CN111970238A - Reliable method for controlling safe transmission of near space airship load instruction - Google Patents
Reliable method for controlling safe transmission of near space airship load instruction Download PDFInfo
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- CN111970238A CN111970238A CN202010659003.1A CN202010659003A CN111970238A CN 111970238 A CN111970238 A CN 111970238A CN 202010659003 A CN202010659003 A CN 202010659003A CN 111970238 A CN111970238 A CN 111970238A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Radio Relay Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to a reliable method for controlling safe transmission of a load instruction of an aircraft, which adopts the technical means of public key encryption, digital signature, integrity verification and the like based on identity and aims to solve the problems of reliability, safety and the like of the transmission of the load instruction of the aircraft. When the airship load interacts with a commander, the aircraft approaching load A updates the instruction packet according to the flight mission, and carries out digital signature by using a signature private key of the commander B, so that the two parties have unified time. The commander B issues a command within a certain time T and encrypts the command by using an identity-based encryption system. And A receives the encryption instruction, decrypts the encryption instruction by using the public key of the commander, checks whether a specific condition is met, and encrypts and replies by using the symmetric secret key. And after receiving the reply of the airship load, the commander B decrypts the airship by using the symmetric secret key and responds to the decrypted reply. Therefore, the invention has strong guarantee on safety and reliability.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of traffic instruction safe transmission control, in particular to a reliable method for controlling safe transmission of a load instruction of an aircraft airship.
Background
The development of aerospace technology greatly changes the structure of transportation, airplanes provide people with a quick, convenient, economic, safe and comfortable transportation means, international flights have replaced ocean passenger ships, become main tools for people to come and go between continents, and closely link all countries in the world. An airship is a lighter-than-air craft, and is largely distinguished from a hot air balloon by having means for propelling and controlling flight conditions. The airship consists of a huge streamline hull, a nacelle positioned below the hull, a tail surface for stabilizing and controlling and a propelling device. The special shape of the airship also determines a plurality of special purposes, and the airship is lifted by buoyancy generated by buoyancy gas with density lower than that of air filled in the air bag of the airship body. The gondola is used for passengers to take and load cargo. The tail surface is used for controlling and maintaining the stability of course and pitching.
The airship in the adjacent space has a large amount of helium filled into the air bag to make the density of the whole airship lower than that of air below 2 ten thousand meters, so that no extra power consumption is needed to maintain the height of two thousand meters. Because the low earth orbit satellite has the characteristics of needing to orbit around the earth, the low earth orbit satellite cannot be resident and monitored in a certain area for a long time, and the geosynchronous satellite is too far away from the ground, the monitoring range is wide, and the monitoring resolution is not high. The air airship can be parked for a long time or fly to an empty adjacent space area 20 kilometers above the ground, so that the concerned area can be parked and monitored for a long time, a high-resolution monitoring effect is obtained, and the air airship can be widely applied to monitoring of traffic conditions, natural disasters and the like in the area in a large range.
The aircraft needs to be matched with different loads in order to realize specific functions. How to ensure safe and reliable control and management of the load of the air airship is a difficult problem which needs to be solved urgently, for example, lawless persons may tamper with a control instruction of the load, and then hijack and control the air airship to implement illegal attacks and other behaviors, so that huge economic loss and social harm are caused. At present, all schemes for controlling the load of the air airship only stay in the aspect of enhancing the reliability of communication and flight control protocols for the airship, but lack how to ensure the information security of control command transmission, and once the control command is invaded, tampered or forged by illegal molecules, great loss is brought.
Therefore, aiming at the problem of the transmission method of the load instruction of the blinker, the invention provides a reliable method for safely transmitting the load instruction of the blinker, and the safety and the reliability of controlling the transmission of the load instruction of the blinker are ensured.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a method for reliably controlling safe transmission of a load instruction of an aircraft airship. The method adopts technical means such as public key encryption based on identity, digital signature, integrity verification and the like, and aims to solve the problems of reliability, safety and the like of the transmission of the load instruction of the blinker in the air at present.
A method for reliably controlling safe transmission of load instructions of an aircraft airship comprises the following steps:
s1: the invention relates to two participants of a load A and a commander B of a flight airship, wherein the commander B runs an identity-based key generation algorithm to generate a public key pair (pk, sk), a digital signature key pair (spk, ssk) and a symmetric encryption key k.
S2: and updating the instruction packet by the load A of the aircraft airship according to the flight mission, and digitally signing by the signature private key of the commander B, wherein the two parties share the same time.
S3: command B issues command m within a certain time TiI denotes the ith command issued in sequence, m being paired with the encryption key skiAnd the time t of the current time1Carry out encryption C ═ Esk(miPiPt1) And E denotes encryption.
S4: a receives the encrypted instruction C and then decrypts the encrypted instruction C by using the public key pk of the commander to obtain the command miSequence number i and time t1. When the following four conditions are met simultaneously, A replies that the instruction r is received and the time t at the moment2And using symmetric encryption R ═ Ek(rPt2)。
(1) Receiving an instruction within time T;
(2) compare the instruction packet, when miConforming to the content of the instruction packet;
(3) when the sequence numbers i are arranged in sequence;
(4) when time t is1When correctness is satisfied.
Otherwise, replying error instruction wrong and time t at the time2And encrypting R ═ E with a symmetric keyk(wrongPt2) The instructions are detailed in table 1.
TABLE 1 error feedback code representation
| Type of error | Instruction mismatch | Index error | Timestamp error | Not receiving instruction in T time |
| Wrong instruction | II | IE | TE | NR |
S5: and after receiving the reply of the airship load, the commander B decrypts the airship by using the symmetric secret key. If r is received, sending the next instruction within the time T; if wrong is received, the last instruction is retransmitted.
The invention provides a reliable method for controlling safe transmission of a load instruction of an aircraft airship.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a simplified flowchart of a method for reliably controlling safe transmission of a load command of an aircraft airship according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, aspects and effects of the embodiments of the present invention clearer and clearer, the present invention is further described in detail below by way of examples with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The method comprises the following specific implementation steps:
s1: the invention relates to two participants of a load A and a commander B of an aircraft flight airship, wherein the commander B runs an IBE cryptosystem to generate a public key and a secret key pair (pk, sk) based on an identity key method; the digital signature adopts a BLS short signature to generate a key pair (spk, ssk); symmetric encryption adopts AES cipher constitution to generate a secret key k.
S2: and updating the instruction packet by the load A of the aircraft airship according to the flight mission, and digitally signing by the signature private key of the commander B, wherein the two parties share the same time.
S3: command B issues command m within a certain time TiI denotes the ith command issued in sequence, m being paired with the encryption key skiAnd the time t of the current time1Carry out encryption C ═ Esk(miPiPt1) And E denotes encryption.
S4: a receives the encrypted instruction C and then decrypts the encrypted instruction C by using the public key pk of the commander to obtain the command miSequence number i and time t1. When the following four conditions are met simultaneously, A replies that the instruction r is received and the time t at the moment2And using symmetric encryption R ═ Ek(rPt2)。
(1) Receiving an instruction within time T;
(2) compare the instruction packet, when miConforming to the content of the instruction packet;
(3) when the sequence numbers i are arranged in sequence;
(4) when time t is1When correctness is satisfied.
Otherwise, replying error instruction wrong and time t at the time2And encrypting R ═ E with a symmetric keyk(wrongPt2) The instructions are detailed in table 1.
TABLE 1 error feedback code representation
| Type of error | Instruction mismatch | Index error | Timestamp error | Not receiving instruction in T time |
| Wrong instruction | II | IE | TE | NR |
S5: and after receiving the reply of the airship load, the commander B decrypts the airship by using the symmetric secret key. If r is received, sending the next instruction within the time T; if wrong is received, the last instruction is retransmitted.
Claims (6)
1. A method for reliably controlling safe transmission of load instructions of an aircraft airship is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1: the invention relates to two participants of a load A and a commander B of an aircraft flight vehicle, wherein the commander B runs an identity-based key generation algorithm to generate a public key pair (pk, sk), a digital signature key pair (spk, ssk) and a symmetric encryption key k;
s2: updating the instruction packet by the load A of the aircraft airship according to the flight mission, and digitally signing by a signature private key of a commander B, wherein the two parties have the same time;
s3: command B issues command m within a certain time TiI denotes the ith command issued in sequence, m being paired with the encryption key skiAnd the time t of the current time1Carry out encryption C ═ Esk(mi PiPt1) And E represents encryption;
s4: a, after receiving the encrypted instruction C, uses the commanderDecrypting the public key pk to obtain the command miSequence number i and time t1. When the following four conditions are met simultaneously, A replies that the instruction r is received and the time t at the moment2And using symmetric encryption R ═ Ek(rPt2)，
(1) Receiving an instruction within time T;
(2) compare the instruction packet, when miConforming to the content of the instruction packet;
(3) when the sequence numbers i are arranged in sequence;
(4) when time t is1When correctness is satisfied.
Otherwise, replying error instruction wrong and time t at the time2And encrypting R ═ E with a symmetric keyk(wrongPt2) The instructions are detailed in Table 1,
TABLE 1 error feedback code representation
S5: and after receiving the reply of the airship load, the commander B decrypts the airship by using the symmetric secret key. If r is received, sending the next instruction within the time T; if wrong is received, the last instruction is retransmitted.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the commander B employs an identity-based cryptosystem, that is, the cryptographic key and the digital signature key of the commander are both related to the identity information of the commander, the identity information includes a user identification number, a mobile phone number, a mailbox, an address, biometric information (fingerprint, iris) and the like, and a symmetric cryptosystem is employed.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the blimp load A updates the command packet based on the mission and is digitally signed with the private signature key of the commander B, both parties being time-aligned, the digital signature being used to ensure that the flight command cannot be destroyed, the time-aligned ensuring the immediacy of the flight command.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein commander B encrypts commands, command order and issued command time with an identity-based password for airship load judgment command correctness.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the airship load A decrypts the received commands, obtains the commands, the command sequence and the command issuing time, verifies the correctness of the commands, and replies by using a symmetric cipher if the airship load A does not receive the commands within the time T.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein commander B confirms whether the instruction is safely delivered and determines the next action for the received reply of a.
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| CN202010659003.1A CN111970238B (en) | 2020-07-09 | 2020-07-09 | Reliable method for controlling safe transmission of near space airship load instruction |
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