optionally, the generating a public key and a private key pair based on the public parameter of the associated device a, the master key and the private key specifically includes:
when the device A is positioned at the level of k (k < l), the authentication server B is positioned at the level of m (m < k <)l), when the device A and the authentication server B have public nodes in the ith layer 1 < i < l, generating a public key and a private key pair of the device A by a private key grading function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE into
Figure BDA0002525036520000151
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002525036520000152
Figure BDA0002525036520000153
optionally, the method further includes: device A random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000154
According to IDBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the equipment A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000155
And according to the IDAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A according to the broadcast chain TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to broadcast chain TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate session keys
skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBJudging whether the authentication is successful;
if the session key SK is generatedAIf so, sending authentication success information to the authentication serviceDevice B, if it can not generate the session key SKAIf the authentication fails, the authentication server B does not have legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the legal private key information is sent to the authentication server B;
if the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBThen "authentication fails and device a does not have the legal private key information matching its purported identity information" is sent to device a.
Example 2: the invention also provides a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method which is executed by an authentication server B and is characterized by comprising the following steps:
responding to an authentication request of the device A, and sending an authentication request to a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE;
calling an identity hierarchical registration function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter and a master key which are related to identity information of an authentication server B;
calling a private key grading function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter of an associated authentication server B and a private key of a master key;
calling an authentication key negotiation function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, and generating a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of an associated authentication server B and a private key of a master key;
in response to device A's key agreement request, device A's public-private key pair is received and broadcast chain T is generated based on device A's public-private key pairBAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBThen, the device a is sent "the authentication fails and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the asserted identity information".
Optionally, the public parameter and the master key of the identity information associated with the authentication server B specifically include:
hierarchical identity authentication when authentication server mth layer needs to perform authenticationThe identity hierarchical registration function of the system HIBE constructs the identity information thereof into
Figure BDA0002525036520000161
Wherein ImRepresenting the m-th layer identity information;
if the upper limit of the level number of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is set to be l, a generator G belongs to G and a random number alpha belongs to ZpThereby obtaining g1＝gα；
Further selecting g2，g3，h1，…，hlE.g., G, obtains the public parameter p ═ G (G, G) of the authentication server B1,g2,g3,h1,…,hl) And generates a master key
Figure BDA0002525036520000162
Optionally, the associating the public parameter of the authentication server B with the private key of the master key specifically includes:
the hierarchy level realizes the private key hierarchy function of the HIBE system as the mth layer of the authentication server B
Figure BDA0002525036520000171
When generating the pairing private key, randomly selecting r, t epsilon to ZpAnd simultaneously generating a private key according to the master key and the public parameter:
Figure BDA0002525036520000172
optionally, the generating a public key and a private key pair based on the public parameter of the associated authentication server B and the private key of the master key specifically includes:
when the device A is located at the level k (k < l), the authentication server B is located at the level m (m < k < l), and the devices A and B have a common node at the ith level 1 < i < l: the public key and the private key pair of the authentication server B are generated by the private key grading function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE
Figure BDA0002525036520000173
Wherein
Figure BDA0002525036520000174
i＜m＜l，
Figure BDA0002525036520000175
Optionally, the method further includes: device A random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000176
According to IDBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the equipment A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000177
And according to the IDAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A according to the broadcast chain TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to broadcast chain TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate session keys
skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBJudging whether the authentication is successful;
if the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAIf the authentication fails, the authentication server B does not have legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the legal private key information is sent to the authentication server B;
if the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication is successful, the authentication information is sent to the equipment A, and if the authentication information cannot be generated, the session secret is generatedKey SKBThen "authentication fails and device a does not have the legal private key information matching its purported identity information" is sent to device a.
Example 3: the invention also provides a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method which is executed by the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE and is characterized by comprising the following steps:
receiving an authentication request of the equipment A, and generating a public parameter and a master key of the identity information of the associated equipment A through an identity hierarchical registration function; generating a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of the master key through a private key grading function according to the public parameter and the master key of the identity information of the equipment A; generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated equipment A and the private key of the master key through a certification key negotiation function according to the public parameters of the equipment A and the private key of the master key, and sending the public key and private key pair to the authentication server B;
receiving an authentication request of an authentication server B, and generating a public parameter and a master key which are related to identity information of the authentication server B through an identity hierarchical registration function; generating a public parameter of the associated authentication server B and a private key of the master key through a private key grading function according to the public parameter of the identity information of the authentication server B and the master key; generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameter of the associated authentication server B and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function according to the public parameter of the authentication server B and the private key of the master key, and sending the public key and private key pair to the equipment A;
in response to device A's key agreement request, device A's public-private key pair is received and broadcast chain T is generated based on device A's public-private key pairBAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBIf the authentication fails, the device A does not have legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the authentication fails, the device A sends the legal private key information to the device A;
receiving an authentication in response to a key agreement request of authentication server BA public key and private key pair of the certificate server B and a broadcast chain T is generated based on the public key and private key pair of the certificate server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAThen "authentication fails and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information" is sent to the authentication server B.
Example 4: the invention also provides a lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication system which is characterized by comprising a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, equipment A and an authentication server B, wherein the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is respectively in communication connection with the equipment A and the authentication server B, and the equipment A is in communication connection with the authentication server B;
the device A sends an authentication request to a hierarchy level identity authentication system HIBE; a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates public parameters and a master key of identity information of associated equipment A through an identity hierarchical registration function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key through a private key hierarchical function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated equipment A and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function;
the authentication server B sends an authentication request to a hierarchy level identity authentication system HIBE; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates public parameters and a master key related to the identity information of the authentication server B through an identity hierarchical registration function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a private key associating public parameters of an authentication server B with a master key through a private key hierarchical function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of the associated authentication server B and a private key of a master key through an authentication key negotiation function;
the device A receives the key agreement request of the authentication server B, receives the public key and private key pair of the authentication server B, and generates a broadcast based on the public key and private key pair of the authentication server BChain TASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE can not generate the session key SK, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends authentication success information to the authentication server BAIf the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends the authentication failure and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information to the authentication server B, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends the legal private key information to the authentication server B;
the authentication server B receives the key negotiation request of the device A, receives the public key and private key pair of the device A, and generates a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the device ABAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBThe hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends successful authentication information to the device A, and if the session key SK cannot be generatedBThen, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends "authentication failed and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the purported identity information" to the device a.
As a preferred embodiment, the lightweight and efficient identity authentication system further comprises:
device A random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000211
According to IDBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the device A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure BDA0002525036520000212
And according to the IDAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A is according to TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate session keys
skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBAnd judging whether the authentication is successful.
As a preferred embodiment, the method for generating a broadcast chain specifically includes: a broadcast self-regeneration authentication model based on a short Hash chain is designed, on the basis of a Merkle Tree, a key chain self-regeneration protocol is adopted to carry out secure connection among the Hash chains on a path on a message line, and the length of the short key chain when the calculation overhead and the communication overhead reach the lowest value in the short key chain self-regeneration authentication model is obtained.
As a preferred embodiment, the broadcast chain TBThe generation method specifically comprises the following steps: a Hash chain pre-distribution step; a Hash chain using step; and a Hash chain expanding step.
As a preferred embodiment, the Hash chain pre-allocating step specifically includes: the authentication server B needs to generate a random value in advance
Figure BDA0002525036520000213
As a seed, generating a Hash chain according to the self requirement of the network:
Figure BDA0002525036520000214
before the node equipment is deployed, all the common nodes R need to be stored in advance
Figure BDA0002525036520000215
The ordinary node R thus authenticates the broadcast key according to the one-way nature of the Hash chain.
As a preferred embodiment, the Hash chain using step specifically includes: if the number of used Hash chains does not exceed the specified number n0Then, the use mode of the Hash chain is unchanged; the authentication server B needs to release broadcast data in a specified time period, then the common node R needs to receive and store the data first, and then waits for the authentication server B to authenticate the data in a subsequent time period, wherein the authentication mode is that the authentication server B broadcasts a related key.
As a preferred embodiment, the Hash chain expanding step specifically includes:
step S1: when the Hash chain is used
Figure BDA0002525036520000221
When (at this time, the common node R is stored with
Figure BDA0002525036520000222
) The authentication server B selects a new random seed according to the formula (1)
Figure BDA0002525036520000223
And generating a new Hash chain using the random value:
Figure BDA0002525036520000224
step S2: redeploying the Hash on the basis of ensuring the authenticable characteristic of the Hash chain; at this time, the authentication server B calculates first
Figure BDA0002525036520000225
And
Figure BDA0002525036520000226
Figure BDA0002525036520000227
then calculate
Figure BDA0002525036520000228
Step S3: after the common node R receives the broadcast message, if
Figure BDA0002525036520000229
Then store
Figure BDA00025250365200002210
And discard
Figure BDA00025250365200002211
Meanwhile, storing the received broadcast message for message verification of the next stage; when the Hash chain is used
Figure BDA00025250365200002212
Time, calculate
Figure BDA00025250365200002213
Step S4: after the common node R receives the message, ifThen store
Figure BDA00025250365200002215
And discard
Figure BDA00025250365200002216
At the same time, utilize
Figure BDA00025250365200002217
Calculating the verification code of the message at the last stage and verifying the validity of the verification code so as to verify the validity of the stored information S 'in the last time period, and simultaneously verifying the validity of S' by using S '═ h (S');
step S5: if the common node R needs to store the message of this time period, in the following multicast key authentication process, the following calculation is performed:
Figure BDA0002525036520000231
step S6: the common node R, after receiving the message (2), uses the stored
Figure BDA0002525036520000232
And received
Figure BDA0002525036520000233
To verify
Figure BDA0002525036520000234
When the validity is verified, the common node R stores the message (2) for the verification of the next message; to prevent loss of authentication packets, the method is implemented in advance
Figure BDA0002525036520000235
Authentication but to guarantee
Figure BDA0002525036520000236
In the Hash chain to
Figure BDA0002525036520000237
Can be released only when the user wants to use the system.
A framework aiming at the physical layer authentication of the electric power wireless terminal is designed, a safety protection device and a wireless access safety control device (namely a safety access platform) are added outside an original wireless access point, the safety protection device and the wireless access safety control device cooperate to complete the access of a legal wireless terminal and the blocking of an illegal wireless terminal, and meanwhile, the safety rules of traditional three-layer and four-layer networks are processed. The structure and the position are shown in figure 1:
the authentication framework comprises terminal authentication, data encryption, access authority control and the like.
Terminal authentication: and extracting the fingerprint of the wireless equipment at the wireless end, and performing fingerprint identification and matching at the local end. Recent studies have shown that the radio frequency characteristics of its transmitting device can be extracted by radio electromagnetic waves. As each person has a different fingerprint, the hardware of each rf device will also differ, and this difference in rf hardware is called "wireless device fingerprint".
Data encryption: the message authentication code MACKi is generated by utilizing the encryption scheme of the wireless communication protocol, so that the confidentiality and the integrity of point-to-point communication data of the equipment can be ensured, and the design of a wireless terminal original factory is not damaged.
The message authentication code MACKi generation algorithm is as follows: inputting: a secret key Ki, a message M, wherein the secret key length is l, and the message M is decomposed into data blocks with the size of b; to facilitate the calculation, the data is not made to output: the message authentication code is MACKi；
Step 1: filling key K with bytes 0x00iThe tail part of the character string is reached to b;
step 2: carrying out XOR calculation on the b-word length character string generated in the step 1 and the ipad to generate a key character string;
and 3, step 3: filling the message M to the tail part of the key character string generated in the step 2 to generate a message data stream;
and 4, step 4: using a Hash function h () based on the SHA-1 algorithm to act on the message data stream generated in the step 3;
and 5, step 5: carrying out XOR calculation on the b-word length character string generated in the step 1 and the opad;
and 6, step 6: filling the calculation result of the 4 th step into the tail part of the calculation result of the 5 th step;
and 7, step 7: acting a Hash function h (.) on the generated result of the step 6 to obtain a final result MACKi。
And (3) access authority control: the access control function of the safety control assembly can not only realize the data packet discarding function on the wireless access safety control assembly as the existing safety equipment, but also can link the front-end wireless access safety protection equipment to realize the wireless access blocking function at the front end. The speed of message authentication under the condition that the density of the power equipment is high is improved, the message delay and the message loss rate are reduced, and the loss of a large number of messages due to the fact that timely authentication cannot be achieved under the condition of high traffic density is avoided.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several modifications and variations can be made without departing from the technical principle of the present invention, and these modifications and variations should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (17)

1. A lightweight, efficient identity authentication method, performed by a device A, the method comprising:
responding to the authentication start, and sending an authentication request to a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE;
calling an identity hierarchical registration function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate public parameters and a master key of identity information of the associated equipment A;
calling a private key grading function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate public parameters of identity information of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key;
calling an authentication key negotiation function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, and generating a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of identity information of the associated equipment A, a master key and a private key;
receiving a public key-private key pair of the authentication server B in response to a key agreement request of the authentication server B, and generating a broadcast chain T based on the public key-private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAThen, the authentication server B sends the information that the authentication fails and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information to the authentication server B.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the generating public parameters and master keys of the identity information of the associated device a specifically includes:
when the k-th layer of the device A needs to be authenticated, the identity hierarchical registration function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE constructs the identity information thereof into
Figure RE-FDA0002744947640000011
Wherein IkRepresenting the k-th layer identity information;
if the upper limit of the level number of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is set to be l, then a generator G E G is selected arbitrarily, andrandom number alpha belongs to ZpThereby obtaining g1＝gα；
Further selecting g2，g3，h1，…，hlE G, get the common parameter p ═ G, (G, G) for device a1，g2，g3，h1，…，hl) And generates a master key
Figure RE-FDA0002744947640000021
3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the generating public parameters of the identity information of the associated device a and the private key of the master key specifically includes: hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE (hierarchical identity authentication protocol) is a k-th layer of equipment A
Figure FDA0002525036510000022
When generating the pairing private key, randomly selecting r, t epsilon to ZpAnd simultaneously generating a private key according to the master key and the public parameter:
Figure FDA0002525036510000023
Figure FDA0002525036510000024
4. the method of claim 3, wherein the generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameter of the identity information of the associated device A and the master key and private key specifically comprises:
when the device A is located at the level k (k)<l), the authentication server B is located at a hierarchy level of m (m)<k<l), and the device a and the authentication server B are on the i-th layer 1<i<When l has public node, the public key and the private key of the device A are generated by the private key grading function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE
Figure FDA0002525036510000025
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002525036510000026
Figure FDA0002525036510000027
5. a lightweight, efficient identity authentication method as defined in claim 4, further comprising: device A random selection
Figure FDA0002525036510000028
According to public key ID of authentication server BBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the device A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure FDA0002525036510000031
And according to the public key ID of device AAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A according to the broadcast chain TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to broadcast chain TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate session keys
skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBJudging whether the authentication is successful;
if the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAThen "authentication failure" is issuedThe authentication server B does not have legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information thereof to send the authentication server B;
if the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBThen, the device a is sent the "authentication fails and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the asserted identity information".
6. A lightweight, efficient identity authentication method performed by an authentication server B, the method comprising:
responding to an authentication request of the device A, and sending the authentication request to a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE;
calling an identity hierarchical registration function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter and a master key which are related to identity information of an authentication server B;
calling a private key grading function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE to generate a public parameter of the identity information of the associated authentication server B and a private key of a master key;
calling an authentication key negotiation function of a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, and generating a public key and private key pair based on public parameters of identity information of an associated authentication server B, a master key and a private key;
in response to device A's key agreement request, device A's public-private key pair is received and broadcast chain T is generated based on device A's public-private key pairBAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBThen, the device a is sent the "authentication fails and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the asserted identity information".
7. The lightweight, efficient identity authentication method according to claim 6, wherein the generating public parameters and master keys associated with the identity information of the authentication server B specifically comprises:
when the m layer of the authentication server needs to be authenticated, the identity hierarchical registration function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE constructs the identity information thereof into
Figure FDA0002525036510000041
Wherein ImRepresenting the m-th layer identity information;
if the upper limit of the level number of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is set to be l, a generator G belongs to G and a random number alpha belongs to ZpThereby obtaining g1＝gα；
Further selecting g2,g3,h1,…,hlE.g., G, and obtaining the public parameter p of the authentication server B as (G, G)1,g2,g3,h1,…,hl) And generates a master key
Figure FDA0002525036510000042
8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the generating a public parameter associated with the identity information of the authentication server B and a private key of a master key specifically comprises:
the hierarchy level realizes the private key hierarchy function of the HIBE system as the mth layer of the authentication server B
Figure FDA0002525036510000051
When generating the pairing private key, randomly selecting r, t epsilon to ZpAnd simultaneously generating a private key according to the master key and the public parameter:
Figure FDA0002525036510000052
9. the method according to claim 8, wherein the generating a public key and a private key pair based on the public parameter of the identity information of the associated authentication server B and the master key and the private key specifically comprises:
when the device A is located at the level k (k)<l), the authentication server B is located at a hierarchy level of m (m)<k<l) and devices A and B are on the ith layer 1<i<l has a common node: the public key and the private key pair of the authentication server B are generated by the private key grading function of the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE
Figure FDA0002525036510000053
Wherein
Figure FDA0002525036510000054
Figure FDA0002525036510000055
10. A lightweight, efficient method of identity authentication as defined in claim 9, further comprising: device A random selection
Figure FDA0002525036510000056
According to IDBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the device A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure FDA0002525036510000057
And according to the IDAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A according to the broadcast chain TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to broadcast chain TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate a session key skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBJudging whether the authentication is successful;
if the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAIf the authentication fails, the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the legal private key information is sent to the authentication server B;
if the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBThen, the device a is sent the "authentication fails and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the asserted identity information".
11. A lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication method is executed by a hierarchical identity authentication system (HIBE), and is characterized by comprising the following steps:
receiving an authentication request of the equipment A, and generating public parameters and a master key of the identity information of the associated equipment A through an identity hierarchical registration function; generating a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of the master key through a private key grading function according to the public parameter of the identity information of the equipment A and the master key; generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated equipment A and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function according to the public parameters of the equipment A and the private key of the master key, and sending the public key and private key pair to the authentication server B;
receiving an authentication request of an authentication server B, and generating a public parameter and a master key which are related to identity information of the authentication server B through an identity hierarchical registration function; generating a public parameter of the associated authentication server B and a private key of the master key through a private key grading function according to the public parameter of the identity information of the authentication server B and the master key; generating a public key and private key pair based on the public parameter of the associated authentication server B and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function according to the public parameter of the authentication server B and the private key of the master key, and sending the public key and private key pair to the equipment A;
in response to device A's key agreement request, device A's public-private key pair is received and broadcast chain T is generated based on device A's public-private key pairBAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBIf the authentication success information is sent to the equipment A, the session key SK can not be generatedBIf the authentication fails, the device A does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information, and the authentication fails, the device A sends the legal private key information to the device A;
receiving a public key-private key pair of the authentication server B in response to a key agreement request of the authentication server B, and generating a broadcast chain T based on the public key-private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the authentication success information is sent to the authentication server B, the session key SK can not be generatedAThen, the authentication server B sends the information that the authentication fails and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information to the authentication server B.
12. A lightweight high-efficiency identity authentication system is characterized by comprising a hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE, a device A and an authentication server B, wherein the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE is respectively in communication connection with the device A and the authentication server B, and the device A is in communication connection with the authentication server B;
the device A sends an authentication request to a hierarchy level identity authentication system HIBE; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates public parameters and a master key of the identity information of the associated equipment A through an identity hierarchical registration function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public parameter of the associated equipment A and a private key of a master key through a private key hierarchical function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated equipment A and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function;
the authentication server B sends an authentication request to a hierarchy level identity authentication system HIBE; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates public parameters and a master key related to the identity information of the authentication server B through an identity hierarchical registration function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a private key associating public parameters of an authentication server B with a master key through a private key hierarchical function; the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE generates a public key and private key pair based on the public parameters of the associated authentication server B and the private key of the master key through an authentication key negotiation function;
the device A receives a key negotiation request of the authentication server B, receives a public key and private key pair of the authentication server B, and generates a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the authentication server BASending the information to an authentication server B; receiving a broadcast chain T generated by an authentication server B based on a public key and private key pair of a device ABIf the session key SK is generatedAIf the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends successful authentication information to the authentication server B, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE can not generate the session key SKAIf the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends the authentication failure and the authentication server B does not have the legal private key information matched with the alleged identity information to the authentication server B, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends the legal private key information to the authentication server B;
the authentication server B receives the key negotiation request of the device A, receives the public key and private key pair of the device A, and generates a broadcast chain T based on the public key and private key pair of the device ABAnd sending the data to the equipment A; broadcast chain T generated by receiving device A based on public key and private key pair of authentication server BAIf the session key SK is generatedBThe hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends successful authentication information to the equipment A, and if the session key SK cannot be generatedBThen, the hierarchical identity authentication system HIBE sends "authentication failed and the device a does not have the legal private key information matched with the purported identity information" to the device a.
13. A lightweight, efficient identity authentication system as recited in claim 12, further comprising:
device A random selection
Figure FDA0002525036510000091
According to public key ID of authentication server BBGenerating a broadcast chain TAAnd sends it to authentication server B; selecting a new alpha by the device A in the key negotiation process each time;
authentication server B random selection
Figure FDA0002525036510000092
And according to the IDAGenerating a broadcast chain TBAnd sends it to device a; selecting a new B by the authentication server B in the key agreement process each time;
device A is according to TBComputing a shared secret SA；
Authentication server B according to TAComputing a shared secret SB；
The device A and the authentication server B respectively generate a session key skA＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SA) And skB＝H(IDA，IDB，TA，TB，SB) According to whether a session key SK can be generated or notAAnd SKBAnd judging whether the authentication is successful.
14. A lightweight, efficient identity authentication system as claimed in claim 12, wherein said broadcast chain TBThe generation method specifically comprises the following steps: a Hash chain pre-distribution step; a Hash chain using step; and a Hash chain expanding step.
15. The lightweight, efficient identity authentication system of claim 14, wherein the Hash chain pre-assigning step specifically comprises: the authentication server B needs to generate a random value in advance
Figure FDA0002525036510000093
As a seed, generating a Hash chain according to the self requirement of the network:
Figure FDA0002525036510000094
before the node equipment is deployed, all the common nodes R need to be stored in advance
Figure FDA0002525036510000095
Thus, the common node R authenticates the broadcast key according to the unidirectional property of the Hash chain.
16. The system according to claim 14, wherein the Hash chain using step specifically comprises: if the number of used Hash chains does not exceed the specified number n0Then, the use mode of the Hash chain is unchanged; the authentication server B needs to release broadcast data in a specified time period, then the common node R needs to receive and store the data first, and then waits for the authentication server B to authenticate the data in a subsequent time period, wherein the authentication mode is that the authentication server B broadcasts a related key.
17. The lightweight, efficient identity authentication system of claim 14, wherein the Hash chain expansion step specifically comprises:
step S1: when the Hash chain is used
Figure FDA0002525036510000101
When (at this time, the common node R is stored with
Figure FDA0002525036510000102
) The authentication server B selects a new random seed according to the formula (1)
Figure FDA0002525036510000103
And generating a new Hash chain using the random value:
Figure FDA0002525036510000104
step S2: on the basis of ensuring the authenticable characteristic of the Hash chain, the Hash is required to be matchedRedeploying; at this time, the authentication server B calculates first
Figure FDA0002525036510000105
And
Figure FDA00025250365100001014
Figure FDA0002525036510000106
then calculate
Figure FDA0002525036510000107
Step S3: after the common node R receives the broadcast message, if
Figure FDA0002525036510000108
Then store
Figure FDA0002525036510000109
And discard
Figure FDA00025250365100001015
Meanwhile, storing the received broadcast message for message verification of the next stage; when the Hash chain is used
Figure FDA00025250365100001016
Time, calculate
Figure FDA00025250365100001010
Step S4: after the common node R receives the message, if
Figure FDA00025250365100001011
Then store
Figure FDA00025250365100001012
And discard
Figure FDA00025250365100001013
At the same time, utilize
Figure FDA00025250365100001017
Calculating the verification code of the message at the last stage and verifying the validity of the message to verify the validity of the stored information S 'in the last time period, and simultaneously verifying the validity of S' by means of S '═ h (S');
step S5: if the common node R needs to store the message of this time period, in the following multicast key authentication process, the following calculation is performed:
Figure FDA00025250365100001018
step S6: the common node R, after receiving the message (2), uses the stored
Figure FDA0002525036510000111
And received
Figure FDA0002525036510000112
To verify
Figure FDA0002525036510000114
When the validity is verified, the common node R stores the message (2) for the verification of the next message; to prevent loss of authentication packets, the method is implemented in advance
Figure FDA0002525036510000115
Authentication but to guarantee
Figure FDA0002525036510000113
In the Hash chain to
Figure FDA0002525036510000116
Can be released only when the user wants to use the system.
CN202010501845.4A 2020-06-04 2020-06-04 Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system Pending CN112040483A (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010501845.4A CN112040483A (en) 2020-06-04 2020-06-04 Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010501845.4A CN112040483A (en) 2020-06-04 2020-06-04 Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN112040483A true CN112040483A (en) 2020-12-04

Family

ID=73579695

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN202010501845.4A Pending CN112040483A (en) 2020-06-04 2020-06-04 Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN112040483A (en)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112787819A (en) * 2020-12-23 2021-05-11 郑州信大捷安信息技术股份有限公司 Industrial control safety communication system and communication method
CN113378136A (en) * 2021-06-08 2021-09-10 罗克佳华(重庆)科技有限公司 Fingerprint identification method and device, password key and storage medium
CN114422106A (en) * 2022-03-28 2022-04-29 科大天工智能装备技术（天津）有限公司 Internet of things system security authentication method and system under multi-server environment

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111832073A (en) * 2020-07-05 2020-10-27 桂林电子科技大学 Deterministic deletion method supporting dynamic insertion of outsourcing data in cloud environment

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111832073A (en) * 2020-07-05 2020-10-27 桂林电子科技大学 Deterministic deletion method supporting dynamic insertion of outsourcing data in cloud environment

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
曹晨磊等: "基于层级化身份的可证明安全的认证密钥协商协议", 《电子与信息学报》 *
潘新星: "无线传感器网络可再生哈希链和广播认证协议研究", 《中国优秀硕士学位论文全文数据库（电子期刊）》 *

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112787819A (en) * 2020-12-23 2021-05-11 郑州信大捷安信息技术股份有限公司 Industrial control safety communication system and communication method
CN112787819B (en) * 2020-12-23 2022-03-15 郑州信大捷安信息技术股份有限公司 Industrial control safety communication system and communication method
CN113378136A (en) * 2021-06-08 2021-09-10 罗克佳华(重庆)科技有限公司 Fingerprint identification method and device, password key and storage medium
CN114422106A (en) * 2022-03-28 2022-04-29 科大天工智能装备技术（天津）有限公司 Internet of things system security authentication method and system under multi-server environment

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN112073379B (en) Lightweight Internet of things security key negotiation method based on edge calculation
CN108667616B (en) Cross-cloud security authentication system and method based on identification
CN101192928B (en) Mobile ad hoc authentication method and system
US8397062B2 (en) Method and system for source authentication in group communications
CN112040483A (en) Lightweight efficient identity authentication method and system
WO2011006341A1 (en) Method for combining authentication and secret keys management mechanism in a sensor network
CN108882238B (en) Lightweight round robin CA authentication method based on consensus algorithm for mobile ad hoc network
CN113037499B (en) Block chain encryption communication method and system
CN102223629B (en) Distribution method of threshold keys of mobile Ad hoc network
CN111865593B (en) Pre-distribution method and device of node group key based on mixed key
CN114398602B (en) Internet of things terminal identity authentication method based on edge calculation
CN112332986B (en) Private encryption communication method and system based on authority control
CN114124371A (en) Certificateless public key searchable encryption method meeting MTP (Multi-time programmable) security
CN115514474A (en) Industrial equipment trusted access method based on cloud-edge-end cooperation
CN101588235B (en) MIPv6 based security multicast method and steps
CN114466318A (en) Method, system and equipment for realizing multicast service effective authentication and key distribution protocol
CN112333701B (en) Cross-domain authentication method based on identity in large-scale Internet of things scene
CN114945171A (en) Terminal secondary authentication method and system
CN112437055B (en) Electric power internet of things network terminal NTRU safe access method based on edge calculation
CN115065474A (en) Identity certificateless intelligent vehicle networking heterogeneous signcryption system under block chain-cloud edge fusion
Guo et al. Research on information security defense based on improved identity-based dynamic clustering authentication algorithm
Roy-Chowdhury et al. A lightweight certificate-based source authentication protocol for group communications in hybrid wireless/satellite networks
Liu et al. One private broadcast encryption scheme revisited
Leshem et al. Probability based keys sharing for IoT security
Li et al. Secure Authentication Scheme for Large-scale Video Surveillance System Based on Quantum Key

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
RJ01 Rejection of invention patent application after publication
RJ01 Rejection of invention patent application after publication

Application publication date: 20201204