CN111884759A - Channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission - Google Patents

Channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission Download PDF

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CN111884759A
CN111884759A CN202010652691.9A CN202010652691A CN111884759A CN 111884759 A CN111884759 A CN 111884759A CN 202010652691 A CN202010652691 A CN 202010652691A CN 111884759 A CN111884759 A CN 111884759A
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code
check matrix
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joint
relay
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杜清河
刘毓
黄黎伟
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Xian Jiaotong University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
    • H04L1/004—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using forward error control
    • H04L1/0056—Systems characterized by the type of code used
    • H04L1/0061—Error detection codes
    • H04L1/0063—Single parity check

Abstract

The invention discloses a channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission, which comprises the following steps: 1) the source node S passes the original information sequence through a dimension M(1)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(1)Then the obtained systematic code is transmitted to code word c(1)Modulating and transmitting to a relay node R; 2) the relay node R decodes the received data to obtain an information sequence, and then the information sequence is processed by a dimension M(2)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(2)Then transmitting the systematic code to the code word c(2)Modulating and transmitting to a destination node D; 3) the destination node D carries out decoding solution according to the received information and the codebook used for transmission so as to recover the original information sequence.

Description

Channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and relates to a channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission.
Background
In a wireless communication system, due to the power limitation of a transmitting end or the long distance between a source node and a destination node, information cannot be directly transmitted between the source node and the destination node. Therefore, when the direct transmission condition of the information between the source node and the destination node is unavailable, the information can be transmitted by means of the relay forwarding technology. And the relay node processes the received information sent by the information source node and then forwards the information to the destination node.
In the relay decoding forwarding communication system, the security of information transmission is also worth considering. At present, in a relay transmission system, a common anti-eavesdropping means is an artificial noise and beam forming technology, and no related safe coding system exists. Assuming that a legal link has the advantage of channel quality, in one-hop transmission, according to an information theory, information which has a certain rate and can not be stolen by an eavesdropping user can be transmitted. However, with respect to multi-hop transmission, an eavesdropper can obtain a 3dB gain after combining the signals overheard by two hops according to the maximum ratio. Since the legal link uses Decode-and-Forward (DF), the final intended receiver can objectively Decode only according to the second hop signal. At this point, the advantage of the legitimate link over the eavesdropping link is completely flattened, and a security rate of 0 can be obtained.
If the legal user adopts an ideal and two independent codebooks to carry out two-hop transmission, each hop can safely transmit information with a certain rate. Thus, eventually, the entire relay transmission system can also obtain a secure rate > 0. Therefore, we propose a coding strategy that enables effective suppression of the eavesdropper joint eavesdropping capability.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art and provides a channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission, which can effectively improve the security of information transmission.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission of the invention comprises the following steps:
1) the source node S will send the original information sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000021
By one dimension being M(1)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(1)Then the obtained systematic code is transmitted to code word c(1)Modulating and transmitting to a relay node R;
2) the relay node R decodes the received data to obtain an original information sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000022
Then the original information sequence is processed
Figure BDA0002575573730000023
By one dimension being M(2)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(2)Then transmitting the systematic code to the code word c(2)Modulating and transmitting to a destination node D;
3) the destination node D carries out decoding solution according to the received information and the codebook used for transmission so as to recover the original information sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000024
In the step 1), the step (A) is carried out,
M(1)x N check matrix H(1)The block form of (1) is:
Figure BDA0002575573730000025
check matrix H(1)Corresponding generator matrix G(1)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000026
systematic code transmission code word c(1)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000031
wherein p is(1)Is the check bit of the codeword.
In the step 2), the step (c) is carried out,
M(2)x N check matrix H(2)The block form of (1) is:
Figure BDA0002575573730000032
check matrixH(2)Corresponding generator matrix G(2)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000033
systematic code transmission code word c(2)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000034
wherein p is(2)Transmitting code words c for systematic codes(2)The parity bits of (1).
The LDPC code used in the step 1) is a system code, and the source node S transmits a check matrix H of the LDPC code used by the relay node R(1)The first K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the information bits, and the last N-K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the check bits.
The LDPC code used in the step 2) is a system code, and the relay node R forwards the LDPC code check matrix H used by the destination node D(2)The first K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the information bits, and the last N-K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the check bits.
When the destination node D only receives the forwarding information y of the relay node RDThen, decoding is carried out by using the LDPC code book H used by the relay node R to recover the original information sequence d ═ (d ═ d)1,d2,…,dk)T；
When the receiver receives the information sent by the source node S
Figure BDA0002575573730000041
Receiving the forwarding information of the relay node R at the same time
Figure BDA0002575573730000042
Then, M used by two hops is utilized(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)Decoding is carried out by means of joint decoding to recover the original information sequence d ═ (d ═ d)1,d2,…,dk)T。
When M is(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)And when the two signals are different, a coupling splicing scheme is adopted, and the receiver adopts a direct method of directly decoding the equivalent check matrix and an iterative method based on a combined Tanner graph to decode.
When M is(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)And if the two signals are the same, adopting a coupling insertion scheme, and decoding by a receiver in a joint Tanner graph mode.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
the channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission reduces the eavesdropping performance of an eavesdropping end by performing related design on a coding scheme during information transmission during specific operation, and then improves the security of information transmission(1)Coding LDPC code of XN check matrix with relay node dimension of M(2)The LDPC code of the XN check matrix is coded, the target node D carries out decoding solving according to the received information and the codebook used for transmission, and the method is different from the traditional safety strategy based on artificial noise beam forming.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system model of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a joint Tanner graph under a coupled splicing scheme;
FIG. 3 is a graph of the joint Tanner under the coupled insertion scheme;
FIG. 4 is a graph comparing the performance of two decoding algorithms under a coupled concatenation scheme;
FIG. 5 is a graph comparing the performance of a coupled tiling scheme with a conventional scheme;
fig. 6 is a graph comparing the performance of the coupling insertion scheme with the conventional scheme.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings:
referring to fig. 1, the channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission according to the present invention includes the following steps:
1) the source node S will send the original information sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000051
By one dimension being M(1)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(1)Then the obtained systematic code is transmitted to code word c(1)Modulating and transmitting to a relay node R;
the LDPC code used in the step 1) is a system code, and the source node S transmits a check matrix H of the LDPC code used by the relay node R(1)The first K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the information bits, and the last N-K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the check bits.
M(1)X N check matrix H(1)The block form of (1) is:
Figure BDA0002575573730000052
check matrix H(1)Corresponding generator matrix G(1)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000053
systematic code transmission code word c(1)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000054
wherein p is(1)Is the check bit of the codeword.
2) The relay node R decodes the received data to obtain an original information sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000061
Then the original information sequence is processed
Figure BDA0002575573730000068
Through a dimension ofM(2)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(2)Then transmitting the systematic code to the code word c(2)Modulating and transmitting to a destination node D;
the LDPC code used in the step 2) is a system code, and the relay node R forwards the LDPC code check matrix H used by the destination node D(2)The first K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the information bits, and the last N-K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the check bits.
M(2)X N check matrix H(2)The block form of (1) is:
Figure BDA0002575573730000062
check matrix H(2)Corresponding generator matrix G(2)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000063
systematic code transmission code word c(2)Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002575573730000064
wherein p is(2)Transmitting code words c for systematic codes(2)The parity bits of (1).
3) The destination node D carries out decoding solution according to the received information and the codebook used for transmission so as to recover the original information sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000065
When the receiver only receives the forwarding information y of the relay node RDThen, decoding is carried out by using the LDPC code book H used by the relay node R to recover the original information sequence d ═ (d ═ d)1,d2,…,dk)T(ii) a When the receiver receives the information sent by the source node S
Figure BDA0002575573730000066
Receiving the forwarding information of the relay node R at the same time
Figure BDA0002575573730000067
Then, M used by two hops is utilized(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)Decoding is carried out by means of joint decoding to recover the original information sequence d ═ (d ═ d)1,d2,…,dk)T。
When M is(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)And when the two signals are different, a coupling splicing scheme is adopted, and the receiver adopts a direct method of directly decoding the equivalent check matrix and an iterative method based on a combined Tanner graph to decode.
The coupling splicing scheme has the following characteristics:
check matrix H for LDPC code transmitted by source node S to relay node R(1)And the relay node R forwards the check matrix H of the LDPC code used by the destination node D(2)Constructing an equivalent check matrix
Figure BDA0002575573730000071
Splicing the front K columns on the corresponding information bits of the two codebooks according to columns, splicing the opposite angles of the N-K columns on the corresponding check bits, wherein the dimension is (M)(1)+M(2)) X (2N-K), and a codeword sequence in which two-hop codewords are rearranged
Figure BDA0002575573730000072
Satisfies the check variance
Figure BDA0002575573730000073
Meanwhile, the equivalent check matrix is the split joint of the two codebooks, so that the sparse characteristic is still achieved.
Check matrix H for LDPC code transmitted by source node S to relay node R(1)Correction of LDPC code forwarded to destination node D for use with relay node RExperiment matrix H(2)Middle and block matrix lambda(1)、Λ(2)Has no ring structure in itself, and has no ring structure for matrix Λ(1)And Λ(2)Matrix formed by splicing
Figure BDA0002575573730000074
The number of 1's existing at the same position between two columns is greater than 1, i.e. according to the matrix
Figure BDA0002575573730000075
The decoding performance of the LDPC code is seriously influenced by a large number of 4 loops generated in a corresponding Tanner graph.
When M is(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)And if so, adopting a coupling insertion scheme, and decoding the destination node D in a mode of combining the Tanner graph.
The coupling insertion scheme has the following features:
a) check matrix H for LDPC code transmitted by source node S to relay node R(1)And the relay node R forwards the check matrix H of the LDPC code used by the destination node D(2)The two codebooks are the same and are denoted as H ═ H(1)＝H(2)；
b) The relay node R can correctly receive the information transmitted by the source node S
Figure BDA0002575573730000081
At relay node R for information
Figure BDA0002575573730000082
When forwarding, a coupling insertion matrix M is adopted to map the information sequence into another group of information sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000083
The information bit transmitted by the second hop meets the information sequence of the first hop
Figure BDA0002575573730000084
The coupling insertion matrix M is a full rank square matrix with dimension K × K and inverse matrix M-1。
The direct method comprises the following specific processes:
the first step is as follows: receiving information c for two hops(1)＝dG(1)＝[d p(1)]1×N、c(2)＝dG(2)＝[d p(2)]1×NThe information bits are combined in maximum ratio, the check bits are arranged in sequence to obtain a new equivalent receiving sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000085
The second step is that: using equivalent check matrices
Figure BDA0002575573730000086
Equivalent receiving sequence
Figure BDA0002575573730000087
Performing a conventional BP algorithm, decoding to recover private data d ═ d1,d2,…,dk)T。
The specific process of the iterative method is as follows:
the iterative method is a BP decoding algorithm based on a joint Tanner graph. Because the two-hop transmission adopts the systematic code, the information bit sequences of the two-hop code words have the same value, and the mutual transmission of information can be carried out when a BP algorithm is used. When the BP algorithm is used by two codebooks, the information value L transferred to the ith check node by the j Variable Nodes (VN) positioned on the information bits is calculatedj→iWhen the code is in use, extra information value obtained from another code book needs to be added; similarly, when updating the LLR value of the jth variable node, an additional information value obtained from another codebook needs to be added. The extra information value is all check information values obtained by information bit variable nodes on the same bit of another codebook.
For codebook 1, soft information for decision
Figure BDA0002575573730000091
The following steps are changed:
Figure BDA0002575573730000092
H(1)information value L transmitted from information bit jth variable node VN to ith check node in Tanner graphj→iThe following steps are changed:
Figure BDA0002575573730000093
the coupled splicing scheme and BP algorithm based on the Tanner graph are shown in Table 1:
TABLE 1
Figure BDA0002575573730000094
Figure BDA0002575573730000101
Figure BDA0002575573730000111
And an insertion scheme, namely a BP decoding algorithm based on a joint Tanner graph can be used. Because the same codebook is adopted for the two-hop transmission, the information bit sequence of the two-hop codeword satisfies the following conditions:
Figure BDA0002575573730000112
when the BP algorithm is used, mutual transmission of information can be performed. When the BP algorithm is used by two codebooks, the information value L transferred to the ith check node by the j Variable Nodes (VN) positioned on the information bits is calculatedj→iWhen the code is in use, extra information value obtained from another code book needs to be added; similarly, when updating the LLR value of the jth variable node, an additional information value obtained from another codebook needs to be added. The extra information value is a signal on the same bit of another codebookAnd (4) storing all check information values obtained by the bit variable nodes.
Codebook H(1)To H(2)The additional information value of the jth variable node of (1) is:
Figure BDA0002575573730000113
where N (j) is the set of positions of row vector 1 of j-th row in the coupling insertion matrix M,
Figure BDA0002575573730000114
is a check matrix H(1)The LLR value of the last iteration of the jth variable node in (j).
For codebook H(2)In other words, soft information for decision
Figure BDA0002575573730000115
The following steps are changed:
Figure BDA0002575573730000121
H(2)information value L transmitted from information bit jth variable node VN to ith check node in codebook Tanner graphj→iThe following steps are changed:
Figure BDA0002575573730000122
the coupled insertion scheme joint BP algorithm based on the Tanner graph is shown in table 2:
TABLE 2
Figure BDA0002575573730000123
Figure BDA0002575573730000131
Figure BDA0002575573730000141
Simulation experiment:
the maximum iteration times of the BP algorithm are 20 times by adopting the LDPC code with the information sequence length of 504, the code word length of 1008 and the code rate of 1/2. The legal receiving end can only receive the relay forwarding information and the channel gain h of the legal link RD1 is ═ 1; the eavesdropping end eavesdrops the source node S and the relay node R at the same time, and eavesdrops the channel gain h of the linkSE＝hREAnd (5) selecting BPSK as the modulation mode 0.707.
Fig. 4 shows the variation curve of the bit error rate with the signal-to-noise ratio of the two decoding algorithms under the coupled splicing scheme, so that it can be seen that the two decoding algorithms have the same decoding performance.
Fig. 5 shows a performance comparison diagram of the coupling splicing scheme and the conventional scheme, and for a relay transmission system in which two-hop transmission uses different codebooks, the wiretapping end can reduce the decoding performance difference with the legal receiving end by constructing an equivalent check matrix, and in this experiment, for the same error rate, the legal receiving end and the wiretapping end have only a 0.2dB decoding performance difference under the conventional scheme. Through the coupling splicing design, the equivalent check matrix of the wireless sensor network has an annular structure, the decoding performance of an eavesdropping end can be inhibited, and under the coupling splicing scheme, the decoding performance difference of the eavesdropping end compared with a legal receiving end is enlarged to 0.3dB under the same error rate.
Fig. 6 is a performance comparison diagram of the coupling insertion scheme and the conventional scheme, and for a relay transmission system in which two-hop transmission uses the same codebook, the eavesdropping terminal can obtain a better signal-to-noise ratio condition in a maximum ratio combining manner, so as to obtain the best eavesdropping performance. In the experiment, for the same error rate, the decoding performance of the legal receiving end and the eavesdropping end under the traditional scheme is very close. Through the coupling insertion design, the information sequence is mapped into another group of information sequences, the interception end can be effectively inhibited from carrying out combined interception by using a maximum ratio combination mode, and the optimal decoding performance can be obtained only by adopting a mode based on a combined Tanner graph. Nevertheless, under the coupling insertion scheme, for the same error rate, the wiretapping end and the legal receiving end have about 2dB of decoding performance difference, and the safe transmission of the information can be effectively ensured.

Claims (8)

1. A channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) the source node S will send the original information sequence
Figure FDA0002575573720000011
By one dimension being M(1)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(1)Then the obtained systematic code is transmitted to code word c(1)Modulating and transmitting to a relay node R;
2) the relay node R decodes the received data to obtain an original information sequence
Figure FDA0002575573720000012
Then the information sequence is processed
Figure FDA0002575573720000013
By one dimension being M(2)Coding the LDPC code of the XN check matrix to obtain the system code transmission code word c with the length of N(2)Then transmitting the systematic code to the code word c(2)Modulating and transmitting to a destination node D;
3) the destination node D carries out decoding solution according to the received information and the codebook used for transmission so as to recover the original information sequence
Figure FDA0002575573720000014
2. The channel security coding method for joint eavesdropping resistance in relay transmission according to claim 1, wherein in step 1),
M(1)x N check matrix H(1)The block form of (1) is:
Figure FDA0002575573720000015
check matrix H(1)Corresponding generator matrix G(1)Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002575573720000016
systematic code transmission code word c(1)Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002575573720000017
wherein p is(1)Is the check bit of the codeword.
3. The channel security coding method for joint eavesdropping resistance in relay transmission according to claim 1, wherein in step 2),
M(2)x N check matrix H(2)The block form of (1) is:
Figure FDA0002575573720000021
check matrix H(2)Corresponding generator matrix G(2)Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002575573720000022
systematic code transmission code word c(2)Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002575573720000023
wherein p is(2)Transmitting code words c for systematic codes(2)The parity bits of (1).
4. The method for channel security coding against joint eavesdropping in relay transmission according to claim 1, wherein the LDPC code used in step 1) is a systematic code, and the L used by the source node S to transmit to the relay node R is transmitted by the source node SCheck matrix H of DPC code(1)The first K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the information bits, and the last N-K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the check bits.
5. The method for channel security coding against joint eavesdropping in relay transmission according to claim 1, wherein the LDPC code used in step 2) is a systematic code, and the relay node R forwards to the LDPC code check matrix H used by the destination node D(2)The first K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the information bits, and the last N-K columns correspond to the bit sequence on the check bits.
6. The channel security coding method for joint eavesdropping resistance in relay transmission according to claim 1, wherein when the destination node D receives only the forwarding information y of the relay node RDThen, decoding is carried out by using the LDPC code book H used by the relay node R to recover the original information sequence d ═ (d ═ d)1,d2,…,dk)T；
When the receiver receives the information sent by the source node S
Figure FDA0002575573720000024
Receiving the forwarding information of the relay node R at the same time
Figure FDA0002575573720000031
Then, M used by two hops is utilized(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)Decoding is carried out by means of joint decoding to recover the original information sequence d ═ (d ═ d)1,d2,…,dk)T。
7. The channel security coding method for joint eavesdropping resistance in relay transmission according to claim 1, wherein M is the number of bits M(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)When the two codes are different, a coupling splicing scheme is adopted, and a receiver adopts a direct method of directly decoding by using an equivalent check matrix and a joint Ta-based methodThe iterative method of the nner diagram is used for decoding.
8. The channel security coding method for joint eavesdropping resistance in relay transmission according to claim 1, wherein M is the number of bits M(1)X N check matrix H(1)And M(2)X N check matrix H(2)And if the two signals are the same, adopting a coupling insertion scheme, and decoding by a receiver in a joint Tanner graph mode.
CN202010652691.9A 2020-07-08 2020-07-08 Channel security coding method for resisting joint eavesdropping in relay transmission Pending CN111884759A (en)

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